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Chapter On~ 
What is Religion? 
Initial Definition of Terms. 
To give a reasoned account of religion it is appropriate to begin with certain 
1 ntroductory verbal clarifications. The groups of terms which are most relevant 
initially to our discussion are: 
11E.xperience 11 , 11 Fact 11 , and 11Value 11 • 
11Religi on 11 and 11 Religious Experience". 
11 Science 11 and II Phi losophytt. 
"Philosophy of Religion", 11Theology11 , 11 Faith 11 , 
11 Reason11 , 11Truth11 , and 11 Reli gi ous Truthn. 
How may we provisionally define these terms in order to use them hereafter as tools 
)f discussion? We consider the first ten of these words in the present chapter, and 
the last three in Chapter Two. At the outset we would do well to consider Brightman 1 s 
def nition of definition: 
11 Before definitions are proposed, it should be made clear 
that all definitions are attempts to describe or point out 
fundamental facts of experience or fundamental theoretical 
concepts. They are therefore to be regarded as hypotheses 
subject to correction ••• Definitions are not dogmas or 
embalmed truths. They are guides to investigation. 11~~ 
Experience. It is often said that experience is the way to truth and that 
experience must be of fact. But like most of the terms we encounter in a discuss; 01. 
such as this the words experience and fact as commonly used have several meanings, 
which we are obliged to distinguish, .if we are to proceed with clarity and order. 
Sxtreme empiricism limits the word 11experience 11 to the most. rudimentary physical 
·~ E.dc,J.r Sheffield Brightman: A Philosophy of Religion. Prentice-Hall, Inc., 
Ne~· York, 1940, p. 88. Used by permission of the publisher. 
2 
:. sense experiences -- immediate sight, hearing, taste, etc. But plainly tr.·2 
English wore!. experience has in common usage covered more than raw sensation. In 
addition to sensation, experience refers to types of happenings to persons other 
thun merely sensory in the above simplest way. It includes the world of inner 
subjective happenings -- our 11 feelings 11 of pleasure, pain, emotions, rational 
thoughts, and awareness of values. We often use such expressions as 11 that dream 
was a terrible experience last night 11 or 11 our climb up the Middle Sister yesterday 
was a wonderful one 11 • The connotations of such uses of the term experience fa ... 
exceed its barest physical or sensate meaning. Brightman defined experience as 
11 811 that is at any time present in consciousness 11 (APR 3). Possibly '!:,he most 
inclusive definition would be to say: an experience is any event that modifies a 
ccnscious being consciously. This might be a flat, sensory event that puts us in 
tr;Jch with the objective world around us in some bare uninterpreted way. It could 
be a far reaching scientific analysis of the atomic nature of matter, which is ne•,er 
dLectly sensed. It could be an inner subjective event that acquaints us with ou:· 
own inner natures. It could be an event of the widest interchange of ourselves with 
the world which leaves us with a sense of moral or aesthetic value. 
The basic problem of science as well as philosophy and religion is to discovE'r 
1,::;"'~y,,-::riences that are recurring, common, or universal with men; so that we may com: 
\o distinguish between "objective experience 11 and experiences which are mereJ.y 
subjective features of emotions or imagination. Presently we will consider the te::cs 
of such objective experiences or 11 truths". 
Reflecting the classic distinct ion of Immanuel Kant, but by no means implyinu 
itn r unbridgeable gulf or irreconcilable conflict between the two, it is helpful for 
pu1~voses of analysis to distinguish between: (1) Scientific experience and (2) Ext .a-
scientific experience. 
"By scientific experience", Brightman writes, 11 is meant 
experience as described and explained by the sciences ••• 
lt is necessary, however, for any philosophical investigation 
to include in its data nonscientific experience. By non-
scientific experience is meant neither'unscientific exper-
ience nor poor science, but rather all human experience which 
is not science. It includes all of our actual everyday 
consciousness, all our sense experiences, our feelings and 
desires, our imaginations and many of our beliefs; it includes 
all of our thoughts, with the exception of those which arise 
in the course of scientific investigation (APR 9). 
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Scientific experience commonly means our cognitive or descriptive experience of 
t1£ world. In order to satisfy our first elementary level or curiosity, we are 
":,:::',, ·,'atetl by the desire to know~ is before us,-· and possibly~ the object beforz 
·,,;:; may work or the event take place or come to be. Thus we may say that the Middle 
Sister is now looming above us: it is composed of a reddish rock and soil, is 
in.ri.abited by several species of large black ants, and stands some 1100 feet high 
above sea level. We may also ask how it got there and plunge as deeply as we may 
in'c.r:) the descriptions of historical or formative geology. Accordingly, thus far we 
are thinking in terms of two classic objective sciences -- geology and biology. But. 
c: ,is kind of experience does not exhaust our experience of the Niddle Sister. 
There is extra-scientific experience, which concerns values. This order of 
c: :,J<"'"ience arises in our deeper curiousity about why there is the event and issues 
ri k.owledge of some purposive meaning, use, or "good", practical:, aesthetic, or 
ethical that the object or event may have. Ps commonly phrased, the world seems to 
be '::':-1e of 11 fact u and "value 11 • ~The word 11fact 11 is used for the moment in the limited 
sense of an object of descriptive science apart from its factors of value). 
Accordingly, we may say that the Middle Sister is beautiful in the pink glow of the 
ea1'ly morning sun, or that its watershed constitutes' a primary source of wate:c fox: 
the inhabitants of the upper Willamette Valley ( a statement of value as well .as 
fact), or that it is a desirable recreation and climbing area. In sum thus far we 
have indicated: -
scientific experience: 
and 
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which is factual, descriptive, "cognitive" --
gives the 11what0 and/or the 11 how 11 of a thing or process~ 
extra-scientific experience: which is "evaluative 11 -- concerns the "why" and 
the "wherefore 0, th~ purpose, use or "good" of a thing 
or process, its value meaning, or meanings. 
Descriptive scientific experience is at the center of a wider range of value 
experience, to which we may now well give the over-all classic name "moral expe.i.:ienr,e 11 • 
("1111oral 11 is here used to indicate the entire realm of value): 
Moral Experience 
the realm of valuation 
the full world of moral 
awareness and value reality. 
Scientific Experience 
the realm of cognition, of 
descriptive fact apart from 
·value 
We shall see how religion arises in extra-scientific or full moral experience. 
'.":li :ji on is concern about values. 
We should emphasize that the above analysis does not imply, any more than Kant 
him:'~lf did, a rigid division between the two realms of experience. To make such 8. 
dis·:~inction for practical purposes, however, does help us to begin our study of 
reFgion. The realm of value and the realm of science are, of course, not inco1,'.l.t11er,-
surate orders of experience. Our ultimate purpose is to suggest an inclusive -::~f';_, 
ition of experience. The following points indicate some fundamental relations 
tween scientific and extra-scientific experience: 
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(1) Interest in values frequently precedes,and is the motivating force behind) 
discovery of scientific fact -- the why sometimes, and perhaps typically, comes firs·~, 
and issues in the what and the how. Edison's discovery of the electric light illus-
trates how a sense of value, the need for such a light, produces the scientific 
article. Conversely we must acknowledge the reverse process, that descriptive or 
scientific information or experience frequently suggests use, purpose, or value. 
Watt's observation of steam pressure in his famous tea kettle suggested its use in 
powering machinery. Psychologically speaking, awareness of scientific information 
and awa:reness of value often go together, no doubt because the scientific thinker is 
also a personal being inevitably interested in value. 
(2) The implication of what has just been said may be taken deeper, by pointing 
out that the rules of logic or right reasoning apply to both realms of knowledge, to 
·,oth facts and values. An inclusive rational perspective, which brings into focus 
and <e;:xplains · the psychological. connect ion above mentioned, or, in slightly other 
terms, the same coherent rea.son often perceives fact and value in one synoptic grasp 
0f insight. The fact of atomic energy and how to release it, when once known, en-
lat'Q';;S immediately into the idea of a number of possible uses, evil and good, to 
·,'lich it may be put. Scientific information and facts are hardly, if ever, still-
)orn, without the ·life of value or potential value pulsing in them. This is probabl:r 
~rue because knowledge itself is a value. There is joy and satisfaction in the 
Jiscovery of truth at whatever level or range. This is what Tycho meant, after his 
uiscovery of the elliptical nature of the planetary orbits, when he exclaimed that 
he was thinking God 1 s thoughts after him. Knowledge and truth are values becaus8 tr•w 
~re the living content of consciousness, which knows itself to be an instrinsic an0 
possibly a supreme value. This statement discloses a third point .. 
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(3) A primary way to see relationship between the two realms of scientifi,-
fact o.nd value, is to recognize that high in the order of cosmic process and fact 
-~here stands our own biological and psychological or self:..conscious beings, which 
contribute value to, or discover it in, the world, making valuation a distinctive and 
real part of the higher levels of interaction and process. If men are the project-.:ts 
of value upon the world, or the perceivers of value in the world, or the creators of 
value from more elementary interacting process of the world, we ourselves are part of 
the world process; valuation, then, as our most distinctive activity is a part of 
the total process. of the objective, scientific world. 
So much, then, for a preliminary consideration of the meaning of Hexperience 11 
in its various ranges. We have yet to define, somewhat more precisely than we have 
thus far implied, two further terms, 11 fact 11 and 11value 11 , prior to coming to 11 religion11 • 
Fact. What has just been said about experience may be transposed to apply to 
fact. Most simply we often think of the word 11 fact 11 as applying to some object or 
process that is directly or sentiently known or observed. But the meaning of "fact" 
is, of course, wider than this. We frequently speak of such things as "atoms" as 
11 /c:.:.:!ts" or the second law of thermodynamics (the law of entropy), but neither of 
:,1e~,8 are directly known through immediate sensory observation. Furthermore, the 
:"'eaL1 of fact must include the factors of subjective, psychological or personal life 
as well as those of external., non-personal event. My imaginary vision of a·blue 
ros8 is a fact, a personal psychological fact, though it may not be an objective 
fact anywhere in nature's kingdom of flowers. The 11blue rose 11 , however., is an 
experience within the larger fact of conscious process or imagination itself, whicL 
is just as much a real fact of our world as nature 1 s flowers are -- though a diffc znt 
order of fact. If religion deals with the interior realm of values and the dimensi. on 
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of personal consciousness that discerns values, religion belongs to the realm of facJ:. 
as now inclusively defined. Moreover, as we may begin to discern an objective :.-eaJ c· 
~.ty in or behind the universe, with the qualities of intelligence and love, to which 
we may assign the traditional -name God, then religion which stands for awareness of, 
and devotion to God, wovld be factual in the most objective and cosmic sense, as 1,;e::ll 
as factual in the inner psychological sense described above. Eventually we wi 1.1 
consider the possibility of religion as fact in this widest meaning. 
Value. Up to this point we have employed the term value, but must now define 
it somewhat more carefully. It is not our intention in this introductory chapter to 
enter upon a full or exhaustive philosophy of value. Whether values are entirely 
subjective, totally objective, or paritally subjective and objective, as resultant 
2r.isrgents of interactive processes; whether they are 11 absolute 11 or 11 :relative"; 
whether they are products of merely finite, human psychological process, or in some 
widsr and deeper way primordially cosmic and universally objective i.n a trans-human 
divine sustainer of values -- to indicate some .. answers to these questions in terms 
of major theories of value, -- is rather the problem of our study as a ·whole. In. 
any case, an initial, working definition must start with the conscious subject. 
On Defining 11Value 11 
We previously said that an experience is any event which modifies a conscious 
being consciously. A value is a conscious being's feeling of joy, approval, or 
satisfaction regarding something of which he is consciously aware or experiences; 
or, a value as an experience which modifies a conscious being in a direction of joy 
approval, or satisfaction. An experience of value carries a conscious being f~om a 
sense of lack or need to a sense of fulfillment and completion, according to hi,::; 
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rLature or the possibilities of his nature. Implied in value experience are the 
relations that tie a conscious being to his world. Accordingly, values are the 
c,:ua1ities of the relations of individuals and things. This would include values at 
all ranges of quality from physical properties and experiences to intellectual, 
moral, and aesthetic properties and qualities and the possibility of quality. Val·Jzs 
are the actualized ideas of good, or the realized descriptions of good for individ-
uals and the relationships between individuals that best maintain and enhance them. 
This concept of value would include John Dewey's important distinction between 
mer:v subjective enjoyment and true value a.s enjoyment understood in its relations, 
"in its connections and interactions 11 and consequences (The Quest for Certainty, 
Capricorn Books, Putnam's Sons, N.Y .. 1960, p. 260). 
Though we sometimes speak of physical objects as having 11values" of their own, 
we should really say that they have 11properties 11 or 11 quali ties" of color, shape, etc., 
leaving the word 11 value 11 for reference to the conscious experience of living beings,--
only living beings can experience or have 11value 11 • 
The origin of value lies in consciousness, and as we mentioned above, consciou 0;-
:"less has a sense of its own intrinsic value. Consciousness is a mode of energy, and 
among all observable energies, it believes itself to be the most potent and wondrou " 
All conscious beings share this first primary sense of value of conscious awareno,ss 
itself, and in sharing a value that is the same for all share something universaL 
We have the feeling that if we permit consciousness to search its own nature, we may 
discover other realms of value, perhaps all value, or at least sir;nificant aVeI)ues 
pf experience· that may lead us to. value. Consciousness is the father of primary 
values that gives all other values possibility and life. As the structure of 
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consciousness begins to be disclosed, a realm of values, common for all personal 
conscious beings, relative to their health and joy is disclosed. For example the 
central function of consciousness is to think, and to think logically and well, or 
truly. Accordingly in this realization we have all the values of knowledge, scien-
tific procedure and truth coming to light. Further, a conscious life cannot fulfill 
its own deepest meaning and potentiality of being$apart from the recognition of 
other conscious life as existing too, and as desiring fulfillment and completion 
of being. Were there actually only one conscious life in existence, it would long 
for another such life as itself to love, with which it might, have fellowship. Thus 
consciousness points to the whole realm of ethical values, the prime one of which 
is the value of love. One further example of consciousness as an origin of value 
lies in sense values. They arise in the intercourse of conscious life with physir::al 
nature, and closely related to our sense values are the aesthetic values of beauty. 
Moreover, the sameness of most sense values, and many beauty values, and therefore 
a further idea of a universal quality in values, inheres in value experience at the 
s~asory and aesthetic levels. We all more or less experience the same 11 bluen of the 
sky, the same 11 scent 11 of the rose, the same 1t song1t of the bi rd, and most of us stanr1 
1 n awe at the loveliness of Mt. Hood in tn.e sunrise. 
To summarize thus far, we have noted that main types of values, knowledge valu~, 
ethical value, sensory and aesthetic value seem inherent to the structure and nature 
of the higher consciousness of our human kind. Furthermore, such values seem 
11 objecti ve II or 11 uni versal 11 to the extent that all such consciousness cha.racteri stically 
or normally feels the need for these values, and strives to experience them. As 
food is to the bodies of men such values are the sustenance of the minds 'and 
emotions of men. 
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Commonly religion or religious value has meant that a conscious being in some 
most important or quintessential way is carried from a sense of lack or need to a 
.sense of fulfillme.nt and completion. We pass now to our main immediate task of a 
definition of religion. 
Religion: its universal form. We have said that religion has to do with value. 
We are ready now to define the word. religion, in its generalized meaning, as 
devotion to whatever is regarded as supreme .. in value. Let us illustrate from the 
history of religions various types of objects to which supreme value or meaning has 
been assigned. We shall then point up our definition more preci.esely by examining 
the term devotion, the emotional and psychological element in religion at the root of 
the ideas of supreme value. Ideas of supreme.value constitute the intellectual and 
philosophic apex of religion. 
In ancient Egypt the sun was worshipped as the supreme diety, Ra. It was con-
Jidered the object of supreme value in the world because so many essent ia.l things 
appzared to be derived from, or dependent upon it -- light, warmth, energy .. impartir>j 
~ourishment for crops. Without these things the dwellers of the Nile valley realized 
~hey could not survive. What could be more objective, mysterious, creative, or 
beautiful than the radiant orbe of the great sun? It seemed to be to the Egyptic1ns 
the central focus of the universe, the very source of life and-good, the father· of 
being, the all-seeing eye. How natural, then, from tl1e primitive standpoint, to 
worship the sun. The temples of the Egyptians and those of other sun cultures, for 
example the Inca civilization in South America, were often oriented to the movement 
of the solar disk, so that worship performed in the sanctuaries would center upon 
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the sun I s light as it poured into the colonnades and chambers. The temple to AI:1on-
Ra at Karnak in Egypt is the world's most notable example of such a sun temple. 
An analogy to the aesthetic side of Egyptian sun worship may be observed in 
modern forms of religious emotion that seem to rise no higher than worship or admir-· 
ation of beauty and artistic value, found either in the splendor of nature 1s beauty 
itself, or in the created arts of the human intellect.· Music, poetry, and sunset 
glory have been gods for us sometime. 
The ancient Canaanites, into whose land the Hebrews moved, after the liberation 
from Egypt, worshipped the forces of agricultural and animal fertility. The atteJit ion 
of these people focused on the mysterious and marvelous generative power in plants, 
cattle, and human beings as the source of life and sustenance; to them it·seemed 
to be that which was of universal importance. They believed that the gods of ferti 1-
ity, or the baals, should be worshipped in manners appropriate to their functions. 
Accordingly, the rites often centered in magical sexual ceremonies performed within 
the precincts of the high places o:c shrines. Human sacrifice in·the form of infant 
immolation to various baals was another way thought fitting to appease the gods of 
fertility. Practically speaking, the emphasis on sex in rite and ceremony constitu-
ted for these people a worship of sexual vitality itself. One of the great accomp--
lishments of the Hebrew prophets was to lift the civilization away from these crude 
forms of religious belief and worship. Aphrodite or Venus in ancient Greece and 
Rom('. was adored as the goddess of passion and love. In Inida the fertility theme 
has been prominent in some of the -phallac cults of Shakti, consort of Shiva and 
goddess of generative or sex-energy. 
Not only in ancient times or in primitive areas, but in the sophisticated socic::ty 
of our own time and place passion is sometimes elevated to place of supreme value, 
and, practically speaking, constitutes deity. 
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With the primitive Arunta of Australia religion and rite center in the appease-
ment of the spirits of the Kangaroo species who are responsible for keeping the 
species fertile. The reason for this form of totemic cult is that this animal con-
stitutes the main food supply for these people. Their survival seems absolutely 
dependent upon the survival of the Kangaroo. In a manner of speaking, the Kangaroo 
spirit has become the object of supreme value to the Arunta and represents the divine 
for them. Thus accompanying the fertility theme in religion is that of economic and 
material values, typified by food supply. 
In sophisticated society money has symbolized the supreme value of possessions. 
The true prophets of God in all societies have warned against the worship of 11Mammontt, 
that is to say, possessions, wealth, and material success. This is the kind of 
idolatry into which a competitive, commercial and industrial civilization like our 
own is prone to fall. 
What has been said of the Egyptian Ra, or the fertility Baals, or the Arunta 
It:ti1garoo spirits is typical for all ancient or primitive polytheistic deities and 
idolatries. To the primitive mind, each god represents some seemingly indispensabJ?. 
function in nature, stands for some object or process that appears tb be of supreme 
,mlue. Many of the gods, of course, in polytheistic cultures stand for the terribfo 
or the evil side of nature and existence. Shiva in India, for example, represents 
in part such destructive processes as disease and calamity. Certain forms of 
wor~;hip associated particularly with his spouse Kali, the terrible, are designed to 
symbolize appeasement of the powers behind the.dis-values or the evil side of expe,~-
ience. The Zoroastrians believed that all evil was ultimately subsumed in one trans-
cendent Satanic Deity, Ahriman, the rival of Mazda, the supreme God of truth, justtce 
and the good.. In spite of this dualism of rivalry between the cosmic Spirit of EvU 
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and the cosmic Spirit of Good, Zoroastrianism ( in the modern world represented by th2 
Parsis of India) has been one of history's highest ethical religions, and is basic-
ally monotheistic. The ultimate triumph of J.Vlazda over Ahriman is believed to be 
certain. 
Bear in mind our initial, working definition of religion, as , devotion to 
whatever is regarded as supr.eme in value-. In our principal effort at present to 
define the universal characteristics of all religion, and religious emotion, we move 
to another high form. The supreme value for original Buddhism, and that which pre-
vails as the basic way of thought for the Hinayana group in Buddhism today, was the 
triumph over suffering and pain, and freedom from the desire and longing for indiv-
idualized or personalized existence as such, which, for 'Buddhist thought, constituted 
the locus of pain. Thus Buddhism exalted the idea of Nirvana, or the final 11 state" 
of release, where personality, the main factor of our painful finite human condition1 
· would be left behind. Buddhism elevated psychological knowledge as the instrument or 
way of such release. It believed that a true psychological theory would disclose 
the non-unity or non-existence of the individual soul. The meditative process, 
designed to bring this realization about, became itself central in the scheme of 
values. By the proper exercise of onw 1 s own resident psychological powers one could 
come to 11 understand 11 Nirvana, and by this form of intellectual identification, 
achieve release into it. Practically speaking in both Buddhism, and the main re lat c~d 
philosophic Hindu cults of Vedanta and Sankhya, the value of impersonality, or the 
impersonal, symbolized by Nirvana or Brahman, rather than the western value of 
personality, was made supreme • In these partially world-denying, life-denying, and 
pessimestic religious systems, 11 salvation11 was spelled out in terms of a denial of 
bodily and psychic individuality. 
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The above discussion of the psychologically oriented Buddhist faith, reminds u~ 
of the religious philosophies that have tended to put man himself as a whole, his 
so~iety and history, in some terms or other, in the place of supreme value. 
The critical naturalism of John Dewey, like that of the 19th century French 
posi ti vi st, August Comte, rested on the premise that man I s scientific thinking and 
the system of values that liberal critical intelligence can conceive, and make 
actual, in the real world of scientific, artistic and social, humanitarian achi.eve-
ment, represent the highest order of natural process. According to this system, 
human idealSin the best sense of western, liberal, democratic, humane values, are 
what is best, truest, and supreme) and are designated by Dewey as 11God11 , or ."the 
divine". Comte classically referred to humanity as itself II le grand 1 e~tre" the 
I 
great or divine being. The present-day Ethical Culture Society in J\.merica is a 
sectarian expression of this religious admiration of the scientific, artistic, 
ethical imagination of man himself as supreme. In this way of thought man I s abil-
ity to conceive and achieve values democracy, peace, love and good will -- is the 
supreme value and highest order of natural process. This type of· "scientific" or 
critical naturalism does not look beyond or above man, his society or history, for 
a trans-human source or sustainer of values. Somewhat more precisely, for Dewey 
God meant the ideal b,~ming actual. (In a later chapter we consider this system 
at considerable length.) 
A further illustration of supreme value, to which many men are responding 
with religious zeal and devotion, is found in another branch of the movement whici1 
considers finite humanity, or human society and history, as the supreme order of 
being, process, and value. The communist faith of Karl Marx and his Russian and 
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Chinese heirs :represents, in acute form, the elevation of 11 society11 to the place of 
God and supreme value. As a matter of fact, any totalitarian order does this. 
Totalitarian philosophy claims that all good comes from organized society, at the 
apex of which is the political state, ruled by a single dictator or a small oligarchyo 
The general truth th?t mar;i,. would perish without social organization; that he could 
not attain any high culture, if he did not have the permanent institutions and 
instruments of organized society, is made the only truth, and the supreme value, 
beneath which all other are sub summed, and from which they are derived. Official 
communism is atheistic and non-religious; yet actually, in psychological content, 
it is highly religious. We must term it, however, a secular religion, which emphasizes 
human effort alone, scientific achievement, and material progress as the ultimate 
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form of activity or natural process, and therefore the final locus of value in the 
world. Contemporary histor:r has shown that Communism is a possible universal form 
of religion. It is now contending with all other forms of historical religion for 
supremacy. The religious form of Communism psychologically is born out in those 
aspects of commun:st culture which strkingly resemble important phases of the trad-
itional religions. It is often pointed out that Communism has its infallible creed 
or dogma: namely its "dialectical materialism11 1 viz.its materialistic or economic 
way of interpreting human life and history, as centering in, and determined r.1.ninly 
½y, thehunger in our stomachs. It has a Bible or inerrant Scripture: Das Capital 
of Marx, the Old Testament of the cult; while the writings of Lenin have become its 
New Testament canon. It has had its prophets, Marx, Engles, and Lenin. Marx was a 
kind of original law giver for the system1 like Moses for the Judea-Christian religion; 
and, like Moses, Marx wanted to lead his children, the laboring masses of the world, 
out of the bondage of capitalist society and slavery. Until his dealth Joseph StaUn 
"?as Communism's high priest. Communism has its 11 eschatology11 or dogmatic view of the 
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outcome of future history in the concept of the necessary and inevitable proletarian 
revolution and ultimate communist or sovietized society, which will constitute the 
solution to the problem of evil. Traditional religious eschatologies have thought in 
terms of a final cosmic or world deliverance from all evil. Communism's church or 
community of the faithful is tts Party, - . :.ch in C, ... 1,.i.:,1L< C-OUJl~):·.:..c;; > c? :.. Y:rv c.lii.;c 
··~ '-' 
,,wmb el' ship ~ res ernb ling 
/ "closed communionl! The fanatical zeal of .many of its followers reveal(·· ~he absolute-
ness of its faith. For example, a young Chinese convert to Communis:, wrote his former 
Christian teacher, at a Christian.mission, in the following way: 
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••• I am no longer the former man you knew. Apart from my body 
which is the same, my whole mind and thought:have changed. I 
have become a new man ••• a loyal believer of Marx-Leninism ••• I 
shall never live for myself alone, but for the masses ••••• In 
this new teaching I have found unimagined blessing and happiness. 
I am very sorry that I must inform you that I no longer believe in God, 
nor worship him. I can no longer address you as a religious brother, 
but I send my revolutiJmary love. 11 (From D •. E. Trueblood, Christian 
Century Pulpit, Feb • .52). . 
The.Hebrews came to believe that the supreme values are really persons themselves~ 
whose inter-personal relations we call society. There is somethinQ in individuality 
or personality as such that suggested to them what is highest in 11meaning 11 or 11value'1, 
and also probably deepest in being. They recognized that persons, in behalf of whose 
w~llbeing society exists, are the superior order of reality and value., and that soc-
iety has no reality and being of its own outside human persons. Men are the locus of 
society. At the bottom of this scheme of evaluation, which gives to it its ultimate 
truth and power, the Hebrews believed they sensed a personal source of existence as 
such, or a trans-human, but personal Divine Reality. He is the fountain of the 
humane values considered necessary., if human life is to live. on the highest personal, 
political, and cultural plane. The personalization of Ultimate Reality was not new 
or unique with the Hebrews. There was the personality of diety in polytheism; and 
aspects of a high,personalistic and ethical monotheism are found in other religious 
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cultures, e.g. in Zoroastrianism and Islam specifically, in Platonism, and in certain 
tendencies in Hinduism, Buddhism, and Confucianism. The Hebrews, however, took 
personalism to its apex of thought in ancient times. 
We have now probably sufficiently illustrated various conceptions of supreme 
value -- the intellectual heart of religion. Let us summarize the meaning of 
religion in an over-all way that may bring out more fully its psychological in re-
lation to its intellectual side. Accordingly we return to the phrase 11 religious 
devotion" and find that it has a three-fold content: 
(1) Hocking defines 11 feeling 11 as 11 a n8Jlle for whatever in consciousness, deeper 
than explicit thought is able to give a bent to conduct 11 • (The Meaning of God in 
Human Experience, Yale, 1912, p. 33). Taking this definition of feeling, religion is 
wholehearted feeling for, and commitment to, some value considered as truly best, 
highest, worthiest, in contrast to all other values. Thus religion is a supreme 
emotional commitment at the range of deepest subjective feeling. Implicit, however, 
in this 11 emotional centeru of religion there is rational content; devotion itself 
has rational vision: for our intense feelings always desire to be justified by 
some ultimate 11 reason11 or 11 reasons 11 • 1/Je therefore pass to a higher level of meaning 
of devotion resident in the idea of a scheme of value as truly best. 
(2) Accordingly, religious devotion is belief -- belief in the accepted value 
as truly real and supreme in being, process, power, and reality, in comparison to 
all other processes, powers, or values. In the related terms of qrightman, to whose 
ana:Lysis we are greatly indebted, it is "devotion toward a power or powers believeu 
to originate, increase, and conserve 11 such value (APR 17). To this we would add 
that the value focused on in religion is regarded as the essential life and process 
itself of such power; in other words, the idea of the power cannot be separated from 
the idea of the value, as if the value were one thing and its source or cause another. 
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Values apart from their originating and sustaining powers or energies would be dis-
embodied and unreal ghosts. 
This stage of our definition of religion refers to its intellectual, or philo-
sophical content in the realm of ideas and theory (recall our many illustrations 
above) regarding the relation of some designated 11 supreme value 11 to primary or 
essential world process -- radiant solar energy, sexual vitality, release from pain 
and suffering, human history and social harmony,or personality itself. Religion in 
fullest sense implies that our supreme value is equivalent to the highest process 
or being that we can find, or assign to, the world as a whole. The third thing 
religious devotion means is: 
(3) Expression of this commitment and belief in private thought, or meditation, 
or in public worship; and in practical conduct or program, of some personal or social 
kind. In sum, religion is commitment, belief, and conduct; or feeling, ideas, and 
action. Let us now put out two terms together 
Religious experience. We may regard religion and religious experience as synon-
ymous expressions, and accordingly may summarize their meaning. When we discern or 
assign s·ome supreme value or meaning to the world and attempt to relate ourselves 
emotionally, intellectually, and actively or practically to it, we have 11 religious 
experience", or living faith. Religion or religious experience, as thus far defined 
in its general or universal, psychological form, does not mean, of course, that the 
Hebrew-Christian God has been found or is worshipped. As we have seen, there can be 
different ideas of supreme value to which devotion is rendered. Our task from here 
on is to attempt to isolate and describe some evaluation of our world which will in 
fact be the truest or highest system of value. If this is achieved in some measure, 
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and we commit ·ourselves to this system, then we shall stand on the threshold of 
11 having" true :religious experience.. Did the Hebrews think in highest and truest way 
about value when they found supreme value in personal life, and believed that the 
source of this value lay in a supreme Personal Life that could only be defined as 
Author of the world and as Saving Love? 
At this stage we may suggest a brief definition of salvation. Frequently 
highest in the conception of religious experience is the idea that the source of 
in ... 
value is itself active,and approaches the worshipper as a 11 reality11 that nccmes/to 
life 11 , to lift it and enrich it, in brief, to "save it 11 • Our understanding of 
salvation as a process will not be complete until we discuss at more length in later 
chapters th~ problem of evil in the world. 
Philosophy and Science. A good way to understand philosophic method is to com-
pare it with science. In order to do this we must first suggest the two meanings of 
philosophy that are in considerable conflict today. They are the newer analytical 
and positivistic type of philosophy and the more traditional, rationo.listic or meta-
physical type. Sometimes the difference is stated as a more 11 scientific 11 philosophy 
in contrast to a more "speculative" philosophy. This distinction is misleading, 
howe,,er, since it implies a certain bias on the part of the school that claims to 
have 11 scientifictt philosophy as to what constitutes 11 science 11 • It must be acknowledged; 
however, that it is a contrast between a secular type of philosophy and a more 
religious type. In any case, the two interpretations may be indicated as follows: 
(a) Philosophy as an analysis of language and logic.. This is the narrower 
view, the first view above mentioned. It believes that philosophy has primarily a 
limited but highly specialized role as the "science of sciences 11 • This means that 
philosophy's main task is to clarify logica.l method and apply it to the critical 
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analysis of language, particularly as it bears on the concepts and assumptions of the 
sciences. Philosophy may succeed in relating the va.rious technical sciences and thu.:.: 
organize and systematize all scientific knowledge. In this role philosophy tends to 
be ~quated with semantics, or the study of words and their meanings. In its worst 
light, philosophy, from once being the queen of the sciences, descends to becoming 
a sort of chamber maid to them. A br.onder, more fruitful, and also a more traditional 
view of philosophy follows: 
(b) Philosophy as a metaphysical interpretation of the world as a whole. 
This view believes that philosophy is inclusive synopsis in depth. It tries to under-
stand, in so far as humanly possible, the ultimate nature and meaning of the univers-z 
as a whole, the total setting for life, so that life's true meaning, values, and 
destiny may be understood. It attempts to integrate human knowledge in order to dis-
cover what is true. being, deepest process, highest purpose, and permanent value. 
While including the function of critical analysis above described as part of its dis-
cipline, philosophy's role as evaluation is stressed. In this view philosophy is 
systematic coherence (we discuss the coherence criterion of truth later on). Philos-
ophy retains its status ~s queen, or science of sciences, but in a more comprehensive 
sense than the positivistic understanding of science. 
According to the above second view there is a teal and valuable distinction 
between laboratory science and philosophy. They are not in conflict, but the former 
recognizes its uwn specialized function and scope, limited to analysis and quantitative 
techniques, and grants that the latter is legitimately concerned with wider meanings 
and values. It will be helpful to summarize what we have here said by contrasting 
/ 
science with philosophy in parallel columns, in a way similar to an excellent discus-
sion by Harold H. Titus (LIP p. llSf, Living Issues in Philosophy, 2nd Edition, 
American Book Company, 1953, P• llSf). 
Science 
The sciences deal with restricted, 
specialized fields; have been 
ctra:racteri stically delimited and 
exclusive of other phases of culture. 
Science is mainly descriptive; 
emphasizes analysis into parts and 
measurement by quantitative, math-
ematical standards, according to 
precise rules of observation and 
experiment; relies traditionally 
on sense experience as origin of 
knowledge; is extro;3pective. 
Method 
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Philosophy 
Philosophy attempts to understand all 
experience, is more comprehensive; 
tries to relate the discoveries of the 
specific sciences to religion, morals, 
and the arts. 
Philosophy is synoptic or synthetic, 
comprehending wholes in addition to 
parts; is prescriptive, qualitative, 
or evaluative in its approach rather 
than merely quantitative; relies 
characteristically on rational reflec-
tion, on the thinking process itself 
as a framer of knowledge; is intro-
spective. 
Aims and Results 
Science aims to understand the how or 
8ausal workings of nature on the 
physical plane for th{:;: prupose of 
predicting and controlling her pro-
cesses; drives for objectivity by 
attempting to ignore the personal 
factor and concerLs of value; inter-
8sted in the mechanics of process; 
yields the technical means of sur-
vival for the good life. 
Philosophy aims to understand the why 
of things in addition to the how, their 
deeper nature, pruposes, and meanings; 
to relate, criticize, and coordina.te 
all areas of knowledge, experience, 
and culture for the highest human 
good; interested in personality and 
values and the subjective phases of 
process and reality; suggests the 
best ends to which means may be put. 
In the words of Brightman, philosophy 
"attempts to give a reasoned account 
of experience as a whole 11 (APR 20) 
John Dewey's school of Critical Naturalism widens the meaning of science to 
include many of the values pertaining traditionally to philosophy, as suggested in 
the right-hand list above. Actually philosophy includes science as one of its special 
disciplines; empirical science would be p2rt of a true philosophy of nature. 
Philosophy of Religion. Brightman with inimitable predi si on wrote 11 Philosophy 
0f religion is an attempt to discover by rational interpretation of religion ... the 
+.ruth of religious beliefs 11 (APR 22). We look presently into the method of philosophy 
inter.orete.tion1~ in considering the meaning of re/'JSO 
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of religion as 11 rational interpretation" in considering the me,ming of "reason11 in 
broadest sense, the criteria of 11 truthu, and the relation of reason as a whole to 
religion. 
Theology now-a-days usually means a method of inquiry that relies on a particu-
lar historical religious tradition, as its ultimate source of information. for 
example, there can be Buddhist, Islamic, Jewish, Christian, Catholic or Protestant 
types of 11 theology11 • Theology is mainly interested in expounding the content of a 
special religious tradition, clarifying its presuppositions and analyzing its rele-
vance to life as a whole. llfor theology, the historical beliefs of the theologian's 
own religious community are the primary sources 11 (Brightman APR 24). 
e,he preceding definition of philosophy, 
According to 
theology, or theologies would be branches of phil~sophy of religion. 
for some thinkers, however, "theology" is a completely independent, authoritative 
discipline separate from science o.r philosophy, resting on an authoritative revelation 
which is presumed to be radically different from philosophy, philosophy of religion, 
or natural theology. (Barth). 
The term "natural theology" has had the special connotation of "an investigation 
of the problem of God based on reason and experience, without recourse to the author-
ity of any special revelation" (lb. 23). "Natural theology" is akin, therefore, in 
~pirit to general philosophy of religion. 
Faith. The English word "faith" has many meanings. There are first the common-
place meanings: 11faith0 is understood to mean sometimes belief without knowledge; 
or acceptance of authority uncritically; or as equivalent to credulity, or wishful 
· thinking. This obviously is the barest or leanest meaning of the word. In another 
commonplace way faith stands for the general hope or confidence that life on the 
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;)ractical plane means well and will turn out well. This is often based on a profound-
er philosophic understanding of faith, to which we now proceed. 
Harris Franklin Rall has aptly defined the idea of faith on its deeper philoso-
phic level as nconfidence in our world as meaningful and in our experience as trust-
worthy11 (_fhristianit:y, An Inquiry into Its Nature and Truth, Schribners, 1941, p. 
212f). In slightly other terms, if a person has 11 faith 11 he has confidence in the 
orderliness and intelligibility of our world. This general philosophical meaning of 
faith comes to light at one level when we think of lfscientific faith", or the basic 
ele.ments of intellectual trust that natural scientists exercise, which motivate' 
their investigation of nature.·, .As Rall again phrases it, scientific faith is the basic 
confidence of the scientist "that the world is not mad", or ultimately irrational. 
The positive expressions of this faith are often pointed out as the scientist's 
confidence in the unity of nature, leading to the idea of her orderliness or law-
abiding character; and his belief in the trustworthiness of the senses, and in the 
adequacy of his rational powers of investigation, which organize sense data into 
rationally integrated experience or knowledge. A further level of the idea of faith 
as "confidence in our world as meaningful and trustworthy" is the valuati onal and 
religious aspect of faith. 
Religious faith has to do with the moral properties of our world. Again in the 
phraseology of Rall, it is confidence 11 that the world is not bad", but has ultimate 
"mora1 11 meaning, purpose_, orderliness or :rationality. It is the belief that existence 
and process are essentially 11 good 11 (Western religions); or at least that world process 
is capable of an outcome that is good (£astern :religions). Common to all the great 
religions of the world is the fundamental belief that there is moral process; that 
the world is a place of moral order, regularity, and dependability, analogous to the 
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concept in science that it is a physical order of regularity and dependability. In 
various terms the great religions have believed that "moral law 11 founds existence an l 
process. For example, there was the concept of 11Maat 11 in ancient Egyptian religion; 
resReotively 
the concept of 11The Good", of "Moira 11 or Fate, and of 11Natural Law";for Plato, the 
great dramatists, a.nd the Stoics in Greek culture; the Hindu-Buddhist concept of 
11 Karma 11 ; the Chinese (Confucian and Taoist) concepts of 11Heaventt and its ttTaott; the 
Hebrew, Zoroastrian, and Islamic concept of the 11Will of God11 -- all of these have 
been various ways of referring to the existence or reality of a moral law or principle 
that underlies and governs existence. (Surprisingly in their concrete content or 
practical moral maxims, all of these systems are astonishingly similar). These 
various concepts of moral order gave existence a basic meaningfulness; they endowed 
the world with permanent goodness, and life with opportunity. 
Faith in its general psychological meaning (compare the general psychological 
form of religion previously reviewed) has, according to Rall, the following elements: 
insight that discerns some meaning or value in our world; trust that is willing to 
surrender to the claims of that meaning; loyalty that endeavors to express this mean-
ing or this truth in life and action. This would describe the general form of faith 
anywhere found in human experience: Nazi faith, Communist faith, scientific faith, 
specific religious faiths, Christian, Buddhist, etc. Returning to traditional 
religious faith, once again we summarize in Rall 1s succinct words: 11Religion postu-
lates a fundamental meaning and goodness in the cosmos, and asserts that as man dis-
cerns this and responds in confidence and loyalty, he will attain the highest person-
al well-being 11 (lb). 
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The distinctive tenets of Hebrew-Christian faith are the following: (1) The 
physical world is good, not evil (compare with Zoroastrianism, Confuci2nism, and 
· Islam and contrast with some emphases in Hinduism-Buddhism). (2) Man is a free, 
spiritual being, in some degree transcendent to physical nature, 11 something different 
from the causal or biological machine" (Hocking, Types of Philosophy, Scribners, 1939). 
The essence of man's freedom is rational, moral responsibility. (3) That finite 
individuality or personality is the meaning and purpose of existence and process; 
or that the universe is an order of ends, purposes, and values devoted to the 
original 
existence and well-being of individual life. (Contrast/Buddhism, which believes that 
man is essentially non-unity and that the iHusion of our individuality is the basic 
cause of desire and thence of striving and of evil). (4) That love is the secret of 
life and its surest means of fulfillment and happiness; the ultimate moral law or 
many 
principle. ( An emphasis on love is also found in/other religious systems). (5) Tha~ 
the supreme significa.nce of personality and love on the finite plane derives from 
· their ultimate significance on the cosmic plane, or in reality as a whole -- i.e. 
that God, or the ~ltimate ground or origin of existence and process as a whole is 
self-giving Personal Love. 
Christian faith involves ideas particularly about the significance of Jesus: 
That the moral meaning of life and the power of love have been fully disclosed in 
him. Accordingly we suggest the main views of Christianity as being: (1) The belief 
that Jesus was the Christ, or the disclosure of moral. personality at its highest. 
His life, teachings, death, and resurrection disclose personality in some ultimate 
way, i.e. disclose or reveal God. Once again in the words of Rall, the significance 
. . 
of Jesus, to Chi1i;:;tians, is that he shows 11what God is and 1Nhat man is to be 11 (lb. 
89). (2) Christians commonly rely on the New Testament teaching for information 
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about the life of Jesus and for inspiration to lead the religious or Christian life 
themselves. (3) Prominent in Christian faith is the concept that the Christian 
tradition, church, or institution constitutes an indtspensible fellowship for 
Christians, the mystical 11 Body of Christ", apart from which inspiration will die. 
( 4) Finally the full meaning of 11 faith 11 as personal experience of 11 God in Christ 11 , to 
• 
use the words of St. Paul, points to the ultimate mystical character of Christianity. 
A statement of "Jewish Faith II in our times would be hard to compress into a 
few lines -- as it is difficult to attempt the same for "Christian Faith". 
There are many Christian groups representing various views and at least three major 
branches of modern Judaism. Perhaps, however, the over-all spirit or outlook, or 
rtfaith 11 of Judaism in our times may be adequately suggested in the following state-
ments from Conservative Judaism .,._ the middle group between traditional 11 0rthodoxy" 
and "Reform11 • Simon Greenberg writes of Judaism as: 
11being more than a system of abstract universal ethical data, but· 
an all~embracing comprehensive way of life, should seek to express 
itself in all forms of literature and art and communal organization, 
as well as Festivals, Sabbaths, Holy Days, daily ritual and synagogue."* 
And Robert Gordis says: 
"Our goal is loyalty to an evolving law, which is the will of God 
as revealed through the experience of Israel. 11 clh't 
We conclude this resume of various meanings of faith with a statement from a 
wise colleague, pointing out the reliance,· of faith itself on the critical faculty. 
11Faith is always in tension within the individual dogging him 
with the very possibility of the truth of its denial. Thus 
faith is open and demands the utmost critical faculty. 11 
-:~ Simon Greenberg, "Conservative Judaism11 in Religion in the Twentieth Cent~ry, ed. 
Ferm, Philosophical Library 1948, p. 327, 325. 
*'/4- Behrman House Inc., 1945, New York p. 77, quoted by Harrison, 11Judaism1t, in The 
Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, March, 1948.-
~ Alfred Bloom, 1962. 
Chapter Two 
What is Reason?. 
Its Use in Philoscphy of Reli~ion 
This chapter attempts to clarify the method of insight., 11reasoning 11 , or 11exper-
ience11 that we employ in order to deal with the problems of the philosophy of reli-
gion. We have alleged that reason is relevant to religion, that it has a role to 
play in religion, and that the rational analysis of religion is important, legitimate 
and proper... We have now to define more clearly what we mean by 11 reason11 as we use it 
ln this study. Furthermore, since the function of reason is to arrive at 11 truth11 ,we 
must also define the meaning of that term or idea, and as we proceed suggest what is 
!'leant by the expression "religious truth11 • ln endeavoring, however, to discuss such 
large questions as 11What is truth?tt, or 11What is reason?" we will obviously consider 
some of the central problems of philosophical method. Our immediate task, then, is 
to raise the, question: What is 11 reason11 in its largest sense, or the 11 criterion11 of 
truth, and what is the application of such reason or criterion to religion and the 
problems of philosophy of religion? 
What is Reason? 
Rationalism.. One of the major premises of this study is that religion is 11 ra-
tiona111, and we trust that the presentation may be an example of 11 rationalism 11 in the 
best sense of that word. The term rationalism need not have a bad connotation, such 
as impiety or atheism.. True, some non-theists or atheists, e.g., some of the philoso-· 
phers of the French Revolution, emphasized reason. In France at that time ttthe god-
:less of reason" symbolized the atheistic movement or aspect of the French Revolution. 
28 
But other great rationalists, notably St. P.ugustine, St. Thomas, Descartes, Leibnitz, 
Kant, and numberless others have been avowed theists. Also much of the mode of dis-
course in the Bible -- -.:1 ld and New Testaments -- is quite 11 rational" or 11 1ogical11 
in structure and implica.tion -- a point which it is not our purpose to elaborate hereo{~ 
Reason -..:i its levels of meaning. There are many dimensions of reason, that is, 
of thought understood as 11 rational process". One primary rational function is the 
power of abstract classification of experiences into universal categories or types. 
Two apples suggest "two-ness", which can be applied as an 11abstract ideau to many 
twos, actual and theoretical. Another primary rational function is the process of 
thinking with logical precision; leading to deductive and inductive inference. A 
third even more basic function of 11 reason 11 , presupposed in the power of abstraction 
is 
and in logical thought/the the power itself to think at all, or to attend at will, 
or freely, to the problems of life; to think about experiences, about rational 
propositions (which assertive judgments, J\ is B, formulate) in order to test their 
internal and external implications and coherency. We here point, of course, to 
reason's own self-transcending power, or its "dialectical" ability, its power to judge 
judgments, expressing the intrinsic life of 11 free spirit". Most fully understood in 
its own highest self awareness,reason is whole-discerning, synoptic insight. 
In largest sense, then, reason is coherent judAinq. It is our corning to 
awareness of beings, and their processes, and relationships in the universe. It is 
the ability, and achievement, o: relating ideas and experiences logically and coher .. 
ently into a unity of conscious awareness. Reason is synoptic understanding or 
i~ See L. Harold DeWolf 1 s discussion of this theme in The Religious Revolt Against 
Reason, Harper, 19h9. esp. p. 133-5; and our subsequent appedix on irrationalistic 
criticisms of reason in religion and replies. 
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11 empiri cal coherence" (P.A. Bertocci IPR Ch. 3). Experience in broadest meaning is 
but careful, refined reasoning about life end the world in which we live. .And by 
11 refined 11 we mean reasoning that pays attention to all areas of experience, and is 
thus truly "empiri ce.1 11 by being inclusive. We must now indicate more carefully what 
coherent judging or reason is by discussing the idea of truth, its definition and 
criteria. In so doing we hope to arrive at a fuller understanding of terms already 
introduced. It is difficult to advance in an understanding of any of our terms 
separately without enlarging our understanding of all of them together. 
What is Truth? 
Both practically and intellectually the largest concern of our historical period 
is the concern with 11 truth 11 • Since ancient time illuminationist, rationalist, empir-
ical, pragmatic, nominalistic and positivistic theories ',buvo had their say con-
cerning the meaning of truth and knowledge. For communists and totalitarians what is 
"true" is what describes the totalitarian ideology and program. In this much their 
implication is right, that an important part of truth is human and moral. In the 
end truth must be understood in its deepest moral and religious meaning if mankind is 
to survive. The following observations attempt to clarify some of the meanings of 
truth. 
The Definition of Truth and Criteria of Truth. In our opinion, Edgar S. 
Brightman rightly distinguished the definition of truth from the various criteria of 
. ' 
truth.-r~ Truth is correctly defined as the correspondence of thought to things, of 
idea to reality. This definition, of course, includes not only the "cognitive act 11 
(Tillich) in which our internal ideas become like, or attempt faithfully to represent, 
t~e reality which they purport to describe, but it also refers to the external reality 
·'.\- A Philosophy of Religion, p. 125-126. 
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itself in its own objective being and nature, the essence of the thing or process 
described. Accordingly, the definition of truth must point t 0 being itself as well as 
the judgment that grasps or understands being. Correspondence as the definition of 
truth is the explanation of 1r1hat truth is when found or experienced, what we expect 
to have when we know truth. To say that truth is correspondence, however, does not 
tell us how we find it, or our method of search and seizure, the way to truth. What 
method we use to seek truth and establish the correspondence would be our criterion 
of truth. We consider presently various criteria of truth. 
Textbooks in philosophy usually call our attention to the several popular criter ... 
ia and attempt to evaluate them -- sense experience, authority, reason, intuition, 
utility, and others. This difference between what truth is as correspondence and the 
how or way in which truth is sought is like the terminal and the track leading up to 
the terminal. Which track or route shall we take to get to our destination? Discus-
sions about truth usually concern the problem of criterion, the correct method or way 
of arriving at truth. The immediate discussion, however, considers chiefly the def-
inition of truth as correspondence, in several meanings and at various levels. The 
issue of criterion will be considered in due course. Both destination and way to go 
are important, but we certainly cannot decide on the route until a clear idea of where 
we want to go is in mind. 
Truth as Correspondence. One way to ana.lyze the Anglo Sa.xon word 11trutht' is to 
commence with its general Latin counterpart, veritas, and consider several English 
cognates. One derivative of veritas is veracity, the correspondence of our words to 
things, of our utterance to what is fact. This, of course, is the basic common-plac~ 
meaning of truth as truthfulness of speech in contrast to an uttered falsehood or lie. 
' ' 
Let us simply call this spoken truth. Another term related to veritas is validi~_y. 
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ln a mah:her of speaking we may define validity as the correspondence of thought to 
its own rules. Truth has its meaning in the realm of logic, namely, as consistency 
in thinking, in relating conclusion to premise. This may be designated by its usual 
name logical truth. In the term verity, however, we come to the central meaning and 
definition of truth, namely, that already mentioned, the correspondence of our thought 
or ideas to things, the agreement and conformity of our judgment to the way the world 
actually is. This is factual truth. (Observe, of course, that veracity, validity, 
mutually implicated., Verity 
and verity/ correctly communicated to others implies both veracity, spoken truth, 
and validity, logical truth). We shall proceed now to an analysis of factual truth 
in its broadest sense. 
Truth as Verity. When we speak of truth as correspondence of an idea to its 
object we may think of this relationship on several levels. First is our over-all 
awareness of the universe as a physical order, and nearest to us in the area of 
experience on the physical plane is the order of qualities directly apprehended 
through sensation. This immediate, sentient level of awareness that an organic being 
has of its world we may term sentient truth. Examples are the experience of the color 
green, the heaviness of the book in our hands, the pain of disease or accident. 
Second in experience of truth at the physical level are these more or less pluralistic 
minutiae pulled together into the larger wholes and gro~s events of practical exist-
ence as it concerns beings of our kind -- the green of the landscape below the air-
liner in which we are traveling, the pull of gravitation on the ship, the pain we 
might sustain in the event of a mishap. Many sentient truths are here presently and 
potentially bound up together in the larger context of practical events. (The level 
of practical truth is part and parcel of the general field of moral truth discussed 
below). We come next to the order of 11 scientific laws" discovered by th~l" :roi'fhcd 
methods of peroeption distinctive to the physical sciences -- the physical theory 
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of color, ,..1=c/f; of gravitation, F'=funM/d2; Pasteur's discovery of disease bacteria. 
Let us refer to this as scientific truth. From an introductory standpoint then, so 
much for verity as it describes the bare 11physical order'' of 01.,1r world. This is 
frequently called the order of fact and that aspect of truth known as cognition apart 
... 1y 
from valuation. It tells us mainfahat ~· We pass now to a fuller and richer level--
awareness of the universe a8 a "moral order 11 , an order of value, which is also fact 
in largest sense. 
Truth in its higher ranges of moral meaning. The whole realm of valuation, 
ethical and aesthetic, may be generally designated the moral realm. Truth, then, as 
awareness of our universe as a moral order means apprehension of our world as bearing 
an order of life and as implying the existence of relationships or 11 lawstt between 
such lives that would make for their well-being and harmony. The discovery of human 
nature (what man psychologically and ontologically is) and laws that would relate 
human lives harmoniously and well would be discovery of truth in the moral realm at 
its ethical center, and represent the correspondence of our thought or ideas to the 
way the world is at this its highest level or echelon of meaning. Let us call this 
moral truth (space does not permit analysis here of aesthetic truth in specific 
sense). Pn outline of the meanings and levels of truth so far analyzed would appear 
thus: 
Spoken truth: veracity 
Logical truth! validity 
Factual truth; verity . 
Cognitive: 
Sentient truth 
Scientific truth -
Valuative: 
Moral truth. 
"" \ ! ) veritas 
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Moral truth would be 11 factua1n · in the largest meaning of the word fact, since 
the presence of life and its implied laws of harmony are facts. The cognitive realm 
cannot keep the idea of fact entirely to itself. That idea belongs to the moral 
realm as well. Would not the outcome of the argument between the subjectivity or 
objectivity of values be that value has a definite objective status at least in the 
sense that a certain order of objectivite beings, namely, human beings, do evaluate 
their world; and that evaluation is an intrinsic and inevitable fact of life? In 
the realm of truth there must be a true logic of evaluation applied to existence on 
the personal plane, and it is the task of the higher human sciences to discover it. 
Moral truth would include awareness of the ultimate power(s) or being(s) which 
' 
sustain the universe as a physical and moral order. As such we could call it phil-
osophical, metaphysicc1l or religious truth. Truth on this highest moral and religious 
level would not only be 11 intellectual 11 awareness and assent to the various orders of 
fact, but also emotional commitment and experience, correspondence with the world 
by way of intimate p~rticipation. Truth as love, for example, cannot be abstractly 
or objectively ( 11 just intellectuallyn) known. It must be possessed, felt, experienced 
to be anything at all. A.s a matter of fact, intellect and emoti-on on the highest 
plane are related. For what is more "reasonable" than beauty or more 11 urtderstand-
ing11 than sympathy? The correspondence of life with life in such dynamic relation-
ship, and, in a manner of speaking of each life in religious vision with what is 
ultimate ( in the faith of personal theism, with God) would be experience of moral 
and religious truth in highest degree. 
Truth as Bein~ and Fulfillment of Process. We have just desc:ri.bed the hierarchy 
of truths largely in a static way. Put movement·, lif~, and growth into :the. p.i:cture 
and we arrive at the next stage. When we reach the highest moral and dynamic thinking 
Ju 
about truth, we are reminded of an ancient, standard conception which states the 
matter possibly in its fullest scope. A line by the medieval schoolman, Robert 
Grosseteste, gives us the clue: "the true is c1nything whatever whose being is con-
formed to its reasons in the eternal Word 11 (i.e. the Mind of God).* What is meant 
essentially is .that truth is the conformity or correspondence of things to their 
eternal purposes. In this meaning when we think of truth we think of cosmic process 
in widest and deepest terms. The idea is that when a process has its outcome, like 
the growth of a. seed into a mature tree, it has arrived as we say at its "true end" 
or fulfillment. When we say that· certain ideals are fulfilled 11 truly", we employ this 
final meaning of truth. Not only then, the correspondence of ideas with reality, but 
the fulfillment of proce.ss with the 1-,1ltimate purposes of reality is what is meant by 
truth. This correspondence of action to ideals, of things to thought, is the comple-
mentary side of our original judgment about the conformity of thought to things, and 
in a manner of speaking indicate• where truth and being are one. Paul Tillich states 
the ultimate identity of truth as being in a profound way: 
11Modern philosophy usually speaks of true and false as 
qualities of judgments. Judgments can grasp or fail to grasp 
reality and can, accordingly, be true or false, But •••• if the 
question is asked, 'What makes a judgment true?' something must 
be said about reality itself •••• The surface must be penetrated, 
the appearance undercut, the 'depth' must be reached, namely, the 
ousia, the 1essence 1 of things, that which gives them the power 
of being. This is their truth •••• Truth, therefore, is the 
essence of things 2s well as the cognitive act in which their e$sence 
is grasped. The term 'truth' is, like the term 'reason', subjective-
objective. A judgment is true because it grasps and expresses true 
being •••• 11 (Systematic Theology, Vol. I p. 101-102). 
By way of summary we say that first in experience there is sentient truth --
color, sound, and all the qualities that compose the practical world~ Then, there is 
* 3elections from Medieval Philosophers, ed. Richard McKean, Scribners, 1929, Vol 
Ir, p. 271-272. 
:;cientific truth or the understanding of relationships in the physical world at a 
level deeper than the immediacy of sense and quality. FJnally, there is moral truth, 
of which the idea of truth as fulfillment of process is part •. Truth in the moral 
meaning of the term is awareness that the universe supports an order of personal 
beings, and of the fulfillment of :relationships between them that would make for 
their welfare and harmony. Knowledge i.s ultimately tested by experience., and truth 
on its highest moral plane is this felt relationship between personal beings. Deeper 
than abstract relationships in thought, its scientific meaning, truth represents per-
sonal reltaionships in life, its moral meaning. Truth is not only something that we 
see with intellectual assent but something which in.a sense possesses us and which 
we live in moral fullness. It is moral process conscious of itself. 
The Ar~'Ulllent Concerning the Status of Truth 
ls Truth Subjective or Objective? .we should indicate briefly the major dispute 
about the ultimate nature and status of truth. The questions may be simply put. ls 
truth 11 objective 11 or "subjective"; is it 11absolute 11 or 11relative 11? Do we discover 
truth or do we create .it?. Considering the various levels of correspondence above 
described, is truth just an aspect of transient, finite process; or does it have some 
status in being, in the principles that found and govern process? How one answers 
these questions will, by and large, determine his position philosophically, that is 
to say, whether he is generally idealistic or prevailingly pragmatic and naturalist ir; .. 
Although, there may be some common or middle ground between the two possibilities, 
the following is a statement of the issues as they have been qal;ssically argued .. 
~ subjective ~ has had other familiar names, such as nominalistic., positi-
vistic, pragmatic. In this view 11truth" is but a functional term describing the 
psychological fact that man can know his world (the older nominalism), and can relate 
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himself practically and satisfactorily to it (the newer pragmatism). Truth is the 
way we 11 namen things within the mind -- it does not refer to anything out in the 
world itself. The ultimate nature of the world is beyond man1s ken; better limit 
intellectual inquiry to that area about which we can be certain or positively know 
(scientific positivism). Thinking further of the pragmatic side of this general 
interpretation, when an idea works, has satisfactory consequences, issues in good 
results, we may name the idea and the relationship between the organism and environ-
ment for which the idea stands 11 true 11 • A pragmatist like Dewey, who helped to for-
mulate the position in definitive way for our times, gave truth a quasi-objective 
status temporarily embodied in the dynamic, adjustive relationship of organism to 
environment in the human media of communication and action. * 
The idealistic and objective conception is that truth is something permanently 
- ----- - ---- ------
real, inclusive of both the mind of man and the world, and constitutes the common 
ground that makes knowledge of the world possible -- e.g. Plato 1 s Ideas., Aristotle rs 
Active Intellect, Augustine I s Veri tas, the modern idealist's "Absolute Experience". 
Truth is not only a psychological., but also a metaphysical and ontological term, sym-
bolic at least of ultimate reality. Without going into the idealistic argument at 
length here the main points have involved such key words as 11 objectiven and 11abso-
lute11. Truth is said to be 11 objective 11 because two persons can see what is true at 
the same time. Truth as an experience common to more than one finite mind must be 
11 outside 11 or 11beyond11 either such mind, according to St. Augustine. For him the 
ultimate place of truth is the mind of God. To modern idealists truth is 11absolute 11 
because the fact of incomplete human inquiry and all our present, partial knowledge 
implies a completer truth which we are seeking, which enables us to judge that our 
'1!-See our further discu.ssion of John Dewey's philosophy in Chapter Three. 
knowledge is partial and imperfect.. (Hence; technically speaking, to idealists some 
kind of 11coherent method 11 will be the correct criterion of truth). The term "abso-
lute11 need not mean something merely 11 logical 11 and static; it may mean that which is 
essentially 11psychologica1 11 and final in power, as, for example, love.-r~ The essen-
tial argument within the idealistic fold is between abstract or Platonic idealism 
and a personalistic or Hebraic idealism. For Augustine the key conception was truth 
as 11 power 11 • Truth is an objective power that comes in from 11above 11 to enlarge and 
save the mind of man. It resides ultimately in the mystery of God's personal being, 
and the term truth in its highest sense is symbolic of this divine reality and power~ 
Truth is the entering of God 1s own thought and life into us. It is the medium of 
communication between the ultimate Personal Being and finite persons: 11God hath 
created man's mind rational and intellectual, whereby he may take, in His light ...... 
and He so enlighteneth it of Himself that not only those things which are displayed 
by the truth, but even truth itself may be perceived by the mind I s eye. 11 ** 
The Criteria or Tests of Truth 
To recapitulate briefly what we have so far said, correspondence as the defini-
tion of truth tells what truth would be when found; the criteria tell us how to find 
- -
truth -- ho-w to compare or conform our ideas with reality. The 11criteria 11 of truth 
are the "ways of knowing". (We shall see presently that the definition of truth as 
11 co:rrespondence 11 is 11 coherent 11 , that is, is a, result of the coherence criterion). 
i~ See our further discussion of the term 11absolute" as qualified by a personalistic 
religious philosophy, Chapter Six, Appendix C, p. 251. 
~~ On Psalms CXVIII, Serro. xviii, 4. 
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I. Ways of Knowing: Initial, Limited Criteria. 
We may list these common-place or frequently cited tests of truth in the follow-
ing groups: (1) various authorities, such as 11 custom 11 , "public opinion", or family, 
economic, political, scientific, or ecclesiastical authority; (2) a type of criterion 
that we shall call intuition, also popularly called sometimes "instinct" or "feel-
ing"; (3) sensation or sense experience; and (4) utility, or the general usefulness 
we find in truth judgments. Let us deal with each of these 11 initial" criteria at 
sufficient length to understand and evaluate them. The problem of knowledge is to 
get the ideas i-n our mind to correspond with the facts of our world. Each of these 
criteria may help us do so to some extent or degree. 
1. Authority or testimony of others is one of the first channels through 
which knowledge comes to the growing person. In addition to handling the world and· 
experimenting with his own fingers, the child soon begins to ask questions of its 
parents. Their answers stand as truth for it. 
The value of authority is self evident. Children cannot learn every-
thing for themselves; neither can adults. Consequently we rely on our various author-
ities, parents, doctors, ministers, carpenters, technical experts of all kinds. Lay-
men have to accept the word of the pharmacist about the prescription he sells them. 
To deny the role of authority or rebel against it, when it is adequate, is iillITlaturity. 
In our quest for truth we should always consider the wise experience of others, 
whereby we often avoid the toil and trouble of finding things out for ourselves the 
hard way. The main sense in which the Bible may be an 11 authority" is as a record of 
accumulated moral and religious wisdom. When, however, we come ~o see 11wisdom" in 
some authority we imply that we are testing such an authority by a standard lying 
beyond it. 
The· limitations of authority, if relied on as sole source of knowledge, 
are manifest. (a) There are dangers in blind faith. Faith should be a vision, and 
vision implies personal experience. We have seen in our day how uninlightened faiths 
of all kinds lead to fanaticism -- Hitler 1s Germany, Stalin 1s Russia. (b) There is 
the tendency of authority to become frozen into unyielding orthodoxies, which hamper 
change and progress. (c) What do we do when 11authodties 11 disagree with each other? 
(d) Exclusive reliance on authority would encourage .intellectual laziness on the part 
of him who rests (or sleepsl) in an authority. 
For example, if we have been brought up in the tradition that looks to 
the Bible as an authoritative guide to, let us say, moral life, this means, by its 
own proclamation, that we should test its insights by reason and moral conscience. 
We read in Isaiah where that prophet, in the name of God, said to the people of Judah, 
"Come now let us reason togethertt (1!18); or in~ where Jesus appealed to the 
moral conscience of his hearers in the words, 11And why do you not judge for yourselves 
what is right". (12:57) Implied in all worthy authorities is some ultimate rational 
appeal that gives them force and sanction. 
2. Intuition is sometimes called the way of immediate insight. It is the 
way young people know they are in love, and the way the religious mystic believes he 
is certain of the presence of God. Intuition is direct apprehension transcending 
sense perception and conscious reasoning. It is direct insight into the totality of 
·t t" ~k a s1 ua 10n. 
Examples of intuition. (a) Sometimes sense experience itself is called an 
11 intuition11 , since it is a kind of direct or immediate insight. I cannot argue, 
reason, or dispute about the whiteness of the cloud I am now looking at -- the color 
1
~ Cp. Harold H. Titus, Livinq Issues in Philosophy, 2nd Ed., American Book Co., 
1953, pp. 199-200. 
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is there, unmistakable, immediately. If we prefer to sense experience as intuition, 
it is our basic intuition that there is existence or being. If, however, it is 
better to reserve the term intuition for a third kind of immediate, non-sentient or 
non-rational experience, as the initial definition above suggests, at least the 
directness and certainty of sense experience has been a standard analogy of what we 
may mean by intuition in other possible realms of experience. A true intuition 
should have a kind of vividness or absoluteness like vision, hearing, or touch. Are 
there any such intuitional experiences? 
(b) The axioms of mathematics or of logic have often been called intuitional 
truths. How do I know that twice two is four, or that I have rightly connected the 
conclusion with the premises of a logical argument? If A is B, and Bis C, then A 
is C, the general form of the syllogism. Once I know the first premise, that A is B, 
I know at once, without delay of thought, that anything related to B must also be 
related to A. The conclusions evolve as an immediate whole of insight. (We note 
presently the dispute among logicians as to whether reasoning is 11wholistic 11 or 
11 chainn). The feats of mathematical prodigies who can instantly add long columns of 
figures, or factor large numbers, seemingly without knowing quite how they do it, are 
spectacular examples of "mathematical intuition". 
(c) Do we recognize values by intuition? Possibly an all-inclusive intui-
tion is the sense of personal being -- my own and others -- as supreme in value, and 
if supreme in value possibly supreme in type of being. Related to this is our sense 
of ethical value,and possible basic intuitions about right and wrong. The possible 
fundamental intuition of the supremacy of personal life in value and being leads to 
the further 11intuitions11 that murder, or abuse of the weak and helpless is wicked. 
Are there fundamental aesthetic intuitions? Why is a rose immediately beautiful to 
most people? An ultimate possibility of intuition would bewhzther men have an imme-
diate knowledge of a supreme source and sustainer of values, God? The problem of 
intuition as a possible channel or criterion of knowledge and truth is closely re-
lated to the idea of 11 a pdo:ri 11 reason, which we consider presently. At our moments 
of deepest reflect icn about the matter we have the feeling that intuition, if it is 
sometimes a valid channel or test of truth, is not anti-rational or trans-rational, 
but profoundly 11 rational". 
The rational function and limits of intuition. Our deepest feelings are 
often our truest judgments. A mathematician or a scientist has a hunch about the 
solution of his problem, and often·the hunch, or intuition, proves true. 
But feelings and hunches are notorious deceivers too. How often we have .. had a 
so called intuition or feeling of certc1inty that has turned out wrong! We may have 
a feeling of absolute certainty that we 2re proceeding north, while d:ri ving along an 
unfamiliar road at night, only to look up and find the north star in a completely 
different place above the countryside than we had supposed! We should be wary of 
unattached intuitions, unexamined intuitions that are not sufficiently or coherently 
related to other possible channels or tests of knowledge. Indeed, intuitions when 
valid may be 11 the outcome of subconscious induction or deduction 11 • Harold Titus puts 
the ma.tter well where he continues, "Intuition seems to presuppose and to be affected 
by our previous experience and thought"-ii-. At least, so it often seems with intuition. 
An auto mechanic I s hunch or "intuition11 as to what I s wrong with my car, after I des-
cribe to him the trouble I am having with it, is based on his general knowledge of 
cars, previously learned. The solution to a difficult problem often 11pops into our 
mind 11 , as we say, but usually only after thinking at length about it. !\t least we 
are certRin that intuition, judging from our many wrong intuitions, must not be used 
alone, but must be controlled by reason and the senses. Very often intuition is the 
., r,.:· 
* Ibid. p. 198, 200. 
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certainty that reasoning or sense experience have been right. We turn now to this 
second mentioned popular way of knowledge. 
(3) Immediate sense experience. One narrower meaning of the term empiricism 
is the view that knowledge is equivalent to sensation. In English philosophy Hobbes, 
Locke, and Hume tried to develop a philosophy of knowledge based exclusively on raw 
themselves 
sense experience. The difficulties they/admittedly encountered makes the reading of 
-se of a flat, sensory ori terion 
thefwould-be, arch empiricists intensely interesting. Some v" .... difficulties/may 
be briefly summarized: (a) Simple sense experience would not take us very far in the 
scientific quest. J'.lll the profounder concepts, or "laws 11 , of science are of phenomena 
not directly sensed. For example, no one has ever O seen" an atom, though·, to observe 
a 
the trace of an electronic particle or its path ir/vaporization chamber is possible. 
Is the second law of thermodynamics (that the heat energy of the universe is constant-
ly diminishing) ever directly sensed by sights, sounds, or tactile pressure? 
(b) Raw sensations conflict, or present what is known to be 11 appearance 11 • fa. stick 
which is actually straight "looks" bent in water. The earth "feelstt stationary; the 
sun "appears11 to move. (c) From the moral si,de, sense empiricism, if taken as the 
sole criterion of truth, would tend to make material values, or sensed values, para-
mount.* Ifut the Ti:lllE;G of human 0njoymonts ·o£ton trnrtscCntfS 'l:limple., disc:r·ettr· ,s~ns,,ti-0':tls o 
Tll.e1:,'e·'.ci:tticisms will suffice to point out the weakness of' an oversimplified empiricism. 
Empiricism should really mean, as we have already suggested, a full, adequate, 
or comprehensive type experience, part of which might be sense experience. ~uch 
broader, rational empiricism realizes in a negative way.,first.,that the senses give us 
only a disorg::mized mass of physical perceptions. Such bare sense data as a falling 
apple, its weight, tides rising, the motion of the planet Mars must be organized or 
*Cp. Titus, op cit. p. 194 
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integrated by rational reflection into the mathematical formula of gravitation as 
Isaac Newton began to understand it (F:d{mM/d2). On the positive side, rational 
empiricism recognizes that the mind is in some sense an active power, and that scien-
tific knowledge is forthcoming only from rationally 11 controlled observations and ex-
periments111\ and from rational reflection. Scientific knmlfled~e, as we understand 
it today, is rationally organized experience. Empiricism should not mean sense ex-
perience alone, but inclusive experience. Rational empiricism, or empirical reason, 
in fullest meaning is inclusive coherent judging. 
By summary let us evaluate the criteria of troth we have so far studied, criter-
ia which we have called popular or commonplace because reliance is so often put upon 
them. Authority, .custom, public opinion are not perfect guides to troth because they 
often conflict, and are frequently wrong. Instinct, feeling, or intuition remain too 
vague for guides unless illuminated by other criteria .. Sense experiences are often 
in conflict, and by themselves are not complete or penetrating enough tests of truth, 
although~ their level they yield a specific and important kind of truth. These 
criteria are sometimes (or partially), satisfactory, but they are limited; and are 
often misleading, if relied on exclusively. These popular types of criteria are 
, obviously dependent upon further criteria, or on a more comprehensive or inclusive 
criterion.. Each of these criteria may be helpful, if used circumspectly, and are 
seen in some larger rational context. We turn next to a further, subtle type of 
criterion, often cited. 
4. Utility. The pra~matic theory of truth (pra~a, a thing done, business) 
in various forms underlies much scientific, and positivistic thinking. It has been 
* Ibid .. 
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the sophisticated way to speak of much sensate and narrow empiricist epistemology. 
There are two levels of meaning to this criterion. It may mean: that is true which 
(1) has satisfactory consequences or practical results, referring mainly to the de-
sires and purposes of men; or (2) can be 11 experimentally11 verified, thus yielding 
not only moral but scientific and, supposedly, even religious truth. The second is 
the fuller statement of pragmatism. Its advocates claim that the pragmatic criter-
ion is the real criterion of science. Moreover some see it as the cardinal method 
of religion itself. After all, our real assurance about God seems to come as a re-
sult of experimental approach, in the usefulness, for example, we find in answered 
prayer. At once the reader will detect a subtlety and an appeal in this way to find 
truth. Indeed, placed in a larger context it is a valid criterion. But apart from 
this larger setting it is misleading and subject to criticism. 
(a) Its relativity appears as one difficulty. What are "satisfactory" or 
11practical results 117 This question is particularly pertinent on the moral level •. 
What satisfies one man or group may not others. Some higher standard is therefore 
needed to judge when results are satisfactory, such as the nature of man as a whole, 
or of t.he physical world, or perhaps even the will of God. To which order of c.onse-
quences are we appealing as pragmatists: (1) personal consequences, (2) social con-
sequences, (3) some even more universal or cosmic set of consequences, satisfactory 
to the laws of nature and life in general? Presumably on the practical, moral level 
it is consequences that are 11 good11 for human life. But this implies that we know 
first ~ is ~ood .£2.£ ~; logically the definition of 11 good 11 has to precede action 
before we can tell whether results are good or not. Similarly, on the level of 
science itself, often "hypothesis" or basic definitions -- direct, tentative judg-
ments as to the truth -- have to precede experiment, in order to tell whether 
11results" "verify" the claims of scientific theory. Indeed, experiment, action, 
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results do often verify hypotheses, but results are such because of the nature of 
the thin~ experimented with. Beneath the confusion of the relativities that an 
- -
over-simplified pragmatism involves, in science as well as in morals, the nature of 
the subject-matter being investigated is the real standard, the nature a.f the atom 
itself, for example, in physical theory, or of human nature in ethical theory. We 
have seen that truth in its fullest meaning refers to being, and it is standards of, 
or in being which we ultimately wish to find. The experimental or pragmatic 
approach may be considered part of a wider method of discovering ultimate qualities 
of being. 
(b) For another thing~ truth is~ useful. Of what practical use is 
the astronomical truth that Alpha Centauri, the nearest star is a double star? Con-
ceivably this fact may have some 11 practical11 value someday, but the illustration 
serves. to point out that often good uses follow info:rmati on :rather than the other 
' way. Are uses, then, our one and only standard of truth? What about orders of 
11moral truth 11 that bear upon the future, that are not now in use but should be? For 
e~ample, that some degree of real world government (more than we now have in the 
United Nations) is necessary if we are ever going to have peace on earth? 
(c) Hocking suggests~ psychological difficulty with pragmatism. Psycho-
logically 11belief is the reference of the mind to an object assumed real, independent, 
objective. The suspicion of subjectivity therefore destroys belief .. 11 -1(-
~ ~~~pragmatic theory appears in its larger context. In the 
words of Harold Titus, what it is trying to say is that "beliefs that are true tend 
to worklf. .o ii;JI'ove or .toot :. themselveij in the long run. 11** 
·)!, William Ernest Hocking. Types of Philosophy, Revised Ed., 
Scribners, 1939, p. 163. 
~- Titus, _£E cit. p. 230 
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As Hocking suggests, a negative pragmatism is correct: no belief which is not true 
will work in the long run. 
"The logical error of pragmatism may be stated as a 
"false conversion" of 11All true propositions work" into 
11All propositions that work are true" ••. No proposition 
which does not work is true. Thus a negative pragmatism 
is of use in detecting the presence of error. 
Pragmatism also has a valuable insight in reminding us that truth finding is an 
active effort. Truth finding is often a dynamic disclosure in process. Again we 
refer to Hocking 1 s trenchant discussion of pragmatism: 
11 Pragmatism ••• has called attention to the fact that 
truth is an enterprise which requires active effort, not 
passive waiting to be convinced. The surgeon, not knowing 
whether an operation will save a life, will never find out 
by 11 suspending judgment": he must adopt a working hypothesis, 
and act on it. Only we must distinguish between the will to 
reach truth, and the will to decide truth. Our decision does 
not make the truth true. 
Again, it has called attention to the fact that there is 
a great region of the world which is unfinished and plastic, 
and where our action changes the facts. Treating a man as if 
he were an enemy may make him an enemy; treating him as a 
friend may make him such. n~f 
whioh 
What is the larger context of understanding about "truth", of/pragmatism 
is a part? We repeat, in order to know what are good or true results for a thing or 
a minipulation we have to know the nature of that thing or process for which the 
results are said to be good or satisfactory. But to know the nature of a thing re-
quires a coherent examination of it and its relation to the world as a whole, in so 
far as possible. This leads us, we believe, to the most comprehensive criterion of 
truth, coherence. 
i*- Hocking, 2E ~- p. 164 
:V.-* Ib. p., 171 
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Reason as Criterion: 
Initial Stage--Logical Consistency 
We must digress into a rather technical level of discussion at this point in 
order finally to bring out the full mea.ning of reason as the criterion of truth. We 
consider here for the introductory student the meaning of several different terms 
and ideas in elementary logic; these are various aspects of what we mean initially 
by 11 reason 11 .i< Traditionally as a process of inference reason has been a.nalyzed in 
two ways, as 11 deductive 11 and as 11 inductive 11 • 
1. Reason as deductive and 11 a priori 11 • A deductive process of reasoning pro-
ceeds from a universal principle to a particular case: 
M p 
All men are mortal 
S M 
Socrates is a man 
s p 
Therefore, Socrates is mortal 
The above is called a categorical syllogism, the terms of which are usually indicated 
by S, P, and M -- S for subject, P for predicate, and M for the middle term. The 
three propositions are called respectively major and minor premises, and the conclu-
sion. This is a basic .f52!.!!l of logical thinking (there are, of course, other forms 
of inference).*{< 
* Recall our earlier general discussion of the various levels of meaning when 
thought is directed inward upon itself, or considers itself as "rational process 11 , 
p. 28. 
iHc Consult any standard textbook on logic, e.g. D.S. Robinson, _9P cit., pp. 155f. 
48 
The::re are two main problems of deductive reasoning. First, is the premise 
from which one starts true in fact? It is easy to see how chains of syllogistic 
reasoning can be perfectly~ logically, but nonsense factually. This suggests 
that our premises should be factually founded, if truth is to be obtained by de-
ductive reasoning. (Of course there is the further problem, what is meant by 
11 fact"? Recall our previous discus.sion in Chapter One). 
Second, does pure deductive (or analytical) reason ever bring to light new 
knowledge beyond what is already implied in the premise? There is a long-standing 
dispute between logicians as to whether logical inference is merely 11 analytic 11 , that 
is, whether it gives only what is already implied in the premises and therefore no 
really~ knowledge; or whether it is "syntheticn, that is, yields new knowledge. 
Our general experience that there is novelty in inference would suggest that syn-
thetic reasoning is possible, or is a meaningful way to describe some deductive 
inference. This writer sides with those who believe that new meaning can come to 
light in deductive inference, and not merely repetition of identically the same 
. * meaning. Ewing illustrates this possibility in the following ways: 
Take an argument such as-..-Mortrtal is to the north of New York, 
New York is to the north of Washington, therefore Montreal is to 
the north of Washington. If the view I am discussing is true, 
the conclusion is part of the premises. But it is not part of 
either premise by itself, otherwise both premises would not be 
needed. So the only way in which it could be part of both together 
would be if it were divisible into two propositions one of which 
was part of the first and the other part of the second. I defy 
anybody to divide it in this way ••• The proposition 'Socrates was 
a philosopher' certainly entails the proposition 1 if Socrates had 
measles some philosophers have had measles 1 , but it cannot be 
that the second proposition is included in the first. For the 
!~rst proposi~i?n certainly does not include the notion of measles.~"~ 
l ' . J , •. : ,l ' •• i. 
····,-* The students attention is here called to an analysis of this point by A. C. 
Ewing, The Fundamental Questions of Philosophy, Macmillan, 1951, Chap. 2, esp. 
p. 30-36, 11The 'A Priori' and the Empirical". 
** Ibid, P• 32-33 
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In ;_ 1Y case, practically speaking, deductive reason certainly does make possible 
new applications of the truth, which we illustrate farther on. 
A priori reason. Deductive reason has been the traditional ally of a priori sm, 
(We discuss a priori reason at this pla.ce because of its importarice in our later 
arguments for the existence of God. The most significant and inclusive argument 
for God may be a priori). Is there any a priori knowledge, or knowledge based on 
. "pure reason", as Kant called it, which does not come from sense experience? Kant 
defined an a priori judgment ( or truth) as one that is 11 universal" and "necessary11 • 
Ewing defines a priori knowledge a$ 11 lmowledge we can obtain simply by thinking 11 
(lb. 26). ~ometimes a priori insights are called original categories of the mind 
or of thought itself. The a priori, then, has the connotation of universality, 
necessity, self-evidence, and innateness. The child, of course, is not born with 
a full awareness of a priori truth ( if there be such); but he may be born with a 
capacity to come to recognize such truth in mature, :reflective life. Examples of 
possible a priori truths would be :related to examples of intuition (discussed 
plr-ev:i 6.lii1ly) • 
(a) The princi plea of lof:)ic are sometimes cited as valid examples of 11 a priori 
reason 11 • These principles are often called the 11 laws of thought". First, there is 
the principle of identity, which means that one must stick to the meaning of terms 
as originally defined or used in an argument, if the argument is to be valid. 
Second, there is the principle of cont:radition, or positively expressed, the law 
of consistency, which means that two contradictory propositions cannot be both true:, 
or in more general sense that one's conclusion must be consistent with one's prem-
ises., as our syllogism about Socrates above illustrates. Pure logical inference 
seems to be a basic type of a priori :reason, and at this level a priori would be 
the same as 0 deductive 11 reasoning.· 
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Third, there is the law of sufficient reason -- the rationalist's main dictum --
that there must be some rational explanation or cause for every happening. Liebnitz 
made famous the saying that there must be some "sufficient reason" for things as 
they are or take place in the universe. Sufficient reason refers simply to the basic 
intuition that truth is discoverable. Even the acts of a mad-man, which take place 
in one sense without 11 reason11 or for no reason, would fall ultimately under the 
principle of sufficient reason in the form of a rational explanation of madness 
itself, that is, why rationality and mentality on the finite plane sometimes break 
down. Some of the basic rationel postulates of natural science rest on the princi-
ple of sufficient reason: notably, science's principle or belief in the orderliness, 
stability, regularity of nature; science's principle of cognition, or that nature 
is knowable; and the scientific principle of simplicity or parsimony, that ,.._ among 
rival hypotheses -- the 11 simpler 11 explanation of a given phenomenon is the valid one. 
To illustrate the commitment of one noted scientist to the principle of sufficient 
reason, we cite J. Robert Oppenheimer. In an article describing the complexity of 
concepts employed in atomic physics he concludes: 
In particle nhysics we may have to accept an arbitrary, complicated, 
not very orderly set of facts, without seeing behind them the 
harmony in terms of which they might be understood. It is the 
special faith and dedication of our profession that we will not 
lightly concede such a defeat. ("Adventures of the Mind 7: 
The Mystery of Matter", Saturday Evening Post, July 5, 1958.) 
The above laws of thought seem, indeed, to govern all logical thinking, dis-
course, meaningful communication, and science. As such they seem a priori, that is, 
11prior 11 or foundational to any possible experience. 
Related to logic, of course, are the axioms and theorems.of mathematics and 
geometry, and the deductive modes of reasoning characteristic of these formal sciences. 
Their principles and procedures are often times regarded as our best examples of 
f'ormal 
a priori reasoning. Beyond the laws of/logic and of mathematics$are there further 
cases of a priori reason? 
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(b) Ideas of reality. Kant called "space 11 and "time" basic forms of existence. 
as 
That is, he said, we cannot think of anything in our sort of physical world/exist-
ing without these 11 dimensions 11 • The problem of whether space and time in some ulti-
mate sense are "absolute 11 or not, as Kant assumed, is irrelevant at this place. What 
their ultimate nature and status is we need not know. That objects, however, in our 
sort of rea.1 world must have a spacial spread and a temporal duration, in order to 
exist in a physical way, is certainly true, and a truth that seems "universal 11 and 
11necessary 11 .. 
Consider next the categoi.:yof 11 substance 11 , that is, that every quality needs 
11 something 11 in which to inhere. Can we think of the red of a rose without the 11 red11 
inhering on something? This "somethingtt philosophers have called substance. We 
have just referred to substance as physical or material substrate. It has long been 
in controversy as to whether I know myself as a II spiritual substancen in which my 
thoughts inhere or go on (note the following paragraph on the category of the self 
and the discussion of theories of mind in our later chapter). The concept of sub-
stance must be filled with dynamic meaning; it must be :relieved of a kind of blank 
inertness which it has had in former times. In recent years, due to the impact of 
modern science on philosophical thought, the concept or category of 11 energy11 has 
tended to take the place of the older concept of substance. Of course, how can 
there be 11 energy11 or energetic movement unless there is 11 somet.hing 11 to move, or be 
moved, or have activity. The concept of energy without substance is an unreal, ab-
stract ghost of a notion; as, no doubt', the concept of substance as an inert lump-
ishness underlying things is unreal. 
The idea of energy suggests the a priori category of 11 causality 11 • In classic 
formulation this meant that every effect must have a ~' or an adequate cause (or 
sufficient reason). The following is one way to suggest the a priori nature of our 
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idea of causality: would we ever raise the question, What causes the leaf that I am 
now looking at to move? and conclude, 'the wind is the cause of its motion', unless 
the causal interest or causal inquiry, in a word, the idea of causality were there 
prior to our experience of the moving leaf? Squirrels see leaves moving all the 
time, but it is doubtful if any of them ever ask about the cause. In original nature 
they lack the causal interest, just as by such a nature we possess it at the outset. 
Man's desire to examine his world scientifically implies the causal a priori, at 
least in the sense above described. It does not necessarily tell us what the causes 
are; but it does establish our confidence that there are 11 causes11 , that is, rational 
or underatandable connections, and it encourages our search to find them. 
In the concept of the 11 self" the category of substance, at least in one form, 
is made dynamic, and the category of causality, at least in one form, is made pur-
posive. We have already referred to the "intuition of the self11 • May we now say, 
knowledge of the self· a priori? Augustine's and Descarte's a priori analysis of 
the self as thinking-energy, in spirte of the attempts to disvalue it, still remains 
one of the best examples of a priori reason about a type of reality. Both of these 
philosophers argued that the self can never doubt or deny its own "reality", because 
affirms one's existenoe, 
the very attempt to do so, i.e. to doubts one 1s existence,/at least as a form of 
thinking energy. To doubt or deny, is to think, and to think is to be conscious or 
self-conscious. Therefore the attempt to doubt one's conscious existence as thinking-
energy is contradictory. Cogito, ergo~' Descartes said. It should probably be 
acknowledged that so far this argument may have but a formal value, since one never 
actually doubts his existence. But at least on a formal plane it illustrates a 
universal and necessary, i.e. an a priori truth. There are, however, deeper implic-
ations, as Descartes was quick to notice in his Meditations, where he proceeds from 
knowledge of self to knowledge of God -- we considerthe fundamental a priori argument 
for God later in our study. In any case,thus far,in awareness of the self as 
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thinrdng energy, in comparison to all other observable energies, the self possesses 
an intimation of its own superiority in value, and possibly in being. We treat at 
greater length in a subsequent chapter the idea of the 11 reality 11 of the self. 
(c) Ideas of value. Recall our discussion in Chapter One concerning the dis-
covery of value in the. consciousness of self, and the earlier point in this chapter 
dealing with the intution of value. Highest moral values seem 11 necessary 11 and 
ttuniversal1', i.e. a priori. Immanuel Kant argued this point as one of his chief con-
tributions to philosophy. Consider the subsumming Hebraic moral law of reverence or 
respect for persons -- what the ethical comm~ndments of Moses and Jesus add up to. 
Rational reflection would tell us that no finite life of our kind could get along 
happily and well without applying this principle in one 1 s relationships with others; 
and experience will quickly test it, if one doubts its nature as 11universal 11 and 
11necessary" truth. We return, in a subsequent chapter, to the problem of moral 
value in our discussion of the moral argument for God. 
What is the realtion of a priori reasoning to intuition? A priori knowledge 
would not only be certain fundamental intuitions themselves, but also the attempt to 
reason about them. If intuition is immediate insight or feeling, a priori reason 
would examine such insights reflectively for internal consistency with themselves 
and with other areas of knowledge and experience. A priori reason is intuition in 
a self-reflective and critical mood. Arguments for human freedom, for example, will 
be an apt illustration of a priori reflection about a possible basic '1intuition11 • 
(Again we refer the reader to later discussion for elaboration of this point.) 
We suggest that if there is immaterial or trans-material being or truths, such 
as the self, moral laws, or God, it is reasonable to suppose that they would best be 
apprehended by a trans-sensory mode of knowledge, that is, by a priori reason. 
Bordon Parker Bowne once said that it would take a priori knowledge to rule out the 
possibility of a priori knowledge. Ewing has ably summarized the nature and general 
function of the a priori in the following passage: 
11The possibility of metaphysics depends on a priori 
knowledge, for our experience is quite inadquate to enable 
us to make on merely empirical gounds any sweeping generali·s-
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at ions of the kind the metaphysician desires. The term a priori 
covers both self-evident propositions, i.e. those which are seen 
to be true in their own right and those which are derived by 
inference from propositions themselves self-evident. 11 (FQP- 30). 
In closing this disc .ssion of the a priori we should clarify a point which is 
often the soursce of much confusion. Does a priori knowledge mean that it stands 
temporally prior to experience? In the following statement Paul Tillich throws 
' 
considerable light on the status of a priori concepts in relation to "experience". 
Speaking of basic 11 ontological concepts 11 (recall our examples in paragraph 11 h 11 
above) as a priori, he says: 
"Ontological concepts are a priori in the strict sense of 
the world. They determine the nature of experience. They are 
present whenever something is experienced. A priori does not 
mean that ontological concepts are known prior to experience. 
They should not be attacked as if this were meant. On the 
contrary, they ~re products of a critical analysis of experience." 
(ST Vol I. 166). 
(For discussion of the relation of moral concepts, a priori, as awakened by 
experience see 11Appendix B11 to Chapter Six, Sect ion 3, 11The Moral Argument for God 11 • 
2. Reason a inductive a d ,, • T/ode of rea~on proceeds from 
particul~ises to the u versal pripc1ple: ,/" / 
/ / / 
,,.Jfen A, B, C, a D, are ob rved to dt,e-: 
/ _Therefor , all men a mortal. / / 
The rule of this. typ of syllogi is that if yrffirm the ar:dent you ay 
(or th other valid m~r if yo/y the co, 
~ust deny The hypothetipal syllogism do,es not exha st the meaning 
/ ,/ 
,,/ ,.,/ 
of L uctive H'owever, ,e~aluating it o~/; prima·ry f·t:tn;,·of.r:!i'u:oh 
,,? 
: 1f0rencc, _,,/ D. s. 
. // 
Princi ple¥§'.f Reasoning (3rd ed)., writes: 
; -
*Systematic Theology_, Vol I., University of Chicago Press, 1951, p. 166 
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2. Reason as inductive and 11 scientific''. This mode of reason proceeds from 
particular cases to the universal principle: 
Men A, B, C, and D, are observed to die. 
Therefore, all men are motal. 
Inductive reason and scientific prodecure are closely associated with another 
variety of syllogism called the hypothetical. It has the basic form, if X, then Y. 
Stated in the form of the hypothetical syllogism the above inductive line of reason-
ing would be : 
Antecedent Consequent 
If men A, B, C, and D, die, then all men are mortal 
A, B, C, and D, are observed to die 
Therefore, all men are mortal. 
The rule of this type of syllogism is that if you affirm the antecedent you may 
affirm the consequent (or the other valid mood: if you deny the consequent you 
must deny the antecedent). The hypothetical syllogism does not exhaust the meaning 
of inductive inference. However, evaluating it as a primary form of such 
inferencei, D. S. Robinson, in The Principles of Reasoning (3rd ed), writes: 

11The method of hypothesis is a striking expression of the 
extent to which hypothetical reasoning enters into the 
procedure of scientific research" (p. 170) * 
5.5 
The main problem of inductive reason is the question about going from "some" 
cases to 11 al1 11 cases. May there noLbe,.exceptions? This has been called the 
"inductive leap11 • (The sections in textbooks of logic devoted to induction are 
discussions in detail of ·hy the inductive leap is justified from the practical 
point of view). In any case, the hypothetical or tentative nature of inductive 
science is evident. 
The relation between deduction and induction. Both forms of reason play a 
vital part in science and man's quest for truth. Mathematics has been the deductive 
11 science11 par excellence, and the mathematical formulation of principles has been the 
ideal of 11 natural" or inductive science. On the technical side Robinson writes: 
11 
•• a warning must be given against being misled by the statement 
that induction is the reverse of deduction. The two ways of 
proceedin8 are not antagonistic, but supplementary. Deduction 
is really present in all inductive inference in the form of 
,:some covert assumption as to the nature of the real world. 11 
(lb. P• 205). ** 
Let us suggest the relation of deductive to inductive reason. A.fter certain 
facts become known through observation, deduction is frequently employed in the 
discovery of new theoretical knowledge, as, for example, in the mathematical dis-
covery of Neptune's and Pluto's existence, the two outermost planets, before they 
were actually observed through a telescope. Another arresting example was Einstein's 
. . 
deduction that light would be· bent in a gravitational field before Eddington proved 
the point by observation, during an eclipse of the sun. The light of a star as it 
passed across the darkened sun's disk, was obs~rved to be displaced from its true 
*D. Appleton-Century Company, 1947 
** Ib .. 
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posi'::,ion in the sky, evidently by the gravitational pull of the sun on the star's 
light. Deduction is used extensively in engineering or technological application 
of the theories of "pure science 11 • Just how to build a suspension birdge, for 
example, given the formula for gravitation or the tensile strength of steel is in 
large part a deductive problem, which is worked out on the engineer's drawing board. 
Reason as Criterion: 
Completed Stage--Rational Coherene 
Reason as synoptic understanding, or full rational coherence, means initially 
formal or logical consistency as just discussed.. Our judgments must fit together 
without contradition. But coherence is more than a matter of formal logic, or 
technical logical consistency. Recall that the technical problem of logic is whether 
our premises and axioms, with which we start a train of reasoning, are true? 
Accordingly coherent judging in full meaning must have 11factual 11, or 11empirical", 
or inclusive consistency and mean the agreement of a logical judgment with the 
entire environmental situation. Some writers;*' use the expression "empirical coher-
ence" to emphasize the nempirical 11, viz, the observational side of coherent judging, 
as well as its purely logical, and (as we would say) its possible a priori dimen-
sions. In any case coherence is rationally organized experience. 
In a succinct turn or speech, Brightman caught the spirit o~ meaning of coherence 
when he wrote, "Consistency is the absence of contradiction; coherence is the pres-
** 
ence of relation11 (APR 190). To see into the whole order of fact and being as far as 
we can,and relate their parts without contradition, is the over-all method, way or 
~~ Peter Anthony Bertocci: Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion, Prentice-Hall, 
1951, Chap. 3. 
** A Philosophy of Religion, op. cit. 
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crit2rion or truth. Harris Franklin Rall well expresses the spirit of coherence in 
describing 11 reason11 as 11 the power of insight or intuition, which sees the whole of 
things and perceives their meaning11 (C 217)! Rational coherence, or synoptic under-
standing, is the experience of looking at the whole as if from a higher perspective, 
To illustrate., the sun appears to rise and to move about the earth; so the 
judgment was for millenia. But this apparent relation of earth to sun is from an 
earth-bound standpoint: 
-
--
- - - ... ....: .... 
-~ 
Rise, however, in imagination, a½ove the earth; look at the solar system as whole as 
if from a point above it in space, and the true relationship of earth and sun and 
the various motions of the planets become clear. 
Coherent judging is judging from the standpoint of the whole. In SU1ll, Georgia 
Harkness defines coherence with exquisite simplicity: 11A statement is true, if it 
is self-consistent throughout, and is consistent with all the information procurable 
in relation to it. 11·** 
Conflicts in Religious Thought, Harper, 1949, p. 63. 
* Christianity, An Inquiry into its Nature and Truth~ Scribners~ 1941, p. 217e 
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Appendix A 
Further Illustrations of Coherence 
Science. We continue our astronomical example in order to show how coherence 
is the real method of science, and makes possible scientific advance. Our problem 
then concerns how man's knowledge of the nature of the solar system, and of certain 
facts of gravitation, has grown: 
(1) The ancient geocentric, Ptolemaic theory (2nd century A.D.) was based on 
the sun's apparent motion, and the apparent retrograde motions of the planets. 
(2) Copernicus (1473-1543) explained these phenomena by his helio-centric 
theory (suggested also in ancient times by Aristarchus of Samos) and, as we mentioned 
previously, as if from a higher perspective above the solar system, so that the 
whole could be seen at once. Ptolemy's theory was too earth-bound. 
(3) Tycho (1546-1601) and Kepler (1571-1630) after painstaking observations 
concluded that the orbits of the planets were ellipses rather than circles as 
Copernicus had believed; they found that planets moved faster as they swung nearer 
to the sun, situated at one of the foci of the ellipse; and that their radii as 
drawn from the planet to the sun swept over equal areas in equal times. 
(4) Galileo (1564-1642) at about the same time was finding that objects of un-
equal weight fall at the same rate, and actually observed the Copernican universe 
(for example, moons revolving around Jupiter) for the first time with a telescope. 
(5) Newton (1642-1727) making his own observations and utilizing the informa-
tion of his predecessors effectively collated data _1'2 11 , 11 311 , and n4n into F=KmM/d2, 
the formula which stood for gravitation untill Einstein modified it in our own times. 
(6) Einstein's (1879-1955) still more general formulation of gravitation in 
terms of relativity explained certain discrepancies in the predicted mot'ion of the 
planet Mercury which Newtonian theory could not explain, as well as widen our · 
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knm:-ledge of gravitation to include other matters, such as the deflection of. a ray 
of light in a gravitational field, or the slower vibration of an atom in such a 
field. Newtons conception of gravitation seems to be a special, limited case of 
Einstein 1 s theory of relativity. 
We see coherence working in these steps as a process that corrects older views, 
includes more facts, relates in a broader way. Summarizing about it we may say it 
is characterized by four governing principles: it is lo!'.]ical, factual, relational, 
and inclusive. A coherent judgment (1) must be logical; it must be self-consistent 
inwardly. The Copernican judgment about the solar system is a more self-consistent 
or logical (if by logical we here mean simple) one than the Ptolemaic. (2) It must 
be factual: consistent with all facts in so far as we can decide what 11 fact 11 is. 
The Copernican theory explains the observed facts better, such as the planets 1 
apparent ttbackward11 motions, o:r the sun's 11 rising 11 ., (3) It must be relational: 
consistent with other propositions, facts, parts of experience held as true by the 
mind applying this criterion. Einstein's picture, derived essentially from the 
Copernican scheme, relates many diverse facts of physics and astronomy, such as 
those we have just mentioned. (4) It must be inclusive: must look at all details 
from the point of view of the whole as if from a higher aspect. We suggested how 
the Copernican perspective is from 11 above 11 as if looking dmm at the solar system. 
Sense Experience. How can we "explain" sense-experience e.g. our experience 
of the color ugreen 11 ? In other words, how may we talk "rationally" about this form 
of 11awareness11 , beyond the point where we simply assert, or emote, 11 see greenl 1 ? 
(Immediate senses are sometimes cited as forms of 11truth 11 that do not fit the coher-
ence criterion, but are rather examples of intuitive knowledge, for discussion of 
which. see criticisms below.) We may analyze our experience of "green11 in these four 
significant judgments, which are levels of understanding about it 1s nature and status: 
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(1) There is the Common-sense judgment: the color green is in the leaf -- a 
quality external to the observer. 
(2) The scientific judgment: the color green is produced by sunlight passing 
through chlorophyl, and is a light phenomenon; it can be measured in terms of wave 
length,f\-""c/f;" Green is not strictly 11 in" the leaf but is an effect of a certain 
type of light, passing between leaf and eye. 
(3) The psychological judgment: 11 green11 in an interpretation that the eye makes, 
a quality that it .. gives to that particular wave length of light; a 
11meaning 11 • Hence, it may be argued with some justification that the color is in the 
mind, a subjective phenomenon ... 
(4) The philosophic, coherent, or synoptic judgment: the color green is an 
emer~ent, a new reality, created or brought into being by the interplay of 11mind" 
and environment; it is really objective, 11 in the object", but only while the object 
is being observed. It is also 11 in11 or 11due to" the mind. If this conclusion is 
right, every aspect of theories 11 1 11 through 11 311 is maintained, but seen from the 
inclusive, that is, the coherent, point of view. 
~ practical illustration: what is the truth about a man whom we happen to see 
staggering down the street? Our immediate judgment might be that he is a drunkard. 
In a further investigation, however, through inquiry with friends, we learn that he 
is a 11 spastic 11 , victim of cerebral palsy. The sense experience, our observation of 
the ambulatory difficulties of both spastic and a possible drunkard are constant. 
Our wider coherent judgment, however, corrects the meaning of the phenomenon. We 
might even broaden our coherent inquiry into a third, larger sphere of information 
if we investigate the medical facts about cerebral palsy, with a view to learning how 
the condition might be corrected (good results: pragmatism) and the person helped to 
regain control of muscles and win a normal life. In this practical illustration we 
see how coherence brings us to the verge of 11moral judgment 11 , and so we turn to a 
few illustrations alcng that line. 
*Where J\. stands for the color quality; o the velocity of lighit; and f the frequency 
or "wave le ngth11 of the radiation phenomenon being cionsidE:ired,. 
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Value or moral truth. ls not coherence the method whereby we come to know 
value or moral truth, make value judgments? For one thing, the knowledge by which 
we come to know other minds than our own and recognize the supreme. value of person-
ality seems to be knowledge based on coherent judging. In this process we seem 
effectively to put together or synthesize all the motions, actions, words, and 
achievements of another human being and conclude that he is a "person", something 
like our$elves. Beyond this we see nature in her history putting forth energies to 
the seeming end of creating numerous such 11persons 11 , and we conclude that this must 
be the, or at least one, supreme end or value. Second, in the field of moral law, 
if persona.1 being is supreme, then the idea of respect for such being coherently 
follows as a fundamental insight. The principle and experience of love itself, ·, 
whereby lives.become related, suggests the coherent nature of moral judging. Third, 
beauty. To discern beauty we have to see the whole in a coherent judgment. It is 
more the total sunset that strikes us as beautiful rather than any one cloud or ray 
of 1i ght or stray feather. J\t least we get the full effect of beauty by observing 
the whole coherently, simultaneously, synoptically. Even our attempt to come to 
appreciate certain forms of 11 surrealistic art11 must be made on a coherent basis. 
Dali I s paintings at first may str.ike one as grotesque, ugly. But when the excellence 
of technique, or the wild dash of colors are taken in, as we attempt to see the pic-
ture as a whole, for some observers, at least, beauty appears. 
Appendix. B 
Criticisms of Coherence 
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The critics of the coherence criterion claim that it is faulty, or an incomplete 
criterion, for three main reasons: (1) that it implies that we must know all truth 
before we can know any truth; (2) that it is a variable standard and itself does not 
excape the relativity with which it charges pragmatism; (3) that some truth judgments 
are non-coherent, thus leaving an area uncovered by the coherence criterion, but 
explained rather by simple 11 corre.spondence 11 • Let us consider each of these criticisms 
at some length. 
(1) Must we know all truth before we can know my truth? Some judgments may be 
absolutely true here and now, though the whole of truth remain unknown as a whole. 
'I'he way of truth is like o. po.th up .a-mountain, which we have to date only partially 
ascended. As we go up, turning and looking out at the horizon, we see farther and 
farther into the realm of truth, although the higher we go some truth still lies 
beyond the horizon. Absolute Truth would be the vista at the top of the mountain, as 
God must see the world. Actually our metaphysical mountain, as far as our finite or 
limited abilities to climb are concerned, may have no literal 11 top 11 for us. God 1 s 
infinite transcendence alone is the condition for a knowledge of ~ ~· Whether 
in an after life we a.re permitted this vision is an entirely academic question. As 
far as we are presently concerned there would be a difference between absolute truthc, 
and Absolute Truth. No one but God experiences the latter, although 11e do experience 
the former in varying ways. If Absolute Truth would be an understanding of the world 
from God 1 s perspective, absolute truths would be those relatively certain judgments 
of sentience, science, and morality upon which we can base life practically. They are 
11 the truths 11 as far as we can see. That I now see this green of this leaf is an 
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nabs0lute truth11 on the sentient level of experience. Indeed, what 11 green11 is in the 
infinite detail of relationships as God sees things may be beyond my capacity to 
fathom, perhaps beyond all human capacity forever to comprehend. But that it is 
11 absolute 11 in its proximate, practical sense that we can declare. Similarly .ii th 
other 11 practical'1 judgments--that twice two is four, that personal being is supreme 
in value, that government should be by the consent of the governed, etc. (See our 
later discussion of these far-reaching moral judgments, and our eventual modification 
of the expression "Absolute Truth11 , Chapter 6.) 
(2) Is coherence vliable in a relativistic manner? The question is pointed at 
the T:Tay coherence 11 changes 11 or 11 supplants11 one judgment for, presumably, a newer 
more inclusive one. The attitude of coherence is always that of the open mind. It 
~mows that subsequent, larger truth may correct present smaller judgments. This fre-~ 
quently is not a correction by cancellation so much as by reformulation, by seeing 
the aspects of an older theory which are good and true, and including them in the 
newer point of view. 'Phere absolute denial of former Views is sometimes necessary, 
the newer coherent judgment simply denotes the former as incoherent, false or as error. 
One important, coherent judgment about our universe would be that errors are possible, 
which on the coherence theory would mean incoherent judgments. Considering this 
tricky problem, coherence would endeavor to take in all the facts. The main one of 
powers of' Judgment. Furlhe:r., coherence would try to understand why .freedom 
these is the freedom and finiteness -- but the growing character -- of our own/ 
and finiteness such as our own is 
11 good11 or 11best 11 for us. This question can be in a measure answered, though admittedly 
it takes us into the deepest of metaphysical waters, namely, the question why God has 
created the world as He has.~~ Therefore, endeavoring to answer these questions as 
judgment that would decide that some 11 incoherent 11 
clearly and as fully as ve can, it would indeed be a 11 coherenttt/judgments are pos-
silbe. In fact, if the later were not pbssibie., there v:ould be no freedom or finite 
;~Pursued at length in our discussion of evil, p. • 
1mrl6 as we know it, 
agair1 upon the 
of this chapter. ) 
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as Bmme 2nd others have thoughtfully pointed out. ~Te touch 
as a growing truth experience 
nature of coherencep.n our section of evaluation at the end 
(We reserve for a later section of this study a more extensive analysis of the 
problem, or meaning of ~,Chapter 6, Section 4. Suffice for the moment to mention 
one or two important distincitions. In depth the problem involves the question, What 
is the relation between "truth" and "being11 ? vTe have already gained some insight into 
this 
tlii:s problem earlier' in'/chapter. Truth is a relation , a dynamic, interactive pro-
cess that connects orders of being, that is connects sentient, thinking beings vd. th 
the world in which they live. When the connection is coherently made, the sentient, 
thinking being (and possibly the world as a whole itself) is modified, is raised to a 
new level of interactivity, emerging process, and reality. For example, that my aware-
ness of certain light vibrations at this moment may bring 11 green11 into being suggests 
that truth, at least on this sentient level,~ being. Could I speak of moral inter-
relatedness, truth in its very highest meaning, in a similar way, that is,as constitu-
in this 
ting 11 being 11 ? It seems so. Love, as ve suggested previoualy/chapter,is an essential 
creative 
aspect of moral truth, and truth in this/degree.,as a relation connecting two persons, 
makes each more in being., or "more truly being" than they uere prior to this relation-
ship. But we must grant that the problem of truth I s relation to being is a most dif- · 
ficult one to understand. Now brief'ly for error., error is the incoherent connection 
or relation of ideas. \hen Fe say that error "exists 11 we simply mean that there is a 
wrong such connection. We do not mean that error exists as a positive, creative con-
nection making new and grander 11being11 such as those suggested immediately above. In 
fact error diminishes or distorts such being. The ideas that are erroneously connected 
in the experience of error -- and it is not an 11 experience11 until the error is dis-
covered and admittedt -- may be themselves being or a form or degree of being). 
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(3) Is some truth judgment trans-coherent thus revealing an area of truth not 
covered by the coherence criterion, and consequently the limitations of this 
criterion? Sometimes sense experiences themselves (recall our previous discussion) 
or some other a priori or intuitive judgments, such as those of memory, or that 
twice two is four; or that I exist, are cited as examples of trans-coherent, or 
-ce 
immediately 11 correspondent 11 , truth. Ewing argues that coheren/ needs to be supple-
mented with 11 experience 11 , that is, truth propositions based on sheer 11 correspondencer 
He says: 
••• but • • • 1coheren0nce with experience' really means 'coherence 
with propositions based on experience', so that He have now admitted a 
second set of propositions 11ot themselves based on coherence but on 
the' mere fact that He can see them to correspond to our experience. 
The coherence criterion cannot without being thus supplemented by 
the correspondence criterion ever do justice to the empirical element 
in our knowledge. 11 (FQP p 63) 
!'., there are two elements in knouledge and true belief to both 
of which it is essential to give an adequate place in our philosophy, (1) active construction and system~tizing by the mind (i.e. coherence). 
(2) an objectively given basis independent of the first element and 
the foundation of its work11 • (FQP p 66) 
Ewing thus claims that the criterion of truth is a dual one, 11 coherence with experi-
~", (Ib. p 63) and by 11 experiencett he means 
respondencett of ideas to the way things are. 
:· sheer, unanalyzable 11 cor-
The reply to this thoughtful criticism might be that it contains a misapprehen-
sion of the full meaning or spirit of 11 coherence". Coherence is in depth a synoptic 
experience that 11 feels 11 relationship intuitively if it cannot aluays 11 see11 relation-
ship abstractly. JI.re not the above examples of so-called trans ... coherent knowledge 
actually coherences on some such deeper level of conscious awareness? Sense experi-
ences are c;reatly complex., rather than simple. It is never "green" in the abstract 
that I perceive, detached from the idea of 11 leaf 11 , with its shape, state of motion 
or rest, distance, height, etc, etc. -- but always a complex of ideas that coherently 
relate to each other. Gestalt psychology has fairly successfully demonstrated how 
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we otserve complex sentient objects as unified wholes. Sense experience particu::i..ar-· 
ly, 2.s giving kno't-iledge of an outside world, is, as Brightman reminds. us, a coherent 
judgment: we interpret the sense pressures that impinge upon our sensory organs aJ 
coming from truly objective sources because we know (coherently?) that we do not 
initiate them. The experience or the fulfillment of the judgment in its terminal 
sense, that there is indeed an objective world out there (thus revealing the irration-
ality of solipsism), is an experience of 11 correspondence 11 as ve have already argued; 
correspondence is the definition of truth vhen found; coherence is its criterion or 
way to go. To turn to memory=. simple immediate judgments of memory -- that I was 
sitting at the typewriter here yesterday -- have a coherent element. Indeed, is not 
its essential nature one of coherence? Memory judgments relate former time ·w.Lth the 
present as in a coherent whole; it is precisely coherence that seems to make memory 
and a sane self possible. 'What about the judgment 11 twice two is iourn? Again, it 
seems to the ~resent writer that the fitting together of the quantative propositions 
of mathematical logic is a cardinal example of coherent judging. At least it would 
certainly be incoherent to say that twice two is five! Finally, what about the in-
tuitive experience, I exist? Is this so unanalytical and simple that it is above, 
or prior to, coherent judgment? A reply in defense of the 11 coherence 11 of even this 
judgment might be to ask, Do we not really conclude that 1·re exist for a number of 
factors that coherently coalesce in the truth of this judgment -- our thought for one 
thing (as Descartes argued), our bodies for another~., our relations to our world for 
a third, etc?. Self-experience is a near infinite one in its complexity. At least one 
of the main problems of mental health, to speak of this dimension, is to attempt to 
11integrate 11 , or make the self 11 coherent11 • 
With these criticisms to caution us., and our attempts above at reply to encourage 
us, let us summarize the value of the coherence criterion. 
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Value of the Coherence Cd teri on 
(1) Coherence is 11pragmatic" and 11 empirical 11 in the widest meaning of these te.m:;., 
It is a mandate to examine all of the evidence that lies at hand and to be guided by 
ttexperience 11 • 
( 2) Coherence suggests that truth is a social fund -- that truth far exceeds 
individual capacity, and that we use the stored wisdom of the past and the investiga-
tions of our colleagues, as well as our own, for our own special inquiries. (Thus 
coherence makes place for adequate authority.) 
(3) Coherence is 11 dialectica1 11 , the capacity by which we may stand off and look 
.. 
at any judgment whatever in order to estimate its truth or falsity. Coherence con-
stantly corrects itself as new knowledge is discovered. As we have already mentioned, 
it is~ excellence the criterion of the open mind (contrary to what is sometimes 
said about it). It makes room for unsuspected elements -- it is able to transcend 
itself. It accepts as its own law, criticism and growth; it does not necessarily 
arrive, nay ever, at a closed system. Coherence itself guards against a too dogmatic 
rationalism. It :recognizes that there are incoherencies in life and existence, and 
makes place for a faith that can carry on in spite of these. Coherence is affirmative, 
positive, but humble. 
(L) Does coherence have any metaphysical implications? Suffused with the spirit 
of harmony and oneness, it does suggest the view that the universe is ultimately 
11 harmony11 or Honeness't, at least from the standpoint of the moral and of value., It 
is the religious point of view in its rational mood. Its faith is that there is no 
permanent disruption of the good purpose of existence, and it tends to look for a 
providential watchcare. In its fullest sense it guards against the idea of the 
"block universe 11 or extreme monism ontologically, which it is accused of 
supporting. Coherent insight discerns that a truly moral universe would have finite, 
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free parts; diversity; many aspects; even the possibility of conflict. Coherence 
implies a creative pluralism rather than a monolithic monism. It may be 11 idealisticn, 
however, in the basic sense that it believes in the dominance of 11 spirit 11 in the 
universe. 
Coherence suggests further metaphysical implications. We have already seen how 
it makes belief in an objective world possible; sens_ations must mean what they say of 
an outer world , if our perspectiYe is coherent and true. It makes belief in 
mind possible: there must be some active agency, some energy to receive sensations and 
interpret them in an orderly way. It suggests that, if the objective i,rorld and the 
mind get together effectively, there cannot be a complete disparity or duality be.:.. 
tween them; that there is community of existence in which they both share.,and per-
haps in part both create. It perceives reality primarily as concrete processes, life, 
individuals, rather than as abstract universals or ideas, though the latter may be 
one form of reality among others. Coherence recognizes the value of using universal 
ideas in the process of analysis as the short-hand which helps us to understand en-
tities and relationships, from atoms, to persons, to societies, and, in a tra.nscend-
ing dimension., possibly the reality of God. 
Coherence and faith. Faith is the arc that completes the circle of synoptic 
judgment. Our experience is fragmentary, rationally, emotionally, sentiently. 
Faith is the further. raticnal interpolation that finishes the pricture of our world: 
Knowledge 
-Faith 
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Fait:1 is the coherent feeling that our world is ultimately orderly, meaninguful 
rational,and personal. Coherence supports religion. Religious faith is essentially 
the belief in the goodness and adequacy of God, in brief, in His reasonableness, 
understanding, and love. These characteristics are attributed to Him on the basis 
of a synoptic judgment about the Divine nature. If He were less than these, His 
being would be inGoherent morally and He would not be the adequate object of worship 
that we suppose nim to be. 
Coherence and the idea of revelation. Given the theistic conception of the 
universe, the idea of 11 revelation11 or a divine self-disclosure has rational., coherent 
meaning. If there is Personal Deity, God would seek to disclose Himself to men as 
part of his highest relationship to the creation for which He is responsible (the 
other aspect would be His relationship as saving power, summed in the idea of sal-
vation considered at the end of our discussion on Man). But when God acts "revela-
tionallyu such self-disclosure would stand at once as rationally coherent with the 
rest of human experience and knowledge, if it is to be a meaningful revelation. If 
revelation is divine initiative, it must also be human receptivity_; if a divine 
reality acts from above and beyond, man must receive within a human understanding, 
which is enlarged and deepened by the revelational experience. Accordingly, a coher-
ence criterion of truth would suggest that revelation is essentially disclosure of 
truth itself, a deepening of reason, an enlargment of experience. We experience new 
truth as that which 11 dawns" or seems to 11break in11 upon the mind -- suggesting a 
transcendent action from above. We do not sieze truth; it is given, Yet we cannot 
receive it unless we are prepared. We have to search and analyze and think, before 
.. 
truth will disclose itself. This is the side of the process for which we are respons-
ible. Revelation is ·ccrr..rr:1..:nicn with God not dictation from him. Divine revelation 
and human discovery 11 are thus different aspects of one process11 (Rall £ 155). 
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Einstein's discovery of £=mc2 was revelation in the scientific sphere; Hosea's dis-
covery (in the midst of his tragic domestic experience of an unfaithful wife) that 
God is love was revelation in the moral and more typically 11 religiousn sphere. All 
revelation may be said to be objective in the sense that it comes through 
experience. That is to say, life has its impact upon us which eventually discloses 
ultimate values and may suggest their source in ultimate Personal Being. The Old 
Testament prophets believed that the channe'l of revelation, through which the divine 
spoke to man, is moral reason or insight, tested and borne out by experience. 
We conclude this chapter with a definition of 11 religious truth11 , and bring to 
a close our preliminary, definitional work regarding the relation of reason to reli g-
ion. 
11Reli~ious truth 11 would be the correspondence of our thought to ultimate realms 
of value, that is, awareness of truly highest value, and of the power or powers that 
sustain and increase it; and the ultimate feeling or full experience of ourselves as 
being in positive relationship to it personally. 
As we now proceed to our larger work of considering the ideas of,. and the argu-
ments for, God; the problem of evil; the religious ideas of man as spiritual being; 
the meaning of prayer and immortality and other problems, we may well bear with us 
the summarizing words of Brightman regarding the relevance and use of reason in 
religion: 
n •• Belief in a theistic God is an assertion of a metaphysically 
coherent universe, a universe organized by rational purpose for the 
realization of rational value" (APR 191). 
11A religious belief can be verified only by its relation to the 
system of our beliefs as a whole which have the marks of consistency 
with one another and with experience" (lb. 121). 


God as · Impersonal Being 
Fundamental alternatives in thinking; about the term 11God. 11 · We 
agree with Edgar S"' Brightman., who wrote that 11The dei' in:ttion of the 
religious object is ... the fundamental problem of religion11 (APR 13.3-4) 
In our terms of the preceeding chapter we might add that the definition 
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of the source of value, and its status in the universe, is the fundamental 
problem of religion. 
One basic way to define deity would be to say that God is source 
and conserver of value.. Whatever is the ultimate source and conserver 
of values would be 11God11 or ttDeity. 11 However, though this undoubtedly 
seems to be a possible general definition, it is just an introductory 
step; we rust hasten to fill this abstract form with further content. 
For example, man himself might be regarded as the 11ultimate source and 
conserver of values, 11 in which case we would have the critical 
naturalistic conception of deity of John Dewey and others. Or there 
may be the conception that there is something beyone man in the universe 
of the 
which is the source and principle/conservation of value. Such thinking 
issues at once into the more traditional idea of God as truly 
objective reality., principle, or power present in the universe whether 
man were here or not. Accordingly, from this more traditional stand-
' point Brightman gives as a fundamental definition: riGod is the 
objective source and conserver of value" (italics mine) (APR 134). 
Another fundamental definition along traditional lines was that of St. 
Augustine, who wrote that God would be whatsver in the universe is 
11 more excellent than," or above, or superior to, man and his finite 
' / 
mind and reason (Bk. II On the Freedom of the Will, vi, vii, xiii). 
On these fundamental levels of thinking there is, of course, the 
problem of defining 11value, 11 Which would finally condition our conception 
of deity. Recall our earlier initial attempts at defining this. term. 
Integral to the problem of value is whether "personality" is 11 value," and 
to what degree? In conclusion, then, our initial definition, given above, 
that God is source and conserver of value, suggests at least two great 
watersheds of thinking about deity that are fundamental and crucial: 
1. Whether deity is entirely a human subjective terminological 
principle, on the one hand; or whether the term refers to a truly 
objective., cosmic principle, power, or being of some kindon the other; and 
2. 1rfuether personality as value must necessarily or not enter into 
the concept of deity: whether God is an impersonal principle or personal 
being. 
Historically, there has been a ttil"d issue of basic importance in 
thinking about deity as referring to a value making and sustaining 
principle: namely., whether values are ultimately unified in some single 
sustaining source, or unitary principle of reality; or whether the 
universe of values remains plural, Le .. whether deity is one or many, 
the issue between polytheism end motheism or other cosmic monisms. 
The classic Hebraic and western conception has been that God is 
objective, unitary, personal Being.~ In the history of philosophic 
~~his statement would be modified, of course, in the case of certain 
classic philosophers such as Aristotle or Plotinus .• 
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thought, however, there been conceptions God as objective but 
impersonal (the tendency of eastern religions), and also conceptions 
of the divine as personal but many (polytheisms, east and west). It 
seems simplest to analyze the conceptions of God first in terms of the 
classic issue between personality or impersonality in God, considering as 
we proceed, when it systematically arises, the use of the term 11God11 for 
a purely subjective principle., Similarly, we shall in due course 
consider polytheism as the earlier form of the personalistic idea of 
deity. 
Our concern first and basically for the personality problem as 
we consider the meanings of the term 11God11 may perhaps be best stated 
thus: 
The problem of the 11 existence 11 or reality of God and the problem 
of the 11personality11 of God are two levels of the same problem., 
Practically speaking for men, God would not 11 exist11 unless He were 
11personal; 11 that is, unless He were a Being., Level, or Order of Reality, 
or a dynamical process, movement, or 11Spirit0 within reality., who is 
trans-human, though possibly inclusive of the human, and in his 
essential 11 lii'e11 is conscious good will or love. 
Accordingly., we view the larger tasl\'.S of this work as endea·voring 
to reply to the question: does reascn or experience test the 11presence11 
or 11 reality11 of God as thus defined? In the meamrhile., with this initial 
clarification . of several fundamental notions or problems,we 
proceed to the following analysis and evaluation of major concepts 
of God. 
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Conceptions of God as Impersonal 
Conceptions of God in the impersonal mood have included several 
fundamental avenues of thinking, all of which are related and all of which 
contain significant iusights. These several approaches or emphases are: 
God as necessary minimal ttunity, 11 as the full 11whole11 of reality, as 
cosmic 11process11 or integrative activity leading to natural formation and 
values, and as abstract form and value itself. 
I. God as Primitive Cosmic "Unity" 
1. It is possible to think of God as the minim.al principle of 
integration, or primitive cosmic unity, without which there could "Ere no 
relationship, connections, order, or areas of coherence of any kind in 
our world. 1le cannot conceive of a world such as ours is, with its vast 
stretches of actually realized order, if its basic ttfactors" are 
completely disparate, unrelated, or unorganizable, i.e. if' it is based 
on 11 absolute plurality.,n (We will note the expansion of this theme later 
as basic to the positive argument for God.) 
The non-theistic personalist, John McTaggart, admitted that it 
is possible to define God as we have just suggested, i.e. in such an 
attent:.ate.d, impersonal way that the argument about his nexistencett 
becomes trivial. As McTaggart discussed it in his famous critical work., 
Some Dogmas of Reli~ion (p .. 186), we may stop somewhere short of the 
radically pluralistic concepticn of the universe as 11 a mere aggregate, 
or a mere chaos.n In that case we may say that 11God" is the minimal 
ttunity11 of the worldc1 i .. e .. the simplest bond of relation that obviously 
holds the elements or atoms (or whatever the ultimate factors may be) 
together the most primitive level of integration. Affirmation of 
God's existence, then, in this abstract sense, would pass without 
comment,. 11 If the word is used in this sense, 11 says McTaggart, 11 everyone, 
except absolute sceptics or the most extreme pluralists must be said to 
believe that a God exists 11, (ibid.) A We must agree, course, with 
McTaggart that the further·problem, from the standpoint of western 
theology and 11 common language, 11 is to ask whether God is t1a being who is 
personal, supreme, and good" ( The Nat.ure of Existence, vol. II, p.. 176) • 
Let us try to diagram McTaggart•s 11God11 in the following way: 
Evaluation. A criticism of this view from the religious side 
would be that it gives only the barest 11metaphysica.111 kind of God., 
hardly an adequate object of devotion and worship. From the logical 
side we would need to define clearly what we mean by such "minimal 
integration," and finally., from the empirical side., examine whether 
the world were actually limited to such minimal structure.. For one 
thing, if by 11)11inimal integration" we mean the barest way by which 
11 electrons11 or other primitive factors cohere to form the elements., 
the world is obviously integrated in far more complex degrees than 
just that. There are vast reaches of molecular, organic, mental and 
personal integration. 
The upper levels of psychic integration may suggest what the 
full nature of cosmic integration is. In any case, from the idea of 
God as the minimal unity, we may proceed to the opposite possibility 
of God as the :maximal whole., Accordingly, we move to what we will 
here call 11pantheistic11 ideas of God., 
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n. Conceptions of Gcd astheWhole of Reality-
. Such mood in thinking about deity is sometimes called the npan-
theistictt view. (Traditionally, the total immanence of D.aity in 
the world and the idea of its impersonality have characterized pan-
theistic thinking--note presently our further definition of pan-
theism). But we must bear in mind., before criticizing pantheism, 
that there are two main types, a narrower and a larger, a naive and 
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a more profound view. The first view. is more of a theoretical 
possibility than one seriously held by thoughtfully philosophic people. 
In so far as it may be held, however--and we find an approximation to 
it in certain primitive concepts of God-we may term it popular, 
naive, or undiscriminating pantheism. Another view- we shall call 
philosophical pantheism. In our present development., then, these 
constitute our second and third major views of God .• 
2. The lower pantheism would understand God to be the universal 
immanent principle of animation or "lifen that informs all nature. 
In this view 11Godn and 11naturen are equivalent., but it is nature 
with a small 11n11 • That is to say., all things without distinction 
derive from a universal t1lif e force., 11 God, as the imperso~til vital 
force, is immediately and without subtilty literally everywhere in 
phenomena. In such terms, the di vine is equally present in nature I s 
surfaces as :in her depths. Touch this tree and you touch God. 
When we hear people say, 110h, God is simply nature, 11 we have the 
mood of the lower pantheism. Referring to our illustration, this mood 
seems to be saying that the term and idea 11tree11 exhausts the meaning 
o:f the term and idea 11God. n 
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Such view would be like ancient animism if reconstructed an 
impersonal monis.m-. . That instead of separate personal 11 spirits11 
inhabiting each and every object of nature, as with primitivy,·, animism, 
the spirits are blended into one impersonal life principle~ sometl'?,1.ng 
like the primitive idea of 11:mana,. n In Polynesian thought man.a is a 
kind of all-pervading, supernatural atmosphere, the basic potency that 
inhabits objects, natural processes, and persons, and gives to them 
whatever quality seems extraordinary or remarkable. The pantheistic 
of man~, in which the primitive person stands in great awe, seems 
to be a universal concept among primitives, having parallel terns in 
various aboriginal cultures, such as 11orenda, 11 11manitou, 11 and 11wakanda. 11 
The popular level of Hindu thought among the Indian masses may in 
•.. 
substance ,·· approximate the 11 pantheism11 above described,; Brahman, the 
impersonal, absolute whole of being, is man:i.i'est in-every nook and 
(cranny of nature, in all lesser gods and goddesses of the popular 
Hindu polytheism, in all living creatures, and in inanimate objects., 
Evaluation., No doub.t the religious type of mind may sometimes 
find itself in such a pantheistic mo.od, when an undis~riminating 
theology of vitalism..and inunanence,such as this, seems to be the 
simplest theoretical possibility, the easiest way out of the problem 
of how to think of God,.. But can we seriously accept such a view? Is 
it true that all things .are, in such an indiscriminate and literal 
way, 11God'1--the object of supreme value and devotiom this particle 
of dust, the cobra w'l;.;th its venom, the North Star in its remote 
11 coldness, 11 a burst of hydrogen energy as it obliterates a city, 
Hitler's criminal madness? Can our thinking rise no higher in a 
discrimination of values a11d in an understanding of supreme value, or 
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in comprehension of a possible objective source and sustainer of 
supreme value which is itse1.f supreme discriminator of value? Naive 
pantheism suggests a total lack of discrimination of value. As a 
student of mine once said, 11you must go deeper than the bark for 
contact with God.n* Is such a primitive pantheism a challenging 
alternative to a scientific world view without God, based on philo-
sophical materialism? Actually, with the great so-called pantheistic 
literature east and west, the Upanishads, Spinoza1 s Ethic, Wordsworth's 
poems, there is always a profoundity that exceeds the lower pantheism 
just described. We turn to this more serious interpretation of the 
divine. 
3. Philoso;ehic or higher Pantheism. In this mode of thinking 
about. deity God is the metaphysical Whcle, profounder in its ultimate 
depth and reality than any finite part or phenomenon of 11 nature11 as 
we, through sensation, perceive her. God is Nature with a captial 
uN. 11 .To put ourselves in the mood of philosophical pantheism we must 
attempt to distinguish between surface ttnature, 11 or bare 11physical 
nature, 11 and the deeper metaphysical world. Surface nature would be 
only that aspect wh:i.ch we finite, sensory beings know, whereas the 
11metaphysical world11 would be that vast increment over and beyond 
our finite perception, which we do not and perhaps may never entirely 
know or fully experience or understand. Philosophic pantheism thinks 
of God as 11 immanent11 in, or identified with, this larger metaphysical 
world, i.e. with Nature in broadest and profoundest depth. The 
Divine is more in its all-inclusive reality than any superficial part 
1
*-Louise Sin:cm, Spring, 1959. 
or phenomenon that may be sentiently and limitedly perceived; though, 
of course, the sentient level of reality is an aspect, o:r 11mode, 11 of 
God, as Spinoza would have said. The concept of Brahman in philo-
sophic Vedantic Hinduism, Plotinus's ~' the Taoists'~, Spinoza's 
Substance, Hegel's Absolute Reason, Bradley's Absolute Experience o! 
Feelin~, even Herbert Spencer's Unknowable Source cf all being, may 
be regarded as representative interpretations of the ultimate Whole 
that transcends finite distinctions., Let us try to suggest by a 
diagram the difference between the two kinds of pantheism. 
Naive pantheism Philosophical pantheism 
Several distinguishing characteristics or types of this 
profounder pantheism should be noted: 
1. All of these systems agree that all finite things are 
aspects, parts, or modes of the Absolute Being, no one of 
which fully expresses or exhausts its Nature. God is the 
maximal principle of eternal and abiding wholeness and 
obviously we finite observers cannot be acquainted with the 
1~hole in all of its ramifying relations and processes. 
2., With some thinkers the quality . , of abstract 11 reason, 11 
or of 11feeling, 11 or of "striving will11 is the most distinctive 
thing to say about the ultimate nature of the Whole, e.g. as 
9 
respectively, with Spinoza or Hegel, or with Bradley or 
Schopenhauer. 
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3. With others, the deepest nature of the Absolute transcends 
reason, or will,, or any other .finite 11mode.11 Brahman in Vedanta 
Hinduism, or the Tao in Taoism, transcends anything that can be 
said or kno"Wn about it. Plotinus expressly placed_:his One, and 
F,H. Bradley ultimately his Absolute., beyond intellectual 
description, though Bradley said 11feeling 11 came nearer to 
expressing the nature of the Absolute than any other finite 
experience. 
4. In some systems (and here we depart from the strict 
pantheistic idea, in the view of this writer) the insight is 
that the Absolute is Personal Being, more like the tradional 
idealism of Ramanuja, 11th century A.D. Hindu philosopher, or 
the modern American idealists, Josiah Royce and Borden 
Parker Bowne. 
5. In many of these systems human 11 society11 is the 
highest expression of the Absolute on the plane of finite 
life and history. 
6. In some of these higher pantheisms, as for example 
the tendency in Hinduism, the finite material aspect of the 
world, with its main quality of many separate individual 
things, is regarded as illusory, 11unrea1, appearance"; or at 
least ultimately unreal though perhaps for the here and now 
temporarily "real." Since Brahman, the absolute Whole of 
being, is absolute unitary Spirit, how can there be in the 
long run many material individual things? 
7, Also characteristic of Vedanta Hinduism is the idea 
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that finite selves are but expressions of the one absolute 11Self11 
or Life of Brahman. The following paragraphs.from The Bhagavad 
~' the most popular Hindu Scripture, and from Sankara, 
greatest medieval interpreter of orthodox Hinduism (9th century 
A.D.), illustrate many of the general characteristics of philo-
sophic pantheism. Following these selections from Hindu 
thought we quote F ,.H. Bradley's now classic passages on the 
nature of the Absolute, in which he denies personality to 
ultimate Being and Reality. 
The Bhagavad Gita on Brahman 
(Most popular Hindu Scripture, 2nd CenturyA.D.) 
The personified Ultimate in the form of the god 
Krishna speaks:) 
11 I am the source of the forthgoing of the whole universe and 
likewise the place of its dissolving. There is naught whatsoever 
higher than I •••• All this is threaded on me, as rows of pearls 
on a string,. 
11 I am the sapidity in waters •• ., the radiance in moon and sun .. .,. 
the word of power in all the Vedas, sound in either, and virility 
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in men ••• the life in all beings am I ••• not I in them, but they in me. 
11All this world,. • .,..this divine illusion of mine, caused by 
the qualities, is hard to pierce; they who come to me, they cross 
over this illusion. 11 (Robt. D. Ballou, The Bible of the vforld, .. P• 93.) 
11 The man who casts off all desires and walks -without desire., with 
no thought of a Mine and of an I, comes unto peace. 
- -
This is the state of abiding in Brahma, O son of Pritha. He 
that has come therein is not confounded; if even at his last hours 
he dwell in it, he passes to extinction in BrahmaJ.1 (Hindu Scriptures, 
ed. Nicol Macinol, p. 235.) 
Sankara on Brahman 
(Sankara, orthodox Hindu philosopher, 788-820 A.D, 
This selection was taken from Hartshorne and Reese: 
Phi1::o"Sophers Speak of God, Univ. of Chicago Press, 
1953, p. 170£.) 
11 Brahman, which is all-knowing and endowed with all powers, 
whose essential nature is eternal purit,y, intelligence, and freedom, 
exists.,..Brahman as the eternal subject ••• (the inward Self) is never 
an object, and.. .,.the distinction of objects known, knowers, acts of 
knowledge, etc ..... is fictitiously created •••• That same Highest 
Brahman constitutes--as we know from passages such as •that art thout-
the real nature of the individual soul, while its second nature, i.e. 
that aspect of it which depends on fictitious limiting conditions, 
is not its real nature ••• ,.the True, the Real, the Self., whose nature is 
pure intelligence.,..knowing itself to be of the nature of unchangeable., 
eternal Cognition ••• lifts itself above the vain conceit of being one 
with this body., and itself becomes the Self, whose nature is 
unchanging, eternal Cognition. As is declared in such passages as. 
'He who knows the highest Brahman becomes even Brahman1 ., •• .,There is 
only one highest Lord ever unchanging, whose substance is cognition, 
and who •••• manifests himself in various ways .... A man may, in the dark, 
mistake a piece of rope for a snake, and run away from it, frightened 
and trembling; thereupon another man may tell him, tDo not be afraj_d, 
it is only a rope, not a snake'; and he may then dismiss the fear 
caused by the imagined snake, and stop running. But all the while the 
presence and subsequent absence of his erroneous notion, as to the 
rope being a snake, made no difference whatever in the rope itself. 
Exactly analogous is the case of the individual soul which is in 
reality one with the highest soul, although Nesience /J.gnoranc:!-7 
makes it appear different •••• As therefore the individual soul and 
the highest Self differ in name only, it being a settled matter that 
perfect knowledge has for its object the absolute oneness of the two; 
it is senseless to insist, as some do f;.g. the Sankhya Hindu~ 
on a plurality of Selfs •••• 
11 In the same way as those parts of ethereal space which are 
limited by jars and waterpots are not really different from the 
universal ethereal space, and as the water of a mirage is not 
really different from the surface of the salty steppe-for the 
nature of that water is that it is seen in one moment and has vanished 
in the next, and moreover, it is not to be perceived by its own 
nature (i.e. apart from the surface of the desert)--; so this 
manifold world with its objects of enjoyment., enjoyel:'s and so on 
has no existence apart from Brahman ..... the entire complex of 
phenomena.1 existence is considered as true as long as the knowledge 
of Brahman being the Self of all has not arisen •••• Just as the 
light of the sun or the moon which pervades the entire space 
becomes straight or bent as it were when the limiting adjuncts with 
which it is in contact, such as a finger, for instance, are straight 
or bent, but does not really become so; and just as the ether, 
although imagined to move as it were when jars are being moved, 
does not really move; and as the sun does not tremble, although its 
image trembles when you shake the cup filled 1dth water in which 
the sun's light is reflected; thus the Lord also is not affected by pain, 
although pain be felt by that part of him which is called the 
individual soul. 11 
Sankara on Knowledge Brahman 
(From Robert D,. Ballou, The Bible of the World, p. 141-2) 
11 The spirit is smothered, as it wel'.'e, by ignorance, but so soon 
as ignorance is destroyed, spirit shines forth, like the sun when 
released from clouds. After the soul, afflicted by ignorance, has 
been purified by knowledge, knowledge disappears,as the seed or 
berry of the Kataka after it has purified water., 
11 Like an image in a dream the world is troubled by love., hatred, 
and other poisons. So long as the dream lasts, the image appears to 
be real; but on awaking it vanishes. 
11 The world appears real, as an oyster-shell appears to be silver; 
but only so long as the Brahman remains unknown, he who is above all, 
and invisible. That Being, true, intelligent, comprehends within 
itself every variety of being, penetrating and permeating all as a 
thread which strings together beads. 
"In consequence of possessing divers attributes, the supreme 
existence appears manifold, but when the attributes are annihilated, 
unity is restored •••• 
0All that belongs to the body (must be considered) as the 
product of ignorance.,.., 1 I am Brahman. Because I am distinct from 
body, I experience neither birth, old age, decrepitude, nor 
extinction, and detached from organs of sense, I have no longer any 
connection with their objects, such as sound. 
11 This conception, 'I am Brahman itself,' incessantly entertained, 
disperses the hallucinations born of ignorance, as medicine disperses 
s.ickness .. 
11Seated in a desert place, exempt from passion, master of his 
senses, let man represent to himself this spirit, one and infinite, 
without allowing his thoughts to etray elsewhere • 
. 
11 Considering the visible universe as annihilated in spirit, let a 
man, pure through intelligence, constantly contemplate the One Spirit, 
as he might contemplate luminous ether. 
"The Yagin, possessing perfect discernment, contemplates all 
things as subsisting in himself, and thus, by the eye of knowledge, 
discovers that all is the One Spirit. He knows that all this movable 
world is spirit or that beyond spirit there is nothing; as all varieties 
of vase are clay, so all things he sees are spirit. 11 
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F. H., Bradley on the Absolute 
(Francis Herbert Bradley., 1846-1924., took Hegelian 
11 absolute idealism11 to its high water mark in England 
toward an impersonalistic interpretation of Ultimate 
Reality., We here quote his works Appearance and 
Reality and Truth and Reality.) 
" ••• In its general character Reality is present in knowledge 
and truth •••• But this general character of Reality is not Reality 
its elf •••• Truth., •• cannot be intellectually transcended. To fill in 
its conditions would be to pass into a whole beyond mere intellect. 
(AR 547). 
"Reality for me ••• is one individual Experience,. • .,a higher 
unity above our immediate experience ••• above all ideality and 
relations ••• above thought and will and aesthetic perception •••• 
Such a whole is Reality, and as against this whole, truth is 
merely ideal •••• It is Reality appearing and expressing itself in 
that onesided way which we call ideal (TR 3l~3). 
11Ultima.te reality is such that it does not contradict itself 
(.AR 137). 
11And Reality is •• ..,the sole perfect realization of spirit.,,.. 
Reality is spirituai. There is a great saying of Hegel's ••• and one 
which without some explanation I should not like to endorse. But 
I ~rill end with something not very different, something perhaps 
more certainly the essential message of Hegel. Outside of spirit 
there is not, and cannot be, any reality, and, the more that any~ 
thing is spiritual, so much the more is it veritably real, (.AR ,52:). 
t1The absolute holds all possible content in an individual 
experience where no contradiction can exist (.A.R 147). 
11Reality is one. It must be smgle, because plurality; taken 
as real, contradicts itself. Plurality implies relations, and, 
through its relations, it unwillingly asserts always a superior 
unity. To suppose the universe plural is.therefore to contradict 
oneself and, after all, to suppose that it is one. Add one world 
to another, and forthwith both worlds have become relative, each 
the finite appearance of a higher and smgle Reality •••. 
11We have an idea of this unity which., to some extent, is 
positive ••• (AR 519-20). 
11Are we then to assert that the Absolute consists of souls? ••• 
The Absolute would not consist of souls. Such a phrase implies a 
mode of union which we cannot regard as ultimate. It suggests 
that in the Absolute finite centers are maintained and respected, 
and that we may consider them, as such., to persist and to be 
merely ordered and arranged. But not like this (we have seen) is 
the final destiny and last truth of things. We have a re-arrangement 
not merely of things but of their internal elements. 1rTe have an 
all-pervasive transformation with a re-blending of all material. 
And we can hardly say that the Absolute consists of finite things, 
when the things, as such, are there transmuted and have lost their 
individual natures .. .,. 
110nce give up your finite and mutable person, and you have 
parted with everything which, for you, makes personality important ••• 
For me it is sufficient to know, on one side, that the Absolute is 
not a finite person. Whether, on the other side, personality in an 
eviscerated renmant of sense can be applied to it, is a question 
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:intellectually unimportant and practically trifling. 
'!'With regard to the personality of the Absolute we must guard 
against two-sided errors. The Absolute is not personal., nor is it 
moral, nor is it beautiful or true. And yet in these denials we 
may be falling into worse mistakes .... But it is better in this connection 
to call it super-personal (AR 529-533). 
11A person •.• to me must be f:i.nite, or must cease to be personal 
(TR hL.9) .. 
11 ! refer to the 'personality• of God and the 'immortality' of 
the soul., I shall assume here., rightly or wrongly, that a persoN>l 
God is not the ultimatetru.th about the universe, and in that ultimate 
truth would be included and superseded by something higher than 
personality. A God that can say to himself I I' as aga:i.nst you and 
me, is not, in my judgment defensible as the last and complete truth 
for metaphysics •••• (TR 432). 
11 
••• I cannot accept a personal God as an ultimate truth.,.. .The 
highest Reality so far as I can see, must be super-personal (TR 436). 
11A doctrine such as the personality of God may be true, as 
giving in an imperfect and incorrect ma11ner a most essential feature of 
reality which cannot as well be given otherwise.. And the doctrine 
may be necessary, perhaps, as being for a certain vital purpose the 
best idea that we can conceive, and the supreme belief on which we 
have to act. But, however this may be, if we go further and take 
personality as be:i.ng the last word about the Universe, we fall, in 
my opinion, into serious error (TR 451). 
11 The absolute for me cannot be God {of traditional faith and 
religionJ, because :in the end the Absolute is related to nothing, 
and there cannot be a practical relation between it and the finite 
will. When you begin to worship the Absolute, you in that moment 
have transformed it. It has become something forthwith which is less 
than the Uni verse •• .!~ TR428) • 
We here pause in our consideration of the higher pantheism for a 
clearer definition of this term as we will use it in this study. The 
word pantheism as describing an idea of God has possibly three main 
elements: (1) the idea of God as "everywhere;" or (2) as totally 
immanent (Hartshorne and Reese in Philosophers Speak of God); and 
(3) the main meaning in which we intend to use the term herea:fter-.-
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any conception of God as the whole of reality which tends to deny 
personality to the whole. (Accordingly, Josiah Royce is not a 11pantheist,t1 
as he is sometimes labeled, but a theist, as .is the Hindu Ramanuja. 
We reserve to a later place the clarification of the term theism as 
ref erring to the personalistic idea of God.) 
Concerning the idea of God 1 s "::i.InI1:ianencett, we should recall that 
the higher philosophical pantheisms just mentioned consider the 
Absolute or ultimate irThole of' Being as always more than any known . 
finite aspect of the world., With these systems, therefore, it is 
clearer to say that the world is immanent in the Absolute Being, 
rather than the other way, as indeed we heard the Bhagavad-Gita 
arm:ml1Ce9 As the philosophical pantheist might state it, 11What we 
know about God is limited; but God is not limited to what we lmow. 11 
Thus a profound reverence, born of our ignorance, before the Great 
"Whole of Being, is always present in the finer side of the pan-
theistic outlook .. 
Evaluation. Our discussion has just brought out that some 
idealh;ms may be called pantheistic, ii' their conception of. the 
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·whole is impersonalistic... The criticisms pantheisms and such idealisms., 
then, are similar. The Il'lAin questions that may be raised about pantheism 
are the f ollowir.g: 
1. What value and freedom do finite individuals have when 
merged with the Whole? Eastern pantheistic .religions tend to lose 
sight of the significance of the individual, of individuality and 
personality., 
2,. What about evil? Are all distinctions of good and bad, all 
value, lost in such pantheistic Whole or Absolute? Some of the classic 
scriptures just quoted suggest this., Is there a connection between 
some of the traditional, practical apathy toward concrete evils, such as 
the caste system in India, and its pantheistic philosophy? (We know, 
of course,that Hindus themselves have criticized caste; and it is the 
fact today that it is not recognized legally in India.) 
3. If the ultimate Whole is trans-personal and unlmowable in any 
finite terms, we cannot establish any personal religious attitude toward 
it. One cannot pray or have fellowship with the impersonality of the 
Whole, as B1"a.filey quite rightly pointed out. The personal 11 God11 of 
human religion, Bradley declared, has only a symbolical function: 
11God11 as the object of religion is the imaginary focal point of man 1s 
highest form of social integration. He concluded that individual 
religious consciousness., involving the conception of a personal God, 
is a finite example of 11appearance, 11 11 mere illusion11 and not 
reality (TR Li34).. The :rrrysticism of the east tends to bear out 
Bradley's logical analysis at this'point. Hindusim in its advanced 
nwstical disciplines (e,.,g. the discipline of the Yagin), and 
particularly early Buddhism, emphasized the flight from personality 
as the way of salvation, the getting beyond individual life, bodily and 
psychic, back to the whole of Brahman or to the absolute nemptiness11 of 
Nirvana. Accordingly, from two of the scriptures we hear the Yogin say: 
11The Yagin in the highest meditation is void within and without 
like a pot in the world-space. Re is also, like a pot in the 
ocean, full within and without •••• he should give up personal 
thoughts. He should abandon all thoughts subjective and objective. 
The external universe is created by our thoughts, as also the 
imaginary world ..... A Yogi in highest meditation •• .,does not know 
himself and othersV(Ballou 145) 
11 
••• union (or Yoga) is achieved through the subjugation of 
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the psychic nature •••• These are the difficulty-producing hinderances: 
avidya (ignorance), the sense of personality, desire, hate and 
the sense of attachment •••• When the chitta (mind stuff) becomes 
absorbed in that which is the reality (or idea embodied in the 
form.), and is unaware of separateness or the personal self, 
this is contemplation or Sam.adhi. 11 (Ballou 146-9) 
4. In so far as pantheism identifies God with the world substance 
or process, emphasizing the divine "immanence" at the expense of a 
possible 11 transcendentn aspect, the tendency is to relate God, without 
adequate distinction of values, too closely with human life, imperfect 
hu.man decisions, history., and institutions. For example, Hegel blandly 
wrote that 19th century Prussian society was the highest expression 
of the Divine Lifel A related problem with historic pantheisms and 
ttnature religions" has been their tendency to limit the divine to the 
procreative process of life, as is characteristic of fertility cults 
ancient and modern. Again the case of India at the level of some of 
her popular religion ( least until the recent past) might be mentioned. 
In sum the main problem with philsosphic pantheisms seems to lie 
in an ill ... de.fined concept of 11God as the 'rwhole.11 , No doubt the concept 
of God as the irJhole is a fruitful one, if we mean mainly God 1s power 
or will which is in control of the whole, from the standpoint of ari. 
ultimate realization of value., The divine 0 wholenessn and 11 control11 
must have essentially a moral meaning, to the effect that evil shall not 
ultimately prevail, but that good shall .. And if the main meaning of 
God I s i.rholeness is moral, this would at once leave place for f'ini te 
freedom and' decision as being a provision of the ultimate moral 
wholeness of God. For if God is 11 morally whole," he would desire 
freedom in his finite creatures, not a Jlln~ish,pre-determined nature in 
them.. If God is morally whole he would approach his free creatures 
on the basis of love, the free persuasive power of intellectual values 
and ideals, and in terms of free, personal fellowship and communion. 
And he would have established a world order conducive to such free and 
moral relationships, i.ell be., and keep himself, duly transcendent by his 
own moral self-limitation., Along this avenue of insight, the concept 
of God as the 11whole11 is fruitful,. In sum, if God is the 11whole11 we 
must conceive this 11wholeness11 in moral, rather than in substantive 
or ontological terms, or too immanentist terms. 
If God is thought of as th"" 11whole 11 we must not be cor.fused 
by too mechanical or quantitative understanding of his wholeness. 
We do not have to think of God'sprivate being., in the most intimate 
reaches of h~s selfhood, as extending, in a spacial metaphor, throughout 
the whole as air fills' a room, a:ny more than our 01,m highest or deepest 
psychic life need be identified with every aspect of the bodily 
organism. We are not totally our own livers or toenails! Some of God•s 
being may be in the part; but we cannot say without confusion that all 
of his being lodges in any one finite part. There may :remain an irmer-
most or a highest, personal aspect of God that transcends arry and all of 
the parts-analogously as we ourselves in our own innermost personal 
selfhood seem to transcend any and all our boally parts, though at 
the level of our voluntary action we can control many of them. As 
Brightman wisely states in a discussion on mysticism, "monism" need 
not be 11 identified with pantheism, 11 but may 11be taken to mean the view 
that a unitary spirit of good controls the uni verse" (APR 171). This 
discussion, of course, brings us to the edge of our human knowledge as 
to just how spirit relates to nature, and we reserve for a later 
place in our study a fuller discussion of how we believe the Divine 
Spirit does relate~ It nmst suffice here to conclude that the concept 
of God's moral wholeness is intimately implied in the concept of the 
divine npersonality;" for how could there be nmoral wholeness" without 
self-conscious being consitiuting such wholeness? And the idea of the 
Personality of God is precisely the point at which many philosophical 
pantheisms seem most confused. 
There is a slightly different way of stating the criticism of God's 
innnanence in the world. Ultimately philosophic pantheism is subject to 
the s8.me criticism as naive pantheism. The concept of immanence is 
the authentic and predominating mood of classic pantheism. Even 
though the farther reaches of Deity are 11beyond I what we may know of 
nature, beyond any finite, individual 11:mode., 11 nevertheless the point 
of classic pantheism seems to be that nature, even that phenomenal 
aspect of her which we do know, is absolutely necessary to the being 
o:f God. Without nature as we know her there could not be 11God11 ... -she is, 
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as she is, an intimate and necessary expression of his life and being. A 
more discriminating theology, however, may conceive the possibility that, 
were nature here or not, God still might be, in some transcendent 
and private aspect of his being. Such aspect of God would harbor good 
that is yet unrealized by nature and finite process, or good that judges 
the evil :in finite nature and process. Pantheistic theology makes God 
captive to the world (and to its evil)-e ... g,. Shiva on his destructive 
----- ---
side; whereas a more theistic theology conceives the world to be the child 
of God, growing into likeness of the Father, whom the Father creates, 
loves, cherishes, suffers for., and hopes for, even chastens,. In a 
pantheistic theology God is totally dependent upon the world; in a 
theistic view, the world is dependent on a free and moral, Creative Father. 
Central to the conscience of pantheism, of course, is the problem 
of the world's evil. In the same mood in which it thinks of every 
finite thing as a necessary emanation of Brahman it shrinks away from 
the moral implication of this affirmation and tends to deny any 
reality to the world. Classic pantheism is caught between the extremes 
of belie-'i·ing that the world is real on the one hand (Sankhya ...... extreme 
dualism), and that of denying that the world is real in any sense at 
all on the other (extreme Vedm1ta, or monism). This unstable tension 
results from~ undiscriminating philosophy of immanence. 
To do justice to all aspects of our problem here, in behalf of an 
integral theism, it is probably better-to say that nature is an 11 intimate 
and necessary expressionn o:f God's creative ~, and its power., 
Thus, such a theism may bedj"~posed to say, indeed with pantheism, that the 
world of manifested form is, or may be, a continuing and eternal 
realization of the divine moral intent. In this sense, therefore, God 
is never without his world., as the posit of his moral will--but to say 
that he is 11 never without his world11 is not to say that he must be 
identified totally with his world_., in the sense of an exhaustive., 
ontological, or immanentist monism. 
Later on in our reconstruction of the problem of God's relation 
to the world, we will use pantheism ts innnanental idea., but it will be 
less rigid., more open--indeed open and dynamic as are the conceptions 
of enera and spirit, which we there employ. 
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Conceptions of God as Cosmic Process 
There have oeen fo:rms of philosophy which have thought of the 
ultimate, or absolute., like pantheism, as primarily ,,, an im.manent 
principle, but have regarded it as dynamic, striving force, rather than 
as static or perfected beillg• One of these systems is that of the 19th 
;~": 
century philosopher Schopenhauer, who conceived the ultimate principle 
desire, or will, at the heart of all life. This mute, co:;;mic impulse, 
or 11world willJ' has its highest expression in man I s life of rational 
reflection, in '.'ideas, 11 said Schop~nhauer. But as finite ,life endeavors 
to e::;:press the c~lmic 
·~t}•t<,· ' ,1J, 
/ and~J'rustratio~;jl.aM ~,nds iri 1pessimism. 1Hence the aim of life, or, 
life's wisdom, should be, according to Schopenhauer, to overcome 
desire, that is, essentially to deny lifets primal impulse. (We observe, 
of course, that Schopenhauer 1s philosophy here reminds us of Buddhistic 
thinking.) 
The dynamism of Schopenhaue!'. s brand of pantheism~ however, points 
to the philosophies which have stressed cosmic or evolutionary process 
as giving the best clue to the idea of God or Deity. With this reference 
then to 19th and 20th century vitalisrns (in which we would include, in 
addition to Schopenhauer's, the thought of Nietzsche and of the early 
Bergson, each of whom presented a related form of the idea of the 
ultimate as vitality itself), we pass next to consideration of two 
evolutionary naturalisms that have been prominent in our time. They 
are highly articulate effo:r'fs to reconstruct the conception of God in 
and optimisti~~!1~?:I1is11:t.. WhY.W~ .....  
I j / 
t ~) 
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classify them as impersonalistic conceptions will be made clear by the 
following discussion. 
Somewhat more precisely than our above title, we should say that 
we are about to describe conceptions of God on the impersonal plane, 
which focus initial interest upon the integrative.,or evolutionary 
process of nature, with its outcome in values. Although we believe that 
the two systems described below are impersonalistic conceptions. 
the reader should bear in mind that there are also theistic or personal-
istic views of God as cosmic process, or types of theistic naturalism. 
We mention these in due time.. From the frequently abstract and mystical 
concept, God as the Whole of Being, which we studied in pantheism., we 
now move to what would be called by its adherents a very concrete and 
llscientific11 view. 
4. T,!_1.e conce12tion of Critical Natu:ralis.m (Naturalistic Humanism): · 
God as the hu,ma.n aspiration for ideal values .• In this view the 
source and sum of values is found in our finite human, personal and 
social experience. God is man's idealizing imagination, the human 
aspiration for the good, the true, and the beautiful. The good w'ould 
be concretely defined as all democratic and humane value:. political 
democracy, respect for individuality in tb.e process of justice, 
international order, world peace and gove1~nment, economic well-being, 
racial harmony and equality., physical and mental health, education, 
love, veracity, honesty, and above and integrating all, 11 scientific 
intelligence. 11 
These ideal values are conceived as subjective 11projections 11 within 
:man 1 s mindi> Our ideals are 11projections" in the sense that they are 
constructions of human rational :imagination as it anticipates good 
and seeks its realization, and thus seem to be beyond, and oth~f than, 
what we now are. Accordingly, the traditional idea of 11God11 as an 
objective :reality is explained in this psychological way. 11God11 
would be 11objective11 for critical naturalism only in the sense that ou:r 
ideal values are as yet unrealized in time and space, out before us, or 
ahead, o:r "beyond" us, as it·were; whereas actually 11 God11 has only a 
. psychological, subjective meaning in :mans s mind. The term 11God11 refers 
to a true psychological function, and as such has psychological statu~, 
· but is not an objective or ontological, cosmic reality outside, .r/iman,. 
Such a subjective concept of God the 19th ~entury European philosophers 
F'.eue:rbach and Compte, and in our 01m time the American John Dewey, 
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have presented to the modern mind. It is undoubtedly a major alternative, 
and challenge, to traditional idealisms and theisms. This system is 
.. 
11 impersonalistic 11 because it conceives that human life, which is capable 
of knowing and foreseeing va.lues, has ariaen out of a non-conscious or 
impersonal process of' nature.. The sole seat and locus of value is the 
human mind. Beyond or outside the human mind there is no 11 valuett 
anywhere in the universe; if :man were not here there would be no "values .. u 
This point of view is, of course, opposite to traditional personalistic 
theism, which has held that, whatever his more intimate relations with 
human life may be~ naod11 is to be conceived as cosmically objective or 
real. After attempting to diagram this philosophy of religion in the 
following way, 11e quote from John Dewey's A Common Faith. 
Dia.gram: Critical Naturalism (John Dewey) 
John Dewey on God 
11 
... the word 1God 1 ... denotes the unity of all ideal ends arousing 
us to desire and actions., Does the unification have a claim upon our 
attitude and conduct because it is already, apart i'rom us, in realized 
existence, or because of its own inherent meaning and value? Suppose 
for the moment that the word 1GQd 1 means the ideal ends that at a given 
time and place one acknowledges as having authority over his volition 
and emotion, the values to which one is supremely devoted, as far as 
these ends, through imagination, take on unity. If we make this supposi-
tion., the issue will stand out clearly in contrast with the doctrine of 
religions that 'God• designates some kind of Being having prior and 
therefore non-ideal existence •••• 
11 
..... the idea of God, or, to avoid misleading conceptions, ••. the 
idea of the divine ••• is ••• one of the ideal possibilities unified 
through imaginative realization and projection. But this idea of God, 
or of the divine, is also connected with all the natural forces and 
conditions--including man and human association--that promote the 
growth of the ideal and that further its realization. We are in the 
presence neither of ideals completely embodied in existence nor yet 
of ideals that are mere rootless ideals, fantasies, utopias. For there 
are forces in nature "and society that generate and support the ideals. 
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They are further unified the action that gives them coherence and 
solidity .. It is this active relation between ideal and actual to which 
I would give the name •God• ...... 
11 There exist concretely and experimentally goods--the values of 
art in all its forms, of knowledge, of effort and of rest -after striving., 
of education and fellowship, of friendship and love, of growth in mind 
and body. These goods are there and yet they are relatively embryonic •• .., 
A clear and intense conception of a union of ideal ends with actual 
conditions is capable of arousing steady/religious] emotion .. 11 (ACF h2,50-51) 
- -
This quotation reveals that for Dewey God is cosmic process at 
that highest level of activity in which men realize, or achieve, their 
11 ideal11 values. I3ecause of its general for.ce and vigor Naturalism 
" 
seems undoubtedly to be:for modern Western man a major alternative 
to the J~deo-Christian-Platonic idealist way of understanding the 
universe which, in general terms ( and w.i. th a few exceptions), was the 
' predominant philo~opb;y in the ·west until modern times., If this 
evaluation of Critical Naturalism is correct., we should now examine it 
more fully as a philosophy, in order to understand the backgreund that 
leads up ·to the 11religious a1:,ex11 of this philosophy of John Dewey. After 
a general analysis, we shall evaluate the major metaphysical premises 
of this philosophy, ending with its treatment of value, wherein lies 
its concept of 11God., 11 
By way of introduction we should mention that, historically, there 
have come to be three major'forms of naturalism: one, classic 
materialism of the 19th century and prier; two, critical naturalism of 
the 20th century, based upon, but by no means identical to, classic 
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materialism; and three, metaphysical and theistic naturalism. The systems 
of Juan Christian Smuts, Henry Nelson Wieman, C. Lloyd ~.organ, s. Alexander, 
Alfred North "Whitehead, John Elof Bodin., Lecomte du Nouy, and Teilhard De 
Chardin may be cited as eloquent representatives of metaphysical naturalism, 
ranging from non-theistic to theistic varieties. 
The new naturalism inIPlies in part its criticism of the older 
11 reductiven materialism. By way of introductory comment., the principal 
emphasis and concepts of this newer position are: 
(a) Its stress of the terms norganism11 and "life" rather than 
ttmechanism.,n recognizing that ~n organism with its self-motion and 
teleological characteristics is not a nmechanism11 as a watch or an 
automobile is. It accepts organic and teleological categories as 
basic in the description of reality, or at least certain levels of 
reality on the animal and human plane. 
(b) Possibly secondly in importance and stemming from what has just 
been said, critical naturalism stresses the qualitative world of values 
in all its forms, which the human type of orgcmism perceives and 
cherishes. Hhereas values were a problem in the older materialism, 
critical naturalism takes values seriously. Values, it says, are at 
least temporarily real, significant aspects of the world~ Instead 
of reducing all things to the plane of non-living matter or energy, as 
the older materialism did., critical naturalism raises the interpretation 
of reality to the level of finite life and mind with the special sig-
nificance that such mind gives to things in its valuing response. 
Therefore, such values as freedom, love, democracy, aesthetic experiences, 
etc., are cherished .. 
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(c) This system is critical, however, in another direction,. It is 
critical of all and sundry attempts to develop .a 11 depth11 metaphysics. It 
is mainly non-metaphysical and positivistic. It would say that the materi-
alist 11metaphysics 11 of the older sort was misguided, because it attempted 
to say, rather dogmatically, what "ultimate reality" is. And for the 
same reason it says that idealistic or supernaturalistic 11metaphysics 11 is 
is misguided. As to what are ultimate beings and causes critical 
naturalism remains noncommittal, agnostic if not sceptical. Its main 
attitude is 11pragmatic11 : 11What good does so called metaphysical knowledge 
do us?11 it asks. Critical naturalism does not think it necessary or 
profitable to inquire into the nature of ultimate reality. It feels 
that metaphysical "substances, 11 11 mine.11 or 11 powers 11 beyond nature are not 
necessary for an ex.planation of nature, It relies on experience in its 
outward scientific sense. It attempts to limit its terms and concepts 
to those of natural science, of physics., chemistry, biology, psychology, 
and the sociological sciences. The role of philosophy, rather than to 
delve into the problem of ultimate being, is to define clearly the terms 
current in the positive sciences, and attempt to relate and d.ntegrate 
scientific lmowledge on the widest front for the highest human good. 
In its criticism of metaphysics the spirit of Comte p~rvades modern 
naturalism, and the various sectarian movements within natur~lism., 
such as 11logical positivism," 11 analytic philosophy, 11 and ttexistentialism. 11 
Modern naturalism is the system of Aristotle shorn of its metaphysical 
committments, that is, Aristotle's concepts of the Active or Cosmic 
Intellect and the principle of Cosmic teleology in 11 God11 the Unmoved 
Mover. Let us summarize this kind of'haturalism in contrast to the 
older materialism by using parallel columns: 
.. 
19th Century Materialism 
lTas a metaphysical theory and dog-
matic, said definitely what 
ultimate reality is, i.e. material 
atoms or energies. 
'Fallacy of over-simplification: 
committed the reductive or 
genetic fallacy and was to , 
monistic. 
Terms: matter, motion, mechanism, 
force. 
0 Nature11 tended to mean only 
inorganic matter in motion: no 
9lace for value in its scheme. 
Deterministic and mechanistic: 
no room for purpose. 
Tended to disregard signifi-
cance of human values: no 
place for religion. Tended 
toward agnosticism and atheism. 
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20th Century Naturalis~ 
Non-methphysical and positivistic, 
unwilling to say definitely what ulti-
mate reality is--metaphysical spec-
ulation fruitless, if not ·erroneous. 
World is complex:; the qualitative 
levels are real and significant; more 
pluralistic emphasis. 
Terms: events, qualities, relations, 
process, interaction, organism, life. 
11Nature11 includes the entire complex-· 
i ty of the world: living beings, per-
sons, values, as well as lower·mater-
ial forces .. 
Purpose and f~eedom on the human 
level is stressed. 
Takes values seriously: in some forms 
makes place for religion as highest 
human emotion. 11God11 defined as the 
human as~~ration for ideal values 
(Dewey) or .. in some systems the tend-
ency of natur~ to bring into being and 
support values (Whitehead, Wieman, 
etc.--see below on metaphysical and 
religious naturalism) • 
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11Science11 limited to the natural 
sciences~ 
11Science" is broadened to include the 
sciences of humanity: sociology, 
psychology, ethics, history, etc. 
As for the older or 19th century materialism which critical 
naturalism has replaced, Sir William Dawpier, historian of science, 
writes of the demise of the former in the following terms: 
11 
••• The old materialism is dead, and even the electrons, which for a 
time replaced particles of matter, have become but disembodied ghosts, 
mere wave-forms. They are not even waves in our familiar space, or in 
Maxwell's aether, but in a four dimensional space-time, which our minds 
cannot picture in comprehensihle terms • 
• • • Thus matter, which seemed so familiar, resistant and eternal to 
nineteenth-century materialists, has become incredibly complex; it is 
scattered as minute electrons in the vast empty spaces of atoms, or as 
wave-groups which somehow pervade the whole of them, and, moreover, is 
vanishing into radiaticn.1 even from our Sun alone at the rate of 
250 million tons a minute." (History of Science 3rd edition, p. 470-1) 
John Dewey's philosophy. ·we are now prepared to eJq_Jlain in SC?me detail 
the philosophy of critical naturalism as it considers the basic issues 
of being, change or process, truth and value. As vehicle for this 
task we use the system of the late John Dewey, who, in terms of world-
wide influence, has been an outstanding representative of critical 
naturalism. 
Being. The basic ontological category is that of 11nature, 11 with 
\·" .... .; ~··- ,, 
a small nn.11 Nature, however, is not necessarily a single being. 
No one factor of nature, as experience reveals it to us, fus to be taken 
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as a metaphysical ultimate or absolute. This system wants to get cMay 
from metaphysical ultimates and absolutes. Rather multifarious facts are 
present tofo:rm the qualitative (or real) world of our experience on 
both the common-place and scientific levels. The only "nature" allowed 
is the,observed nature of many forces, energies, processes, events, 
interactions, and qualities. The naturalistic view of being is a 
pluralistic view. In fact, rather than to speak of 11being, 11 it is 
perhaps more in keeping with the spirit of the new naturalism to speak 
of "beings,. 11 Indeed., lest the very word being or beings implies 
something ultimate and absolute in the sense of the older metaphyFlics, it 
is probably best in the long run to rever to "event, 11 as a term with 
less metaphysical freightage than 11being. 11 Some main events, then,that 
naturalism ~erceives going on in our universe are the following: 
Events that physics and chemistry describe, such as electronic, 
magnetic, gravitational, :radiational., etc. 
Vital events, such as organic species living and striving with 
environment in order to survive and evolve; the experience.of color., or 
pain, etc. 
Psychological events, such as imagining, reasoning, remembering, 
loving, etc. 
Sociological and historic events, such as New York City, the 
invasion of Normandy., Harvard College in session in 1966, .. etc. 
Activity and process. As our last paragraph suggests., critical 
naturalists speak more of activities and processes than they do of 
kinds of being. This point of critical naturalism follows in the 
tradition of the ancient Greek philosopher Heraclitus. In this 
philosophy nature is conceived as activity and process more than 
anything else. The activities and processes are interacting ·and 
"striving." The kinds of "beings" or objects we have in theworld are 
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the results of innnediate adjustment or equilibrium of stresses arising in 
the course of nature's interacting energies. These results may be called 
11 event.s 11 or nqualities. 11 Thus water is the event or quality of 
equilibrium resulting from the interaction of Hydrogen and Oxygen, which 
in their turn at their atomic stage are the result of interacting 
electronic and protonic energies. Further examples of reality as 
interacting processes are: vision is the equilibrium resulting from 
the interaction of an eye with its environment (indeed this implies 
the entire evolutionary history of the organism or species as it has 
interacted with the environment in such a way as ·to yield organs of vision 
as a result); mental qualities, for example, "reason" orabstract 
thinking is a practical kind of adjustment that life on the human plane 
makes as it interacts with environment; a human society represents -still 
another kind of equilibrium. Atoms, water, vision, reasoning, a society, 
and so on are functions of nature's interacting energies in 'Various 
phases. Critical Naturalists wish to avoid the notion of 11 levels," or 
super- ordinate 11 stages, 11 or echelons of being, as descriptive of reality, 
elsewhere suggested in this study. They pref er to say that nature I s 
activities proceed on one plane, fearing apparently that a doctrine of 
levels might commit them to some of the fallacies o;f the older meta-
physics. (Y .H. Krikorian, et. al. Naturalism and the Ht1..'nan Spirit, 
Columbia Univ. Press, 194L, p. 284-5). 
1--.Te summarize the naturalistic account of truth and value., and its 
account of mind., from which the problems of truth and value arise, as 
-
follows: 11 intelligence11 is a derivative., functional phenomenon which 
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has arisen as the result of life I s interaction with the environment. It 
is a tool or instrument, developed -Eo a . high de'gree oi'· perl:ection in the 
struggl~s for ·survival in one of natures primat~·'species. ·· It has a 
pragmatic origin. Thus the qualities of, or the content of intelligence--
mathematical ideas, moral conceptions, sentient and aesthetic experiences--
are conceived only in an instrumental way. Wben the interaction of 
life w.ith environment ceases, "mind, 11 and its content of "truth" and 
"values11 will cease to exist. However, while mind, truth, and values 
do exist as functional qualities they are temporarily "real" and 
significant. But "mind, u or II consciousness, 11 or "personality, ii has 
no permanent reality. In fact, it is wiser to avoid noun-words such as 
11 consciousness 11 or"mind11 as descriptive of these phases of natural 
functioning. These noun terms suggest metaphysical substantiveness, and 
this is wrecisely what should be omitted from consideration. It is 
better to employ the functional terms of thin-~ing, perceiving, willing, 
in referring to an organism's awareness of its environment and its own 
existence. If the terms "mind" or "consciousness" are sometimes used in 
a noun sense, it is strictly a symbolic use--the poetic license that is 
allowed within the system. 11Mind" has a quasi-objective existence or 
embodiment in the strictly human 11 universe of discourse," that is, in 
the various media of social interactivity. Of these media human speech 
or language is primary. Speech is as nruch a natural energy as any other. 
Nature comes to flower, as it were, in human II discourse. 11 The thistle 
blossom suggests a kind of diagram for Dewey's system: 
-
-
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Human society in its best sense of free democracy, the cultural forms 
of art and religion, etc., is nature in· its highest fulfillment. At this 
level the word 11 science11 takes on its widest human meaning. 11Science11 
stands ultimately for those sociological disciplines that will !'elate 
men harmoniously and well. We have seen that even the term "God" may 
enter the system at this level. According to John Dewey 11God11 is the 
symbolic term standing :for the highest human values or idea.l aspirations. 
God is a suTuoective, psychological factor. As naturalism speaks of God 
in these terms and sees value in religion as highest human ,emotion it 
may be designated "religious humanism. 11 
Criticism. We will center our· critique on critical naturalism• s 
philosophy of "man". and 11 mind. 11 Naturalism insists that llmetapb:y:sical11 
questions (the problem of ultimate beings, causes, meanings, or purposes) 
need not be included in a mature philosophy. But :ii' this is true, then 
it is- strange that man :finds all the 11 metaphysical1' questions at the 
very hee.rt of his ·life of inquiry:· Whe.re did the world, where did life 
come from? What is mind and consciousness? What is the meaning of life--
the purpose of existence?: Is there some over-all plan, an all-wise 
and all-able Being or Power who presides over it? . Can we avoid meta-
. phrsical questions? In the ethical. field, take the problem;···on what 
standard should we base conduct? The general rep~y of the pragmatic 
naturalists is 11 successat living. 11 But to definell.success11 we must 
first define what "living best11 means, and also whose success( But this 
involves the questions of 11what life is, what man is? Our ethics (our 
conception of human duties and conduct) .will undoubtedly dil'f er4f as 
· we make different replies. to the question, What is man? But this 
question is '11me_tapbysica111 in the old-fashioned sense, for it involves the 
issues of whether man is free, what his relation to the world of nature 
may be, to a possible Supreme Being, the status of his personal consciousness, 
etc. It is intrinsic to the life of consciousness to raise the question 
whetherit itself is something ultimate and permanent, in contrast to the 
non-conscious flux in the midst of 'Which naturalism assumes consciousness 
arises as an impermanent quality of interacting material forces. A 
strange anomaly indeed that a non-conscious nature produces a creature 
who can sit in judgment upon the very process that has brought it forth. 
According to naturalism personal consciousness is but a derived, ca.used, 
and passing quality, while personal consciousness itself fondly hopes 
that it may be the primordial, causal, and permanent quality, or at 
least related to what is fundamentally or cosmically causal and 
permanent. 
The form of critical naturalism just discussed is a sophisticated 
materialism.. Indeed it is critical of the old reductive materialism 
on the one hand, and of idealistic or supernaturalis·l;ic 11 transcendental-
ism" on the other. It believes that it can maintain a middle position., 
the assumption that nature is capable of producing conscious life and 
values as her chief pride and glory., without grounding conscious life 
and values in anything ff,orc than pre-conscious 11material 11 flux. The 
chief problem is that~ immanent cspacity .2!_~ ~~nature's ~rt 
for conscious life and values is assumed. 
-------
The main question, then, asked 
of critical naturalism is the one asked of theold materialism: how can 
the motion (or interaction) of non-conscious forces (or events) produce 
consciousness? To say that trmatter11 (or tdth the newer naturalism, that 
"events," "qualities," and 11 relations 11 ), the non--conscious forces of 
nature, are endowed with potential consciousness or the possibility of 
L.1 
of consciousness seems very nearly, again in the words of Sir William 
Dampier, to be "an assumption of the very thing to be explained, a 
restatement of thep:roblem at issue~ 11 (History of Science, op. cit. p.206.) 
The point of ultimate ambiguity with Dewey is that. he does not 
clarify what the 11 :roots, 11 11 the natural conditions," or "s?mething11 in 
nature is that gives rise to, or'makes value possible, when man appears,; 
he does not explain what constitutes the seat, conditions, sta·tus, or 
nature of value at the stage of cosmic process prior to, or below, the 
coming of man and his imaginative faculties. (A Connnon .Faith, Yale 1934, 
p. /..1.8; Intelligence in the Modern World, ed. Joseph Ratner, Random __ ,. 
House, 1939, p. 1041.) In the controversy concerning whether Dewey 
became a 11theist11 or not, succeeding the publication of his work ! 
Connnon Faith, Corliss Lamont clarified the point in the negative by 
concluding that 11 ••• Dewey believed that the cosmos as.~.whole is neutral 
' . ' .. 
towards human aims and values. 11 ( 11New Light on Dewey's .Common.Faith, 11 
Journal of Philosophy, Ja~. 5, 1961, p/23.) 
The critical naturalist insists that consciousness or mind must be 
analyzed in an nempirica111 or 11 sc.ientific11 manner and tha·b mind can be 
thoroughly or completely explained by the 11 experimental11 approach. 
(Krikorian,. NES, op. cit,., Ch. 11.) But the question then arises, can 
all aspects, of mind be so analyzed? Elsewhere in this study we sugges~e , .. 
that certain elements of 11mind11 seem to elude, or defy, any othe1~ kind of 
analysis than an introspective or a priori one. Tnis_would contradict 
the main critical naturalist assmnption that mind is totally subject 
to empirical analysis~ For example; to reviewthe matter briefly, the 
whole of our inner life is basically private. Our experience of ideation 
or thought, of self-transcendency and freedom, of feeling and emotion, 
( if others get to lmow about these things at all) are a report of the 
subject about himself. Would a chemical e.nalysis of the brain ever 
reveal the 11blue rose" we have from time to tome in this duscussion 
imagined, ordi.sclose or quantify one 1 s thought ,of love for another? To 
say that these subjective experiences can have objective or behavioral 
manifestations or correlates is another problem. Indeed I can paint the 
blue rose, thus revealing to a psychological observer the artistic 
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bent and character of my mind and personality; or I can solve a problem 
of ballistics by writing the ~quations on a blackboard and thus reveal to 
him my i.nterest in physics .. Or I can reveal that I was undecided 'Which 
way to turn while I am driving w; car, and thus disclose my freedom. By 
' 
noting carefully the behavioral correlates of mind,psychological science 
can indeed say much about mind and predict much about it. But to say 
that these behavioral manifestations are mind and consciousness is to 
confuse effect with a cause., a derived level of interrelation, process, 
and being with a possible prior, originating level of process and being. 
To summarize these main difficulties of critical naturalism: 
(1) It _arbitrarily rules out ultimate metaphysical questions as of little 
or no value. Yet these are the issues man is most concerned about. 
(2) It begs the question and is basically contradictory in assuming 
that man1 s valuing consciousness is a natural product of a non-conscious 
nature. (3) It arbitrarily rules out an introspective method of studying 
consciousness or mind. Yet the main content of mind can be lmown only 
introspectively. (4) This system of thought leaves us with a "relativity 
of values," since it believes that there is no objective., cosmic standard 
of value beyond man. If it says that 11man11 is the standard, we raise 
the question 11What is man? 11 , or "What about or in the nature of man 
nmst necessarily leas. to the humane valuing that Critical Naturalists 
desire?11 vJhose valuation is highest or best? Co:mnnmists are just as 
sure of their ideals and 11values 11 as westerners. A true philosophy 
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must distinguish between 11 ideals 11 as just any imaginary thought or fancy, 
and ideals as descriptive of the true good, constituted by objective and 
universal relations, as indeed Dewey himself affirmed in the significant'.· 
quotation previously given. Why are the cherished values of the Critical ·· · 
Naturalist., of 11 love., 11 "respect ft0r personality, 11 11 democracy.,tt etc. 
supreme? 1"7hat gives them their authority and ultimacy? Do we not 
indeed have to look for a standard in man., but in man perhaps because in 
the man-producimg universe as a whole,in a prior and permanent way? 
Would not lack of faith in a cosmic support of such values tend to'cut 
the nerve of assurance about values and accordingly interest in 
values'? Such was indeed· the trend; at least for a while., 1n 
the 11logical-positivistic 11 branch of naturalism, in A.J. Ayer and 
his followers, where they expressly ruled value thinking out as 11illegitimate. 11 
. . 
Dualism vs. non-dualism as alleged crux of the controversy. 
Materialists and critical naturalists chide theistic naturalists and 
idealists for advocating· 11 dti.a'lisni11 ... ..:.that some kind of sharp, unnatural 
and unwarranted .contrast or' conflict ·exists in the latter thinking 
. . . 
between 11nature1i and an alleged 11 supernature, 11 between matter on the 
one hand and mind or spirit on the other. But is the real issue that of 
11 dualism11 vs. "non-dualism?11 On their side; disavowing dua+ism~ yet 
seeing the need for making place ·tor mind; spirit, consciousness., personality, 
and value in the scheme of things, the higher materiaiists or critical 
naturalists believe they solve the problem cy saying that nature, in 
certain types of interaction, is or can be "minded" ---mind, is explained " · 
in terms of "nature. II (We have already sur.;e;ested tha·t this seems to 
11beg the question, 11 • to assume what we wish to prove). 
On their side, however, are theistic naturalists and idealists 
incorrigible dualists {assuming that dualism is irrational or bad)? 
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Their general reply is that they avoid dualism in a better, more coherent 
way,.and beg the question less than do critical naturalists. Their 
formula is essentially that mind can be embodied--nature is explained 
by mind, that is, either as a direct manifestation, or at least as the 
derived., or indirect, work of mind. They look to the traits of mind 
observable in nature, i.e. what seem to be her numerous purposive and 
intelligible structures, for a strong empirical support of their 
position. The over-all point of view of philosophies flowing from the 
idealistic and theistic traditions is that it is easier to explain 
nature--that is to say, more empirically coherent---in terms of purpose 
and mind than mind in terms of non-mental ttnature. 11 
We turn .now to a variety of metaphysical naturalism, which we 
may term semi-theistic. ·while being consciously founded upon Dewey1 s 
main form of critical naturalism and "scientific empiricism, 11 it takes a 
significant step beyond the system just described, in holding that 
values have a truly objective and cosmic source in nature herself as a 
whole, below, or out beyond, man. It is not fully 11 theistic11 or 
11personalistic11 because personality is denied to this objective source 
of value. The system, however, which we are about to review, does. 
stand at the next level of thinking about deity, nearer to a full 
theistic idea. One further general comment before we proceed, the main 
difference between critical naturalism and metaphysical or theistic 
naturalisms is that the former denies a cosmic or trans-human support 
for values, while the latter affirm in various ways such a support. Their 
similarity lies in their naturalistic or 11 scientific11 terminology and 
in their general empirical approach. For many philosophers metaphysical 
or theistic naturalism seems a wise co1upromise between, on the one hand, 
traditional forms of idealism, or dualism, and, on the other., materialism 
and critical naturalism. Accordingly, in our present stage of thinl<:ing 
about deitY as c~smic process, but still in the impersonal mood, we 
proceed to our fifth significant definition of God. 
5. God as the objective tendency of nature to produce and support 
values; or as Henry Nelson 'Wieman speaks of this view: 11 God is that 
structure which sustains~ promotes and constitutes supreme value11 (in 
Religious Realism, ed. D.c. Macintosh, Macmillan, 1931, p. 155). 
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Wieman subsumes his view of God under the terminology 11 Creative Event" 
or "Creative Good11 of nature herself (The Source of Human Good, 1945). 
We may term: this form of metaphysical naturalism semi ... theistic, because 
it stops short of full personalistic theism, while at the same time it 
affirms a metaphysically objective source and sta.tus of values. We 
contir.ue our description: the ·evolutionary process itself as a. whole is 
interpreted teleologically and optimistically,·that is, as containing an 
immanent 11prupose0 which reaiizes itself in new·and higher foms of 
11 creative good. 11 God is the tendency in nature to produce and increase 
emergent values as new wholes of-integrated structure. God is the 
principle of nature's certain gro~rth or integration toward value. 
· Nature is sure to integrate or emerge into new and higher wholes or 
forms of being, such as is· found in human life, which can know and 
realize values. Nature guarantees that evaluating creatures like 
ourselv~s will come to be, and that the ideals they achieve will be the 
hmnane, democratic values common in western Judeo-Cbristian liberal 
society. 
Brightman, commenting on the emergent evolution of Wieman arid 
Alexander, says, 11They differ from hurnani'sm-Lc'ritical Naturalisy in 
their metaphysical olh\jectivity. God is'·objectively real ••• and no 
/ 
mere rationalization of subjective striving" (APR 156). In order to 
understand the full force of this position we discuss two terms, the 
concepts of ttemergence" and 1'wholism, 11 emphasized by two emergentistic 
naturalists, writing in the earlier part of our century, C. Lloyd 
Morgan and Juan Christian Smuts • 
. ~ The concept of emergence was po:pularized in the well-known 
publication by Lloyd Morgan, Emergent Evolution (1923). His class:i.c 
statement was: 
. '.'We live in a world in which there seems to be an orderly sequence 
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of events. It is the business of science, and of a philosophy which keeps· 
in touch with science, to describe the course of events in this or 
that instance of their occurrence, and to discover the plan on which they 
proceed, Evolution, in the broad sense of the word, is the name we give 
to the comprehensive plan of sequence in all natural events. 
11 But the orderly sequence, historically viewed, appears to present, 
from time to time, something genuinely new. Under what I here c:=3-ll 
emergent evolution stress is laid on this incoming of the new. Salient 
examples are afforded in the advent of life, in the advent of mind, and 
in the advent of reflective thought. But in the physical world 
emergence is no less exemplified in the advent of e ach new kind of atom, 
and of each new kind of molecule. It is beyond the wit of man to number 
the instances of emergence. But if nothing new emerges--if there be 
only regrouping of' pre-existing events and nothing more--then there is 
no emergent evolution •••• 11 (EE 1-2 .') 
n ••• One starts, let us say, with electrons and the like; one sees in 
the atom a higher complex; one sees in the molecule a yet higher complex; 
one sees in a quartz-crystal, along its lin.e of advance, a still more 
complex entity; and one 
a )! 07(,:i_c.cl~ 
t /1 (/_ flo.f . .' 
an organism, along its line of advance, 
3/ 
,, 
an entity with the different kind of complexity spoken of as vital 
integratio~ •••• 11 (EE 12) 
We amplify: an emergent is something novel,; it is a new uri.forseen 
quality or value; it is not just a 11 resultant11 , as might be f orseen or 
anticipated lying at the end of a mathematical sunnnation. It represents 
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a jump 11up11 to a new level of being or energy, a wider or higher synthesis., 
Hydrogen and oxygen combineto form water,. Neither of these original 
elements have the properties or characteristics of water. Hydrogen 
burns fiercely and oxygen causes things to burn; whereas water quenches 
fire. The compound, H2o seems a newer, 11higher11 whole, or integrated 
unity, with new and unpredictable (?) properties or ttvalues. 11 (Indeed, 
the combining of hydrogen and oxygen into water may stand as an 
analogy of the origin of all value. Values have their origin and 
initial meaning in the properties of the emergent wholes that describe 
· the integrative ore volutionary process of nature.). 
Hydrogen, carbon, oxygen., nitrogen, arid a few other 11 life elements" 
combine to make the marvelous creative synthesis which is 11 life. 11 Life 
is an emergent energy 'With peculiar properties: namely those of growth, 
reproduction, repair, spontaneity of action and reaction relative to 
environment, having the capacity of transforming \:lXte:rior inorganic 
energies into sensory experiences and values, giving life forms awareness 
. '. . '. . ' . 
of .their environment and accordingly sorne command.or freedom over it • 
. At this. l.atter level of interactivity, organic process--for example, vision 
.capacity""'.-interacts with a certain type of cosmic radiation (or ray of 
11 lightt1) to. produce color and 11 sight, 11 experience_s which are essentially 
emergent wholes, brought into being·by the interaction.of certain energies 
or forces. Similarly, other sense values are created as emergents, or 
emerge into being. 
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Finally, life in its highest synthesis of mind or rational personality 
constitutes a $Upreme type of emergent whole. It comes to be as the 
higher synthesis of physical energies; it emerges from forces interacting 
within the brain., and between the brain and the outer environment., along 
the synapses of the sensory receptors. The peculiar quality of mind as 
emergent ectivity has been its own life of thought and reasoning; its 
capacity for abstract thinking, for having ideas, exercising imagination 
and forethought; conceiving or being aware of 11values, 11 and promulgating 
plans and proposing purposes in order to bring the future under a 
command of realized value, in the form of truth, beauty, and love 
experience. 
The 11 holism11 ~A- concept of the late General .Smuts, South African 
premier, emphasized the achievement of the emergentistic process of 
nature in bringing into being new and higher f1,nctioning wholes 
(Holism and Evolution, 1926). This classic essay is an alternative way 
to state the emergentistic philosophy. The cardinal fact which Smuts 
cites is "the synthetic tendency of the universe11 (H Ev), the tendency 
of the world throughout its various levels to come and to stay together. 
With this as the observed or empirical basis of his thought he postulates 
a metaphysical principle, Holism., which he claims underlies this 
tendency. He wrote: 
11 
••• Holism ••• underlies the synthetic tendency in the universe, e.nd is 
the principle which makes for the origin and progress of wholes in the 
universe •••• This whole-making or holistic tendency is fundamental in 
nature ••• it has a well-marked ascertainable character, and •••• Evolution 
is nothing butt he gradual development and stratification of progressive 
V I 
~'J!'rom iihe Greek H0los, whole, entire. 
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series of wholes, stretching from the inorganic beginnings to the highest 
levels of spiritual creation." (BE, p.v) % 
Like our descri~tion of the emergent process presented above, examples 
of the wholistic process which describes the natural process, follow: 
first, on the organic level, smaller energy centers or events (electrons, 
protons, neutrons, positrons, etc.) integrate into atoms; atoms into 
more complex units, or molecules, ·inorgmiic and organic. Second, on the 
~~ 
"Smuts continued with illustrative examples: 
11The newt forms a new leg in the place of the severed limb. The plant 
supplies the place of the severed branch with another. The regeneration 
may be effected from different organs. Thus if the crystalline lens is 
removed from the eye of a Triton, the iris will regenerate a new lens, 
although the lens and the iris in this case have b~en evolved from quite 
different parts. Numerous similar curious facts of restoration could be 
menti<i>ned. The broken whole in organic nature restores itself or is 
restored by the undamaged parts. The cells of the remaining parts set 
themselves the novel task of restoring the missing parts. The power to 
do this varies with various plants or animals, and varies also with the 
different parts in the same plant or animal. Generally one may·say that 
. . . 
the more highly differentiated and specialized an organism or a cell is, 
the smaller is its pl~sticity, or the power of the remaining cells to 
l -·· 
restore the whole in case ·of injury or mutilation. But the fact that 
the power exists in numerous cases is a proof that not only can the 
.' ::_·i, .. ' -
cells through reproduction build up the original organism according to 
' . -. .. ' ' 
its specific type, but also that when this type is damaged, tbe remaining 
cells or some of them can restore it, and recomplete the whole •••• The 
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organic level, holism causes the various ranges of organic,. living 
substances to emerge. The cell is an area of holism; the germ cells 
integrate or wholize into the various organs of the body. Each of the 
major organs., and the body altogether, are greater functioning wholes 
than s~parate cells •. Thirdly., there are the psychic, mental, spiritual, 
moral, and aesthetic levels of holism. The ultimate world of holism, 
according to Smuts, is expressed in human personality, and the system of 
human values that human personality creates and looks out upon, including 
very nature of the cells is to function as parts of a whole, and when the 
whole is broken dmm . an unusual extra task automatically arises for 
them to restore the breach, and their dormant powers are aroused to action ..... 
"The aspect of co-ordination or subordination of parts to the whole is 
also most significantly illustrated by the phenomena of reproduction •••• 
For in reproduction the cell or the organism clearly appears to look 
beyond itself, its functions become transcendent, as far as it is 
itself concerned; its efforts and energies are bent on objects and 
purposes beyond itself. In fact., in reproduction the cell or the 
organism bears clear testimony to the fact that it is not itself alone, 
and that it is part of a larger whole of life towards the fuliillment 
of which its most fundamental functions are directed •••• Here more than 
anywhere else the importance of thew hole as an operative factor 
appears, not merely the immediate whole or individual c:rganism, but 
also t~e transcendent whole or the type which has to be reproduced 
and maintained at all costs. (HE, p. 80-82). 
the wider social and institutional wholes where values are preserved. 
,. 
These modern philosophical expressions, 'emergence and wholism, remind 
us in part of Aristotle's word 11Actuality," which meant 'essentially the 
principle of material, cosmic integration toward form, as atove described. 
11Actuality11 is an old, standard, and, as far as it goes, a challenging 
and doubtless true description of basic process (see our later discussion 
on Aristotle). Ultimate reality is indeed in part the principle of 
"integration." Unlike Morgan in his works on emergence, Smuts, in 
Holism-and Evolution., did not refer to the term 11God11 as the ultimate 
description or explanation of process. For Smuts, although there are 
wider· social and institutional wholes where human values are preserved, 
, there is no all-inclusive Cosmic Whole beyone or prior to human 
personality and the institutional values it creates. There is no 
primordial Unity or trans-human Whole to the world, to which one might 
assign the idea of cosmic Consciousness or Mind. To Smuts there is 
finite 11holismtt as a natural or cosmic process at work primordially in 
nature, prior to the arrival of man, and coming to highest expr·ession 
in him and his civilization. Smuts does not explain why there is the 
principle of holism. Apparently he 1vished t6 remain strictly an . 
11 empirical observer," uncommitted to further metaphysical speculation. 
He simply sees holism as the principle immanent in the facts and 
describes it. He does not ask why the universe is directed toward 
wholizing itself in its various ways, and supremely in personality--
except vaguely to say that the coming of finite minds like our own 
answers the general appetite of cosmic process for _greater wholistic 
organization .. 
As left with Smuts, Holism is itself an abstract., impersonal term 
or forc.e, in a class with Bergson's Elan Vital {a:t· an;-'~arly stage of 
I 
Bergson's philosophy) or Schopenhauer1s unconscious Will, the .driving· 
force within nature.. Using the tem as a clu.e for.~ more theistic point 
of view, however., Holism may become (though not for Holism and 
Evolution) a significant part of the;evidence 9f a Cosmic Purpose and 
a C~smic Mind that such purpose implies, as indeed Morgan and other 
cosmic theistshave so conceived reality. Our immediate purpose, however, 
in presenting this background in the concepts of emergence and wholism 
has been to set the stage for a. presentation of Wieman. 
Wieman uses the term 11God11 as descriptive ultimately of the cosmic 
process .that emerges into new and higher wholes of value/*' but he do:Ss 
not aavance to a full theistic concept of Cosmic Purpose or a personal 
Cosmic Mind. His thought arrives rather, we would say, at the stage of 
11 cosmic purpose" with a small 11p. 11· ·. We quote from Wieman1 s •:. 
classic essay, The Source of Human Good, as a powerful description of 
the concept of deity we are here endeavoring to analyze: Based f i:rmly on 
Dewey's Critical Naturalism or empiricism., Wieman goes beyond Dewey in 
attributing trans-human cosmic 11purpose11 to nature's integration;,' 
emergence, or wholizing toward values. 
1
~Morgan exceeds Wieman in pressing toward a concept of God which is 
Theistic or personalistic~ Life, Mind, and Spirit, p. 306-313., esp • .311. 
• !, *'"1 
· Henry Nelson Wieman on God 
(From The Source of ·Hu.man Good, 19L.6. Wieman was an 
influential philosopher of religion and Christian theo-
logian at the Univesity of Chicago Divinity School.) , 
11 
••• There is an order which is coercive, determinate, and 
antecedent to all that man may do or seek or 1·now, setting limits to 
knowledge, to truth, and to all that may happen. It is the order of the 
existing world as created to date, plus the order of creative energy 
as it o~erates in the world, plus the range of relevant possibility 
as determined by this structure of creative energy and the world with 
which it nmst work (196). 
11 The richest and highest values sought and found by religion and 
morals are interpreted as structured events and their possibilities ••• 
11 
••• There is one respect, being naturalists, in tvhich we depart 
from both traditions: we ignore the transcendental affirmation in . 
the Jewish Christian tradition of a creative God who not only works 
in history but resides beyond history. The only creative God we 
53 
recognize is the creative event itself. So also we ignore the transcen-
dental affirmation in the Greek Christian tradition of the reality of 
Forms of value, uncreatej and eternal, having causal efficacy to constrain 
·, 
the shape of thinc;s without themselves being events at all. The only 
fo:rms of value we recognize are produced by the creative event •••• 
11Thus the active God derived from the Jewish tradition and the 
~ 
Forms derived from the Greek tradition are both brought down into the 
world of time, space, and matter and are there identified as events 
displaying a definite structure with possibilities .... 
11 
••• The transcendental must be ignored., except as an imaginative 
construction of the hmnan mind. (7-8) 
1'When good increases, a process of reorganization is going on., 
generating new meanings, integrating them with the old, endowing each 
event as it occurs with a wider range of reference, molding the life of 
man into a more deeply unified totality of meaning •••• 
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11 
••• The creative event reorganizes the mind and transforms its 
appreciable world without the qualities of the reative event being 
themselves discriminated·and distinguished from the newly emergent meaning. 
« (56-51)· 
"Widening and deepening community between thos~ who participate in 
the total creative event is the final stage in ere at i ve good •••• 
11 
••• The creative event is one that brings forth in the human 
mind, in soc'iety and history, and in the appreciable world a new structure 
of interrelatedness, whereby events are discriminated and related in a 
manner not before possible. It is a structure whereby some events 
derive from other events, through meaningful connection with them., an 
abundance of quaiity that events could not have had without this new 
creation. (64;..6,5) · 
11 
••• The creat,i ve event., together with every one of the subevents ••• 
are emergings, integratings, expandings, deepenings, that is, they are 
not accomplished facts •••• are events in process •••• happenings in transit ... 
always a new structure, whereby some events are more widely and richly· 
" 
related in meaningful connections. 
11The human problem is to shape human conduct and all other conditions· 
so that the creative event can be released to produce maximum good. 11 (68-69) 
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11 
••• If we cannot go along with the creative process, we shall suffer 
the fate which other cultures and civilizations have suffered when they 
reached a like limit in their capacity for further creative·transformation. 
( 74) 
11The creative event is supra-human, not in the sense that it works 
outside of human life, but in the sense that it creates the good of the 
world in a way that man cannot do. Man cannot even approximate the work of 
the creative event. He would not.come a:ny closer to it if his powers were 
magnified to infinity, because the inflinite increase of his ability would 
have to be the consequence 01 the prior work:mg of the creative event. (76) 
11 
••• The primary demand which the creative event makes upon· man is 
that he give himself over to it to be transformed in any way that it may 
require. ( 78) 
11 An examination of creat i ve good will reveal the reason for this 
insistent need of religious devotion to think of God as a person, while 
at the same time demonstrating that the source of human good cannot be 
a person, but is mch more •••• 
11 
••• Since creative good at the level where it saves and ·trans.forms 
human personality always works in the form of interaction between persons, 
we must deal with persons to deal with it •••• 
11From all this we conclude that the mythical symbol of person or 
personality may be indispensible for the practice of worship arid personal 
devotion to the creative power, this need arising out of theverf nature 
of creative action and so demonstrating that the creative event J,.s .. the 
.actual reality when this symbol is used most effectively :in persohal 
;:.c;.ominitmen-t of faith. This symbol may be required even by those 1who know 
tp.r.ol;!,gh intellectual analysis that a person is always a creature an:d that 
therefore personality cannot characterize the nature of the creator •••• 
11 
••• The real source of human good is neither transcendental nor a 
person." (266-268) 
(From Fieman, 11 Is There a God? A Conversation" (L'5etween Max Otto., 
D.C. Macintosh., and H. N. 1rTiema!!7 Willett, Clark, 1932) 
11 God is superhuman., but not supernatural. (:Ll) 
"God is that interaction between individuals., groups., and ages 
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which generates and promotes the greatest possible mutuality of good. (13) 
"I deny personality to God, not by subtraction but by addition. 
God functions so vastly and so importantly that it is confusing and 
unintelligible to attribute personality to God. 11 (48) 
We cannot enter here upon a full ex.position and appreciation of 
Henry Nelson "Wieman as a major American philosopher of religion. In 
what follows, however,_we will attempt to paraphrase the main substance 
of his thought and conclude with a brief criticism4 
Wieman believes that "there is an order antecedent to man, 11 working 
toward emergent wholes, or "new structures of interrelatedness, 11 on every 
level of nature: inorganic, organic, mental-moral, social-spiritual(~ 
Source of Human Good). These emergent wholes are the seats and reality of 
all values. The supreme emergent wholes or values have their seats in 
man's self-conscious personal life or experience, sentient and aesthetic, 
scientific and philosophic, moral, social, and religious. This order of 
emergent wholes and values defines the very structure, meaning, and 
seeming 11 intent11 of process ore volution itself. It is accordingly 
objective and cosmic; that is trans-human, more than human.,, though it comes 
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to fullest expression in the human realization of true values--i.e., those 
of the Graeco-Hebrew-Christian tradition, the humane and democratic Hest, 
and any other human values of other traditions. It is perilous for man 
not to perceive and heed this s tru.ctured order of the ·world-in-process. 
Individuals, groups, and generations will be judged by the "Creative Event11 
according to whether they perceive and heed. If, they-wi.11 perceive and 
heed they will experience joy, fulfillment, happiness, and social harmony; 
if they do not perceive and heed, they will be ignored by the Creative 
Event and abide in. misery, frustration., strife, .and death. The Creative 
Event will deliver its opportunity to others more responsive to its demands. 
The Creativ,e Event is not itself self-conscious, Cosmic Mind or Person, 
like the God of traditional theism. It is rather an impersonal value-moral 
structure ( ?) immanent in nature, an impersonal "moral law" (letting 
11mora111 define all realms of value, including the value of knowledge). Or, 
if it is not to be defined as "structure, 11 which may connote a too definite, 
antecedently existing Form or Forms of being (an idealism which 'Wieman 
would probably disclaim), then perhaps it is more correct to say that 
the ultimate which Wieman means is the potentiality of nature to have 
such value-moral structure. 
As a psychologist of religion, in addition to his being a note-worthy 
philosopher of religion, perhaps no one in our time has more profoundly 
described the operation or reality of the 11creative event11 or of 
11 creative interchange" (Man's Ultimate Commitment) or of 11God11 in terms 
. - ' . 
of deepest psychological o:r social experience than ha~ \]ie!Ylfln. To speak in 
. , ·~ ' . . ~·,: : . ·~ . . •_; . 
traditional terms., he has described someth:ing of what. tli.e 11Holy Spirit" of 
:, ""' ' :1,. ',; ·:,. 
God indeed is. He accomplishes this in his descripti~ns. of "the sub-ev~nts 11 
. ·' ' ,,' ,... .. .. ' ... 
in The Soi;rrce of Human Good (and repeated in varian~ fo:i;-rns elsewhere in his 
writings) that operate in bringing into being human good. 
Take arry creative human interchange or relationship: the teacher-
student relationship in the learning and knb'tvledge experience,; creative 
conversation between friends; college friendships; creative comrrru.nion 
in faithful marriage; the inspiration of beauty in artistic or aesthetic 
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interchange, e.g. as we listen to the works of a great composer through 
the intermediation of the musicians; scientists working together in 
special, technical fellowships in their endeavor to make a moon rocket 
that will carry men to that world-all these types of interchange may be 
described in several levels of creativity or unfolding awareness. First 
is the awareness of new qualitative meaning on such inter-personal . 
relationships. Second is the feeling of expansion, growth, or enrichment 
of one's ovm person in the relationship. Third is the deepening or 
enriching of the meanings in the world about the participants• Fourth is. 
the deepening of the sense of community or fellowship or society between 
the persons so engaged--subsumed 1inder the experience of n1ove. 11 Here 
we have indeed a classic description of the presence and working of the 
"Spirit11 of "God immanent" in life, in deepest psychological sensitivity, 
when life opens itself to the creative good that is existence. 
Evaluation, This philosophy of religion seems in unstable equilibrium 
between a frank, non-theistic naturalism such as Dewey's and personal-
istic theisms, in connection with the concepts of purpose and of personality 
as supreme value. (1) "lrTieman1s 11 creative event 11 seems to be a cosmic 
purpose of a sub-personal, sub-conscious kind. But the question may be 
raised, how can there be "purpose11 which is Jess than 11personal, 11 without 
conscious intention or personal mind to entertain and realize 11purpose. 11 
If true values and the true good are permanently increased as. cosmic 
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intention, would not this require a self-~9nscious personal conceiver and 
conserver as well as an "increaser" of value, working on some totally 
immanent and · sub-conscious plane? In our own finite experience, we know 
that values do not often come to be as a chance product of blind groping, 
but rather we experience them most often by careful foreordination and 
intelligent planning on our part. Could their standing or 11purposivenesstr 
on the cosmic scale be any less wide awake, intelligent, or personal, if 
it istru.e that the cosmcs at large is busy intending and creating value? In 
Wieman 1s system God is too immanent, too much within the process, really 
to see where it is going, and that it may eventually arrive at the expected 
destination of human good. Do we not need a concept of· God as not only 
in the process,. but also behind or before, and in froht of, or at the head 
.. 
of process, as its eternal conscious foreseer, foreordainer, and guide? 
(At later places in our study we endeavor to solve the problem of divine 
11f oreor·dination" and cosmic 11freedom11 or evolutionary process.) 
(2) Finally., as with all cosmically impersonalistic systems., which yet 
recognize 11personalityn as supreme value on the finite. scale, we may 
ask, vfoy does personality have such status or value on our plane, if it 
lacks backing in some terms similar to our own on the cosmic plane? 
IV. . God as Abstract Truth and Value 
(Abstract Idealism) 
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The great idealisms have affi:rmed that we need not only growth and 
increase of value in the world, but that for this process to take place, 
and for its outcome to be in some· measure assured, we need an eternal 
cosmic source and standard of value., a cosmic awareness of the forms and 
structures that embody value. We need a 11place, 11 11 being., 11 or "Mind," that 
in some way "oversees" the ordering of structure into value, With this 
suggestion we come to our sixth significant conception of God4 
Not all idealisms are personalistic. We have already discussed 
eastern pantheisms and Bradley's philosophy as impers.onalistic forms o:f, 
idealism. · Plato's and Aristotle I s philosophies were types of abstract 
idealism. In our opinion t,hey may be classified as a19mi-personalistic, 
without having the full value of personalistic idealism, or theism., as we 
shall define that term shortly. Nevertheless, their concept of Ultimate 
Reality or 11God11 is a classic., standard possibility which has its 
timeless appeal.(We· include Aristotle's philosophy along with Plato's 
as "idealism, 11 if we give that te:rm its general definition of a phil-
. 
osophy which believes in an eternal order of truth, value., and form, 
according to which the irorld process is structured.) 
In the viewpoint implied in this book God is, at least,what Plato 
and Aristotle say he is on the side of his creating or forming cosmic 
energy. We place Plato and Aristotle, however., on the negative side of the 
Personalistic watershed of thinking about deity. Perhaps we do them an 
injustice; others may prefer to relate them to the positive side of that 
watershed. In any case., we mean to do them no irreverence. It is 
probably correct to say that there are elements of personalistic theism in 
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' ' ' Plato and Aristotle, but a 11 theisIJ1" which would be characteristically Greek 
rather than Hebraic. 
Modern critical naturalists share with theists the intellectual ancestry 
of Plato and Aristotle, particularly on the side of the humanism of these 
· anciient philosophers; theists claim them particularly on the side of their 
idealism. To the outline of their thoughts here presented we add the main 
substance of their cosmic philosophy in their own words in subsequent 
quotations. 
6. For Plato and Aristotle God is the abstract structure of truth, value 
and form OveT•a.rching and inspiring cosmic process. 11God" or Ultimate Reality 
is the system of ideal truths, values, laws and forms of .being, rega~ded as 
eternal, ·objective realities beyond man Is mind, a:1 d 11 above 11 finite process 
(Plato),·or existing as the immanent; subsisting patterns fer that process 
(Aristotle). Our description continues: God is the impersonal order of Truth, 
Beauty, and Good, conceived as objective, metaphysical, spiritual (immaterial) 
11 Ideas 11 or UForms" ,* the eternal forms of being that structure world process. 
Man in his intellectural and moral life can know, share, or participate in 
the ideas or forms, as does nature, in so far as her individualities, and 
processes, reflect or express them, 
Plato and Aristotle would accept indeed, after Parmenides, they were 
the authors in Western thought of -~ the "objective" or. 11 idealistic" concept 
of "truth" described in our previous chapter. Truth was. to them not only the 
corresponden·ce of thought to things and of tJ,ought to its own rules of right 
' 
reason (truth in its double faceted psychological.sense); but also truth meant 
or had a cosmic reference and dimension, i.e. it was correspondence or conform• 
ity of things or natural processes to the laws and forms of,thought, or reason,. 
~~ The Platonic and Aristotelian terms were "idea" and 11 eidos 11 • 
These dio.grams are based mainly on the Cosmologies suggested by Plato's 
Timaeus dialogue 2.nd Aristotle's twelfth book of the Metaphysics. In the 
Timaeus Plato presents us with three coordinate, eternal principles, matter, 
the realm of Ideas with the Good., and God. In the Parmenides dialogue, however, 
he speculates that the 11 ideas 11 ma:r in truth be unified within the Divine mind 
itself (see our later quotation p. ). Aristotle suggests two eternal 
principles: matter--as--informed and God. Accordingly we have: 
( 
. Embodied individuals are appearances; abstract universals (ideas) are the 
. • . 
realities. Man's spiritual part or soul reflects or shares, participates in 
the Ideas in so far as he has lmowledge. God, or the "Demiourgos 11 (Timieus), 
originally looked to ,tlle. Ideas and brought order out of the primeval, mate:rdal 
11 receptical11 or chaos • . Thus God is the principle of creativity, organization, 
or conformity that gets matter into ordered form or law, which we call nature. 
AN/._:,-;} ~ 
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Ideas/forms/universals are embodied in individual objects (in nature). Reality 
is matter-in-formed, growing, developing through various levels of integration 
in fulfillment of her highest potentialities or ide::i.l forms, which are known in 
the life of God. God is the focalpoint of pure truth or form, the ideal Actua.1-
ity (Entelecheia), or Ultimate Principle of Forrnation, toward which all things 
move, or conform, as by .desire (eras)*: God is the Unmoved Mover. It rema:ins 
a question in the interpretation of Aristotle as to whether God is aware of 
his world, and accordingly whether He is fully personal. 
We unify and surmnarize, for Plato and j.1,ristotle, God or the Divine is the 
eternal principle of formation, integration, or actuality ordering creation 
according to rational law: 
overarching process as the eternal Ideas (Plato) 
irmnanent in process as the eternal Forms (Aristotle), though God 
himself as pure spirit is transcendent to the process He influences. 
~*" In the Metaphysics Aristotle uses forms of "eros 11 (or love) and other terms 
for desire, to express the striving of natural formations toward the perfection 
of forms as God perceives them in the ideal. In the Symposium, Plato had 
discussed the role of 11 eros 11 or desiring love in a similar manner, as it per-
t 2ins to the striving of the human soul toward perfection in the Good, . the True 
and Beautiful. 
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Any cormn.on-place process of evolution or natural integration would illus-
trate the work of supreme Actuality and its presence in the universe: the 
whole of the evolutionary process striving to "Actualize" itself in the coming 
to be of beings of higher r1;1tional personality; the growth of an acorn into a 
oak; the expansion and integration of two .little cells of the zygote into the 
marvelous complexity of the whole foetus and its human brain, filled with the 
potential personality of a Shakespeare or a Lincoln. The fact and process of 
11Actuality11 as the purposive principle of nature I s phylogenetic and ontogenetio 
"evolution" transpires under our very eyes daily in countless expressions , as 
creative Spirit informs and organizes reality according to rational 11 Ideas 11 • 
Ar.istotle used the expression entelecheia translated (through the Latin) 
11 e.ctuality11 to describe that process that seemed to be leading things into their 
final, 11 actual11 , or completed .form. As he looked out at nature at the evidence 
of this process, it spoke to him of supreme purposiveness and intelligence. 
Whatever else God may be he is certainly the supreme Actualiging principle of 
process. We now quote (and we trust without too much distortion by removal frorr, 
their original context) major passages of Plato and Aristotle on Ultimate 
Reality and God. 
Plato on Ultimate Reality: 
The Ideas, their Divinity . ., and God 
"Socrates proceed~d: ·••.I was afraid that my soul might be blinded 
altogether if I looked at things with my eyes or tried to apprehend thern by 
the help of the senses. And I thought that I had better have recourse to the 
world of mind and seek there the truth of existence. I dare say that the sim-
ile is not perfect .... for I am very far from admitting that he who contempJa tes 
existences through the medium of· thought, ~ees them only •through a glass 
darkly' ••• (Phaedo ~ J (Sml 208). 
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11 
••• the mind., by a power of her own, contemplates the universals in 
all things ..... the soul vie"ters some things by herself and others through the 
boa.ily organs•.. • • lmowledge does . not consist in impressi6ns of sense, but 
in reasop;in.g about them ••• •• we no longer seek for knowledge in perception 
at all, but in that other process, however called, in which the mind is alone 
and engaged with being. (ThA~etetus - H (RH 188-90). 
11And have we not a right to say in his defense, that the true lover 
of lcnowledge is always striving after being -- that is bis nature; he will no·t 
rest in the multiplicity of individuals which is appearance only, but will go 
on -- the keen edge will not be blunted, nor the force of his desire abate 
until he has attained the knowledge of the true nature of every essence by a 
sympathetic and kindred power in the soul, and by that power drawing near and 
mingling and becoming incorporate with every being, having begotten mind and 
truth, he will have knowledge., and will live and grow truly, and then, and not 
till then, l.Jill he c~ase from his travail. (Republic - J(Sml 239). 
· ::For he,...whose mind is fixed upon true being ••• is ever. direct,ed 
towards things fixed and immutable, which he sees neither injuring nor injured 
by one another., but all in order moving according to reason; these he imitates., 
and to these he will, as far as he can, conform himself •••• And the philosopher 
holding converse with the divine order, becomes orderly and divine, as far as 
the nature of man allows ••• no State can be happy 'lihich is not designed by 
artists who imitate the heavenly pattern ••• 
ttAnd when they are filling in the work, as I conceive., they will often 
turn their eyes upwards and downwards: I mean that they 1dll first look: at 
absolute justice and beauty and temperance, and again at the ·human copy; and 
will mingle and temper .the various elements of life into the image of man; and 
this they will conceive according to that other image., which, when existing 
:• 
among men, Homer calls the form and likeness of God.· (Republic., Th. 254-5), 
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"And there is an absolute beauty and an absolute good, and of other 
things to which the term 1many' is applied there is an absolute,; for they may 
be brought under a single idea, which is called the essence of each ••• The 
many, as we say, are seen but not lmo1rm, and the ideas are known but not seen • .,. 
(Republic Ib. 265) 
11And this is he whom I call the child of the good, whom the good 
begat in his own likeness, to be in the visible world, in relation to sight 
and the things of sight, what the good is in the intellectual world in relation 
to mind and the things of mind.• • 
11And the soul is like the eye: when. resting upon that on which truth 
and being shine, the soul perceives and understands, and is radiant with 
intelligence; but when turned towards the t wi.light of becoming and perishing., 
then she has opinion only ••• ,.. 
11Now that which imparts truth to the lmo-wn and the power of knowing 
to the lmower is 1rhat l would have you term the idea of the good, and this you 
will deem to be the cause of science, and of truth ••••• and., as ••• light and 
sight may be truly said to be like the sun., and yet not to be the sun, so in 
this other sphere, science and truth may be deemed to be like the good, but not 
the good; the good has a place of honour yet higher •••• 
, , 
"You would say., would you not, that the sun is not only the author of 
visibility in all visible things, but of generation and nourishment and growth., 
though he himself is not generation? ••• In like manner the good may be said to be 
not only the author of knowledge to all things lmo1m, but of their being and 
essence., and yet the good is not essence., but far exceeds essence in dignity 
and power ... (Republic, Ib,. 267-8) 
11 The divine is beauty., wisdom., goodness., and the like; and by these 
the wing of the soul is nourished., and grows apace; but when fed upon evil and 
foulness and the opposite of good., wastes and falls away ••••• of the heaven 
which is above the heavens., what earthly poet· ever did or ever will sing worthil, 
It is such as I will desoribe ••• There abides the very being with which true 
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knowledge is concerned; the colorless., formless, intangible, essence·.,, visible 
only to mind, the pilot of the soul. The divine intelligence, being nurtured 
upon mind and pure knowledge •••• rejoices at beholding reality, and ••• gazing upon 
truth, is replenished and made glad .. ., ••. she beholds justice., and temperance, and 
lmowledge absolute, not in the form of generation or of relation, which men call 
existence, but knowledge absolute in existence absolute; and ••• the other true 
existences for ideas7.. • • ( Phaedrus - J ( Sml 291-2) • 
..,_ - ., . . 
11 
••• ideas:• •• beauty, goodness, justice, holiness and of all which we 
stamp with the name of essence in the dialectical proc~ss, bo.th when we ask md 
when we answer questions. (Pha edo, Ib. 173). 
11 
•• we •• are going to discourse ·of the nature of the universe ••• The 
work of the creator, whenever he looks to the unchangeable and fashions the form 
and nature of his work after an unchangeable-pattern, must neces~arily be made 
fair and perffect ••••• was the world ••• always in existence a~d without beginning? 
or created, and had it a beginning? Created, I reply, being visible and tangiblE 
and having a body ••••• the father and maker af this uri1verse •••• must have looked 
to the eternal; for the world is the fairest of creations and he is the best of 
causes. And having been created in this way, the world has been framed in the 
likeness of that which is apprehended b..r reason and mind and is unchangeable , and 
must •••• be a copy of something .... God desired that all things should be good and 
nothing bad, so far as this was attainable. Wherefore also finding the whole 
visible sphere not at rest, but moving in an irregular and disorderly fashion, 
out of disorder he brought order •••• ,~the various elements had different pl~ces 
. . 
before they were arranged so as ·to form the universe._ At first,, they were all 
without reason and measur~. But when the world began to get into order, fire 
and water and earth and air had only certain faint traces of themselves, and 
were altogether such as everything might be expected to be in the absence of 
God, this, I say, was their nature at that time, and God fashioned them by form 
and number ••• ,. .God made them as far as possible the fairest and 'best, out of 
things which were not fair and good (Timaeus, Th. 391-3, 415). 
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"If, m,y friend, we say that the whole path and movement of heaven., 
and of all that is therein, is by nature akin,to the movement and revolution 
and calculation of mind, and proceeds by kindred laws, then, as is plain, we 
must say that the best soul takes care of the world and guides it along the 
good path ••• The ruler of the universe has ordered all things with a view to the_ 
excellence and preservation of the whole, and each par·t., as far as may be, has 
an action and passion appropriate to it. (Laws, x., lb. p. 434., 442). 
-
' . ' 
11\fould you., or would you not say., that absolute knowledge., if there is 
such a thing, must be far more exact knowledge than our knowledge; and the same 
of beauty and of the rest? ••• Yes •• And if there be such a things as participati?t 
in absolute knowledge, no one ·is more likely than God to have this most exact 
knowJredge? •. • Certainly• ( Parnienides., lb. 369). 
11 
••• God ••• is •• one and the same immutably fixed in his own proper image 
••• is ••• perfectly simple and true both in word and deed; he 9~a~ges not; he 
deceives not •••• (Republic lb. 82-6) 
Aristotle on God 
(From Book XII of the Metaphysics) 
11Nothing ••• is gained even if we suppose eternal substances., as the 
believers in the Forms do, unless there is to be in them some principle which 
can cause change ••• There must., then., be such a principle, whose very essence is 
actuality ••• without ma.t ter ••• eternal. • • • • actuality is prior. • • • • there is som.e-
·~hing which moves without being moved., being eternal, substance, and actuality 
•••• The final cause ••• produces motion _as being loved, but all other things move 
by being moved.•• The first mover ••• exis'l:s of necessity; and in so far as it exist 
by necessity, its mode of being is good ••• On such a principle ••• depend the 
·· heavens and the world of nature. And it is life., such as the best which we enjo:, 
• . • And thinking in itself deals with that which is best in its elf ••• ,. •• the act 
of contemplation is what is most pleasant and best. If., then., God is always in 
that good state in which we sometimes are, this compels our wonder; and if in a 
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better this compels it yet more. And God is in a better state. And life also 
belongs to God; for the actuality of thought is lite, and God is that actuality; 
and God's selfdependent actuality is life most good and eternal. We say there-
fore that God is a living being, eternal, most good, so that life and duration 
continuous and eternal belong to God; for this is God ••• Those who suppose ••• 
that supreme beauty and goodness are not present in the beg:inning ••• are wrong 
in their opinion ••• It is clear then from what has been said that there is a 
substance which is eternal and unmovable and separate from sensible things. It 
has been shown also that this substance cannot have any magnitude, but is with-
out part and indivisible •.•• But it has also been shown that it is impassive and 
unalterable ••• The nature of the divine thoughtinvolves certain problems ••• thou2J1t 
is held to be the most divine of things ••••• it must be of itself that the divine 
thought1,hinks (since it is the most excellent of things), md its thinking is a 
~hinking on thinking •••• Since ••• thought and the object of thought are not diffe-
rent in the case of things that have no matter, the divine thought and its object 
will be the same ••••• throughout eternity is the thought which has itself for 
its object. 
"We must consider also in which of two ways the nature cf the universe 
contains the good and the highest good, whether as something separate and by 
itself, or as the order of the parts. Probably in both ways, as an army does; 
for its good is found both in its' order and in its leader, and more in the latte:r 
for he does not depend on the order but it depends on him • .And all things are 
ordered together somehow, but not all alike -- both fishes and fowls and plants; 
and the world is not such that one thing has nothing to do with another, but 
they are connected. For all are ordered together to one end ••• (RM:IA 282-293) 
Evaluation of the Platonic-AristolJBlian concept of God. 
To begin _with, two basic things might be asked of Plato and Aristotle on 
the side of thei~ thought that seems to emphasize abstract or impersonal, but 
objective Truth as Ultimate Reality: (1) Can the realm of 11truth11 or 11Ideas', or a 
, , 
cosmic intelligence or purposiveness, be"abstract11 , that is, without seat and 
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and focus in e. 11personal mind11 ? Here is the basic question we asked of the 
Platonic-Aristotelian idealism. It is like the question asked, but on a higher 
plane, of reductive, impersonalistic naturalism: can there be "purpose" in sub ... 
conscious process? For Aristotle and Plato the inqui~J is, can there be 11purposerr 
in an abstJBact impersonal Cosmic Truth or II Intellect11 -- a Truth and Intellect 
that would not know of its own existence and power? Actually, of course, Plato 
and Aristotle realized this problem themselves, and solved it by introducing 
some element of Personality, that is, a supreme cosmic forethought and self-
conscious pu~posiveness into their systems of reality. Plato accomplished this 
in his principle of deity or 11 demiurge11 in the Timaeus; Aristotle by saying that 
God was at least conscious of himself as the focal point of all rational truth 
·, ,, 
aid form, that God's activity was "thinking on thinking" - i.e •. self-conscious .. 
, 
(2) Further, we ask the same question of Plato that we do of all value 
systems that regard 11pe:rsonality11 as supreme in value and being on the finite 
plane, yet may deny it reality on the cosmic plane. To put the question in his 
language or thought form, let us consider the 11 idea of man11 , one of the trans ... 
cendent ideas that govern a significant stream of process or development in the 
natural world: if there is the Idea of :man, that is., of self-conscious, intelli-
gent and moral life in the realm of Ideas and ultimate Truth, would not this 
personalize that rea~? -- lilce a leaven, in the figure of Royce., which must 
inevitably leaven the entire loaf? 
(3) To continue our criticism, it has sometimes been held that the Platonic, 
Aristotelian God is too 11 impassive and unalterable11 , to use Aristotle's own 
words; that the sum of the Greek idea was God as static., abstract "perfection"; 
a frozen logical essence., which :may account for natural structure and order., but 
is hardly an object of fellowship for man. Such a critic'ism may be to some 
extent justified as we ponder the preceding quotations., possibly more justified 
in Aristotle's case than in Plato's• Certainly the concept of God as outgoing 
and down-going, as sel.t:-g:;i.ving and serving love., as Chesed and Aga_pe., as in the 
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Old and New Testament pictures, is foreign to ~he Greek concept of deity. It 
might be said that this is precisely one of the central points at which the 
Greek idea or God may fall short of full 11 Pe;rsonality11 as we define Divine 
· thol<t;,Ai t/;i,i. 
Personality presently., and as the Hebrews11 knew God. 
(4) The trouble wi. th platonic abstractionism is that it cannot successfully 
derive our factually individualized world of physical objects processes and per-
sonal presences; it cannot account for the common fact or experience of in.di-
, 
viduality. Plato himself acknowledged this in the dialogue Parmenides, which 
is devoted to a criticism of his own system. Accordingly Platonism results in 
a 11 dualism11 for which it has traditionally been famous., between a world of par-
ticular realities in their material aspect and a realm of universal ideas or 
of mind. Aristotle solved this problem by placing the Forms within nature from 
the outset. Our conclusion is that a purely abstract way of thinking of ulti-
mate reality must be modified; will mu.st come to be regarded as significant in 
-
the cosmic. scheme as 11 intellect11 or· 11 :j.deas 11 • Indeed, can you have intellect or 
ideas without will; can you have mind 'w:i. thout personality? We need some kind 
of metaphysics that 'w:i.11 actually account for concrete things, and in a measure 
describe processes of individuation. In the search for an adequate conception 
of God., Royce•s v0rds challenge the searcher., as he considered Platonic 11 realism.11 
but moved on to a more personalistic concept of reality: 
11 The world of validity is indeed, in its ultimate constitution, 
the eternal world. It seems to us so far a very impersonal world 
and a very cold and unemotional realm, - the very opposite of that 
of the :mystic, Before we are done with it we shall find it in 
fact the most personal and living of worlds, Just now it appears 
to us a realm of bodiless universal meanings. Erelong we shall 
discover that it is a realm of individuals, whose unity is in 
, , , 
One Individual, and that theory means, in this eternal world, 
not theory., but Will and Life". (WI, vol. I. 222) 
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Historical note continued. Recall our previous mention of the large 
hns 
influence that Plato ts and Aristotle's t:·10ught/\had on Judaeo-Christian 
civilization. Persons in the histor"iJ of philosophy who have taken 
the impersonalistic implication of Plato's and Aristotle rs thought and have 
developed systems which we have given the general name 11 abstract idealism11 (or 
points of view closely allied to it, such as modern "absolute idealism11 } have been 
Averroes, medieval Arabic philosopher who utilized Aristotle_;, Spinoza, Hegel, 
Bernard Bosanquet, George Santyana, andNicolai Hartmann. These men have tended 
to believe that impersonal mind or abstract logical or "immortal essencestt 
(Santayana) constitute the basis of reality. 
On the other side however, early Christian theologians like Clement and 
Origin of Alexandria., and especially St. Augustine developed the personalistic 
implications of Plato., adapting his idealism to Hebrew-Christian modes of belief 
regarding diety. lTe have observed that St. Thomas did this in distinctive 
fashion for Aristotle. Some of the early Renaissance philosophers were 
Christian Platonists, notably Ficino and Patrizzi; Pomponazzi followed Aristotle~ 
In the modern world Josiah Royce's system., which we may term Personalistic 
Absolute Idealj_sm, is possibly the most aml::dtious., conscious attempt in our time 
to personalize the Pla.tonic outlook. Other modern personalistic idealists 
would be closely related to Plato in their general belief that ultimate reality 
is 11spirit11 and 11truth11 in some form -- for example, Berkeley, Kant., Bowne. 
1-Te have already mentioned ·whitehead and Boodin as types of modern 11naturalistic11 
philosophers who are also theists, . who consciously follow Plato as their 
main ancient tnspiration from the Greek tradition. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Conceptions Of God Continued: 
pod As Personal Source Of Truth And.Being 
V. Sub-Monotheistic Conceptions . 
ir.Te mention the following two personalistic coneptions of deity for their 
historical significance. 
7 • Polytheism. 11God as personified particular. value 11 (Brightman),. We 
illustrate this view from classic Greek, civic rel'igion. ·Zeus represented 
such natural fore es or moral values as st~rm,: justice' 11moira1, which was fate 
or destiny, etc. Athena was the goddess af civic· spirit or virtue,. Ares was 
the r,oddess of war and savage lust. Apollo· the god of wisdoni and prophecy. 
Aphrodite was the goddess of beauty and love.· Demeter was the goddess of. grow-
ing crops and grain; her Roman counterpart was Ceres, from which our English 
words cereal and ceremonial are derived. 
11Animism11 was the earlier phase of polytheism, and is found among primitive 
groups today; it is the belief that individual natural objects, a tree, a parti-
, 
cular stone cir stream, a mountain are inhabited or "animated" by a personal 
living spirit or deity, maligned or benevolent. 
From the ancient or primitive points of view the rationale of polytheism 
may be understood. In pre,.:;scientific ages and with sub-scientific sq,cieties, 
the average, unphilosophical person, would look at the universe as mainly a 
plural order, with many seeming absolute facts or forces, which could not.other-
wise be explained except by attributing their·origin to a specific and separate 
supernatural 11personality11 • Particularly would this.kind of solution occur to 
the primitive mentality as the conflicting forces of. nature and life .were observecl 
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or ex:p'?rienced. For example, Isis-Osiris represented the verdant, benigned 
/ 
forces of vegetable fertility and growth along the Nile river. Opposed to these 
was Set, god of the blasting sand storm that raged out of the desert from time 
to time, destroying the precious crops of the Nile, upon which the people de-
pended. In india today Shiva, on one side of his make-up, represents the gene-
rative principle of nature on her constructive benigned side; whereas Kali, a spo, 
of Shiva, SOl,ieti1:10s represents· evil,, disease., calamity or the destructive forces 
or s.ide of nature. · To the ancient mind diseases were caused by evil spirits or 
demons, a theme familiar in the New Testament. 
The difficulty with polytheism, of course, is its belief that the universe 
is founded in many conflicting forces, as represented by animistic spirits, or 
waring Olyrnbian deities ( Homert s ll:lad). 
Ancient polytheisms., though many of them were gross in thought and practice, 
were not without their moral value. The gods represented virtues as well as 
vices. Polytheism is a simplistic intellectual. system. To the simple ancient 
mind it solved-nru.ch of the problem of existence, particularly the problem of 
evil. In polytheism each ill :in life is attributed to some specific demon or 
evil spirit. The universe is grounded in many conflicting forces represented 
by the pagan deities; therefore the existence of evil and suffering would not 
give rise to any grave intellectual problem. Rather, with diverse supernatural 
powers regarded as the causes of things, conflict and pain would be expected, as 
was the frequent and common lot of ancient and primitive men. From the perspect-
ive of a profounder moral coherence, however, it is no doubt just to condemn 
these systems as naive and superstitious. If the universe is founded ultimately 
upon disparate plural forces, better assign such forces an impersonal or sub-
personal status, than to animate. them 'With the capricious intentions of gods. 
(On page 9:in Chapter we discuss, from an ultimate rational standpoint, 
why there cannot be more than one creative God). 
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8. Henotheism or monolatry. 11God as personified national spirit11 
(Brightman)_; or the belief in the existence of many gods but the worship and 
service G!f only one. 
It is highly probable that this was the religion of ancient Israel between 
the time of Moses and the great writingprophets. 11Yahweh11 was the national 
deity that delivered the children of Israel from Egypt, and, on one side of his 
role., went before them as the 11 Lord of Hosts 11 , or the god that brought them 
victory against their enemies, the Canaanites, whose land they were invading. 
In his other role, of- course, Yahweh was regarded as source of the great 
Commandments, which stood as the fountain of Hebrew moral and social organizatio1 
thereafter.. But thel•e are nm.ny indications in the earlier books of the Old 
Testament that the Hebrews of that time believed that 11 other gods 11 had at least 
theroretical existence for other people, although such gods had no influence 
or command over Israel. We cannot here go into the history of the struggle of 
ancient Israel 1-n.th polytheistic belief as reflected in the literature of the 
Old Testament. Hebrew history, hcwever rose r:rway from the polytheistic-heno-
theistic point of view to a pure ethical monotheism. Monotheism conceived of 
Yahweh as Lord of all peoples and nations, whose righteous ,,ill was the source 
of all moral truth and justice and whose love and concern went out to all men 
and races. This_, of course, became the message of the great, universalistic 
' -
ethical prophets, particularly Jeremiah, II Isaiah., and the author of the book 
of Jonah. A 11 henotheistic11 strain., however., lingered in the thinking of nar-
rower nationalistic groups in Israel down to the New Testament times, namely, 
the concept that the Jews were Yahweh 1 s specially favored people and that He 
was special God to them, though other men might be His children on a less favo-
red basis. 
In our. own day a demonic type of henotheism appeared in the religion of 
Nazism in Hitler's Germany. Hitler and the Nazi philosophers claimed that the 
German rac-e was God1 s favored people, and that Hitler was his special messiah, 
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to lead them in military conquest of their neighbors. Non-Ger~ns were regarded 
as inferior and fit subjects £or slavery. At the same time in Japan Shintoism 
was used in a similar way by the totalitarian government., as a religious sanction 
for Japanese superior race ideas and to justify aggression upon other peoples. 
Anthropologically speaking, of course, superior race theories are erroneous. 
Henotheistic concepts of deity are simply 1"1l'ong. The highest message of the 
Old Testament is that all men are equally God's children and subjects of the 
divine love and watchcare. The 8th to the 6th century B.c. ethical prophets 
proclaimed this; the teachings of great Rabbis like Hillel.in .the inter-testa-
mental period. announced it., and the Christian movement aimed to restore the 
.universalistic outlook wherever a narrow nationalistic point of view in Israel 
had overshaddowed it. 
IV. Mon2theisti£ Qonceptions 
' 
9. The great historic monotheisms., Ju1eo-Christian., Zoroastrian, and 
Islamic., proclaimed that God is supreme Personal Creator or ¢0urce of the world; 
He is First Cause and Designing Intelligence of the world; and is presently 
active m sustaining value in personal life and history. 
There were., of course., monotheistic developments in other than these 
near-eastern religious cultures. The philosophic or rational 11monisms11 of 
Hinduism., advanced Mahayana Buddhism, Ancient and Medieval Confucianism, and 
the Greek Platonic-Aristotelian philosophies (just reviewed) are· significant., 
universal expressions of the general advance of human culture toward the "mono-
theistic" idea. 
The Upanishads., early scriptures of the Hindus (C. 6th century B.C.) 
stressed the unity of God., and in ~cxra of these writings Deity or Brahman was 
described as Purusha or Personal Spirit. Recall., however., that in others of 
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these writings he is depicted as a totality of being that transcends ~hat we 
ordinarily mean by I conscious personality'. Though the question has remained 
open in scholarly opinion, F.any expressions in the Analects of Confucius and in 
the Golden Mean, attributed in part to Tsesze (Confucius' Grandson)., ref erring to 
11 Heaven11 and its "moral law" or Tao, suggest that Heaven was conceived as· a 
Supreme Personal Presence to these early Confucians. Though Lao Tzu (6th 
centvry B.C. father of Taoism) generally depicted the 11 Tao 11 in impersonalistic 
terms he nevertheless stressed forgiving love as the ultimate virtue, reflective 
of the Tao. Mo Tzu, 5th century critic of Confucianism, spoke of God as 
"Universal love11 • In such ways these other ancient Chinese sages were like the 
Confucian, profoundly monotheistic in the tendency of their thought. In "11vz-
medieval orient Ramanurja, (11th century A. D. Hinc-:u)expressly described Brahman 
in a way that suggests personal life and selfconsciousness. In early medieval 
Buddhism the Lotus Sutra describes the universal Buddha Spirit as a saving 
ttr 
personal presence to all who will believe, and .a one ·who occupies the place of 
supreme or near-supreme ~ty, short o:f ultimate Nirvana. Chu Hsi, the 12th 
century A.D. Confucian trAquinas11 , taught that the ultimate reality behind 
things was the Great Reason. 
Of course, we have noted significant differences between some of these 
philosophical monisms of the orient and of Greece, and highest Hebraic monotheism. 
We have already observed the chief difference to be the prevailing idea of 
divine impersonality among major groups of the orient, in contrast to that of the 
divine personality in the occident. As we have observed, however, it· is ·signif-
icant that in some of the non-Hebraic cultures highly ini'luential personalistic 
or monotheistic schools arose.In addition to Ramanuja in India and Plato or 
Aristotle in Greece, as outstanding exmnples of movements in non-Hebraic 
culture,s toward monotheistic thinking, we should mention the Stoics in 
Greece, who developed a virtual monotheistic concept of diety. . Cleanthes fa.moue 
Hymn to Zeus is a beautiful expression of Stoic 11 theism11 • For classic culture, 
the ideal of ultimate reality as One Being reached its apogee in middle Roman 
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times in the philosophy of Plotinus. The ultimate Being or One, however, which 
Plotinus described was decidedly a trans-rational and trans-personal principle. 
In addition to the emphasis on the unity of Ultimate Reality all of these 
monisms and monotheisms had another alJ-irnportant feature in common, namely 
their general ethical outlook. Socrates and Amos wo~ld have thought eye-to-eye 
about certain fundamental matters of _morality, as a comparison of the first 
book of the Rapubli~ or the dialogue Gorgias. 'With the Book of Amos would 
-
quickly reveal. The concrete content of "moral lawn., which in all of these 
systems was regarded as being supported by an ultimate trans-human realit;w was 
astonishingly similar. The last five of Moses Commandments (the particularly 
Ethical Commandments) effectively reflect the basic moral rules of all these 
cultures. These rules., similar the world over, pertained to the sanctity of 
truth, of life, of personal possessions, sexual self~discipline, and the sin 
of avarace. 
Historic monotheism rises to its highest expression in the Old and New 
Testaments in the general concept of God as saving Love (Chesed and Agape). 
In the Hebrew ... ChristianScriptures the Idea of Self-giving Love becomes the 
central meaning of the Divine Personality. As we have just observed, many of 
the scriptures of the other great.religious cultures move in this direction and 
attain the concept of God· as Love. This is the more remarkable because of the 
metaphysical impersorialism underlying a good deal of the oriental view. Some 
of these systems have developed a strong ethic of dynamic love, in spite of 
the problematic nature of sel:fhood and personality in their psycho~ogies and 
metaphysics. ~i- The Heb:r9w-Christian scriptures assume that there is an indissolual 
* Sir Charles Eliot, authority on the Indian systems, believes that the 
Buck1hist 11 metta", or love, is equivalent to the New Testament Agape (H & B p216). 
See also the profound discussion of the Buddhist scholar, Hajime Nakamura, on 
"metta.11 as self-giving love, K.W. Morgan: The Path of the Buddha, 386-87; and 
our discussion in manuscript, 11 The Personality of God", p. on the idea of 
serving-love er 11Agape 11 in the other world faiths, Hinduism, Buddhism, the 
Chinese Confucian and Taoist system and in Sufi Islam. 
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relation between the idea of love. and that o:f ~'J?erso111·, and bring this 
psychology or metaphysics to its very apogee of thought.1H~ 
Zoroastrianism and Islam are equal with. the Old Testament· religion · .in their 
ethical outlook and. in their profound analyses of human nature. They are 
similar in their belief in man•s transcendent freedom, and in sin as lying 
in malice of will or spirit (rather than residing in the passions of the body, 
as was emphasized in Greek and Oriental dualism). These non-Hebraic monotheisms, 
however, were overburdened ( as was the earlier concept in the Old Testament 
itself) with the idea of God as principally a stern law-giver and sovereign 
judge., beneath whom men are fearful subjects. The full concept of God as loving 
Father., and the possibility of men as confident sons come to light in highest 
Old Testament prophecy and constitutes the _central message of the New Testament. 
(Zoroastrianism is noted particularly for its vertical cosmic dualism, or the 
idea of a transcendent personal Spirit of Evil, Ahriman, as opposed to Mazda, 
the supreme God of the Good -- see our further description in chapte/on evil) 
Finally it should be mentioned that in Islamic culture the Sufi mystics made 
the concept of love key to the understanding of Allah and of human ethics., 
developing what was implied in the Koran's theory of Allah's mercy. 
Modern western philosophical theisms derftvo partially from the historic 
monotheism of _the Old and New testaments and partially from Greek Idealism. 
Before proceeding to a full definition of theism and of God as Personality, 
however, we should note :in passing one further historic type of monotheism 
in the.west, namely Deism in its classic 18th century form. 
' 10. In Deism God was conceived as transcendent First Cause, or 
orig:inal creative Intelligence, needed to explain the presence of the world, 
~ .. --------------
. ~Hi-_Classic Biblical passages on God as moral Personality or Moral Intelli-
gence and Love: Ps 103; 139; Hosea 6: Li-6; 11:1-4; II Isaiah 40; 53; Jer 31; 
Mtt 5-7; Lk 10: 25-37; 15: 1-32; Jn 14-15; lstJh 3-4. 
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but not now actively related to it. In this philosophy man gains awareness 
of the existence of Deity by reasoning from the order and perfection of nature. 
Predominantly an 18th century phenomenon· in Western Europe, it influenced 
some of the Fathers of the .American Revolution., such as Thomas Jefferson a,nd 
Benjamin Franklin.1H~ Thomas Paine., English emigrant and pamphleteer of the 
American Revolution formulated Deism in a book highly critical of Christianity 
and traditional religion, His Age of Reason is a classic Deistic document. 
In spite of its polemics against traditional religion, Paine captured the main 
spirit and outlook of Deism in eloq,uent way when he wrote in that work: 
11 It is only in the Creation that all our ideas and conceptions 
of a Word of Go~ can unite. The creation speaketh an universal 
language, independently of human speech or human language, 
multiplied and various as they be. It is an ever-existing 
c:riginal., which every man can read. It cannot be forged; it 
cannot be counterfeited; it cannot be lost; it ·cannot be altered; 
it cannot be suppressed. It does not depend upon the will ·of 
man whether it· shall be published or not; it publishes itself 
from one end of the earth to the other. It preaches to all 
nations and to all worlds; and this Word of God reveals to man 
all that is necessary for man to know 0£ God. 
Do we want to contemplate his power? We see it in the 
unchangeable order by which the incomprehensible whole is governed. 
Do we want to contemplate his munificence? We see it in· the 
abundance with which he fills the e arth. Do we want to contemplate 
his mercy? We see it in his not withholding that abundance even from 
the unthankf'ul.. In fine, do we want to know what .God is? Search not 
~*In 18th century England and France names associated with Deistic 
thought were Thomas Morgan., Thomas Chubb, Thomas Woolston, Matthew Tindal, 
Voltaire., and Rousseau., 
the book called the Scripture, which any human hand might make, but 
the Scripture called the Creation. 11 
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Behind Paine and th'q Deists was a century of Newtonian physics and 
metaphysics. Newtonianism looked at the world of nature as a great machine, 
perfect in every detail, which the creator had originally fashioned and 
put in motion just as a mechanic would build and start a machine. In tbis 
philosophy, what was thought to be the mechanical order and perfection of 
Nature was the greatest argument for a Supreme Artificer of Nature. 
Central to Deism was the dualism between God as transcendent Spirit on the 
one hand, and the world machine on the other. Corollaries to this 
Deistic conception w011ld be , the irrelevance of personal, 
petitionary prayer (would God intervene in the perffectly pre-determined 
operation of the world machine, in order to answer anyone's prayer?); and 
the · · impossibility of miracle, or a supernatiral intervention 
or disruption of such world machine. 
The subsequent histories of natural science; of philosophy; and of 
modern, historical Biblical research and criticism, on its constructive 
side (which did not reach its i"ull force as a movement until the late 19th 
century) ha.ve all revealed the shallowness of much of Paine's type of 
polemics against traditional theology. His eloquence, however, did restore to 
the concept of Deity a dignity which was laciing in some phases of the popular 
religious belief of his time.% 
1~ Brightman has called attention to the resemblance between the 20th 
century Barthian concept of God as the Wholly Other and Deism. Barthianism~ 
however, is not 18th century Deism; for God breaks through to 11 speak11 to man 
in the f:1Wesome mystery of the Hebrew-Christian Scripture or 11Word. 11 (Paine 
t(i:"s tla)11n 
would have=fE!l nHioo.1& such a notion as this 1) To the present writer, the 
Barthian 111H1olly Other" concept of Deity reminds us in many respects of 
84 
11. Modern philosophical theism. God is personal conscious Mind or 
Spirit, whose 11being., 11 or whose 11work," is present both in nature and in 
values. Another way to state the view would be to · say that the ultimate and 
eternal energy of the universe is personal., Loving Hill. Such a definition 
would include the possibility that God is not only 11 immanent11 ·in his world, 
but also 11 transcendent11 to it., that .is to say, transcendent to what we, 
from the standpoint of our finite experience or vision, may know of 
the world. The ultimate problem of God's relation to the world, whether as 
totally immanent, partially immanent, or totally other and transcendent, seems 
a secondary one to us. 
Vedanta' Hinduism's impersonal Brahman, Bradley's Abso~ute, Plotinus 1 One, or 
Lao-tzuts Tao. Barth modified his earlier position on God as 1'Wholly Other," 
in his book The Humanity o:r God ( 1960) • A general critic ism of Barthianism 
and Deistic theologies as a whole (if Ba:rthianism is such)· would be the , 
simple coherent judgment that if God reveals himself at all, there must be some 
common ground between his divine and our human experience, which the classic 
Deists themselves acknowledged in accepting human reason as mediti:rn of the 
knowledge of God.. If He were !'Wholly .. Other", we would not.,. nor could not, 
know Him at all, indeed as the great trans-rational monisms have said 
(Vedanta , Plotinus, Bradley). Or from the classic Deistic side, if God 
speaks to man through 11nature, 11 we must include all of nature, including 
man, human na;i:.ure and· reason, and philosophy,; and finally historic 
religions themselves as possible media of the divine ''Wcrd. 11 
Some modem interpreters define 11 theism" as the concept of God as 
"totally transcendent," and "pantheism" as the idea of God as "totally 
irmnanent, 11 reserving a new term, 11panentheism, 11 as expressing the modern 
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(and probably c~rrect) belief that God is partially immanent, but also 
partially transcendent to the world of our possible experience,(so Hartshorne 
~ . ' ' . 
and Reese in Philosophers, ppeak of ,God). To the present writer the main 
issue is whether God is personal or impersonal. 11 Theism11 as a term should 
be reservedforthe affirmation that God is personality, whatever his 
ultimate relation to the ·world may be. We delimit the term npantheism" 
to mean those concepts of deity as the impersonal Whole of Being. 
11 Panentheism11-. may be used, if desired; to express belief in the partial 
immm1ence of God. 
Major perspectives of theism. First, classic dualistic theism has 
emphasized God's transcendence to the world. In this view, God would be 
the 11Creator11 of the world of matter and nature., but not himself involved 
in his w orld by way of any 11 immanence" of his own being (what Hartshorne 
and Reese call_ "theism"). Is this the Old Testament Concept? Is it the 
vi,ew of Plato (if he 1:o:e regarded as a personalist)? There_may_indeed be 
emphasis on "dualism"., or on 11 transcendence11 , in the classic or older 
theism of the church. In the theolog,J of the Jewish-Christian tradition we 
encounter the idea _th2.t God created the world ~ -nihilo, or out of nothing.-* (We 
examine this possibility and an alternative to it in our next chapter, 
when we discuss the cosmological argument). No idea would stress the 
transcendent, divine power any more effectively than that of a creation 
~ nihilo. Descartes' system, of course, is the most clear-cut dualistic 
philosophy of the western world. 
-l~n::.q, 2. Mac: 7:28; (Prov. 8:22f.); St. Thoma.s Aquinas ST g. 46, art 1,2. 
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A second type of theism, stressing the divine immanence, has derived 
;its inspiration.from., and often expresses itself in the idiom of, science., 
empiricism, and .the naturalistic tradition. Thus, naturalistic theism 
takesthe .world of natural process 11 realistically11 ., that is, as being in 
some way necessary to God., and sometimes·refers to the world of nature as 
God ta body. V'hitehead Is philosophy of 11 0rganism '1 is perhaps the most 
notable instance of naturalistic theism of this kind. Also., the emergent-
istic evolutionary•theisms., already mentioned, of C. Lloyd Morgan., 
/v,'}i)\~_ 1 t!_;}/;!A~l · C/vY-/v;{;}y1, · 
Samuel Alexander, and John Elof Boodin"'represent similar trends of thinking. 
Third, Idealistic theism typically describes God in the characteristie; 
method and idiom of philsosphical rationalism and idealism., which has held 
that "thought" or 11 reason11 rather than 11mattertr and "sensory experience" 
are the best clues to an understanding of.: existence·. Such theisms have 
tended to stress the "absoluteness11 of God as over against the 11reality11 
or 11independency11 of nature. R.amanuja in medieval India presented a 
theistic concept of Brahman in these terms. In the west George Berkeley, 
18th century philosopher, and in modern America, Borden Parker Bowne, 
whose thought follows the Berkeleyan personalism, and his student Edgar 
s. Brightman, represent one development within idealistic theism. 
(/!\ · i d.f/1:t..ftJJ /,//•. 
Josiah Royce, uhose views root ~in partJ Hegelian absolute 1:lGBi}iisa., 
and .his student William Ernest· Hocking, have been notable. representatives 
of a further type of idealist thesim. If nature is not entirely a 
11 phenomenal:appearance11 , she is best to be conceived somehow as an eternal 
or continuing expression of God's direct, energizing.will, 11 as being an 
or.der .of organization of the experience of God11 (Brightman APR 226). 
fv:zw: 
What we-~ just called "naturalistic" and "idealistic" theisms 
cannot, of course, be rigidly distinguished., Representatives of both 
"schools" would ov.erlap a great deal in their thinking_. It is mainly a 
characteristic "method", empirical and "scientific" on the one hand., and 
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rationalistic and 11 a prioritt on the other where a major line of dernarc.ation 
can perhaps be traced ,l;>etween the above··mentioned represent.ati ves of 
·· · · . .a /4;, a,ttt· 
these types of theism, However, such descriptive terminolo~~ be 
o(_,{'--._'' ' 
made· with:..g»@Mi··o~ caution. The 11 idealists" .are often brilliantly and 
,·. ' 
staunchly 11empirica111 in many of their insights and utterances; whe.reas 
the "naturalists" and "empiricists" among theists are often quite 
11 idealist,ic11 in their descriptions of reality as spiritual procwss. Whereas 
.'' 
Bowne, in general, thought that God transcends time in his GWn being, 
,, ' llk?..d 
Brightman; student of Bowne, ~ a temporalist iri his view of the divine 
nature. · Frederick Tennant strives in his great work, Philosophical 
Theology, to be the 11 empi:ricist11 par-e:x;cellence in theology, but the 
outcome of bis theological labors lbasioally reflect Kant's phenomenalism 
and idealism •. 
A.fourth way to indicate major types of theism in our time, cutting 
across all of the.views just mentioned, centers on the problem of evil, and 
how it is solved from within a theistic standpoint. Some views hold to the 
adequacy or "absoluteness" of both God's ;eower' and his goodness in his 
fundamental relation to his world; other views, while stressing the 
adequacy of· Godts moral character or his goodness, have defined that 
God nru.st be 11finite 11 in his power. (Our later chapter examines each 
of these approaches to the problem of evil.) 
The Idea of God as Person or Personality 
The substance of the Hebraic idea of God as personal or Personality 
is fourfold. According to the implications of Old and New Testament, God 
is, or has: 
Self-conscious life or self-consciousness, 
Consciousness of his world, 
Love, or yearning outreach toward his world (Chesed and Agape), and 
Power to deal with the world's problems, as Lord of Nature and Lord 
of History. 
Within the perspective of the Hebrew meaning, no concept of God will be 
fµlly personalistic, unless it includes these four, major phases of 
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moral personality. Self-consciousness is indeed the basic logical meaning 
of n:::iersonality. 11 But metaphysically, and semantically, can 11 self-consciousnesstt 
have meaning as some l:ind of psychological state existing by itself, 
separate or isolated from any necessary reference to "an other11 or 11the 
other", that is, to a world or environment conceived as in some degree 
outlying or beyond the self which is conscious? Apparently Aristotle 
answered this question in the affirmative so far as his concept of God went; 
for, though giving to his God self-consciousness he seemed to deny to Him 
consciousness of His world. Accordingly, in comparison to the fullest 
Hebraic sense (and possibly in terms of the only metaphysical, psychological, 
and moral sense oonceivable) Aristotle 1s concept of God was only partially 
personal. Plate's God was conscious of his world, but (at least in the 
Timaeus) seemed subordinate to the Ideas, or the Forms of truth and being, 
which stood as the impersonalarchetY})es of world structure. Further, 
the idea of Agape was lacking to both Plato's and Aristotle's concept of 
God (eros, rather, wasthe prominent theme in the Greek concept of love). 
·.·. The Hebrew-Christian concept of God as Personal centers in the idea of 
Chesed or Agape. This idea adequately ste.tes the 11perf ectfon11 of God as 
Personality. 
~ demonic. 
() 
) 
"Personality," as mere self .. consciousness without love., would 
As for God's power in dealing with the problems of the world, 
we'inay adopt either one of two alternative points of view. These are that 
God 1s power is either absolutely or totally adequate (recall our above 
reference to "theistic absolutism"), or God 1s power is partially but 
increasingly adequate ("theistic finitism11 ). 
Simplifying the above discussion, perhaps we may say that the concept 
of God as Moral Personality includes two major aspects: intelligence and 
love. (We Will not argue further here the possibility of subsuming 
intelligence inself in love, though this possibility may occur to the 
reader). Our larger task, then, in the next (and in succeeding chapters) 
is to attempt to set forth types of reasoning concerning God's existence 
or reality as trans-human Intelligence and Love, if we are to prove His 
existence as 11 Personal11 or "Personality." Our gener~l method of 11 prooftr 
will be the larger one of 11empirical11 or "rational coherence" as previously 
defined. The problem of the 11 existence1i or reality of God and the problem 
of th~ 11personality11 of God are two levels of the same problem. Practically 
spea::: ;:; ~~~t ;~~~~:~1{y~~~d ~}~ti (xist11 ~i~{1s'f ~e !ere 11personal11 ; 
that is, unless He were a Being, Level, or Order ~f Reality, or a dynamical 
process, movement, or 11Spirit11 within reality, who is trans..;human, though 
possibly inclusive of the human., and in his essential 111ife11 is conscious 
good will or love. 
Before we enter upon this larger task, however, the following SUllUllary 
of the major concepts of God here discussed may occur to the reader·. After 
the f~ll analysis just completed in this chapter the reader may find the 
f ollmving outline a helpful simplification. We head this lest with an 
attitude toward 11God11 and theistic belief heretofore not specifically 
mentioned. 
90 
A Summary of Major Ideas Concerning Deity 
First, atheistic and agnostic: (1) The affirmation that there is no 11 God, 11 
that the "'° rld is meaningless from the standpoint of permanent value sustained by 
a trans-human reality; or (2) the affirmation that the word 11God11 stands for the 
incomprehensible., ultimate 11 power11 or 11powers 11 within or behind nature 2nd the 
universe as a whole, but that this possible ultimate unity, power or powers 
cannot be lmown in human, rational terms. There maybe 11God11 in some terms but 
we cannot lmov , and accordingly suspend judgment. 
Second, the affirmation that the word 11God11 stands as a symbol of man 1s 
growing ideals and their realization in historic process.· God as a purely 
subjective, psychological principle, the point of view of 11 humanismn or critical 
naturalism. 
Third, the affirmation that God is the mute striving of vital process (the 
desiring principle), manifest in natures evolutionary ramifications--the point 
of view of the lower vitalisms, e.g., Schopenhauer •. 
Fourth, the affirmation that God is the objective principle of "order" and 
"integration" found in nature and her evolutionary processes: (1) in the mini-
mal sense of McTaggart, viz. God as the minimal principle of order necessary 
to account for the vagrant and stray patches of "order11 or integration which 
we do infact find; or (2) in the maximal sense of Aristotle and many others, 
including many modern metaphysical naturalists, that God is the full principle 
of integrative 11Actuality11 irmnanent in or, in some way guiding., nature along 
paths of form, purpose and value. Contemporary emergentistic and evolutional'.'IJ 
theisms: v\Jieman to Morgan to Whitehead. 
Fifth, the affirmation that God is the objective order of Ideas., eternal 
values, abstract truth, or impersonal archetypes or laws of physical and moral' 
structure that underlie or overarch process: "Platonism". 
Sixth, the affirmation that God is the ultimate, ineffable Whole of Reality 
various idealisms, philosophical pantheisms, and mysticisms, especially eastern., 
91 
Seventh, the affirmation that God is Ultimate Personality, or Personal 
Cosmic Hind, with elements of the above views included, especially four, five., 
and six. This is the belief found, or suggested in, the major, historic mono-
theistic religions of the world, and possibly comes to highest expression in 
the Hebrew-Christian system. 
Cl~ssic Illustrative Quotations on the 
Personality of God 
It is fitting to conclude this chapter with the affirmations of represent-
ative theists concerning the Personality of God. These statements bring out the 
basic meaning of Personality in God as outlined previously. Surely Paul Tillich 
is in considerable historical error where h\;l writes in Systematic Theology, Vol. 
I, (p. ) that the concept of the Personality of God is an historically late, 
19th century concept originating with Kant 1 It is indeed rather an ancient 
concept coming to one of its major fruitions in Kant. The principal theme in 
the Biblical idea of the Divine Nature is God aamoral intelligence or Love, 
i.e. as self-concious moral personality. Such passages as those referred to in 
the note below certainly bear out this judgment relative to· the Biblical concept 
of Deity; they affirm (or seem to affirm, as their basic implication) the ultimJC<f 
of personality in value, and root this conception in ultimate reality or God~ as 
the author and sustainer of being.* Beyond the Biblical personalistic concept 
of God there are, of course, m:my authorities from whom we might quote. We 
select the following six for their generally recognized greatness as theologians 
or philosophers, one ancient, and five modern. These quotations are not selectec 
ii- Representative Biblical passa,ges on God as }feral Personality or 111oral 
Inteliigence and Love; Ps. 103, 139, Hosea 6~4-6i ll:1-L~; Jer .. 31; 
II Isaiah 40;53; htt 5-7; lk'l0:25-37;·15:1-32; John 14-15; 1st Jhn 3-4. 
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as full representative arguments for God as personal--the ~uestion of argument 
we reserve for dG~ail in our next chapter--but they awe chosen as classic state-
ments or affirmations of the Personality of God to contrast with the several 
major types of impersonalistic views of Deity presented earlier. Note the 
basic contrast in several of these passages with Platonic 11 abstractionism11 , · 
commencing with St. Augustine's familiar personalization of Platonism in the 
idea of God as the Personal Source of Truth. (Many further passages could be 
cited from Augustine indicating ~rit_§.s as dynamic Personal Consciousness, or 
Cosmic Intelligence and Love as.previously defined; we quote Augustine again 
at length in our discussion of major arguments for the existence of such God). 
§t. August~ 
(An affirmation· of God as Per,sona.l from Classic 
Christian theology). St. Augustine: 354-430 A.D.) 
11 It is evident that none con:e nearer to us thon the Platonists., ••• These 
philosoDhers, then, whom we see not undeservedly exlated above the rest in fame 
and glory, have seen that no material body is God, and therefore they have 
transcended all bodies in seekin~ for God. They have seen that whatever is 
changeable is not the most high God, and therefore they have transcended every 
soul and all changeable spirits in seeking the suprerre. They have seen also 
that, in every changeable thing, the form which makes it that which it is, what-
ever be its mode or nature, can only be through Him who truly 1§, bec~use He is 
unchcmgeable. And therefore, whether we consider the whole body of the world, 
its figure, qualities, o.ncl. orderly moverr.ent, and also all bodies which are in 
it; or whether we consider all life, either that which nourishes and maintains, 
as the life of trees, or that which adds to all these intelligence, as the life 
of man; or that which does not need the support of nutriment, but only maintains.: 
feels, understands, as the life of angels, -- all can only 12.§2. through Him who 
absolutely i.,§. For to Him it is not one thing to.£§., and another to live, as 
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though He could be, not living; nor is it to Him one thing to live, and andthm:' 
-
thing to understand, as though He could live, not understandingJ nor is it to 
Him one thing to understand., another thing to be blessed, as though He could 
understand and not be blessed. But to Him to live., to understand, to be blessc:d 
are to be. (City of God, VIII, 5,6) 
-
11And hence, since without doubt we place the Creator above things created., 
we must needs confess that the Creator both lives in the highest sense, and 
perceives and understands all things, and that he cannot die., nr suffer decay, 
or be changed; and that He is not a body, but a spirit, of all the most.power-
ful, most righteous, most beautiful, most good, most blessed. (On the Trinity 
xv, 4). 
"I call upon Thee, 0 God, the Truth, in whom, by 11hom, and through whom 
those things are true which are true in every respect. 
God the Wisdom ••• 
God, the true and highest life, in whom and by whom and through whom those 
things live which anywhere live truly and supremely. 
God, the Beatitudes, in whom and by whom and through whom all things are 
happy which anywhere are happy. 
God, the Good and the Beautiful ••• 
God, the intelligible light, in whom and by whom anc.l. throue:h whom those 
things intelligibly shine 1,h ich anywhere intelligibly shine. 
God, whose kingdom is a. whole universe of ,·Jhich the senses have no know-
ledge. 
God, from whom to depart is to die., to whom to return is to be restored to 
life, in whom to dwell is to live. (Soliloquies I, i, 3). 
nBut the true Father is true of Himself, for He begat the Truth. It is 
one thing to say, That man is true, for he has ta.ken in the truth: it is 
another, God is true, for He begat the Truth. See then how God is tFue, --not 
by participating in, but by generating the Truth. (Qn the Gospel of St. John 
Tractate XXXIX). 
11Behold and see, if thou canst, 0 soul ••• God is truth •••• in such a way as 
the heart sees, when it is said, He is truth. Ask not what is i;ruth; for immed-
iately the darkness of corporeal images and the clouds of phantasms will put 
themselves in the way, and will disturb that calm which at the first twinkling 
shone forth to thee, when l said truth. .See that thou remainest, if thou 
canst, in that first twinkling with which thou are dazzaled, as it were J) by 
a flash, when it is said to thee, Truth., (l'rinity VIII, 2). 
11 let no one say, I do not know what I love. let him love his brother, 
and he will love the same love. For he knows the love with which he loves, 
more than the brother whom he loves • .So now he can know God more than he 
knows his brother~ clearly known more, because more present; lmovm more, because 
more within him; knovm more because more certain. 
Embrace the love of God, ond by love embrace God. That is love itself, which 
associates together all good angels and all the servants of God. b3- the bond 
of sa,nctity, and joins together us and them mutually with ourselves, and joins 
us subordinately to Himself. In proportion, therefore, as. we are healed from 
the swelling of pricl.e, in such proportion are we more filled with love; and 
with what is he full, who is full of love, except with God? Hell, but you will 
say, I see love, snd, as far as I am able, I gaze upon it with nw mind, and I 
believe the Scripture, saring, that 1God is love; and he that cwelleth in love 
.dwelleth in God' •••• so love also loves indeed itself, but except it love itself 
as loving so:r:r.ething, it loves itself not a.1love. Uhat therefore does love love: 
except that which we love with love? But this,to begin from that which is 
nearest to us, is om~ brother ••• the Apostle John ••• placed the perfection of 
righteousness in the love of our brother ••• intends God to be understood in 
brotherly love itself ••• declares sufficiently and plainly, that this same 
brotherly love itself ••• is set forth by so great authority, not only to be 
from God, but also to be God. When., we love our brothGr from love, we love our 
brother from God ••• Therefore we love God and 0Ul1 neighbor from one and the srur.e 
love; but we love God for the sake of God, and ourselves and our neighbor for 
the sake of God. (Trinitz VIII, 8) 
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11The love of God comes first in the order of enjoininr, but the love of 
our neighbor first in the order of do:1-ng ••• Becuase thou dost not yet see God., 
thou dost earn the seeing of Him by loving thy neighbor.. &; loving thy neighbor 
thou purgest thine eyes for the seeing o:f God ••• Love., therefore., tby neighbor; 
and behold that in thee whereby thou lovest thy neighbor; there wilt thou see, 
as thou mayest, God. (9n the Gospel of John XVII, 8). 
'Morgan, Whitehead., Boodin 
(Three philosophical naturalists on the Personality of God. 
In what sense and to what degree these men may be designated 
11nuturali stsn has already been explained. C. Lloyd Morgan, 
British philoso··,her., b. d. • Alfred North Whitehead, 
B1~1ti'fln-American philosopher., teacher at Harvard from 1924 to 1938, 
b. d. • John Elof Boodin, Professor of Philosophy, 
Uni ve rsi ty of Southern C1;1 lifornia, b • d. ) . 
C, Lloyd Morgan 
(On emergent evolution and God, from Emergent Evolution, Henry 
Holt, N.Y. 1926, and Life, Hind, and Spirit, Henry Holt, N.Y., 
1925, Gifford Lectures for 1922 and 1923. respectively.) 
111,Je live in a world in which there seems to be an orderly sequence 
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of events. It is the business of science, and of a philosophy which keeps 
in touch with science, to describe the course of events in this or that 
instance of their occurrence, and to discover the plan on which they 
proceed. Evolution, in the broad sense· of the word, is the name we give 
to the comprehensive plan of sequence in all natural events. 
11But the orderly sequence, historically viewed, appears to present, 
from time to time, something genuinely new. Under what I here call e11'Srgent 
evolution stress is laid on this incoming of the new. Salient examples 
are afforded in the advent of life, in the advent of mind, and in the advent 
of each new kind of atom, and of each new kind of molecule. It is beyond 
the wit of man to number the instances of emergence. But if nothing new 
emerge -- if there be only regrouping of pre-existing events and nothing 
,mm -- then there is no e11'Brgent evolution •••• (Emergent Evolution, 1-2) 
11 
•••• 0ne starts, let us say, with electrons and the like; one sees in 
the atom a higher complex; one sees in the molecule a yet higher complex; 
one sees in a quartz-crystal, along its line of advance, a still more complex 
entity~ and one sees in an organism, along~ line of advance, an entity 
with the different kind of complexity spoken of as vital integration •••• 
All qualities are emergent within the gvr8Jlli_g L7'f natur~?:. Lite ah.d mind 
in no sense act into it, or any part of it, from without -- from so11'B 
disparate order of being •••• (Emer_g_ent Evolution, 12-14) 
11 
•••• This, for me, leads upwards towards God, as directive Activity 
within a sche11'S which aims at constructive consistency •••• God, as being, is 
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the nisus of the universe pressing onw-2_rds to levels as yet unattained; or, 
as I should prefer to say, is the Nisus directive of the co1.::l'se of events •.•• 
the crucial question arises whether, and if so in what sense, such an ideal 
is veritably Real •••• (EmerganlF Evolution, 33-34) 
11 The net result of the considerations adduced in the foregoing section 
is that the prefix 1super1 and the word 1beyondt may from the point of view 
of emergent evolution be applied to any stage of emergence as contrasted 
with the precedent stage. The molecular stage is super-atomic; the crystal 
or colloidal stage is super-molecular; and so on ••• But all stages fall 
within the rational order of the cosmos in our comprehensive sense, and for 
us this rational order is, in spiritual regard, not other than Divine Purpose. 
For us Divine Purpose is inclusive of all advance -- physical, vital, -mental, 
social, and in spiritual regard. Could we but, reach the acknowledged limit 
there would be no 1supert beyond it •••• 
11 In Divine Purpose as I conceive it • .-.quite central and essential 
is Substantial Unity. It is here, as elsewhere, that I am monistic to the 
core. For tr there be any validity in my concept of substance, it entails 
the renunciation au fon1 of all radical dualism or pluralism. These 
concepts lend themsel.ves, no doubt, to dramatic mythology •••• 
11 
••• when I say that ••• God is Spiritual Substance, it will no doubt 
be said that I leap from the impersonality of Divine Purpose to the 
personality of God. 
rrt-.Jith the concept of God as personal most of us have started in our 
early years as an initial assumption. For many of us there has followed 
careful weighing of relevant criticism. Some of us still accept Divine 
Personalitr under acknowledgment. But it does not follow that the concept 
under acknowledg·rnent is in all respects the same as the earlier concept 
under initial assumption. Is the concept of the physical world., 1:g-hich the 
man of science bids us accept, just the snme as that of the boy 1rhen first 
he enters the laboratory? 
11 How comes it .•. that our individual enjoyment is also personal, that 
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our individual reference is shared by many persons? In evolutionaI'"IJ regard 
it just is so. Tfa accept what 1,re find I in natural piety'. But if, we regard 
the whole evolutionary process as a manifestation of Divine P11rpose., it is in 
us as persons that Divine Personality is revealed. Through expan?i~n of 
thought in spiritual regard we reach out towards, .though we are unable to 
grasp, the limiting concept of personality. If we be persons and more than. 
individual selves, i1:: is in religious regard through the a11-embrncing 
Personality of Gcd. 
11 Revert to possession by mind. Truth., beauty, and goodness are possessed 
by each individual self of enjoyment as the centre from which reference goes 
forth. Bu:t; when they are not~ possessed 
,t ;.. 
in some te:mpo.:r.al sequence of 
mental processes - ... mine, yours, or another 1 s -- do they surcease and drop. 
out of be:ing? Perhaps so. But rr.ty they not be temporal manif esta:t ions -of: 
values which in spirit;ual regard am eternal? In the attitude of acknowledgment 
I believe that they ~ so. The rarer is comprehensive at the unattainable 
limit of the timeless, And the Timeless and Eternal is the I AM towa.rds 
vrhich we reach out in spiritual regard. Thus truth, beauty, and goodness 
rational, aesthetic, and ethical values -- are raised to a higher status 
for those in whom the spiritual attitude is supervenient, since they have 
their ultimate being in God •••• 
11 1 know full well that, with respect to much that I have said •••• I shall 
be charged with my$ticism. So be it. In discussing emergent evolution I was 
faced by problems many and various. In spiritual regard I am faced by 1rwstery. 
And in presence of nzy-ste:ry, the sp::Z.:ttual attitude, if monistic, cannot as I 
think be other than nzy-stic.u." (Life, Mind., and Spirit, 306-313) 
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Alf red North Whitehead 
11 Thus the whole (natural) process ••• requires a definite entity (God), 
already actual among the formative elements, as an antecedent groi.:nd for the 
entry of the ideal forms into the definite process of the tem,Joral world ••• 
God, who is the ground antecedent to transition., must include. all possibilities 
of pbysical value conceptually, thereby holding the idealf orms apart in equal, 
conceptual realiza-t,ion of knowledge. Thus, as concepts, they are grasped 
together in the -;'i.fi!lf:.t./,fte:iv synthesis of omniscience •••• God ••• is complete in the 
sense that his vision determines every possibility of value. Such a complete 
vision coordinates and adjusts every detail. ••• This .ideal world of conceptual 
harmonization is merely a description of God himself. Thus the nature of 
God is the complete conceptual realization of the realm of ideal forms ••• God 
has in his nature the knowledge of evil., of pain, and of degradation, but it 
is there as overcome with what is good •••• Every event on its finer side 
mtroduces God into the world ••• The power by which God sustains the world is 
the power of himself as the ideal ••• The world lives by its incarnation of 
God in itself ••.• He transcends the temporal world •••• The abstract forms are 
thus the link between God and the actual world •.•• God is that function in the 
world by reason of which our purposes are directedto ends which in our own 
consciousness are impartial FS to our own interests. He is that element in 
life in virtue of which judgment stretches beyond facts of existence to 
values of existence. He is that element in virtue of which our purposes 
extend beyond values for ourselves to values for others •••• He is the binding 
element in the world. The consciousness whiuh is individual in us, is 
universal in him: love which is partial in us is all-embracing in him •••• 
The passage of time is the journey of the world towards the g3.thering of new 
ideas into actual fact •• ,. The present type of order in the world has arisen 
from an unimaginable past, and it will find its grave in an unimaginalnle 
future. There remain the inexhaustible realm of abstract forms, and creativity, 
with its shifting character ever determined afresh by its owncreatu1->es, 
and God, upon whose wisdom all forms of order depend. (Relif,;ion in the 
~ak~ng, p. 152-160.) 
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11 
••• the nature of God is di polar. He has a primordial nature and a 
consequent nature. /J!he primordial side of his naturg is eternal, actually 
deficient, and unconscious •••• The consequent nature of God is conscious; and 
it is the realizatJ.on of the actual world in the unity of his nature •••• the 
consequent nature is the weaving of God's physical feelings upon his_primordial 
concepts ••• ,lfhe consequent sidi/ originates with physical experience derived 
from the temporal world, and then acquires integration with the ~rimordial 
side. It is determined, incomplete, consequent, 'everlasting,' fully acutal, 
and conscious .••• !'(Process and Reality, p. 521-2h.) 
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John Elof Boodin 
11God must be conceived as a reality beyond material incarnation--a pure 
spiritual level, ex.pressing itself through matter and l:ecoming lmown to us 
through this expression. The higher level in the advance of life does not 
merely emerge from below, but implies a stimulus from beyond. and the·. 
creative response of the finite to this stimulus. The ord~r, beauty, and 
love of the highest level must radiate through all the levels even to 
inorganic matter and its evolution. For it is to the highest level in the 
cosmos that the lower levels owe their order ••.• God is not to be conceived 
merE:ly as the highest level of evolution, but as an independent life. ·This 
life permeates and envelops all that is in space and time. God is not 
dependent upon the process in space and time, but is the field within which 
the process moves. All order depends in the last analysis upon the structure 
of this divine field~ But this depends upon nothing. It is self-contained 
in its perfection-the perfect symphony--though its creative love goes out 
to all. Through the genius of this soul of the whole, the constancy of 
levels and the equilibrium within the whole is guaranteed ..•• The divine must 
not be conceived as an impersoanl field; it suffuses the cosmos as soul, as 
creative intelligence. God's life., it is true, cannot be characterized as 
personal in our imperfect sense--lim ted as we are by our material evolution--
but it cannot be less, rather must it be inconceivably higher than what we 
mean by personality •••• (~, P• 44-h5) 
11 If we think of the cosmos as a living whole, what we call empty space 
may be the soul of the whole--all-pervasive spirit in which the transmitted 
patterns of energy are immanent and directed to their proper target. At 
any rate, to one who conceives the cosmos as a living whole space has lost 
its terror •••• Space is really the divine presence •••• If we conceive space as 
the universal rr.atr:ix of order, then corpuscular matter becomes the amorphous 
plural material, 'With its indeterminacy and inertia, but also plasticity to 
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be ordered in the lattice-work of space~ If, however., we recognize the facts 
of change c1nd emergence everywhere, we cannot suppose that space is a 
stereotyped order •••• This structure must be a ,hierarchical dynamic structure •••• 
containing in itself all the patterns and hierarchies of patterns of all 
possible integrations from the atom to creative genius ••• steering the 
material conditions towards structure and everywhere contributing such 
structure as the reccdiness of the individual and the ensemble of conditions 
permit whether H2o or.a human personality .... (God, 85, 147) 
ROYCE, BOHNE, BHIGHTI1AN 
(Three philosophical idealists on the Personality of God .. Royce, 1855-1916, 
reached his fame as a teacher at Harvard from 1882 to 1916. Bowne, 1847-
1910, was the noted teacher of Philosophy at Boston University from 1876 
to his death. Brightman, to , inherited Bownets chair at 
Boston. Bowne and Brightman derived the main substance of their thought 
from Berkeleyan personalistic idealism; whereas Royce stood more in 
the absolutistic, Hegelian tradition of Idealism.) 
Josiah Royce 
(In the following way Royce believes that he successfully 
refutes Mr. Bradley's Impersonal Absolute.) 
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11 The Absolute therefore must not merely~ A, but experience itself, 
as possessing the character of A. It is, for instance, 1 above relations 1 
(according to Mr. Bradley). If this is a fact, :::,nd if this statement is 
true of the Absolute., then the Absolute must experience that it is above 
relations. For Mr. Bradley's definition of Reality must not., li.ke the 
mystical Absolute, merely ignore the relations as illusion. H, must experience 
their 'transformations' as a fact, -- and as its own fact. Or., again, the 
Absolute is that in which thought has been 'taken up 1 and •transformed', so 
that it is no longer •mere thought'. Well., this too is to be a fact •••• 
The Absolute, then, experiences itself as the absorber and transmitter of 
thought. Or, yet again ••• 1personality1 ••• Well, this transcendence of 
personality is a fact •••• Hence, the fact that the Absolute transcends 
personality is a fact that the Absolute itself experiences as its own fact •••• 
"The Absolute .... is above the Self, and any form of mere self-hood 
( according to Bradley).. The fact that it is thus above selfhood is something 
1not other than experience•; but is wholly experience, and is the Absolute 
Experience itself. In fine, then, the Absolute, in Mr. Bradley's view, 
knows itself so "'°ell--experiences so fully its own nature--that it sees 
itself to be no Self, but to be a self-absorber ••• aware of itself in the end, 
as something in which there is no real Self to be aware of •••• Eu t if the 
Absolute is all these things, it can be so only in case it experiences 
itself as the possessor of these characters. Yet all the concrete self-
possession of the Absolute remains something above Self; and apparently the 
Absolute thus knows itself to be, as a Self, quite out of its own sight1 
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11Now,. ••• He know., at all events., that •.. Hr. Bradley's Absolute is a self-
representative system •••• And we know., therefore., that the Absolute, despite 
all Mr. Bradley's objections to the Self, escapes from selfhood and from all 
that selfhood implies., or even transcends selfhood, only by remaining to the 
end a Self. In other words, it really escapes from selfhood only by 
experiencing as its mm, this its own escape. This car.sequence is clear. 11 
(The vTorld and The Individual, vol. I, p .• 551-2). 
11Fe are free, upon the basis of the general argument of these lectures., 
to assert that the bsolute is no absorber and transmitter., but an explicit 
possessor and knower of an infinite Pealth of orga.nized individual facts,--
the facts, namely, of the Absolute Life and Selfhood11 ( Ib. p. 587) 
11What our ••• conception asserts is that God's life, for God's life we 
must now call this a,bsolute fulfillment which our ••• Conception defines, sees 
the one ·plan fulfilled through all the manifold lives, the single consciousness 
winning its purpose by virtue of all the ideas of all the individual selves, 
and of all the lives. No finite view is wholly illusory. Every fj_nite 
intent taken precisely in its wholeness is fulfilled in the Absolute. The 
least life is not neglected, the most fleeting act is a recognized part of 
the world's meaning. You are for the divine view all that you know yourself 
at this instant to be. 11 (lb. 426-27) 
11 
••• In brief, then., the fore going conception of God undertakes to be 
distinctly theistic., and not pantheistic. It is not the conception of any 
Unconscious Reality, into which finite beings are absorbed; nor of a Universal 
. ' . . . 
Substance,. in whose le.w ethical independence is lost; nor of an Ineffable 
Mystery., which we can only silently adore •••• I am certainly disposed to 
insist that what the faith of our fathers has genuinely meant_-, by God, is ••• 
identical with the inevitable outcome of a reflective philosophy. (~ 
Conception of God, p. 49-50). 
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Borden Parker Bowe 
0 
••• First principles themselves must be founded in the nature of the 
infinite. Just as what is real is founded in the infinite, so also what .is 
true is founded in it. In ow finite experience we find ourselves working 
' 
under a system of laws and principles which condition us, and which allotµ' acts 
must obey. And these laws are not of our making, but rule us even against_ 
our will. Under this experience there grows up the notion of a realm o,f · 
impalpable and invisible laws, to which all reality is subject. He 'l;,hink of 
them as ruling over being, and not as fo1mded in being. And thus first 
principles particularly are conceived as s. kind of botomless necessity, which 
depend on nothing for their validity, and which vJould exist if all reality 
were away. But the 1mtenability of this view is palpable. Lawo of every 
sort, thought-laws among the rest, are never anything but expressions of the 
nature of being. Reality, by being what it is and mot son:ething else, 
founds all activity and all law •••• 
11 It is necessary to the thought of any agent that it have son:e definite 
way of working. Without this the thought vanishes and the agent is nothing. 
This mode, or law, of action, however, is not imposed from without; but is 
simply an expression of what the being is ••.• (M3taphysics, p. 141-44) 
'
1The question of divine limitation, then, really concerns God I s relation 
to those necessities of reason, or eternal truths. Is he conditioned by them. 
or superior to them? ••• If we should assu.rre a realm of truth to exist apart.· 
from being, it could have no effect in being unless we should further asswre 
an interaction between it and being. But this would make truth a thing, and 
would compel the assumption of another being deeper than both truth and 
reality to rr:ediate their interaction. At this point we fall an easy prey to 
our ow abstractions. A law of ns.ture is never the antecedent, but the 
consequence of reality. The real is first and only, and being what it is, its 
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laws result as a consequence, or, rather are but expressions of ~hat the 
things are •••• Truth, •• is never anything more than an expression of. ~he 
necessary relations of ideas, or of the way in which recson universally 
proceeds. As such, it is nothing apart from the mind or antec.edent to it, 
but is simply an expression of the mental nature •••• There. is no realm of 
truth apart from the world-ground •••• This dependence may be conceived in 
two ways. Truth may be viewed as founded in the nature of the world-ground., 
or as a creature of volition •••• we object to the statement either that God 
makes truth., or · that he recognizes it as something independent ,of himself. 
: He is rather its source and foundation; and it,. in turn, is the fixed mode 
· of his procedure •••• The basal fact is a thought activity, and reflection 
shows that this has certain forms_. •• heovJVer, they do not rule intellect, 
but only express -what intellect is. (Theism, p. 191-96) 
nunless., then., appearances are unusually deceitful ••• it is plain that 
man is no impotent annex to.a self-sufficient mechanical system, but is 
rather a very significant factor in cosmic ongoings, at least in terrestrial 
regions. He is an inhabita.nt of the invisible world., and projects his 
thought and life on the great space and time screen which.we call nature. 
But naturalism; in its sense bondage., misses all this, and seeks fo1~ man 
in the picture world of space images, where, in the nature of the case., 
he can never be~ l.Tith this initial blunder, man becomes less and less in 
the system,; first a phenomenon, then an ~~-':lpiphenomenon', and finally he 
tends to disappear altogether. Mca."'IW'hile matter and motion go on integrating 
and dissipating as per schedule, and ½MV2 remains a constant quantity. 
The whole history of thought contains no more grotesque inversion of reason., 
11A world of persons with a Supreme Person at its head is the conception 
to which we come as the result of our critical reflections. (Personalism, 
p. 277) 
.,.07 
11 
••• the notion of an impersonal spirit ••• too, is more easily· sa:td -~bm 
understood •••• 1-.re conclude that if the 1mrld-gr01 .. md be intelligent: and 
rational, it must also be conscious and personal. (Theism, p. 157) 
11 The objections to affirming a Supreme Person are largely verbal. Many 
of them are directed against a literal anthropomorphism.. This, of course, is 
a man of straw. JVIan himself in his essential personality is ~s unpicturable 
and formless as God. (Personalism p. 264) 
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Edgar Sheffield Brightman 
11God is a conscious Pe;rson of perfect good will. He is the source of 
all value and so is worthy of worship and devotion. He is the creator of 
all other persons and c;ives them the power of free choice. Therefore his 
~urpose controls the outcome of the universe. His purpose and his nature 
must be inferred from the way in which experience reveals them, namely, as 
being gradually attained through effort, difficulty, and suffering. Hence. 
there is in God's very nature something which makes the effort and pain of 
life necessary. There is within him, in addition to his reason and his 
active creative will, a passive element which enters into every one of his 
conscious states, as sensation, instinct, and impulse enter into ours, and 
constitutes a problem for him. This element we call The Given. The evils 
of life a.nd the delays in the attainment of value, in so far as they come 
from God and not from human freedom., are thus due to his nature., yet not 
wholly to his deliberate choice. His will and reason acting on The Given 
produce the world and achieve value in it. 
11 This definition may be put more concisely in the following terms: 
11God is a Person supremely conscious, supremely valuable., and supremely 
creative, yet limited both by the free choices of other persons and by 
restrictions within his own nature. 
11This definition makes God nmch more limited than does traditional 
theism., yet much less limited than does any form of dualism which contrasts 
God 1d th matter or with any being in the universe which originated 
independently of God. (The Problem of God, Abingdon, 1930, p. 113-114) 
11 
••• the traditional theistic idea of God has been what we may call 
absolutistic. That is, for St. Augustine., for St. Thomas, for Descartes, 
for Kant, and for many modern philosophers the fundamental attributes of the 
divine Person have been omnipotence, omniscience., eternity or timelessness, 
and infinity, as well as perfect goodness •••• But ••• the attributes of power, 
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timelessness, and infinity need to be reconsidered.·· Ve first show why an 
empirical a:Jproach to God can no longer be satisfied with the assertion that 
God is timeless •••• 
"The thesis to be defended is that the God of religion., from everlasting 
to everlasting., is a temporal being. Indeed, it may be said that all reality, 
all experience., whether human or divine, is a temi;:iorally moving present. 
- . ,. ( ' 
Nothing 'real is a nu:nc · stans. Activity, change, du:ration are the essence 
of ·the real.'· The real endures; the real chanc;es; the real grows. God is 
the real or at least the most significant part of the real. 
11 
.... Eternity is a function of time, not time of eternity. With 
Heraclitus we may assert that all things change except the Logos of change. 
That there is constant change is the testimony of both experience and of 
science. That the changes in experience conform to law is the testimony of 
rational thought. Reason finds evidence of eternal form which the changes 
never violate. 
11 
••• At any rate; Kant held, and experience testifies, that time is 
essential to our inner life as space is not. We can have experiences to 
which space is not relevant,; but time is the universal warp and woof of 
every experience. Now, if God is a real being, he must stand in real 
relations to our temporal experience. He must be the ground and explanation 
·of· our time, and events in our time must make a difference to him. The 
temporal character of the self' points to the temporal character of God." 
(Person and Reality., The R.onaid Press Company., 1958, p. 322-324) 
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Addendum on the Concept of God as 11Spiri t 11 
·.· / ... 
Nels F.S. Ferre has been a very influential theologian of the American 
scene in the mid-twentieth century. Currently, Professor Ferr( is in the process 
of clarifying his noteworthy life-long commentary on the Ilfew TestHment concept:ii.on 
of God as Agape. In a provocative essay entitled 11 Beyond Substance and Process 11 
he states that 11 God is not a spiritual Personality but personal Spirit" .~t-
Ferre believes that 11 Persone.lity11 is too 11 substantive 11 in its cor:notations as 
the term best descriptive of God. Rather .he says that we must clarify theology 
by conceiving God as 11SpiritJ1 G:; 11 2;ersonal Spirit. 11 --(And we are here reminded 
of Martin Buber). ,_Ferr' believes that we cannot conceive God in too substantive 
a fashion., because 11 substance 11 has connoted things, entities, and persons in 
their exclusive, over-againstness to other things, entities, or persons; whereas, 
God is all inclusive., creative., dynamic Spirit suffusing the Universe. On the 
other hand., he says, if we go too far along the way of a process philosophy., 
and identify God too closely with process., we are obviously making m,m too 
immanent in particular flux and really no more than natural evolution. Accord-
ingly., he writes, "If' God is substance, he is an entity in terms of 2 Supreme 
Being, alongside and among other things 11 ,; and again 11 •• if God is conceived of 
either as substance or as person2.lity, in the sense of an exclusive independent 
entity; he cannot be present and absent at the same time. He is either present 
or absent 
/ or ue sin against the law of excludeci middle. tHH} On the other hand., ltif God is 
. an aspect of process,oppositely he possesses no transcending aseity.wlHH~ 
Therefore Ferre" believes tl'l,a,t the ·essential N. T. description of God as 
11 Spiri t 11 is the mediating and transcending yerm W\3 need--transcending the 
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substantive, 11personc,lity 11 , but not the adjectival, 11 person2.l, n as terms 
approximately attributed to God.Mo>st eloquently he writes -- and here we 
recall some of the insi0ht of the late Josiah Royce -- 11 God as Spirit ••• is that 
reality who, focussed as a purposive totality, :!.sin this sense a distinctive 
entity and yet present in and with all distinctions as their inner identity. 
God is o.lso o.11-inclusive, the only ultimate reality. He is both person0.l 
subject., as such limiting his power and freedom for the sake of the reality and 
the freedom of creation, and yet also the co-subject of all subjects, indeed, 
the co-presence of all creation in son:e sense ••••• if God is Spirit and trans-
personal, in the full sense that he co.n at the same tirr.e be both personal and 
impersonal or non-personal in himself, then he can remain self-same and yet 
create that which is other and be pre~:ent with such creation for the sake of its 
reality and privacy, yes, for the sake of its genuine f1~eedom, impersonally or 
in gr, ades of the personal according to the need of the creation or the stage of 
history... As person::i.lit;;7 Goel has external relations and his relation to the 
world must be one basically of e~carnation; as Spirit, God becorr.es basically 
the ident,ity and inner reality of all; and yet as personal, he maintains external 
relations with regard to his own self-being, his oun self-sufficiency, his own 
aseity. 11 *1'*~} 
h,PN-
We will no~ attempt to evaluate in detail these complex statements. No 
doubt it is wise for theology to consider ~erfe's suggestion and employ the term 
"Spirit11 in referring to God, rather more thm1 the term i1personality.n Spirit is 
indeed a ho.llowed, sug'.~estive, and 11 orthodox11 term ·which may well be emphasized 
by theism. we submit, however, that 11 spirit 11 can be a very cloudy, vague, 
vaporous term signifying little, unless carefully defined. When we think of 
"spirit11 in quintessential sense we usually mean the thinkin,;, eval,:_atimg , and 
purposing ~ir;.d of personal beings or persons. Does not 11 person.J.li ty'i therefo:ce 
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come back into the pictu:ce as the more t:con1:1cending or inclL1.si ve category? 
Person:1lity best defines or exemplifie8 11 spiritr1 •. 11!e would se.y t'hat in the 
above discussion Ferre delimits the expression 11personality11 too much. If, 
however, we may use it in a more expansive sen:Je_, so that it does not have an 
offensive exclusiveness or separo.teness, as Ferre alle,':.ses, but rather a liberatin·· 
inlifting inclusiveness, then surely it is om~ best term for the description of 
God. For the cardinal 
virtue of the truly big or .senerous 11 person11 is always his inclusive 11 spirit 11 , 
that is, his breodth of understanding, his toleration, his :senerousity, and 
crea:tiveness, his lovin3 servicableness. God has such attributes in s.uprenB 
degree, and accordingly moral 11 personality 11 at its best on our plane, would by 
no means be the least valuable term or category attributable to God--indeed we 
maintain it is the highest or best term attributable to God. In conclusion, let 
us use Ferre'sphraseology God as 11personal Spirit 11 --but let us capitalize the 
whole expression into God as "Personal Spirit11 • It is then equivalent to our 
11 Personality of God 11 usage. I think it only a variation of words, not· of ideas. 
In speaking to the world today from the sense of v L·.e of the Judaeo-
Christian system, the greatest issue is whether God is 11 Personality11 or 
11 Impersonali ty 11 • I think for simplicity and clarity we have to use 11 Personali ty• 
in the debate, 8nc1 defend it. In the privacy of theological talkj perhaps we 
can substitute "personal Spirit". Bmt the main issue remains, Is God self-
conscious Life?---at least in the primary din,3nsion of His multidimensional 
Being, nature, or Reality? If self-conscious, then the. most appropriate word 
is 11personnli ty 11 , whatever other subtlty we may then have to say is true of God. 
Differences in the ~.dea of God center mainly in two questions: ( 1) How does one account for form, law, rational structure, and value in the universe as to their 
basic place or sta·::;us, and how form and vah,e relate to process or bPcomming? And ( 2) there is the question of whether conscious personality is supreme or not 
in value e.nd in procesc~ Accordingly we have tr~e great systems of thought about Deity, eastern and western, ancient and modern, 
Panthetem (e.g. Hi1:..,luism) 
~----,,,_,,.... _____ _ 
God as 
the undiffere:atiated 
Whole of Deing 
/ I 
: rfv ~? 
' ( 
Problems: 1. The principlas of 
individuality and pe .. r sonali ty 
are denied value an~ ~~ality. 
But then how/why do finite 
individual forms af~ear in 
the finite part -- Dow do 
specific forms and values 
arise out of an ul tinate:i.y 
undifferentiated B-:::ing? 
2. The problem '.:>f 11 good111 
and "evil 11'. if such Being is 
11beyond 11' good and evil 1 
---------~- -----~=----
Critical Naturalism 
(a.g. <T. Dewey) 
Fo:;.--m and value are constructs 
of Tien's imagination: 
(f/v) 
E ~
Problems: 1. How do personal, 
consoious J-5.fe and values 
coma f?Gm L~personal, non-con-
scious, ncm-value process? How 
do fo:rms e.ppsar from formless 
ppocess, 
2. The problem of the 
relativity of values, 
Semi-theistic, or Sub-personalistic 
Naturalisms (e.g. H.N. Wieman) 
Form and value are inherent in 
emergent process; an impersonal 
movement toward form and value: 
· r/v _____-} 
E----
,1 111 
'purposive 
Problems: How can 111cosmic purpose 111 be 
sub-personalJ how/why does 11 integration11', 
"emergence 0 ', "whelism11· take place? 
Abstract Idealism (e.g. Plato-Aristotle) 
Form and values are 111prior11' and transcendent 
standards of process: 
(f/v) ~ 
~-~ -:::\ 
E 
Problems: How "prior"' unless in Personal 
Mind? 
God as 11'.Actuality111 : the principle of the 
world's integration into form and value. 
Modern Personalistio Theisms 
(Idealistic and Naturalistic) 
Sub-Mor:othd.stic Conceptions of Deity 
Polyt'.;,ism 
Form and value as the personal, cons-0-ious, 
moral purposes or thoughts of Cosmio 111'./Iind"', 
11
'Person/:I., or 11'Consciousness1:n: Henot>:dsm 
MoD0the!s~~c 6onceptions 
--ff:i.storic mou:itheisms 
Deis:r:. 
Barthianis::n 
Problems: 1. The exact relation of the D:;.;rine 
! ) Mind to the world of nature and procoss? ·p· fY-. E/;.v- __ ,,.,,,,,,,_...--~ 2. To the human mind and its freedomi 3, The problem of "imperfections" or "evils" in process? 'h; world's apparent purposive integration, emergence, 
wholizing into a finite personal order explained. 
ft~1" &~-~;::[_,,__ fn ~.,-l_ 
--=----
Chapter Five 
Major Arguments for God 
Patterns of Reasoning in the Empirical }food 
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11Empirical11 reasoning concerning the existence or reality of God refers 
to a method, a mood, or a mode of insight and experience based on general 
observation of world .facts objective or external to the self (the sentient 
and intelligent powers of the self, with which we make the observations, of 
course, teir,g assumed). 
Be.fore we proceed, however, to examine in detail the empirical type 
arguments, as the rnain interest of this chapter, we -:w;i11 look first at 
t , ~de· · f 11 · r·i, d dl t · · · ne :i a o · proo . , an socon y·. prese:n: an.,"::,, :, ::;- · 
introductory resume o.f all the arguments for God as to the typical method 
and aims of each. 
In science, as well as in philosophy, the quest for truth involves the 
idea of proof· for the statements and judgments made purporting to be 
descriptions of reality. "Logical proof 11 is of course correct deduction 
from premises already given. "Empirical proof 11 is a wider sort cf proof 
which we have previously described as empirical coherence, p. 57:, &f ¥ ~ ,..), 
To put the matter in slightly different words, but with the same result, I 
believe, we say i;vith Trueblood that proof is 11 cumulative 11 or converging 
11 lines of evidence.ti 11 Proo.f" is the limit to which accumulative evidence 
approaches. "Evidence11 here may be understood as any of the legitimate 
tests of truth so far considered. Trueblood 1s able summary of the idea and 
problem of proof may be repeated with profit here: 
" ••• The necessity of cumulative €Vidence ••• applies to everything 
we know in the realm of matters of fact. It apr,lies to evidence 
for the existence of God, to evidence for the existence of atoms, 
to evidence for the existence of historical chara cters"" (LB p. h2) 
/1@-/'--G{ r £l:,,,,..t1-d/ /9'9'-;).., 
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The sum effect of the following arguments for God may be considered 
11 proof11 in this open sense. Fo one of these arguments may be definitive 
or uapodi· tic" in certc1.inty by itself. Some of them may be stronger than 
others. But altogether they may point in a similar direction, with God as 
a focal limit, and with enough incompletion in the case of each vector for 
the spark of faith, of necessity, to make its leap. 
\ I/ 
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Classification of the Arguments for God 
as to general method and aims 
TA-. rat,, ~ 
Sul:,_j ~ t:. ftt1--e .. , 
I. Typically "rational", that is to say, detached, or "objective", 
11 logicalll type arguments--as William lfowton Clarke wrote, arguments 1!from 
the intellectual starting point" (OCT 105): 
A. Enpirical arguments: based on the existence of the world as a whole 
and its process. In reQsoning about .. the God the· empirical ·-mood looks at 
O;;j 1/ 
/ 
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Argument~ · Adumbrated in Plato I s moral idealism, and implied in the Hebraic 
Old Testament Prophetic thought, the basic logical form of the argument 
was crystalized by St. Augustine. Elaborations·of phases and details of this 
argument are fount in St. Anselm, Descartes~ Kant in. his moral reasoning, 
Josiah Royce, William.Ernest Hocking, Charles Hartshorne, and many others. 
(Gt• ontos: being; that is, the argument through which we may _know directly 
and intimately something of the 11be:i.ng11 of God). 
II. The Religious or psychological type arguments, or the typically · 
11 committed11 or "emotional" argument. As Clarke sayswe may approach the 
problem of theism 11from the·religious·starting.;.point" (Ib_ll8). 
!>. Perhaps most simpJ.y described it is the discovery of Mind in the. 
universe through.the experience of moral "salvation". The mystiCls, prophets, 
seers, and devout of all cultures have tended. to know of God first ... in tl:lis 
way. In his Varieties of Reli_g_ious Experience !the modern Am.erican 
philosopher ·williarn James gave a classic description of "salvational 
experience" in its general or universal form. Within Christian theology 
more specifically Douglas Clyde Macintosh, the late noted Yale theologian, 
·, ' 
spent a lifetime in the analysis of the ideas of 11 conversion11 ., and of 
11 religious11 or 11Christian experience," or the experience of God. His now 
· classic -work., Theolop:y as an· Empirical Scienc~ was devoted to this theme. 
·we shall utilize both of these sources to .. explain this 11 religious11 argument 
for God. 
None of the above divisions should 1De regarded as fixed or impassible from 
one to another. Indeed_ quite the opposite seems true; all of the above so-
called arguments for God are profoundly related. None can be discussed 
without implying many of the others. The "religious· ar~ent11 is by no 
means illogical or 1'unreasonable. 11 .· All of these arguments taken together may 
constitute phases of a full, rationally coherent insight concerning God. 
---------- ------- ----------· ~~~ 
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The full we;ight of the empirical arguments probably rests on profound a priori 
factors, as Kant qu.tt~ rightly, but critically, discovered. In our following 
discussion we attempt to point out what rational, or a priori premises lie 
behind each argument. In the view of this writer, the possible discovery 
of the ultimate subjectivity of any or all of these arguments, far from 
leading to their destruction or invalidity, leads probably to their establish-
ment on the profoundest basis. If, in the deptps of our subjectivity, any or 
all of them help us to stand in some measure face to face with ultimate 
reality a1.1d God, so that our own subjec~ivity is awakened, as it were, by 
the presence of an unmistakable and overwhelming objectivity, to use the 
time-honored analogy, as the eye is cleaved, but quickened and fulfilled, 
in its mission and destiny by light; so if any of these arguments bring us 
into a vividness of experience and reality in like manner, they are 
arguments, or rather we should say, experience of Qod indeed. 
Needless to say there has been great dispute in the history of western 
philosophy regarding the validity of these arguments. Some c~itical 
thinkers have rejected all of them, and this not on1y among materialists 
and naturalists, but Christian theologians too, Paul Tillich being a notable 
present day example. Others have accepted the "empirical" arguments but 
decline to see significance in the "a priori" patterns of reasoning. The 
view of this writer is that all of these arguments are profoundly significan~ 
when sufficiently appreciated, and that all of them rest no doubt upon a 
priori depths that are their real validity. At any rate, we shall attempt 
to indicate more fully what is here implied by the analysis, or rather tbe 
coherent synopsis, of the arguments. 
ll8 
Empirical Reasons·for Belief in.God 
1. The.Causal Argument 
. In its initial mood this argument is 11 empirical11 ; it first looks out at 
the ,::orld and permits the presence of the world as a whole to suggest a 
train of reasoning about causality. The objective confrontation of the self 
by the world is the starting-point. In depth, however, this argument deals 
with the logical implicl'tions involved in the idea of causality. As Clarke 
has said it is the "discovery of Mind in the universe through the idea of 
cause. 11 Accordingly it seems in depth essen-t;.ially a priori, as the 
subsequent discussion will attempt to clarify; .it rests ultimately on 
logical, axiomatic insights. 
(1) The··main idea of the cosmological argument. At its empirical 
starting-point the argument may think of world causation (i.e. what causes 
existence and process as a whole) in·terrns of the modern evolutionary idea 
of unfolding, that "one existi11g thing has unfolded out of another" (Clarke, 
Ib. 110). Or, if the terminology ''.unfolding11 seems to commit us initially 
too much to a pre-formationist me of philosophy of evolution (see our 
later discussion of this point), perhaps we should refer more simply to the 
evolutionary·~ of integration and emergence of cosmic energi'es into 
various fqrms of individuality, from sub-atomic entities to finite persons. 
This then is our initial observation. Resting on it our reasoning follows. 
Let.us start with the most complex object of present evolutionary development, 
man, or more specifically, you or me, the cosmic origin of which we wish 
' . 
to explain. We have:, then, a series of causal terms, or thinking about 
causal terms, of the following kind; reading from right to left: 
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Nth 
1 
y X D / C / B /,. A 
The ( The Y ability The X abil- The 11nru.ta7 The ! Parents/ You or I 
"mystery" or factor in ity, factors, tion11 heredity (1 as individual 
of time the "life or 11 causes 11 v of the ( factors, .persons 
and / elements", C, of mutation~' genes of . of the\ '\ 
space? / H, o, N, etc., earlier ( genes, i.e. . 
1 
· in their I organic 1. the human 
/ galactic-wide\ forms; i.e. "species" 
.1 
\ 
presence; i.e. the evolu-
1 the cosmic · i tion of 1 
I environment as life \. \ a whole in deepest .·. 
\ sense containing 
\ 
the possibility and 
power of integration 
and emergence into 
various forms of ,. 
individuality. \ 
\. \ 
,. l . .. . 
"" 
\ 
As we proceed from the right and read left, through these terms, A, B, C, 
etc., we enter successively deeper, or wider, or more inclusive stages of 
causation under the evolutionary idea of unfolding or 'integration. 
One of the typical or traditional· points of the cosmological argument 
is that we get into, or have assumed, an infinite regression of terms, 
unless we posit an Absolute Original Cause, or Originating '"Will, 11 an 
11 absolu~~ origination," with ultimate cons:tructive power, suggesting all-
su;fficient Intelligence and Purpose (and possibly even good will or love--
see our. later point). In discussing the cosmological argument in its 
simplest terms, as to whether all the various ,·motions" of the universe 
can be .. explained under the idea of mechanical impact preceeding mechanical 
-3~ 
:u;.g. As now postulated: hydrogen instability and other. factors in the 
structure and Frooesses of the DNA molecule. Given mutation, "natural 
sel~ction11 is part of the explc1.natory principle here--see our later 
· dis.cussion, p. , on the purposive interpretation of 11natural selection." 
. . 
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impact.i~--in our above picture in terms o;f B's impingement on A, and C1s on 
B., etc.--Plato stated the spirit or main question of'the argument at an 
early stage in Western thought, vJhen he wrote, 11How can a thing· which is 
moved by another ever be the beginning of change? (Laws X) 
-
He concluded that 
only the "self-moving" principle or thing, namely 11soul11 or "mind", could stop 
such a regress a.nd explain the series. Along this se.me line in William 
Newton Clark's apt summary we have the central mood of the argument stated 
in its timeless appeal: 
11 
••• The need of originating power cannot be evaded by claiming that 
one existing thing has been unfolded out of another •• _.. This power of 
unfolding was somehow originated and impar-ted and this was absolute origin-
ation ••• .Absolute origination implies some sufficient.inventive and 
creative energy" (Ib. 110). 
In other liOrds, the cosmological argument points to the idea of 
"power," resident in, or behind, the process described as 11 evolution, 11 
11unfoldingJ 11 or "integration." In the observance of the presence of 
things, the "power" of being underlying the individuating and integrating 
process is the term in which . thought inevitably lodges. The ar~ent 0% rd.a o/ ~/! 
(dl1 /-t-i/2~ /ll.ct.$nm., t/2t. ~,er.A a;:,cu;r (J-tfi»\. D 'ti its profoundest level alleges that rea~oning bac'lcwards in time j\ the mjnd 
arrives at the idea of ultimate power as stopping the regress--with the 
connotations of supreme adequacy or intelligence, and purposiveness, 
inherent in the notion of "ultimate power11 • If causal thinking aims at 
full "explimation", it cannot rest with bare sequential and regressive 
11 description11 of finite factors ever receeding behind finite factors, ~ 
infinitum. Causal reasoning (at least along the cosmic dimension), if we 
puruse it seriously and conclusively, expands outward and upward to a 
highest and most inclusive category or necessity of thought, namely 
Supreme Creative ~ind. 
<!~See dur discussion of the various meanings of the term "mechanism" or 
11 mechanical11 , as we review the teleologica·;t argument, p.. • 
William Temple has stated the mood of the oosmological argument 
precisely: 
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•• Reality is fiz st presented as Process •• ,We are therefore led to 
enquire whether Purpose can be the governing principle of the world-
process. It has, at least, this advantage as a candidate for that 
function; it is a principle of explanation which itself requires no 
further explanation. Allother types of explanation set new problems; of 
every other answer to the question Why? we ask Why? again~ But 
Intelligent Purpose is self-explanatory. When we have tw ced an 
occurrence to the Purpose of an intelligent being, we are satisfied. 
And this is natural enough, for in such acase Mind has referred· 
the occurrence to itself as causeu. (Nature, Man, and God, Macmillan, 
1935, p. 219-220). 
• 
Main premise of the oosmological argument. One a priori basis of the 
cosmological argument has come to light: it is '!;hat:'i'nfil'iiite re_gress violates 
the law of thought frequently called the principle of "sufficient reason", or 
which we might alternatively term "adequate explanation" or uadequate ,~usalit.'y~I:~ 
Is the law of sufficient reason true? The student has to decide this for 
himself, and on it muoh of the validity of the causal argument rests. In its 
defense we would say, the law of sufficient reason seems to be the basic incenti v~ -
for all logical or scientific investigation of our world. The hunger for ratio-nal 
or sufficient explanation or causality seems innate in man as constitutin.g the 
very substance and meaning of his intelligence as a whole, 
We will not here enter into a full treatise on the idea or meaning of 
"causality". Suffice it to say that a cosmolqgical argument does ineeed rest 
on a "coherency" or 11 idealist" oonception of ,c,ausality and_ truth, as insight 
into an "inferential whole or implicative systemn*; rather than on a radically 
empiricist or positivist Ti.aw 
sequence (Hume). f1t 
of o ause as only observed connection or: 
*Daniel Sommer Robinson, The Principles of Reasoning, 3rd ed, D. Appleton-Century 
Co., 1947, Chap. XIX "Causality",P• 259. 
**- ~-l 11,e,xr-,Pcrpc f {orJfi?tLe, 
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Foot note; (> f:;i-:') '6-- . 
** Ernest Nagel's discussion of causality in The Structure of Science (1961) implies 
~to us) a coherency philosophy of causality where he suggests that 11 causality11 is 
11 a maxim for inquiry rather than a statement with a definite empirical content
11
, P 320. 
(p. 316-324 for full discussion). 
In the essay 11 The Case for Atheism11 (in The Problems of Philosophy, ed by Alston 
and Brandt, Allyn & Bacon, 1967, p. 82f), Nagel poses a criticism of the cos:r.i.olggical 
argument in the following statement; 11But if God can be self-caused, wny can..T1ot the 
world be self-caused 111 We reply; How can the world ~e as II self-caused 11 be explained 
without using teleological terms'? We ch 3 1J.enge the critic to explain.the world as 
a 11 self-caused" system without using 1;he teleological language (and the thinking 
behind it) which he wishes to rule out. To say the world is at some point 11 self-
caused11 is to say that there is a teleological principle in itt If you say that the 
world is throughout a 11mechanism11 (and mean what you say), and also is 11 self-caused11 , 
then, it seems that you are saying that it is some kind of perpetual motion machine. 
Point to a' case of smmething in the world that is self-caused, and do you not poin;t 
to something teleological·? The burden of the analytic (or mechanist) critic here I ti 
is to point to something 11 self-caused11 that is E:£>! teleological (that is, ~to I -~ '\ 
attempt t O ®Xplain it in t 1tap:.~ meohtanicaLl tares, totthaltlytfhrieejoftteleol:gt-.,Dbcald 'l, : ~' '\ tmpl~eations. Plato's orig na ~nsigh in aws ""'w~s a s us oanno e one. , 
To the argument which endeavors to refute theism at this point, to 
the effect that the human mind does accept without perturbation or scandal 
the idea of 11 infinite regress," as e.g. in a mathematical series: 
5 -- 4 3 ~- 2 -- 1 - 0 
and that the ref ore there is no reason for not accepting 11inf inite regress" 
in cosmological thinking, we reply: 11Regress 11 in an infinite mathematical 
series is an abstract static notion, useful in the limited purposes of 
mathematics; whereas the series or causalities of nature, OR the 
universe., are concrete and c'lynamic, are actual 11motions 11 (Plato) or 
processes; for which we are seeking full, sufficient, or coherent explanation. 
~1hereat in pure mathematics it seems an axiom of thought that the mind may 
indeed think in terms of infinit,e .series es, it seems 
equally an a·xiom of thought that where the concrete cosmic process as a 
whole is considered, thought leads in~vitably to the idea of "ultimate 
power" and "purposiveness11 • That indefinite recession seems allowed in 
one type of thinking, does not mean that it is the nec~~sary or most suitable 
type of thinking in other problems or experience. 
-------- ----------- --
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The sum of this initial and basic stage of the cosmological argument 
is that if we are i.~terested in full 11.explanation11 or full "intelligibility", 
we are led to .Cosmic Intelligence or Purposiveness as highest exp~ato:ry 
prihciple. Others have stated this main substance of the argument ,well:,. 
11Let me, then, now try to bring out what I conceive to be the essential 
.truth which the cosmological argument, when rightly stated, establishes. 
The gist of the argument may be expressed thus: Acknowledging, as we cannot 
help doing, the existence of a world of nature, we are logically driven to 
aclmowledge that there .. is a rE:al existence beyond nature., unless, indeed, 
we are prepared to rest in an ultimate inexplicability, and to relinquish 
the attempt to frame an intelligent conception of nature at all.II (G. Dawes 
Hicks, The Philosophical Bases of Theism, New York, Macmillan, 1937, p. 180. 
Quoted in David E. Trueblood, Philosophy of Religion, New York, 1957, p. 92.) 
"The dependence meant in the argument ha.s nothing to do with succession 
in time. What is really meant is that our Ir..nowledge of any event in Nature 
is not complete until we know the full reason for the event. So long ~s you 
only know that A is so because Bis so, but cannot tell wijy Bis so, your 
lmowledge is incomplete. It only J:,ecomes c·omplate when you are in a 
position to say that ultimately A is so because Z is so., Z being something 
which is its own raison:d'etre,, and th~ref?re such that it would be senseless 
to ask !!hI Z is so ... 11 (A.E. Taylor, quoted in: William P. Als'I' :m, ed.,' 
Religious Belief and Philosophical Thought, New York, 1963, p. 41.) 
Of course, the sceptic may reply t~at he is not thus interested, that 
the universe is tooproblematic to him to really care about "ultimate 
explanations." We are at this level deep in a priori suppositions anyway, 
he may say, and far from the empirical field. For the sceptic, therefore, of 
cours~ the alternative is that the universe is unintelligible.* 
.i*'John Hie~, Philosophy of Religion, Prentice-Hall, 1963. P• 23. 
(2) Alternative ways·of interpreting the idea of God as Original or 
"First Cause. 11 The argument Je aves us with three possible conceptions of 
8.S 
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the relation of God/ "First Cause", that is as Ultimate Cosmic Intelligence, 
Adequate Power, or Purpose: 
(a) As transcendent First Cause in a temporal sense, with creation.=! nihilo, 
the classic popular Hebrew-Christian view: 
1. ( 1 
Eternity 
I\ 
I 
God Nature 1:at 
•--------,,T~im,....e--------7+ 
ii:-
(b) As first Cause in the sense that God is the continuing or sustaining 
intelligence and purposive Ground of existence. Such a view may not be 
incompatib1e with the idea of the eternity of nPture and the organized 
material world. This is the concept of God in his "causal" ralation to the 
''°rld as continuing efficient causality: 
·-------
Nature-Time ~ 
----------------) 
~/\ "}Dad /\ / 
The eternity of nat"'1lre with God was an aspE:lct of Aristotlets philosophy .. 
(c) God as First or Prior Cause in the sense of Formal or F:inal Causality 
only, as the 11 Unmoved l/1-gver" (Aristotle); the world grows into the Divine 
Forms by desire: 
./ 
World God 
Time 
At this point a fundamental confusion regard:ing the idea of nFirst 
Cause, 11 to which the argument· points, frequently crops up. The question is 
raised, perhaps the argument does carry us to the notion of a 11First Cause, 11 
but why stop here? Who made the "First Cause," who made God? Doesn't the 
possibility of thinking in terms of infinite regress retu:r:n on this highest 
level itself, to destroy our argument after all? Our reply is, 11First Cause11 
means "beyond which there is no otherH--this is what the argument has meant 
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in its conclusion .. -hence it would be quite illogical to ask 1,Jho made, or what 
was the cause, of the "First Cause." Ii' we have arrived at the idea of 
,;First Cause, implied., of course, is the self-sufficiency or 11ultimacy11 of 
such cause in itself---traditionally cl.escribed·as the aseity, or self-existence 
er self-explaining"nature of the very idea, "God." :f.. 
A thesis of this study will be that God's causal relation to the world 
is probably best understood as a combination of possibilities band c above. 
- -
He is immanent, 0 ma.terlal, 11 or "efficient11 causality throughout the levels 
of lower nature, prior to the appearance of finite freedom. His influence 
upon the world at that level becomes one of "final" causality through the 
spiritual power of ideal values and truths to inspire and guide the life 
of freedom. 1~~ 
,, ... ';, 
,~ .· 
* On the centrality of the 11 infinite regress" or :tsufficient reason11 issue 
to the argument, and discussion of other premises, see Paul Edwards\ e31:cellent, 
negative criticism in (ed~ Donald R. Burrill: The Cosmological Argument, A "<7 
SpectrUI!l. of Opinion, Doubleday-Anchor book, 1967, po lOlf. · 
See also Alvin Plantinga in the s 3 me volume, p. 125f, on the posi ti vJ; 
side of the argument, esp. on the illegitimacy or absurdity of the question 
11Who made God 0 ? To ask 11who ma.de God'? 11 is • says P]antinga, like asking 11why 
are all vacuums empty1 11 • All vacuw.ts are empty by definition of a 11vacuum11 • ; 
Likewise by definition or conceptualization in a cosmologi"cal argument, 11 God" 
means the self-explaining, originating power without further antecedents -- ;this 
is what 11 God II means. Therefore, it is iillogical or redundant thinking to raise 
questions about 11antecedants 11 • (See a'lso our further discussion, already 
indicated, on page 319). 
/ . / /// 
-( .,,~, {~-"-~',I--
'~ -l!- 1. . -These points we amplify at a later stage of our discussion in the 
chapter on God's relation to the world. 
(3) Further aspects of the cosmological argument. We have just 
considered the, type of causal reasoning that seems to disclose an 
ultimate category of thought, namely, the idea of Absolute Originating 
Power., with the implication that such power is organizingly adequate or 
"Intelligent," and morally adequate or "Purposive.II Absolute Power is, 
125 
of course, one of the primal notions of Deity., and if the ideas of intelligence 
and purpose seem implicated in this original concept, then we have stated 
the main substance of the cosmological argument and discussion might rest 
here. There are, however, three further categories, related to the 
precelding, that causal thinking suggests, each of which seems ultimate, 
and may open to the reader further depths to the cosmological argument~ They 
are the concept of Ultimate or Unconditioned Being, Ultimate or Eternal 
Order, and Ulti.rnate or Absolute Love. In the history of thought the 
cosmolog:ical argument is frequently stated in terms of the first of these 
fur:ther concepts. 
a. The derivation of the concept of Necessary, Unconditioned, or 
Eternal Being was in one instance formulated in classic way by St •. Thomas. 
It rests on the ex nihilo nil fit principle: the a priori axic:m of thought 
that out of nothing nothing comes. St. Thomas stated the reasoning as follows: 
[f.ssume that7: ... 11 at one time there was nothing in existence. Now if this 
were true, even now there ,rould be nothing in existence, because that which 
does not exist begins to exist only through something already existing. 
Therefore, if at one tll!le nothing was in existence, it would have been 
impossible for anything to have begun to exist; and thus even now nothing 
would be in existence--which is absurd. Therefore ••• there must exist 
something the existence of which is nrcessary •••• Therefore we cannot 
but admit the existence of some being having of itself its o~m necessity, 
and not receiving it from another, but rather causing in others their 
'. ' ' ' • * 
necessity. This all men speak of as God. 11 
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The validity of Thomas' s argument, just presented, niay seem heightened 
as we focus upon it, or personalize it by considering the central form · 
of existence for us personally, riamely, that of the ·self~ It would then be 
stated (much as Descartes in his Meditations and John Locke in his Essa_y 
~eming Human Understanding analyzed it) in the following way: I am, I 
know that I exist. Further I know that I did not cause myself, but that 
some other great power or cause or being is responsible for me. And in 
the idea that I did not produce myself, or that r·am a conditioned or 
contingent being, there is the implication of my cosmic cause as the 
Unconditioned Being. It is other and· greater than I because it produced me, 
and seems ultimate, absolute, or u.no,:,nditioned because it produced all the 
~on~:i.tions that produced me. It· is greatet tha:n me because it produced the 
possibility of the mighty species that produced me, 'and behind or deeper than 
that, the possibility, in the basal cosmic conditions as a whole, for finite 
.' 
life to be. Further, this unconditioned being cannot be 11 mere nature, 11 
understood in some reductive, or merely mechanical, purposeless, and mindless 
sense. For nature~ understood in that sense, -would also be conditioned being, 
with one part depending upon and relat :trig to another, · and we would fall into 
Plato I s infinite regress problem again. 
Neither can our category of unconditioned being mean the trans-expericnc-
ible Whole of nature, but still as less than purposive, intelligent, or less 
than personal; for we never experience the alleged unconditioned whole of a 
mindless, mechanical, or purposeless nature. What we actually experience of 
nature a:re her corrditioned, interrelated, interdependent parts, or nature as 
-lf-Sumna Theologica, I, /. 2, frt. 3, p. 23, Vol. I. Anton c. Pegis, The 
Basic Writings of Saint Thomas Aquinas, Random House, 
(The a priori base of this argument belies, of course, Thomas' desire to 
keep his arguments for God strictly 11 empirical. 11 ) 
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contingent. But how do we rise from this ma.ss of contin,sency,to the idea 
of.Unconditioned or non-contingent Being? 
given by God, the unconditioned Himself? 
How., indeed, unless the idea be (.e_,9, j} e.rcaril!~ 
In such vein someAhave pressed the 
cosmological argument and find its deepest significance. At any rate, this 
first 
aspect of causal reasoning may leave us with the/alternative as to the relation 
of such Divine Causality to the world: If what we call nature is basically 
mindless and mechanical, non-purposive and non-personal, then the unc.onditioned 
Being of ~hem the argument speaks and within whose presence its logic may 
bring us, is not 11 nature 11 but is a trans-natural Being, or, in the traditional, 
positive language, a super-natural Being. 
On the other hand, however, we have pointed to the possibility that 
nature is itself, in its depth and ultimate 1n1oleness., this very unconditioned, 
enabling Being and Intelligent Power. Either point of view is aqceptable to 
an intelligent theism. In either case, the only 11unconditional" or absolute 
reality we ever seem to experience, from our fi,nite standpoint, are factors 
of mind 2nd spirit; truth, logical thought, rational will and freedom, love. 
The cosmological argument, i:.r,ten, at this level may reveal such intellectual 
and moral values as the priWJ.l or original. qualities, and, these are what 
the religious instinct.has immemorial;I.y said relate us to God. Let us look 
at yet another a priori facet of the cosmological argument. 
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b. The derivation of the co0- cept of· Etenw.l Order, or tha.t the world 
could not nossibly come by chance,,~ is suggested by the following anelysis. Firs·' 
Fhat do ue menn 1Jhen 1·e Se.y that the uoi·ld mi[';ht possibly ha.ve come llby chance11 ? 
Do ue me~·n by chance the rc1.ndom motions and the random contact of some .kind of 
elemental units or pPrticles? ne he.Ve to begin an argument uith some concept; 
let_ us begin 1-rith this one: the root idea in the concept of nature as "mechan-
ical" or mindless. To assume that the 'primord:ial particles or units or energy 
quanta could, in finite or infinite time, nrrange themselves by chance contact 
into this present orc.1er df nature presupposes that the particles haye the 
capacity or potentiality for order already. hnd this order is implied at three 
.. necessary places or stages. 
(I). Each particle must be determinate, that is possess a 11 character", 
or be a 11 law11 or an 11 order" within and of itself. If such hypothetica.l particle 
inside itself rere in a state of perpetual flux and· change, no combination of 
such partfoles uould at anY instant hold; in other words, this present order 
of the world coulcl. never arise. There lTll~st be some constc:mt, a determinate, 
stable character of the particles themselves. We must posit lau1 ~ oretG'-) in 
the system et t.he start. lJe sec that rational, meanili.r·ful co~1stancy must stand 
-at the very begin1,ing. 
(II). Further, there mt1st not only ·be ratiorn:ll constancy or order 
with:\.n the particles, but 2lso :cational connection or order 1:ietFeen the 
particles. If they are to cohere into c:i.n order at some futnre. time, they must 
be related in some fundamental rational 1my. Again relationship or rational 
unity is assumed from the beginninc;; the basic factor of order is given. 
(III) Add to this the third level of 11 order implied in the very 
poucr of orderly integration and .for;-1atio11 uhich we clo in fact find throughout 
numerous stre2nis of orgD.nization and individuation, building .cmd leading up to 
· ~A-$ee also our lri4er adc.endum on the sem2:-1tics of 11 chance11 , p./ ;HJ-.P}, 
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highest cosmic integration on the finite pl.:me in mm,, and the concept of 
original order, integral to the very meaning of uhat we perceive, seems to 
theistic faith, overwhelming. (Viewing evolution as a vhole ne are encouraged 
Ch,J 
to move beyond HacTaggart;r p. o/""'f; in our concept of 11 order11 .) 
The result is that you cannot start or continue the world conceived as 
beginning with an indeterminate mass of particles (or energies) in chaos. The 
hypothesis breaks do1m on ra tionol grounds ~ There is, He believe, but one 
other hypothesis -- namely, that order, .rational unity, and not chaos is the 
original factor and the continuing constructive fa(to:r • }I. oreover, this cannot 
.be the barest, ragged, minimal patchuork of order (the plane vhere McTaggart 
leaves the concept of ~ty), but order sufficient to account for the actual, 
elaborate, 11 vertical11 integrn.tion that we find as the larger fact of our world, 
which culminates,on the finite plane, in man. 
c. The category of Ultimate or Absolute Love, as a further 11 attribute'1 of 
Unconditioned Being and Pmrer, is possibly derived in the following way. Do we 
not, 1-1ithin our mm self-concious individuo.lity, have ~n experience of Absolute 
Love --willing ( or conditioning) existence in its M.r;hest form? For, in order 
that individuclity exist at all, Ultimate Reality, or the Source from which ne 
have come, must in its fundamental character be utterly forth-going from itself, 
self-giving, mnst be Love for establishing the conditions of our finite life and 
freedom. In the principle of our mm individuc1lity or personality ue seem to 
possess an insight, if ue search it out, about love on its cosmic side. But when 
lJe thinck of love ve think of some personal activity as its source uhich the 
felt presence of love al~:ays meano. It is possible to say, from one point of 
vieH at least, that the intimation of Ultimate Love, which our very existence 
calls to mind, implies the Personal Activity uhich founds that love. Such is 
the cosmologic2.l argument perhaps at its deepest range. George Holmes H01rison, 
though writing from the standpoint of a radical personaljstic pluralism which 
I would not wish to espouse in all respects, once stated this point most 
beautifully which He are here endeavoring to make. 
11 '.I'he true love vherewith God loves other spirits ;is not 
the outpouring upon them of graces uhich c:re the unearned 
gift of his miraculous p01rer; it is the love, on the con-
trary, Fhich holds the individuality, the personal initiative, 
of its object sacred ••• 
11 Love ••. now has its adequate definition: it is the alldirect-
ing intelligence uhich includes in its recognition a ·world of 
beings accorded free and seen as sacred, -- the primary and 
supreme act of intelligence, Fhich is the source of all other 
intellic;ence, and i·rhose ol,ject is that universal circle. of 
spirits, .. The City of God" (~ Limits of Evolutio_n 257, 361) 
Similarl';· the personalistic poet of the 19th centur"IJ 1 'alt Uhilunm 
wrote: -
Immense have been the preparations for me, 
Faithful and friendly the arms that have help 1d me. 
Cycles ferried my cradle, r01·inc; and rouing like cheerful 
boatmen, 
'Ii'o:r room to me stars kept aside in their Oim rings, 
They sent influences to lool: after Fhat uas to hold me, 
Before I uas born out of my mother generations guided me. 
My embryo has never been torpid, nothing co1:ld overlay it. 
For it the nebula cohered to an orb, 
The long strata piled to rest it on, 
Vast vegetables gave it sustenance, 
iionstrous sauroids transported it in their mouths and d_e,,.. 
posited it uith care 
All forces have been steadily employ 1 d to complete and delif,ht 
me; 
Now on this spot I stand with my robust soul;!< 
In sum what has the cosmological ar,r:ument done for us thus far? 
It has given us four fundamental categories or ider1.s of 11 God11 , or th0 
11 divine11 • The unfolding, intee;ration, or evolution of things suGgests 
11 ... :,~,-¥ 
~'-o/V/V,(,(,(P){_ , . 
11 Absolute B:nganAA""i4AR11 , C reati,n Emere;y, or Ultimate Power. Existence 
itself sugc,ests unconditioned, or Eternal Being. The organization and 
orderly processes of what exists sug~;ests ultimate, or Original Order. 
Alrareness of myself as exist inc; sue; ;ests absolute or Primal Love. 
Ue have seen that some axioms or premises involved in the argu-
J\laJ1711.._ 
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ment are: 11 impossihility of inf· ff;_te regress 11 , or "sufficient :'U!Ei=M11 , and 
11out of nothine; nothing comes''. 'i'o attack the argument these premises 
must be shown to be invalid. 
* Oxford Boo~ of American Verse, p. 343-344 
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Kant's criti0ue of the cosFological argument. 
He have observed that in a number of respects this argument is 
deeply a priori. Kant's t7pc of c~ticism is often c~ted as conclusive-
alonp: with his criticisms of t1:o other classic arr:;uments, the teleo-
logical and the ontological. Let us anay his criticism (which centers 
on one point) of all of. these arguments so that it Hill not trouble us 
further. 
To paraphrase Kant, metaphysical, speculative ideas, such as those 
of the cosmological argument -- using our 01-m terms above, the ideas of· 
ultimate -Power, Being, Order, and Love -- are simply ideas in our finite 
minds. Hon do we know they refer to anything outside the human mind? 
The fallacy in the argument, said Kant, is that we make an unwarranted 
' -in 
leap from a subjective notion witl/ our 01m heads to an alleged reality, 
God, outside us. 
Kant's analysis in the Crit:Lque of Pure T?.eason that the tHo so called 
empirical arguments for God, the cosmolor·ical and the teleological, are 
really a priori; that the 11 ontological argument 11 lay at the base of them, 
Has in sc,me T'a·.rs correct; P:od he pressed that alJ three should be thr01m 
out of col'rt together, on the score that they Pere onl0.r tall'ing about 
subjective notions in their reference to First Cause, Cosmic·Purpose and 
Perfect Being. The mere idea of God, in such terms, 11ithin our oun finite 
m:inds docs not guarantee their real counterpart in highest objectivity in 
-~ 
the cosmos. 
Actually, houever, it is easy to -see that this Has nothing more, in 
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effect, than an arbitrary denial tl12t 11 ideas 11 can refer to 11 reality11 --
essentially a nominalist criticism of a Platonic and idealistic view 
of things. Ve may dispute 1,tl. th Eant by holding to the entirely possible 
and quite obvious position that ideas--at le2st many_of them-- rln refe~ 
to reality, or in a measure reflect ;:,_rid participate in reality, This seems 
ind .ed -::,he larger, coherent truth both '.n reason and in experience. -rfany 
ideas assert thei:c own truth and we must go by them. For example, our 
ideas of space, time, and causuli ty (md Kant himself admitted this 1); 
our ideas of food, friends, of health; of an education --these can come 
to have their counterparts in reality. Our ideas of mathematics and logic 
and of scientific theory do in numerous instances fit the porld that they 
believe they describe. The sense of our mm free c-1.om ancl many of our 
-ive 
senses of moral value have object/ counterpe_rts in many inste, ces in the 
per sons and ideas of other human beings J r1,,ncf 01 du A-u/4_ l?;'P1.s-Ai:7 le_ t.) o __ Jt._ Al-</}y\_r,z,---,1.. 
~JP 
I:f it is true that many ideas of lesser importance reflect and 
indicate reality, uhy may not it be possible, or all the more true of 
the idea of Goc1, that is to sa;r, of the source and foundation of being, 
the most important idea of all? rant recognized his earlier rnist2ke 
j_nvolved in his denfal of the validit~( of the ontolot;ical type arguments 
for God, by his own reconstruction of such an argument in nrofound moral 
terms, 1-ThicJ, 1ie later examine, In the Critioue of Judgment he also re-
constructed the teleological arg11ment in mora.1 terms. 
Speakinr: of the ontological argument paYtici~Jarlv but in a nay nhich 
-
1ould be true of ell our arg1}ments 11nder consideration the folloHing 
comment of A. Seth ''ringle-Pattison ~ formulates the larr:::er per-
spectiw: in ,rhich Kant I s original critic ism may be rebutted: -
)I-mode consistent with itself, i,true, that necessary 
" •.• This fundamental confidence of reason in itself 
is just what the ontological argument is really labouring 
to ex~1ress -- the confidence, n·amely, that thought, when~ 
implication in thought expresses a similar implication in 
reality •••• Fundamentally, it is the conviction that 1 the 
best we think, or can think, must be.' •••• 
11Admittedly, however, such •••• transcends the empirical 
reality of man's own nature or of the factual world around 
him ••• , 11 (~ ~ of ~, 240-241) 
Similarly D,Eirueblood has expressed the point 
"The fact that ue know with the mind does not mean that 
we cannot know what· is outside the mind, 11 · (Philosophy of 
Religion, Harper, 1959, p. 37) -
Pe devote the next few pages to classic statements of the argu-
ment from cause, on ancient, one early medieyal, one early modern, and 
one contemporary. 
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___ [__ I 
Plato. on the Causal Argument 
(Book X, The Laws. In the expression 11 They11 , ~tlth which 
the follo11ing passage begins, Plato probably · alludes to 
the at.omistic materialists or followers of Democritus. 
The expression 11 art 11 has the general meaning of design or 
purpose; and by 11 soul11 Plato means the principle of intell:tgence) 
11Athenian. They say that fire and water., and earth and air, all 
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ex:Lst by nature and chance, and none of them by art, and that as to the 
bodies 11hich come next in order, -- earth, and sun, aid moon, m. d stars, 
they have been created by means of-these absolutely inanimate existences. 
The elements are severally moved by chance and some inherent force e.ccord-
ing to certairi affinities amonc them -- of hot with cold, or of dry with 
moist, or of soft 11ith hard, and according to all the other accidental 
admixtures of opposites vrhich lwve been i' urmed by necessity. After 
this fashion and j_n this ma.rmer the whole heaven has been created, and 
all that is in the heaven, as 1-rell as animals ;:inc. all ;,lants, and all the 
seasons come from these elements, not hy the action of m:i.nd, as they say, 
or o:'"~ any Goel, or from art, but ••• by nature and chance only ••• does not he 
who tallrn in this ,;ay conceive fire and water and earch and air to be t,he 
first elements of all things? These he calls nature, and out of these he 
sup·1oses the soul to be formed aftert·rards ••.•• , I must repeat the singular ar-
gument of those who manufacture the soPl accordin~:r to ~heir mm impious 
notions; they affirm that -which is the first cause of the generations and 
destruction of all things, to .be not first, but last, and that •;hich is 
last to be first •••• Nearly all of them, m'," friends, seems to be ignorant 
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of the nature and p01ver of the sor_] , especially in 1;hat relates to her 
origin: they do not knoi: that she is among the first of things, and 
before all bodies, and is the chief author of their chanr;es and transpo-
sitions ••.• Come, then, and if ever ue are to call upon the Gods, let us 
call unon them noF in all seriousness to come to the demonstration of 
their mm existence. And so holding fast to the rope we uill venture 
upon the depths of the argument ••••••• some things are in motion and 
others at rest ••••• 
"Cleinfas. I rmrnt sa;;- that the motion which is able to move itself 
is ten thousand tj_mes su;)erior to all the others •• ,. 
11Ath. I mean this: when one thing changes another and that another, 
of such will there be any •1rimary changine element? How can a thing 
nhich is moved b·,r another ever be the beo;inning of change? Impossible. 
But when the self-moved changes other, and that again other, and thus 
thousc1.nds upon tens of thousands of bodies are set in motion, must not 
the beginning of all this motion be the change of self-moving princil)le? 
110le. Very true, I quite agree. 
11Ath. Or, to Jut the question in another Hay, makint=; ansver to 
ourselves; -- If, as most of these philosophers have the auda.city to affirm, 
all things uere at rest in one mass, which of the above-men-:,ioned principles 
of motion 1;muld first spring up among them? 
11 Cle. Clearly the self-moving; for there could be no change in them 
arisine; out of any Gxternal ~se; the change must first take place in 
themselves. 
11 Ath. Then we must sav- that self-motion being the origin of al 1 
motiom;, and the first rhich arises among things at rest as well as among 
things in motion, is the eldest and mighV est principle of chanc:e., and 
that Fhich is changed h\' another and yet moves other j_s second ••• 
11 Cle. You mean to ask whether ·we shm,ld call such c1. self-moving 
p01-,er life? 
llJ\.th. I do ••.• And when we see soul in anything, mu.st we not do 
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the same -- must 1re not admit that this is life? ••• And 1-Jhat is the 
definition of that uhfoh is named 1sou1 1 ? Can we conceive of any other 
than that which has been already given -- the motfon 1-rhich can move itsel:::? 
11 Cle. You mean to sar that the essence which is defined as the 
self-moved is the same with tl.1.at which has the name soul? 
11Ath. Yes; and if this is true, do we still maintain that there 
is anything wanting in the qroof that the soul is the first origin and 
movinG pm:rer of all that is, or has 1')ecnme, or nill be, ••• the source of 
change and motion in all things? 
11 Cle. Certainly not; the s011.l as being the source of all motion., 
has been most satisfactorily shmm to be the oldest of all things. 
111\th. And is not that motion Hhicb is produced in another, by 
reason of another, but never has any self-moving ,,ower at all, being 
in truth the chan'e of an inanimate body, to be reckoned second, or by 
any louer mimber which ~/OU may nrefer? 
11 Cle. Exactly. 
11 Ath. Then thought and a ·_,tent ion and mind and art and law will be 
prior to that which is hard and soft and heavy and light; and the e;reat 
and primitive rnrks and actions will be 1:orks of art; they will be the 
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first, and after them Pill come nature and works of nature, nhich 
however is a Prong term f.,r men to ap)ly to them; these Fill follow, and 
will be ri.ncler the government of art and mind ••••• If, ~/ friend., we say 
that the uhole Ja.th and movement of heaven, 2.nd of all that is therein, 
is hr nature al··in to the movement and revolution a.nd calc11_lation of 
mind, and pr,)Ceeds by kindred lars, thef as is plain, ve must say that 
the best soul takes care of the world and r;uider.: it elong the good path ••• 
The ruler of the universe has '.)rdered all things uith c1 vi0m to the 
excellence and preservcition of tb0. uhole, and each part., as far as may 
be, lw.s a:n nction and pasr:.ion ap·)ro,,riate to it ••• 11 (J/Sml Lr22f) 
St. Aur;·1 sti~i.n tl).e Idea of Cause 
11 Indeed the power ' . .J' the. Creator and His omni.potent and .all-s1:Taying 
stron[;th is for' each and every creature. the cause of its continued 
existence; c1nd ii' this strenr:th rere at any time to cease from directing 
the things ,'hi.ch have been created, at une and the same time both their 
species , ·ould cease to be and their uhole nature vould perish •• Since 
i-JG e.:re other than He, we are not in Him for arw other reason except 
that He caused it,· 2nd this is His uo1·k, ,rhereby He conta:i_nes all things ••• 
And by this diS'•)o s i tion., · 1 in Him ve live a.nd move, and are 1 • • • ( P / AS -
De Gen. ad litt IV xxii). 
Descartes on the Idea of Cause 
" •• Thus from the fact that I "as in existence a short time ar;o it 
does not follow that I must be in existence now, unless some cause e.t this 
instant, so to sr)eak, produces me anew, that is to say, conserves me. It 
is a matter of fact perfectly Glear and ev:i_dent to all those rho c,,nsider 
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with a;;tention the nature of time, that, in order to b e conserved in 
each moment in which it endures, 2. substance has m:ud of the same power 
and c1,ction as 1-10uld be necessary to produce and create it aneH ••• so 
that the light of nature shows us clearly that the distinction betvieen 
creation nnd conservation is solely a distinction of the reason. 
11
,1\.11 that I thus require here is that I should interrogate :myself, 
if I -wish to lcnow whether I possess a 1J01 er 1;.ihich is capable of bring-
il7 g it to pas.~ that I uho nou am shall still be in the future ••• if such 
power did reside in me, I sould certainly be conscious of it. But I am 
conscious of nothinp; of the kind, anci by this I lmmT clea:'.'l:-:r that T de:Jcnd 
on some beinp.: different from myself. 
11 Possibly, hm-,ever, this bein.r· on which I depend is not that uhich 
I call God, and am created either by my parents or by some other cause 
less perfect than God. This cannot be, because, ci.s I have just sa:i_d, 
i·t is rlerfectly evident that there must be at least as much reality 
in the cc1Pse as :Ln the e.rfect; anc.1 ·i:,lrns since I am a thinking thine;, and 
po.c;sess an iclca of God within me, 1:,hatever in the end be the cause assigm:d 
to J:IT(J existence, it must be alJ.ovec'. that it is likeHise a thinkin.:.; thing ••• 
(Meditation III, Sml 122-3). 
11 And. '"hen I consider that I doubt, that is to say, that I am an in-
complete and de!Jencl.ent beinr·, the idea of a beinr,: that is complete and 
independent; that, is of-' God, ·presents itself to my mind 11i th so much 
clistintness and clearness -- anc1 from the fact alone that this idea is 
found j_n me, ,,r that I who :1ossess this idea exist, I conch1 c1e so cer-
tainly that God ·xists, and that Il'I)r existence c'epends entirely on Him in 
every moment of my life--th[:.t I clo not think that the fa:mm, nrl.ncl i~,; capable 
of lmoving anything with more evidence ,ind certitude. 11 ( Medi tc1.tion IV, 12 7) 
( i. T 11T 
. 
1m. .L. 
·v-rnliam Nm-rton Clarke on the Causal Argument 
Clarke, 18hl-1912, was an outstanding professor of 
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Christian theology at Colrate-nochester Seminary, .fJJ.lL I; 
·:\1111.i: n IM!r:1 between 1890 a·nd his retirement). The following 
passage was taken from his ·uidely influential book, An Outline 
of Christian Theology, Chra.les Scrj_bners Sons, 1898}. 
"The d;i.scovery of 2. Mind in the universe through the idea of cause. 
11 In the natural use of our powers ,;.re advance from simple observa-
tion to the assertion of cause for that ,-hich vre observe. To do this is 
to act upon one of the first nece::1sities of our minds. As soon as man 
bec·ins to think, he assumes that ever:rth:Lng has its cause; and later 
thought results in plac~.ng thi.s nrim:i.tive assumption among the universal 
certa:·,nti0s. All science rests upon it. It stands as an mciom that every 
effect has an adec,tw.te cause. Hence, Fhen we observe ourselves and the 
things around us, near and fnr, 11e nat1':cally begin to inqui:ee what 
car,sed the,se objects of nur 0bserv::1tion. 
11
''e naturall·r assume and assert our mm existence, and the recog-
nition of real existence outside of ourselves comes next; and uhen 1re 
have a.ssumcd tl·at we and the u.niverne exist, 1,e next Fish to l.mow uhat 
caused us anc; the universe to exist. 1 'e did not make ourselves, and the 
thinss th2t He behold, mutable though magnificent, bear the marks not of 
original but of de:~')endent existence. Somehm' existence has been caused; 
the ex:i.stence that : o discover must have s0me ground; some ,ouer must 
have caused :i.t to be, and to be: ns it is •••• 
11We naturally as8ert that origin implies an originating power. 
Absolute oric,ination :implies some sufficient inventive and creative energy. 
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1 rhatev'er has had a beginning has been br:),~un by some adequate force. Nor 
can the need of orir:inating ,OFer be eve.ded by claiming that one existiJ:).g 
thing has been unfolded out of another, Changes in the form of things--
as the change from seed to fruit, or from caterpillar to butterfly -- are 
not accounted for by saying that the >ower of unfolding has someho1; been 
stored in the germ. The storing of such ;,ower in germs is not so sim,_,le 
a matter. This poi:1er of unfolding nas somehou originated anci. im1Jarted, 
and this was absolute origination, All that has been riginated, in 
,Thatever manner it may have reached its ·)resent state, has been originated 
by some adequate po1-:er. And the ,.hole vntverse has been originated. 
11 Concerninp the universe, there are only two possibilities. :::;ither 
it has at some time begun to ex:i.st, or it has never ber:un to exist, bt·t 
is 11.thout beginnin:', and has al;:ays existed. 
"Take theformer, which is the ordinary hypothesis, and say that 
the universe did at some time absolnte:i.y ber,:in to exist. Then it is 
necessary to affirm that it was bro1-1,n·ht into 1:>eing by some pcl.eqnate 
antecedent Dower. Just PS 1.m 2,re compelled to assert a cal1se for eech 
Sl'.J,::>arate thing or occurrence, so necessity is 1'-r1on us to a:i"fj_rm a cause 
for t};e sum-total of all that ever had a beginning; and if the universe 
h2s had a ber,inning there m,~st be a First Cause,. sufficient for the pro-
ducine of c1ll that exists or has existed or is ·to exist, Pith 211 its 
pm.rer oi' llri~olding and all its significance. 
n:~ven if we accept the lat:~er h~rpothesiR, and say that the universe 
ha 0 : never ho.ct a bep;inning, but has al,,ays existed, and always been passing 
through ,m tmbegun mid endless roP_nc, of chanr_;e, i::;till we must ;:·.ssi?n to 
it a cal'tse. 1:'e are relieved of the ne:-ce:;r-:ity of asserting a causE· 
antecedent in t:Lme, bPt not of the neces::-,it,f of asserting 2.11 underl;-/ing 
and determi.n:i.ng cause. Dcne2th the material form and movement anci variety, 
l 
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and back of the process of unfolding by i:.rhich the lmiverse has come to 
be ,:,hat it js, we are compelled to affirm that there is some cause for 
it,s be-ing .sucl1 a un:iverse as it, is, and a cause :for its exist ng at all. 
If the universe is eternal, v!e still hc've to inouire h01-c there came to be 
an eternal i_;nj_verse. If the universe is ever changinf', and unfold.in~,;, we 
ask hc1v there came to be a.n ever-cha.nginr: and \1nfolding universe, and by 
what the character and direction 01~ its endlest; movement is determined. A 
cause still underlies it. 
11 If we r,ish to know the nature :,:f the cause that originated and ga.ve 
character to the universe, we nmst examine the un:iverse a,, an effect, 
and judge ,!hat manner of cause would be adequate to it. TJhen we do this, 
we arc compelled to say that, tho un:i_verse l)eing what it is, the c2l1.se can 
have been nothinc'.; but 2. Hind. The universe, a.s we have seen, bears the 
im;)ress nf a Mind, for it can 1,e understood by minds. The onl~r ade0uate 
cause for a universe that bears the im:)ress of a m.:i.nd is a Mind, --
antece:dent ::i_n time if the universe has had a bee;innine:, ancl eternally 
e·iving character to it if it has not, ••• , 
11 This is substantially the cosmolorrical argument for th0. existence 
of God ••• In the production of the thin9s that we see, there must h2.ve 
been a Hind adequate to devisinr:~ them, and a ·, ill adequate to carr ing 
the cnnception into effect. But these are aualities nf a self-conscious 
and self-directing irtelligence such as ne name a Personal Spirit. 
d ~ ~ 11 Thic; is not an argument that has force in the chilclhoo @1 01 
less car.rent --:ith tlw c:dvrn-ce or knoHledP-e. 0 - ~ The vaster 
the sum of matter and motion, force am'.. l:i_fe, s::)irit and meaning, that 
we disc.over in existence, the more t1 rr;ent the necessity of recor-:nising 
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some adequate source, spiritual, intell:", · ent, ~md ·,;mrposeful, from which 
it has proceeded. The D.n:i.verse as knmm to the scientist demands God 
for its cause far more 11rr".eD.tly than did the heavens ,:md _the earth as 
. lmo1n b the patriarch or the psalmist. The earliest assumption of human 
thouc;ht, that an adequate produc:i.nr; ,oirer is ir:i"'.;)lied in the e~dstence of 
,·Jhat we sec-, is also the testimony of the visible un:·verse, vith its 
immeasurable vastness and tts inf:mite variety. Nothing is more certain 
thB.n that science, in its maturity, will affirm one spiritual cause for 
the rmiverse. 
11 It should 1"Je adc.',_ed that in this argument we observe at once the 
· validity anc1 the limitation of the arryment froni effect to cause. The 
process of fnferrtng cause for anTi;hi..l'J.g that ex:Lsts is ~,erf ectly v2.1icl., 
but it 1m.:st Gto·,) someuhere. Bacl~ of all causation that ,Te can trace 
there must be one source,. -- one uncaused cause ,--and this c2.n be nothing 
else t' 1a 1 n Minc1.. Here is mystery to us; but nothinc: can be conceived as 
self-e::i.sting, except a Hind gre2t enolir-,·h to causc, all other existence. 
If our see:·ch f-or cause cr.nnot rest here, it can rest noFhere 11 (p. 109-113) 
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2. The Argument from Purpose or Design 
Clark has classically phrased this approach as 11 The discovery 
of a :M:imd·: in the:unive.rse through the presence of ends in the universe 11 • 
If the cosmological argument looks backward along process toward origins, 
the teleological argument looks at the present functioning of process 
as it suggests development and a future. It is another phase of causal 
reasoning, making inquiry into the cause of formative processes in detail 
and their apparent purposiveness. It is that aspect of causal thinking 
which discovers particularly the category of Ultimate "urpose. 
The general statement or mood of the teleological argument is as 
follows: 'Te note the development and integration of being into a personal 
and moral world; this seems the outstanding fact of existence and process. 
The levels or orders of cosmic pur9ose that the teleologist finds are 
the 1~olloning four: 
(1) The fitnessof environment for life. First, there is the general 
universal fact that nature has 11 life11 elements, Carbon, Hydrogen, Oxygen, 
Nitrogen, vihich are fit for seats of life, and which exist on a cosmic 
scale in vast abundance throughout the galaxies. This uould be the 
profol1.ndest level of seeming 11fitness 11 of the cosmic environment as a 
uhole for life. Second, we miGht add to this such local seeming examples 
of fitness as the intricate chemical balance of sea-water, Fhere life first 
appeared on this planet, and without Hhich life would be impossible. 
The late noted Harvard chemist L. J. Henderson in his well-known work 
The Fitness of the Environment, though not committing himself to a 
---,-
of 
theistic explanation, discusses in [;reat detail axam~'Jles environmental 
11 fitnes:::,n and concludes in the folloFing memorable way: 
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11 There is, in truth, not one chonce in coutless millions 
of millions of millions thD-t the many uni:que ,)roperties of 
carbon, hydrogen, and oxyr:en, and especially of their stable 
compounds nater and carbonic ?Cid, which chiefly make up the 
atmosphere of a ne'tT planet, should simultaneously occur in 
the three elements otheruise than through the operation of a 
naturai la1· uhich somehon connects them together. There is no 
greater probability ·that these unique properties shouJ.d, ·be:. ~-... ~, 
with-out .·,du~ cause uniquely ·favorable. to tbe organic. mechanism, 
These are no mere accidents; an explanation is to seek. It must 
be admitted, however, that no explanation is at hand. /italics 
ours_] (The Fitness of Environment, New York, 1913, l9j8, p. 276). 
"For undeniably two things Hhich are related together in a complex 
manner by reciprocal fitness can make up in a very real sense a 
unit ••• In human affairs such a unit arises only from effective 
operation of purpose11 (Ib. 279), 
Such facts as these sug:-·est that the cosmic preparation ~s a whole and 
biological evolution are intimately related, seemingly as one continuous process. 
In the eyes of faith such remarkable facts of provision seem a posittve 
11prevision11 • 
(2)_ The adaptiveness of life to environment: to the telEologist a further 
provision appears in the process of variation at the level of the genes and theil 
mutation, a provision which makes possible a free adaptiveness of life to chang-
survi ve, exp0rimEmt with mony udoptutions or forms., and advano0 · 
ing conditions of environment, so that life caP/to the most favorable forms. 
(He study this pahse of the argument in some detail shortly) • 
. (3). The actual appearinr, or arrival of personc:l life in man, potential 
with highest valuational or morol meaning and possibility -- often colled the 
11 upward trend of evolution11 • To say the same thing in another uay: there are 
the over-adaptations of 11 value 11 , intellectual, aesthetic, and moral in man's 
case, uhich sugr;ests that evolution is a spiritual development, or has purposive 
spiritual meaning. (This poj_nt also ne consider further presently). fl· /&7 • 
{11.AIA.-t.,t- °'41,tl.. f l"'O !a,/f.:t. 'tftR.. nt!Jf'T · . 
(4) A g J • 1}, ·: W,,-_significant point is that the 11 mechanica).11 aspects_ 
[av-·~ "-0 ~ f!.(U(f'ed · . · 
th'i:)mselves of our,Aworld · have their deeper purposive, or teleolor:;icaJ._ 11 meaninp:s 11 • 
For example, the arm is ·a machine, a lever and fulcrum, but this pure machine 
is instr11.mental to the purposes of the Hhole man. The mechanisms of existence 
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seem instrumental to the ~urposes of existence and therefore reve2l purpose 
themselves. Fe examine the 11 mechancial" aspect of the natural selection process 
in our discussion which foll01·rs, and ercleavor to suggest hon it relates to a 
larger scheme of things. 
The Fact and Theor~r of Evolutionary Change 
The fact of evolution is hardly any longer under dispute among philosophers 
of religion. Modern investigation into the origin of species has called man's 
attention to the general fact of life's adaptability to the conditions of 
environment, 1-1hich has made for change, growth, development, or 11 evolution11 of 
animal forms. 
Major theories of evolution. This adapt~bility to environment, or 11 apparen 
purpose", has been explained in several different ways during the history of 
modern evolutionary thought. The first of these was the theory of 11 conscious 
purpose" on the part oft he individual animal, which uas set forth by Chevalier 
de Lamarck (1744-1829). The illustration of the evolution o.f -~he giraffe, 
according to this theory, is connnonplace. The idea 1-ras that an early horse-like 
animal was forced by its natural enemies, drought, or some other environmental 
chc.ngc~·- to migrate into a semi-arid region where food grew only in trees. 
Accordingly, the individuals of this species began stretching upward by consciou. 
endeavor in order to secure food, and thus, in the course of generations, by 
'.La i;:rinciple of the 11 inheritance of acquired characteristicsj' developed the 
long neck of the present-day giraffe. 
The main objection to this theory is that it placed too much emphasis on 
the role of environment as a factor of evolutionary change. It did not consider 
the organic factors in depth within the bodies and germ cells of animals, where 
the ultimate possibilities of change lie. How "Characteristics" Here "acquired" 
and ho1-r tttransmitted11 ·was never n&lly clarified. A. Weissman (1834-1914) 
discovered that th~.germ cells are the same in the :parent and the.offspring--
Le. not, affected by the .habits of the organism-.:..disproving Lamarck's essential 
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point. Apparent]y a correct theory of evolution should take into account, not 
only environmental factors, but a subjective, or organic princ:Lple of changs, 
'· 
within the germ cells of individuals. This the modern theory does, and it 
begins with Charles Darwin (1809-1882) in his epochal book, The Origin of 
Species, first published in 1859. Present day evolutionary theory is based not 
only on Darwin but also on Mendel's (lf:2.2-1884) genetical uork, and on that of 
Hugo De Vries who discovered the principle that tho o4nrriotoris·tio·s of germ 
·oolls· rometimoa eudd.only change_ by abrupt "mutations". Geneticists now 
realize that s:mo.11 "variations", somewhat as Darwin originally thought, 
as well as larger or abrupt mutations, ore also responsible in part for 
evolutionary change. The term 11mutation" hasbeen applied to several types 
of ohanges,such as those in the ·· · . "chromosomes., or other heredity 
To 
partic.la which have a permanent.· effect on the genotype"; as well as~ 
the individual 11 point mutations 11 of the genes."' 
*G. Ledyard Stebbins, The P:roce~ of Ortanic E'Volution, Prentice-Hall, 1966, p. 
21 
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1-Jha+, Dp.rwin so.id about evolution. The concluding paragraphs or' 
Darwin I s Origin of Snecies summarizes the principles or 11 causcs 11 of evolution 
as he thought of them in his day; He wrote t'.1at there are several 
major laws that must lbe taken into account if we are to explain the origin of 
species. These principles are: 
(1) Growth 
(2) Inheritance (implying reproduction) 
(3) Variability 
(4) Struggle for existence 
(5) Natural selection 
Observe that .the first three prir.ciples refer to 1Jowers or capacities 
within life itself, that is, centering in the germ cells, or what we today 
call the genes. (lv:endel published an account of his genetica1 experiments, 
which pointed to the existence of genes, in 1866). Though Darwin recognized 
the factors of 11growth11 , "inheritance''; and 11variability 11 as being of 
primary importance, ecual to those of the struggle for existence, o.nd natural 
he " 
selectior/ did not explain or descrice variation and inheritance in detail. 
He did observe that no offspring are e:::actly alike, o.nd spoke of the 
gradual accumulation of small variations, as ultimately responsible for 
evolutionary changes. This, of course, was surface description rather than 
a depth analysis or 11explanation 11 of one of the major factors in evolutionary 
chDnge. Dar,;:rin recognized this limitation of his study and admitted that his 
book aimed mainly to d~;scripe 9r explain o~l/ _the last tw? principlesJ.narnely 
9/( rm tAi A,1.,i(41ea.tf /J.R/4--P/IC4111~ d. Ctv?-1 6-e 4~1d d,r;t-
the struggle for existence and naturalselection.A Hendel'' and De Vries added to 
Danrin I s epochal discovery the theoretical ingredients pertaining to inheritance 
and mutation essential to modern evolutionary thought. In Darwin 1s own mind 
-:~Published an account of his genetical experiments in 1866 uhich pointed 
to the existence of Genes. De Vries published his research on mutations in 
1901. 
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the organic factors in de:pth, i.e., those of growth, inheritance, and variabil-
ity, were as important as the last two principles, or those of struggle and 
selection. A casual reading., however, of the Origin of Species might suggest 
that Dart"7in emphasized the last two, 11 mechanical11 factors, i.e., those 
concerning the relation of the animal form to its environment--at the expense 
of the first three 11 life11 factors. Such mis-reading of Darwin came to be the 
popular interpretation, Finally, in the conclusion to Darwin's book we find 
that he believed in Cosmic Purpose in the sense of divine Creation as a first 
cause. God, for Darwin, originally established the present laws of growth, 
inheritance, variability, etc. These work themselves out in the evolutionary 
history of life. His stirring last sentence seems to suggest that God is not 
~ the process but is behind the process. In Darwin's theology we have the 
idea of a transcendent purpose, not an immanent purpose, and God is 11 Dei'lticir 
in quality. Fe quote Darwin's eloquent conclusion to the Origin of Species 
ffiixth and Last edition 187'§: 
"Authors of the highest eminence .se.em to be fully satisfied 
with the view that each .species has been independently created. To 
my mind it accords better with wllat we know of the laws impressed· 
on matter by the Creator, that the production md extinction of the · 
past and present inhabitants of" the world should have been due to 
secondary causes, like those determining the birth and deat.h of 
the individual, Uhen I view _all beings not as special creations, but 
as the lineal descendents of s9me few beings which lived long before· 
the first bed of the Cambrian system was deposited, they seem to me 
to become enobled •••• As all the living forms of life are the lineal 
descendents of thosB which lived long before the Cambrian epoch., we 
may feel certain that the ordinary succession by generation has never 
once been broken, and that· no cataclysm has desolated the whole world." 
Hence we may look 1-1ith some coni'idence to a secure future of great 
length, And as natural selection works solely by and for the good of 
each being,. all corporeal and mental endowments will tend to progress 
towards perfection, 
11 It is interesting to contemplate a t.angled bank, clothed Yd.. th 
many plants of many kinds, with birds singing on the bushes, with 
various insects flitting about, and 1-rith worms crauling through the 
damp death, and to reflect that these elaborately constructed forms, 
so different from each other, and dependent upon each other in so 
complex a manner, have all been produced by laws act-ing around us. . 
These laws, tak:.n in the largest sense, being Growth with Reproduction; 
Inheritance which is almost implied by reproduction; Variability from 
the indirect and direct action of the conditions of life, and from 
use and disuse; a Ratio· of Increase so high as to lead to a Struggle 
for Life, and as a consequence to Natural Selection, entailing Divergence 
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of Character and the Extinction of less-improved forms. Thus, from 
the war of nature, from famine and death, the most exalted object 
which we are capable of conceiving, namely, the production of -the 
higher animals, directly f 01101-rs. There is grandeur in this view of 
life, Hith its __ several powers, having been originally breathed by the 
Creator into a few forms or into one; and that, ·whilst this planet has 
gone cycl,ing on according to the fixed law of gravity, from so simple 
a· begim1ing, endless forms most beautiful and most wonderful have te(:n, 
and,are being evolved. 11 
(The Origin of Species, E.P. Dutton, 1942, p. 462-463.) 
we are now 
· As contemporary thought views the matter, /.Prepared to summarize the 
processes that make for evolutionary change.~~ They are: 
A. The process of genetic mutation (De Vries 1 contribution) adding new 
variety of c:enes to the gene pool of 2.n animal population. 
B. Sexual reproduction bringing these genes into new combination according 
to the laws of inheritance (Hendel), observed as trait differences in offspring. 
C. Natural selection (Darwin's emphasis) favoring gene combiPati9n suited 
to a given environment. The geneticits Dunn and Dobzhansky write of the 
relation~);J.ip of thes~ P.ro9,e_z~es: ]) • JJ-N f-1 al'M-e otl CJ o-rflJ',ttfrl/ 
111fatation is the origin of :'n hereditary trait which did not 
exist at all in the parents of the mutant. Suddenly, among many 
normal offspring, a single individual is born with some unexpected 
trait, nhich is then transmitted to the offspring of that individual. . 
• • Precisely why mutations occur in man or in other organisms we do 
not know as yet. ;iute.tions appear more frequently in the offspring of 
individuals treated uithX rays, high tcn·perature, 13nd some chemicals. 
But mutations also occur without any treatments. For a.Ll ne know, 
they just happen.... the occurrance of mutations is regarded in modern 
bioloEY as the fountainhead of all evolution. In every generation, the 
process of mutation adr.'..s a variety of Genes to the gene pool. Eext, 
sexual reporduction and IIendelian recombination brinG these genes into 
new combinations. And finally, natural selection is the great thresher, 
which separates the e;rain from the chaff. You may ;ilso liken organic 
evolution to the process of manufacture. nutation supJlies the raw 
materials, while sexual reproduction, Mendelian recombination, and 
natural selection accomplish the manufacturing process itself. ** 
-l~ At this place the reader should consult such an excellent technical 
study as L.C. Dunn and Th. Dobzhnnsky. Heredity, Race, and Society, New 0 
American Library, 11. l1entor Doak, 1952, p. 39-81..0r _e-1 ,_ ~. =/...-2dyMc/.._~[i.fft;)t5/ /l'lt!C.,?fJ'C£ 
**Ib. PP• 76-78 -if t311ftvM~ (vr1{µ,t[~
1 
l'~n'u(e<ll-a./l
1 
/9(.~ ('I;., 
/o,_ OCl-ltt /JULJ, 
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We have briefly reviewed the history of evolutionary science in modern 
times preparatory to our consideration of the teleological argument. At the 
heart of that argument is the semantical problem involving the meaning of the 
t'\" 
' two terms stressed by each side in the dispute betHeen theists and non-theists-- ~ 
nomelymechanism and purpose. Theists use the term 11 purpose11 to describe natural ~ 
process in.its ultimate totality of meaning. In the dialogue with non-theists 
the counter term 11 mechanism11 or "mechanical" is often posed against "purpose" 
as th~ better description of. our world's processes. 
To enga_ge the dialogue, then, we put the question to the critic of purpose 
first, Hhat do mechanistically inclined philosophers mean by 11 mechanism11 , when 
they say nature 1s relationships and processes can be explained "mechariically", 
more clearly than they can be accounted for 11 teleologically11 or by 11 purpose 11 ? 
On the other hand, what do theistically disposed philosophers mean when they 
allege that nature contains 11 purpose11 over and beyond her mechanical structures 
, 
and movements? The critical point in the interpretation of evolution lodges 
here. 
Mechanism or Purpose? 
Idealist. and theistic philosophy has claimed that the linear, integrated, 
or compound development of evolutionary process can ultimately be explained 
only in terms of "purposive causality". This premise stated negatively is that 
such process cannot be explained in terms of 11 mechanical causality". To attack 
this premise involves an analysis oft he mm nings of the terms 11 purposive11 and 
"mechanical", and the critic of t.heism would have to show· that the category or 
ideal of pur.)ose is meaningless or unclear, and that 11 mechanical11 is the more 
meaningful or sufficient e_xplanation. Hhat, then, are ·several alternative 
-JI.< 
meanings of the expression 11 mechanical1'? Do these meanings explain process as 
we perceive it? If they are examined and found wanting,· our alternative is to 
explain process in terms of purpose, and to define as carefully as we can 1-rhat 
~ 
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First, if ue mean by 0 mechanical11 simply the loc;ical exclllsion that what is 
11 mechanical11 operates by non-purpose, and continue to say that the universe is 
founded on mechanical principles, He have, of course, b;t semantical ~ ~ 
~, arbitrarily ruled out the possibility of ~urpose in the origin and process 
of things, and nothinc more can be said; except, perhaps, to point out the many 
purposive operations which we find as empirical facts, such as human and animal 
purposes. How do such purposive processes arise vithin, or out of, a universe 
defined as totally non-purposive? Indeed, this first level of discussion arouses 
the question, Can any mechanism be without its purpose? To this question we are 
inclined to reply in the negative, since any mechanism, if it be formed or 
rational, would have its 11 purpose11 immane,-t in its function. The purpose of a 
printing press is to produce newspapers, or perhaps novels. True mechanism can-
-out 
not be defined witl,/purpose. Fe shall return i;,o this initial point later on. 
Second, by 11 mechanical11 we might mean impact, or that the motion of a systen 
X is caused ~ the impingement upon it of an external system Y, (two billiard 
balls hitting each other). Plato reminded us, in his remarkable Book X of The 
Laws, that such a concept,.as an attempted explanation of world causality as a 
whole, involves us in an infinite regress of thought. As Plato conceived the 
problem, if System X is defined as non-selfmoving, and system Y , and likewise 
system z, be so deffrcd, then Fe must, in our re[;ression of thought ever,tually 
come to some antecedent system lThich ,u.self-.11oying, or a purposively moving 
system, if we are to stop the regress. Actually many types of motions in the 
universe are non-mechanical in the over-simplified sense of "impact'J Especially 
is this true with organic motions, Hhich go on by powers that act internally, as 
whole, field structures, and by apparent purposes. We mentioned previously the 
growth of the zygoyte into the complete organizm Ds illustrative of such a whole 
forming process. Indeed physical science, in its attempt to explain even atomic 
and sub-atomic processes, has generally abandoned mechanical modc:11 of impact, 
and irreducable cross masses impincinc; on each other. 
Third, let us define mechanical, for the moment, as motion caused hy the 
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built-in, inherent structure of an operatiw:; system; as we say that an automobile 
runs or functions in one, or only one ,,Iay, determined by the explosion in ths 
motor, _the k,ir.ids, relations and rotation of its wheels and gears, etc. · He 
perceive at once that our universe, with its g·rowth, developn:ent, chan;e in pro-
cess and direction, the coming of new and different, and unforeseen systems of 
integration, function and form, eludes n:echanical description in th:i.s sense. 
Or we consider a related concept. If we n:ean by n:echanical son:ething 
materially structured and machine-like, that operates by sunerimposed .f.91:£§, like 
a printing press which works bJ incoming electricity, many significant operatiion 
of the universe are rr.or~ organic than machine-like in this sense. ¥.any processe;J 
are self-operating, self-reproducing, and self-repairing, and apparently purponiv 
· These, of course, are especially the organic processes of life, and, as we move 
higher up the scale of organic comple:xity' we move in the direction bf greater 
and greater self-operation, and apparent purposiveness, which reaches its climax 
in human freedo~ of will. This fact, of course, necessitates that~ fully coherel 
philosopb¥ -- in addition to rr.echanism pershaps -- introduce at least the catagor~ 
· 
11 organism11 , suited to explain such phenorr.ena, which the word rr.echanism as thus fa~ 
· defined is undable to do. Even atoms are trans-machine-like in that they have in-
herent power, rather than super-posed power. 
In the fourth place, let us emphasize the idea of geterminatio,n in our 
previous attempts to define n:echonical, Do we mean by n:echanical, · then, somethin[ 
. '' in~v i table II or "deterministic 11 '? For example, we may say that a rbck must inevi-
; ; 'I 
atb];y fall by the fo!'ce of gravity in an utterly predictable direction or trajec-
tory; as some exterior or ouperimposed force, or indeed, even sorce inherent 
structure, may channel it. :.1e ho.ve already called attention· to the fact that 
many beings and processes, notably org:mic processes, give the appearance of sponw 
taniety, indertimin:::tion, and freedom. :2:volution as fundnrr:entai proce~]S itself 
seems fluid and open, and the r:•ore it proceeds the n,oro open ond unpredictable it 
seems to 'cecorr.e, particulai.~ly at the level of man I s intellectual and moral 
developn:ent, where gross mechonical o.no.lo~ies broak cl.mm o.s expl:Jno.tions of 
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human nature. 
Back of the idea of 11determined" or 11 determination11 lies the idea, as we 
have pointed out, of the given "structure" or 11 nature 11 or 11 order 11 or 11 system11 
that does the determining. The atterr;pt to define n:echanical as that which is 
determined still leaves unresolved the probler:, of the structure or nature that. 
underlies the determined process. The spirit of inquiry, or sufficie.nt reason, 
would at this level raise the question, Hhy this structure and not some other? 
lJ..911 ~ this structure, particularly if it i::i comp 1.icated and wonderful, whether 
watch, or the DNA molecule of the gene, or living cell, or mutational process? 
Even if the universe were a vast, gross machine of sorr:e kind, like a printing 
press, and even if freedom could be explained in deterministic, machine-like 
fashion, as for example, Spinoza attempted, and r:,odern Behaviorists wish to ·db 
~- we would still have the fundarr:ent-21 question: Why or what 11 constitutes 11 the 
world machine as a whole in the first place , with its amazing complexity, its 
pre-determined "foreordination11 and its astonishin~ unfoldins, evolving, or 
integrating power? 
Accordingly, to construe rr:echanism in terms of a deterministic philosophy, 
while foregoing freedom in the finite parts, would at least, in one direction, 
point to Deism, or son:e form of creationist theism. The deists 1.-tere certainly 
right in holding that the world, conce1ved as a syste1n of perfected machinery, 
implied a tanscendent Creative Intelligence. In another direction such a deter-
ministic philosophy might prefer to embrace Spinoza's form of l:::elief in an imma-
nent Absolute lI:ind or 11 Intelligence 11 of some kind, that is, in the concept of 
Ultimate Causality, Substance, or Deity as the absolute "rational structure 11 
itself of the universe. Such a. view has been inspired by the "determinism" or 
"necessity" found in logical processes of thought, or in mathematical reasoning, 
as our best clue to what we n:ean by 11 rr:echo.nism 11 and the world as a n:echanical 
system. Significantly Spinoza chose to write his n:etaphysicol work, Ethi.£, in 
the form of Euclid I s treatise on georr:etry. 
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To be sure, there nre "logical processes of thought 11 , o.s weJ,l o,s other . 
. \··,,: 
psychological deterrnino.tions, and countless forms of material determination that 
describe much experience and I'eality. 1.!e would only clnim that 11 n:echanisn: 11 as 
... w·· 
thus defined does not toto.ily or exha,stively describe our ,-:orld. 
Fifth, related to the deterministic icleo. is the possibility that "machine 11 
, • ,; I ' 
may n:ean we 11 get out 11 of a systeni only what is orizinally 0 in it 11 and never any-: 
thing 11 new 11 • 1-'.'.echanism is mathematical summation. For example, a ma:gnet can. pull .• 
out of a box only the :~iv:~n numl::er of pins '.-rhich w::re orisinally in it. The 
processes of en:ergence, however, of materio.l forms of life, and evolution as a 
whole, do seem to 11get out 11 of the system novel co1:1.binations and qualities. uhich, 
in a !nOre orizinn.l state, were not present. H20 is different in quality as a 
higher en:ergent whole than the ori1inal Hydrozen and Oxygen out of which it corr.es. 
Life is different in function and quality than the original Carbon, Hydroge_n~. 
Oxygen, and Nitl:'ogen from which it en:erges. Intelligence, or scientific::. and 
moral consciousness, seems ·a new and hi:;her whol;6 different from t_he cells or 
gray-matter, synapses , and electric currents out.A_ which it con:e s. 
In the sixth place, could we n:ean by 11 mechanical 11 son:ethin1 precisely opposi"tt'!.-
to determined, but rather a motion which is absolutely 11 random 11 or 11 by chance", 
"unpredictable 11 , or 11disordered 11 '? When people so.y that evolution, for instance, 
carre "by chance 11 , it is apparently son:ething like this that they have in mind. 
The "chance II throwing c£ dice rray be said to be 11n:echanical II in the sense that 
which side will turn up next is unpredictable or cannot be 11purposed 11 • Aside 
from the reolization, of course, that there are the 11 laws" of probability that 
govern even the fall of dice, if enough throws are considered, we fttO.Y obse;cve tl';tut 
the processes of nnture at least rr.any of them -- are profoundly unrr.echanical a:s 
now defined. Viany of them are ordered, structured, predictable. Indeed, if we 
,n:ean by n:echo.nical a r:.otion which is disordered or irrational., we thm by hypothesi5, 
forfeit the possibility of rational expl~nation of our world. He would have to · 
remain philosophical sceptics~· and are reminded of problems raised by our firs~,-
defini tion. 
!J-{, ~~ <{ «~cut~o.1(7,, In conclusion, then, what do we really """!I ~g::- ier:Jlrecsion "machine" 
or 11 rr.echanical 1;;_otion11 or 11 rr.echanical process"? _ exclusion,)\,impact, 
inherent structure, super-posed force, determination, logical necessity, mathe~ 
matical summation, randomness or caprice? There are indeed kinds of r:-:otion or 
processes which are n:echanical in one, or combino.tions of, sorre of the above 
mentioned ways. Such is, for example, the impact of one billiard ball upon 
another, or one rock upon another as both tumble down the mountainside. The 
first loosened rock may inevitably determine the direction and force of the motic: 
of the second rock. The analogy of 11 mechanism11 fits best such gross moverr.ents in 
nature as that suggested by the billiard balls and rocks. 
But we have· raised the question ·,;hether any motions, in the last analysis, 
have an ultimate or completelr sufficient explanation in such terms? There is t.L 
billiard que behind the balls, representing the will of the player, which is the 
ultimate origin of this kind of mechanical causation. An ant seeking to dig its 
burrough might have loosened the first rock above. There is the mechanism of 
lever and fulcrum in the arm and elbow of man, but the origin of ,:,otion in the 
arm must be pushed back into the free will of the 01tmer nnd user of that append:\::; 
There are certain machine-like or 11°Qlind 11 aspects in the proce,:-;s of natural 
selection when we think of the given fixedness, or the structure of an environ-
rr.ent, and the "inevitability" with which it "kills off" unfavorable mutations, 
or 11enhances 11 , 11nourishes 11 or 11preserves 11 favorable mutations. But such mechanic 
aspects by no means explain the totality of evolution, either the reason for 
mutation itself in the first place, or possibly further sorr.e positive influence 
the environrr.ent might have, of an ultimately metaphysical and purposive charac-
ter. We know already that certo.in forms of rc.ys coming from the side of environ-
ment may influence mutation, and therefore possibly the whole course of life I s 
developrr.ent. Our question is, Can ultimate causality or causalities be reduced 
to simple machine or machine-like functions and concepts? IIany of the deeper 
processes, functions and beings of the· universe seem to transcend description by 
too simple machine or mo.chine-like analogies. He are inclin$d then, to turn to 
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the concept 11 purpose 11 o.nd examine it, to see if it be a more .adequate descriptive 
~~t~. 
idea for basic proceeses in cur wcrld. At least it has theAadvnntage of 
de_scribing the appearances. l;)etter. 
The theist takes 11 purpose 11 to n:ean the compound, integrative functions or 
moverr.ents responding to the. influence of field structures or forces, to whole 
patterns or systems-, illustrated in a striking way by ontog;:enetic developn:ent 
or the growth phenorr.enon. There seems to be evidence also that field structures, 
or kinds of natural 11gestalten 11 are present and control process at the most 
elerr.entary levels of .nature, in ro.diation phenomena and within the atom and the 
atomic nucleus. \le leave such issues, of course, to the physicists to clarify 
further. 
Ultimately, the theist understands "purpose" to ce process as guided by 
· prevision of future possibilities, by "ideas", or 11 ideals" or conceptual "forms". 
He affirms that the tot. evidence of the world suggests such i:urposive causality., 
far more patently-than it suggests blind, mechanical causality -- at least, in 
any of the terms, or combinations of terms above reviewed. That the growth of 
the cells of the. human zygote .c3:re governed or 11 controlled" by an ultimately 
wholistic, field :force, containing in some profound .1ray the 11pattern11 or plan or 
11 idea11 of the man they are destined to be seems the best ,and simplest, ultimate 
e:iq:lanation of this type of natural behavior. The assumption of materialists and 
· mechanists -is that, explanation by 11 idea11 and 11 purpose 11 is less simple than explan-
bv meohanical analogies. · · · 
1 atioif. But the theist may reply (and here the argument indeed rests) that purpose 
is often, for many processes at least, a simpler type of explanation than efforts 
.:• ,· 
to explain 11 mechc,3;nically11 , whatever 11 mechanical11 may mean. \'That :could be simpler 
than to say 11 My purpose takes me to Portland tomorrow11 , as the final type of 
explanator'IJ principle? There are hosts of mechanical agencies, indeed, that help 
me to get there, and similar agencies may be found in all of nature's processes; 
but the ultimate explanation of her process or evolution as a whole seems more 
simply answered by 11 purpose11 than it does by the infinite regress of thoueht, tha.'i 
any type of mechanical agency involves. Mechanical agencies are proximate, 
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intermediary, instrumentalities of the intrinsic, pruposive causality which is 
our world - .. such is the faith of theism. 
1-Te return theh to our point earliEir raised. MechanisIT}\,itself has its 
. ot d.e ~l/1.~t- t'A'-u/4:tt'er 
intrinsic r,:urposive meaning -- since the mechanical features of our 'worldAare · Y 
those enduring factors that make the environment stable and predict~ble, in 
which life may learn 11 to make habitual the most favorable adjustment11 (D. c. 
. ' . . 
Macintosh). Thus, may not insight perceive in the mechanisms of our world their 
translucent meaning as 11 purpose 11 -- and accordingly their reality ultimately 
as idea or 11 spirit 11 • We look at a chair -- certain. sticks of a certain type of 
wood, shape, or structure, glued together. The 11 structltre 11 is the 11 mechanism11 
of a chair; its use, function, or iden is the 11 purpose11 of the chair (indeed its 
"soul" ilo use an old notion of Aristotle). Full knowledge of the chair concerns 
its prupose; concern with its sticks, and how they are glued and structured is 
only partial knouledge of it. Fe observe a whirling ;:,iece of complex machinery--
perhaps some piece of farm equipment. We do not kn~ it fully until 1-Je know its 
purpose as a threasher or a binder. Elton Truet-:: ood states the point well: 
Even natural selection itself becomes part of the evidence of 
God's purpose in the world, for it is the means of the shifting 
out of countless unsatisfactory forms and thus has helped to 
leave the stage relatively free for the development of those 
forms of existence which facilitate both the production and 
appreciation of value. 
(David Elton Trueblood, The Logic of 
Belief, Harper, 1942, p. 204). 
Aristotle would have stated that the form or idea of oakness is inherent 
in the acorn, and g1 ides the process of its development into the mature tree as a 
kind of purposive or intellectual prevision, as that part of nature strove by~ 
or desire to fulfill its meaning. Our mm conscious purposes seem a legitimate 
analogy, at least, of the type of 11 purposiveness 11 exhibijrnd in the acorn, This 
is not to affirm naively that an acorn by itself is 11 self-conscious 11 and antici-
pates or consciously strives toward its destiny, the tree, as ue perceive and 
move toward our goals. But an acorn regarded in its total cosmic setting, as 
expressive of cosmic formation alone a specific stream of •organic development, 
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may express, or function os, the 1ror1il. oi the Cosmic or Divine Purposiveness pro-
claiming that acorns and oaks stal) bo. The acorn by itself is not conscious, but 
the Creator of the acorn, which embodies the Creator's lm'.s of development, and 
possibly something of his very being, in its physical energy, may be. We turn nm-· 
to a more precise statement of the problem of evolution as theism has conceived i·t 
Evolution and the Design Argument 
The over-all empirical point of such an argument is that we observe the 
development and integration of being into a personal and moral world --this seems 
the larger fact of existence and process. Hore carefully, the central facts of 
evolution are two: (1) the adaptiveness of life to environment and (2) the actuc:. 
appearing or arrival of personal life in man, or the 11 overad.srtations 11 of intelle, 
-lo- .. . 
tual, aesthetic, and moral value. The contemporary tele9'gist or theist believes 
that both levels give evidence of a larger Purpose. 
The adaptiveness of life~ environment. The older teleological argument 
for God, in the pre-Darwinian days, rested its case on the specific instances of 
design. The point was made that the remarkable contrivances of nature, particula: 
ly on the organic levels, e.g. the advnnced animal eye, sucgested a Creator of 
transcendent Intelligence and Purpose. 
The development, hovever, of evolutionary theory since the ·time of Dar1·1in ha: 
poit1ted out that it is not just one step from such instances of design as the eye 
to the Creator, as if possibly He made Adam, de'novo, with his perfected organic 
-·- . 
features, out of nothinc;. Rather t,l1ere are many ste11s in .the process of creation 
of nnimo.l forms, namely, the who lo evolutionary history of life. Philosophically 
the problem of the design arguinent, in the light of evolution, as Darwin clarifie, 
that ccncept of oric;ins, became the possibility of whether life in some sense doet 
not design itself? In the popular imagination, the naturn.l selection theory was 
interpreted as 11 scientifically11 ex_)laininc oricins in purely mechanical terms, to 
the effect that life "by chance" developed in certain directions to meet the con-
ditions of environment, and that ·the concep·b of either immanent or trenscenclent 
Purpose irhich euided the process 1-ms not necessary. 
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Hodern genetical science, however, since Ilendel, presents the tele_ologist 
with an opportunity to clcfify the desicn idea on broader or deeper terms than the 
older argument knew. Present-day evolutionary theory explains change by the con-
cept of variation by mutation of the genes, with favorable mutations defined by 
the conditions of a given environment. 
Accordingly a modern teleological view of evolution uould cite such mutation 
itself -- this capacity of life at the very deepest level of process to adjust or 
adapt itself -- as significant evidence of an ultimate spiritual meaning, design, 
or purpose in or behind our rorld 1 s evolutionary development. The spiritual 
meaning inheres in this 11 free capacity" uhich makes possible the manifold growth 
and integration of life in many experimental directions, instanced by all the. 
past and present organic forms. The question of design moves back from specific 
instances, such as the advanced animal eye, to the marvelous process of mutation 
itself that occurs in the g.erm cells and genes Yhich made the development of the 
eye possible. The central philosophical question involved in the evolutionary 
idea today, as the teleolocist or religious philosO".'ber would raise it , is l!hy 
does life possess this remarkable capacity for experiment ui th nru.l tifarious muta-
tions, until the most favorable gene combinations, given the environment, are 
hit and held through countless generations? The environment may, by natural 
selection determine the pre::;ervation of the "favorable combinations 11 , but it doet 
not explain why life experiments with su,.ch combinations in the first place. The 
modern teleoloeical argument focuses attention npon the VD.st depth and richness 
of life's capacity to adjust and suggests that this is the major instance of 
design and purpose. This free experimentation of life -- resulting in the com-
binations that are most favorable, given the environment in which it seeks to 
make its nay -- is the deepest level of the argument that nc1ture seeks ends and 
reveals purpose. This general end seeking poFer theists may cite as the Great 
Instance of Desicn, the design for and behind an order of life, its survival 
and grorth by free development in response to environmental requir.oments. It is 
in these terms that modern.theists believe thc,y discover 11 a i:Iind in the unive_rse 
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through the preserce o ends in the universe" (1Tilliom Newton Clarl-::4-. The 
follouing memorable quotations from men of science, frame the issue in the 
largest light. 
Provision for all living things is r cvealed in phenomena which 
we know today but 1-Jhich Darwin did not lmou -- such as the wonders 
of genes. 
· So unspealrnbly tiny are these eenes that, if all of them 
responsible for all living people in the world could be put in one 
place, there Fould be less thnn a thimbleful.- Yet these ultramicro-
scopic genes and their companions, the chromosomes, inhabit every 
living cell and /:'re the absolute keys·to all human, animal and 
vegetable characteristics. A thimble is a smnll place in which to 
put all the individual characteristics of .two pillions of human 
beings. Houever, the facts ::-.re beyond question. Well, then -- how 
do genes lock up all the normal heredity of a multitude of ancestors 
and preserve the ps~,rcholor:.r of each in sti.ch an infinitely sm.o.11 
space? 
Here evolution really ber;ins -- at the cell, the entity uhich 
holds and carries the genes. Hm-r a few million atoms, locked up an 
ultramicroscopic gene, can absolutely rule all life on earth is an 
example of profound cunnine; and provision that could emanate only 
from a Creative Intelligence; no other.hypothesis uill serve. 
(from Man Does Not Stand Alone, 1962 
A. C.71orrison). --
'Js there a purpose behind it all, and if a Purpose, A Purposer? 
Our personal ansuer 1 . says Sir Arthur Thompson, 1 is that uhen ue pass 
beyond Science to the deeper Why? an d endeavor with all resoluteness 
to maim some •sense I of the whole, ue may reasonably, though of course 
trans-scientifically, retain the old-fashioned belief in God, which 
includes a belief in a Divine Purpose in Nature. An all-around or 
synoptic view leads us, ue speak for ourselires, to interpret Nature as 
an expression of the Divine Fill or Purpose. An installment of the 
growing realization of that Purpose is our fair earth; a richer 
installment may be looked for in Man and Human 
Society. 
1From the fitness or adaptations that are to be seen everywhere 
in living creatures, Paley argued directly to a 'Divine Artificer', as 
from a natch to a uatchmaker. But 1-re know non that these adaptations 
occur in related types in greaduated degress of perfection., and 1-re can 
give an approximate account of their evolution. Their rise and' lJrogress 
can be accounted for in terms of factors verifiably operative toda.y --
variation, heredity, selection, and isolation. So, if re t're inclined 
in this direction, ~'e modify Paley's argument, and think of the Creator 
so ordnining the original Order of Nature that out of it there gradually 
and naturally evolved the Fell-adapted multitudinous species uhich ~re 
see and admire today. The Creo.tor made things to make themselves, 
conserving a certain degree of .:·reedom from first to last, so that an 
occasional outcrop of ue;liness is the ta~-: on artistic freedom, j~st as 
evil is part of the price of ethical freedom at a higher level. 1 
(from 11 The Beauty of Nature", r,,,::rinted 
in Opinions and Attitudes, edited by 
Thomas and Horgan, Thomas Helson & Sons, 
Net·J York, 19h0.) 
161 
He continue with the theistic conception of evolution at the basic 
level of life's adaptiveness to environment by concluding more carefully 
about several points, two of them previously mentioned. The processes 
that make for evolutionary changes are: mutation adding neH varieties 
of genes to the e;ene pool of an animal population,; sexU,al reproduction., 
bringing these genes into new combinations according to the laws of in-
heritance (Hendel 1 s Laws), observed as trait differences in offspring; 
and natural selection. 
Natural selection has been called1tthe great thresher'' -- favorinc; 
c;ene combinations suited to a e;iven environment. Two important things 
should bG said about the idea of natural sGlection as re revimr this 
principle. (1) _It is frequently said that natural selection uorks 
11 negatively11 , that is to say, to kill off 11 unfavorable11 adaptations. 
From a philosophical standpoint, houever, it is quite as easy or possible 
to loo~: at it as 1:orking 11 positively11 , since by it the 11favorable 11 genes 
are preserved or 11 :nourished". Even though the process of natural selGction 
seems from one point of view 11 mechanical 11 , this positive aspect of it 
suzgests, in the eyes of faith, a deeper purposive meaning. Recall that 
the mechanismsof existence may, in their largest light, be Seen as instru-
mental to the purposes of existence. iTatural selection is a part of that 
order of natural lau uhich Fe may term mechanical, if by mechanical 1-1e 
mean, at least in one sense,utterly dependable in operation. The mech-
anical aspects of the environment of natural lau in which we live are 
necessary as a stable basis for life, if, to repeat D, C. Macintosh's 
memorable phrase, -living beings are "to learn to make habitual the most 
favorable adjustment". As previously sto.ted, since life on the finite 
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plane Fould be impossible Hithout the mechanical aspects of environment,A 
we may see in such features a 1urposiveness that gives them their spiritual 
value or meaning. This we do ·with "natural selection" as 1vith any other 
11 mechanical" aspect of process. 
(2) But more deeply, hoF far can the semantics that natural selection 
is a "mechanical process" be pressed? If ue mean by mechanical that a 
process takes place 11 by chance11 one of our previous possibilities only 
in the follmring two ways could it be said that natural selection is a 
mechanical process (indeed, these tno uays are themselves more journalistic 
speech than scientific), The tuo. are that mating on the animal plane may 
be thought of as occuring "by chance meeting", and/or that factors of 
environment may "alter by chance 11 , thus brinc;ing about evoll~tion, that is, 
a different selection of surviv ng e;enes than present in the original 
animal form. 
Intee;ral to natural selection is, of course, the temporally prior 
level of process uhich evolutionarJ theory has clarified as 11 mutation11 • 
Does natural selection, conceived as a mechanical process, mean that mu-
tations take place 11 by chance 11 ? In current scientific terms, it is often 
or II spontaneously11 • 
said that mutations take place 11 at random% This is a verbal cover for 
our present human ignorance as to why they tck e place, beyond our lmo1,ledge 
of the fact that they do take place.* Fe do not know trhat causes mutations; 
they occur 11 at random", that is to say, in many directions. Geneticists 
find that most mutations rhich they can induce artificially by x-ray or 
other means are 11 unfavorable", gj_ven the environment. Is the current 
· or 11spontaneously11 
scientific verbalization 11 at random;( the same as the philoso1_1hical _notion 
11 by chance 11 ? It would be a large philosoph:Lcal assumption to say that 
*Geneticists know that x-rays and chemicals oan induce mutation artificially. 
_It has been theorized that some mutation, at least, is 11 oaused11 or induced by 
~he~.ioal instability in the co3:1ponents_ of DNA, and even atomic instability as 
in vhe case of Hydrogen bonds in the DNA molecule. See Stebbins Processes of 
Organic Evolution., op. cit. P• 27-29_; F, W. Stahl, .'!'..he 1~echa:nic~ of Inheritance 
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mutations occur 11 by chance 11 , if by ch2nce we mean a l:ind- of groundless, 
unfounded, absolutely capricious acti.vHy i.e., activity uithout any 
further possible explanation, meaning, or raticnale, that 1rould escape 
further loe;ical description or "sufficient reason11 • Does anything any-
uhere happen in an absolutely 11 random11 or iriexplicable1ray, alt<llgether 
eluding rational analysis, man's or God's? :·e are inclined to accept 
Leibnitz's principle/of 11 sufficient reason11 , as the basic lau of thought. 
1?"'- rfi...1_ n0N,( 1.,dr.171.t o-1- A.f' a.,;¢ 
ThisJuould rule out such scepticalpossibilit/ regarding fundamental 
processes in· our Horld. Sufficient reason would sa~-- that. mutations have 
some 11 cause 11 , 1-rhich we clo not yet understand. Fhen we come to understand 
such cause, then it 1,.;ill be, not 11by chance 11 that they occur; but they uill 
then be seen to occur by the rational laF of that cause, To say .that they 
occur by chance would be to give up the possibility of further investiga-
tion into the causes of mutation. Fe ar,rcc nith Einstein that 11 by chance11 
is never a scientific ansFer. He said 11 1 would never believe in a dice-
throning God1"~ 
Indeed, it is better to spea!: of natural selection, not as a mechanical 
process, but as a 11 rational procesr; 11 -- b~r 1,hich human science means that 
it can clearly perceive some, a·t least, of the factors and relotionships 
bY 11hich the process of evolutionary selection goes on" If then we best 
define it as 11 rational11 ue have taken the first larser step in under-
t d . 't .. ·t 1 I" ·t · t· 1 t ,,/ th lc;ua._ f s an ing i as sp1r1·-ua • 1 1 is ra· 1ona , He · ranscen}f e. 1 t , g 1ey o 
the mechanical, at least in terms of the mechanical as groundless caprice. 
In any case, the philosophical issues relative to present-day evolu-
tionary theory. are these: (1) 1 'hat causes variation or mutation vfithin 
the genes? We should hote the differe·nce betveen such terms as 11 mechanism 
of change11 , 11hich rould refer to the selective work of the environment 
* See our discussion in an appendix tothis chapter on the idea of 11 chance 11 , p. 
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vis a vis "favorable mutations", and the process of mutation itself, • 
uhic~ ;:;ers to the immanent capacity ·of life, \Vb.ether the category~//e_,'IR,1,£,t caq_,.ra/~
11 
d'\~; 
as exhaustive 11 explanatory 1)rinciple" · 
11 mechanism" or 11 mechanical11/ can be applied at or to that level of process 
is a critical question. (2) In so far as evolutionary theory tru<es into 
account the role of environment, in ad,:i tion to the mu tat ion of genes, the 
basic question is: what is 11 environment11 in its fullest reach and meaning? 
At least the 1-rhole mystery of time and space uould have to be explored 
before we could finally say. Purpose may act from the side of environment, 
as well -as possib]y in t,he mutation of the genes, in some ultimate meta-
a,-,,.d_ ~v..li.a/J VvA Prt41,t,l q_if--'(, . 
physical way now unknown,/\to physical science. We will return to this point prese~Ht 
A further problem concerning the detail of modernevolutionary theory--
at least looming large in the popular confusion over this theory -- has 
been the concepts of the struggle for existence (one of Darwin's major 
principles) and survival of the fittest (the term popularized by Herbert 
Spencer). 1'hen these classic ideas Fere first intoned in the early days 
. ~1t2l-Kct[rn_ 
of the evolutionary controversy they seemed to mean, in the popular int r-
pretation, the ,'ar of all against all--that bioloe;ical nature Fas, through-
out her evolutionary history, a rending _ and bloody process, 11 red in tooth 
and claw11 • Actually, these concepts include the symbiotic or cooperative 
side of the relationship betueen animals and species as much as they imnly 
conflict and the predatory side, As it has often been said, the 11fittest11 
are not necessarily the 11fightingest 11 • Che song bird that can sing the 
sweetest 1·rins the mate over his rival that cannot perform so well. · In 
man's significant case itself, the chief factor of survival and fitness 
has been uit and intelligence more than size or braun. Vieuing this aspect 
.. of the meaning of struggle and fitness, the geneticists Dunn and Dobzhansky 
write: 
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Not even among the animals and planets of the 
jun::-·le is relentless strugc:le and bloodshed 
a necessary pri'.ce of evolutionary survival and 
progress. Biologists know that mutual toler-
ation and cooperation are just as ubiquitous 
in nature as exploitation and predation ••• 
Natural selection tends ••• to promote coopera-
tion, and to minimize competition among or-
ganism. 
(HRS, P• 66-67.) 
Finally, to chase the squirrels of 11purpose 11 , sup)osedly running 
through the branches of evolutionary theory, in some hot empj_rical 
fruitless. Like a real squirrel, frequently invisible as it hides behind the tree 
pursuit is, of course/haH\ray up, the critic of teleolo;c-y might say, 
You just ·cannot put your hand on 11 purposes" empirically; they elude 
you. Are, then, the squi~~rels of purpose really there? If "empirical" 
be defined too narrouly, the teleologist, of course, must ar;ree that 
they are not 11 there 11 in some tangible, sensible way. 
Doubtless 11purpose 11 is not found at the enci of the road of 
empirical investigation of the lmrest key. In terms of such key, it 
might be as foolish for the. modern teleologist to say that "purpose" 
lodges in the 11mystery of nru.tation11 , as it was for his great-grandfather to 
reason from the completed eye. immediately to the hand of God as he made 
Adam. All the intervening evolutionary processes bet.men the initial 
purpose, if there be such, and the advanced animal eye come between. If 
the further 11 causes 11 of mutation were discovered to be in some 11 mechanism 
of change", for example in the instability of the hydrogen atom, as has 
recently been proposed, the teleologist might·be simnly further embarrassed--
providing theism does·not remain alert to the trap of too narrow a concep-
tion of 11 empirical science11 , and the knoHledge processin general, implied 
in non-theistic views of,evolution. Of course, Hydrogen instability, if 
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it Here .seen to be the ~ ~ ~ of evolutionary chance, wouldAitseli 
be supreme purpose. To recall our earlier discussion, purposes -- which 
are after all, spiritual ideas -- cannot be empirically 11 seen11 ; they can 
only.be.rationally imputed or 11 lmown11 , after, indeed, all the empirical 
facts and physical appearances are in. 
Teleology and 1wrposive philosophy must necessarily be the view of the 
total or coherent perspective. It is a view from the dimension of value 
above the simple empirical plane. 11 Purpose11 is a cnherent, value mode of 
insight, essentially non-empirical, if empirical knowledge be narro.rly 
defined as aluays some kind of 11 mechanical lmouledge 11 , or as gross sen-
sory appearance. If,. this must necessarily be the meaning of 11 empirical11 , 
. purpose is essentially transcending and.§: priori insight. But may He not 
define the empirical in a broader 1-ray than this? Must not empirical itself 
include the possibility that a total process may bespeak its value and sig-
nificance? Many ranges of empirical science have in our-time disclosed 
the necessity of viewing things as wholes, rather than as disconnected 
pa,rts. This would be true. of processes as well a s of single objects. 
This is true in the understanding of the atom, of biological matters, and 
of psychological processes. Gestalten o.nd whole - seeing have come to be 
an integral part of 11 empirical science11 nonadays. Thus these two methods 
empirical investir.;ation and purposive evaluation '.""- drau closer together, 
if, perhaps, they do not completely merge. 
T. A. Goudge in a remarkably thoroughgoing study of evolution from 
·the standpoint of critical philosophical analysis, dismisses. teleolor;ical 
and purposive vim-rs. In a resume, however, of the teleological concept 
(uhich he himself criticizes) of pre-human evolution, he admits that 
· 
111·lhat has to be made intelligible is the fact that it?fevolution and 
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selection) took nlace at all". This is indeed the larger issue. Goudge 
does not s.peak to it -- as indeed uhat man cir 11 science11 can? It is at 
.this level ~rhere a coherent, rational faith sees 11 Cosmic Purpose 11 ; and here 
the controversy must rest open, to be sure, for the theist to go his 
uay of intepretation, and the thoughtful non•theist his. 
Somewhat like the current alternative theories of radiation phenomena 
quantum or wave? -- either of which are possible, so far as we are able 
to judge empirically, so our human understanding. of evolution may have to 
rest Hith "mechanism" or 11 purpose11 -- in so far as we may empiricicllly per9 
ceive. He do \mou from the interior standpoint of our oun life, that the ( 'O t'Wl (YU-4,;1_c;) 
, 
11 atoi:ns 1,\if have purpose at the level of self-conscious organization in our. 
case. Why then may not, the atoms, at the obverse height. or depth of su-
preme cosinic order, contain or express or b:e the media of purpose? 
The over-adaptations of . value. 1 Te now move from the first more 
technical level of theistic interJretat ion of evolution, relative to the 
genes and the idea of mutation, natural selection, and survival, to the 
larger understanding. Focusing on the arrival of man and the over-adapta-
tions of value, a former student summarized and anticipated the point 
uell: 11When we consider that mutations occur entirely at random ••• it 
becomes even more remai:-kable that man, a conscious moral, intelligent .being., 
has come to be out of the many ages of past life, Man is obviously not 
the result of a series of lucky chances being repeated over and over; 
the number of chances of getting off on to some other track, or no track 
at all, are far too great to lead us to su11pose that man is the product 
of caprice. 11,"* At this stage of the argument from purpose, the teleolo-. 
gist· perceives the adaptation of life to environment beyond the point .of 
*The A~oent of Life, A Philosophical Study of the Theory of Evolution, University 
or--Toronto Pre"ss;-1961, p. 202. - - ~--
**Alice Clark, Fa ll 1 1948 College of Wooster. 
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minimal subsistence for physical survival, and finds in it, the broader 
fact of spiritual capacity in man's case, an ultimate indication of 
purpose in the process of evolution. The sum of the evidence is man's 
"moral capacity" or fitness. To the teleoloeist the following develop-
ment leads up to this appearance of spiritual or moral fitness. 
(1) Ve observe that nature in evolution has gone beyond or risen 
a1::ove the criterion of physical strength (muscle power, size and Height). 
Man the physical t-realking has survived, The clinossauri are extinct. 
The little mammals, that.once cowered in the shadow of those lumbering 
lizards, are nou the rulers of the planet. -.iurther, even in the direction 
of mammalian evolution, nature did not stop with the [;reat uhales, but 
went Of]- to produce man. Seemingly nature was not interested in physical 
strength or size alone, but in .::.ntellectual strenght or power. 
(2) Nature has a,dvanced beyond the material criterion of length 
9£ ~ for an individual of a species. ·The great Redi:ood trees of Cal-
ifornia are several thousand years old, but organic evolution did not 
cease with the·Redwoods, 
(3) Evolution has compiicated itself beyond the criterion of mere 
numbers of individuals in a species -- again a basic kind of material or 
quantitative criterion, Bacterial or insect forms of life are far more 
nun:erous than higher animals, but nature did not stop nith bare quantity. 
Not life in general, numbers, quantities of individuals alone, but quality 
of life, and quality of individuality in the higher form of sentient 
intelligence in man's case has been the result of the process of evolu-
tion, and may suggest its aim. 
(4) To the theist it seems significant that life in its higher ani-
mal forms has com'llicated itself beyond the criterion of bare physical 
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stability, in terms of nervous simplicity and the simplicity of life 
functions. Bacterial and other lower forms of life have lived with simple 
nervous and functional constitutions for countless eons, and within envir-
onments that 1-70uld be impossible for higher, more complicated forms of 
life. A paramecium seems quite at home in a puddle of water, 1·:ith the 
physical simplicity and stability that mru(es it possible for a pnrnmecium 
to Iive in a·puddle. Tho lower forms of life get along well ri th the 
simplest kind of instinctive motor reactions. Duy Hhy has e_volution pushed· 
on tmrard the vast complexity of man's brain and self-coi;iscious life, with 
its delicate balance (that cc.1.n so easily be gotten out of b~lancel). 
Evolution has pushed beyond the range of unerring, mechanical instinct, 
by which life is more stably and simply governed. Mental and psychic 
evolution has brought freedom of deliberation or rat1onal thought, by ,hich 
the individual determines its own action on the basis of self-consciousness 
and personal responsibility; Determination by unerring instinct is far 
more accurate and certain from the standpoint of a "specie' s interest" 
in its survival, than the more exciting abandonment to freedom as in 
man's case. TThy hasnature pushed on t01rard the production of creature.s 
1-rhose actions are in considerable measure self-determined? This ability 
of self'-determination:, based on the vast complexity of man I s nervous . system 
is 1-hat distinguishes human personality from the nameless individualities 
of the animal species. 
In sum, Henri Bergson asked in his noted volume Creative Evolution, 
Why has life gone on complic.citing itself beyond the point of bare subsis-
tence and physical survival in any of these basic material uays: strength, 
size, and ueight, length of life and numbers, or nervous simplicity, uith 
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its consequent functional simplicity and stability? These facts for 
Bergson rendered a purely mechanical or materialistic interpretation of 
evolution impossible. Sir William Dampier, English historian of science, 
put it thus: "Life presses in wherever it can, up to .and beyond the limits 
of subsistence". (History of Science, 3rd ed., p. 345). 
In brief, evolution has long since transcended physical or merely 
material criteria. The result has been not alone something material, but 
in addition something spiritual. Not just life, but quality of life; no.t 
just individuals, in the sense of the countless numbers of a species, but 
personal life has been the actual outcome of•the process, The true sig-
nificance of evolution is found in· the fact that ·in the course of the ages 
creaturer'apable of moral existence and moral growth have come forth. 
Like any r,enetical process it seems reasonable to evaluate it by _its 
final outcome. If we define as "spiritual" tha:t which has a moral nature, 
or the possibility of such a nature, then there has ·been spiritual possi-
bility, and ·by virture of this, spiritual meaning in the process all 
along, since its outcome is man 1-1i th his moral-spiritual potentialities. 
To speak of nature's spiritual possibilities or potentialities seems· 
tantamount to saying that there is spiritual meaning or purpose in her. 
Lecomte du Nouy 1-rrote; in Human Destiny, that the coming of a man 
represents the sta,·e Hhere evolution of body may be com1)lete and evolu-
tion of mind and moral, or spiritual life begin; where natural process 
ceases to be determined by glar.dular secretions and instincts alo_ne, where 
it ceases to be mechanical arid 11blind"; but where it becomes self-conscious 
and free. Man stands at the height of evolution where ends and aims and 
drives are no longer merely physical -- for food, shelter, for satjsfaction 
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of sex and hunger a~)petites -- but Hhere effort is made also for spiritual 
ends, for love and felloi,ship, for kn:_,wledge for lits own sake, for peauty; 
where individuality in the higher psychic form of personality rises in its 
unique dignity and value out of the generality which is the species. 
All of the higher human qualities lie beyond physical survival value:, 
(1) Abstract kno1:1ledge, science, the rational intellect -- animals do not 
seem to need it, and co,;nt]ess ages of prehistoric men got along vithout 
great use of it. 1 bat is the survival value, in terms of absolute phy-
sical need, of Heuton' s laH of 1:;ravity or of the kno11ledge of the periodic 
relation of the elements? (2) There is the over-adaptation of moral 
value. Regard for others, of the higher morality, is not necessary for 
bare survival -- indeed it sometimes requ±res the sacrifice of one's self. 
Animals lack awareness of the higher morality. It is, however, a central 
human fact that men of all creatures cannot survive in any decent human 
sense Fithout cultivating this capacity for the higher morality. The 
over-adantation of moral virtue, in its ultimate sense of regard for others, 
becomes the absolute criterion of survival in man's case -- if he is to 
survive on a plane equal to his highest possibilities as man. What is 
the survival value of Jesus 1s Sermon on the Mount? Several hundred 
thousand years of primitive and proto-humans survived before Jesus, or 
before Moses delivered the Ten Commandments, or Buddha preached the 
Eight-Fold Path. But life I s fitness in man I s case· has not remained on 
the bare physical or cave-man level. Life's fitness in man's case has 
become moral fitness. The theist sees no greater proof _than this of the 
spiri t:ual meaning ond purpose of the vorld. ( 3) Finally, man 1 s aesthetic 
or religious ~;".ensitivities too seem to be over-adaptations which transcend 
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physical needs. \That,. for example, is the physical survival va!iliue of 
. . 
Beethcven I s Fifth Symphony or. Shakespeare I s Hamlet or St. Teresa I s mysticism? 
In sum, evolution is the story of the spiritual integration of our 
world., ending in self-consqious·personality. This is the over-all fact 
which suggests the stgnificance and purpose of the process as a 1hole. 
Our study of God's relation to the material world from the standpoint 
of many scientific details,·such as those of advanced evolutionary theory, 
surely forces theism away from its older transcendentalist notions toward 
a theology emphasizing God's immanence •. This was powerfully·stated by 
. '* 
Th. Dobzhanslcy where he wrote in Science Ponders Religion (ed. Harloi·r 
Shapely, Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1960):. 
It is really strange that so many religious thinkers 
wish to confine God only to the pap left in the series 
of natural events. This mru: es the whole of nature as 
completely godless as the crudest materialists ever-
. pictured it. This is- perhaps a consequence of the old 
ascetic vieH, which held that the natural world is evil 
and corrupt, and thPt natural man is depraved by Orig~ 
inal Sin ••• Scientific knowledge is cumulative; the 
breaches between-natural events become fewer and nar-
rower. This dimishes a God who stands ,apart from the 
created world; not so the God nho· includes the Creation 
in His divine b!:>ing-. p~ 1J:5µtalics our~ 
Fith this statement, of course, we do not mean to rush headlong into 
the embrace of a theology of total immanence, or toward a naive pan-theism 
which would declare that the meaning of 11 deity 11 is exhausted by the material 
world as we superficially know her in sensory experience. See this tree 
and we see 11God11 , says o. ;naive pantheism. See this tree and· we may behold the 
·'/l:., 
work or God ·aays a rrrfounder thoism.* 
J'·~ * ee our disoussion in the ohar:iter on God's· relation to the world on immanence 
· and transcendence. P• ;'3:~-'/. 
·.•.:-
-,./_:-•r. 
t-; 
· '* Dobzhansky is no teleologist or advocate C!f 11 orthog~e-sisn. nor goes the way of 
theism in any definite sense. He appears rather to us a Dewey type humanist; as 
judging by his The Biology of '!Jlltimate Concern, Ne~1.American Librarr, 7°~-~.?',:'.'~~nd.. 
· He.r.smilY-.~nd.:tb.e,.J:la.twe Jlf :M,an, Harcourt ,Brace• & Worlii:, 1964, and' '~an Con5ort 
with Things Eterna.111 in Shapley €,i). Science Ponders Religion, 1960~ ·'Dobzhansky 
admires the thought of Teilha.rd de Chard.in. 
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Some Premises and Criticisms of tho Teleological Argument 
and Replies 
David Humets Dialgoues Concerning Natural Religion (1779) highlighted 
for.philosophic thought in the west several critcisms of the cosmological-
teleological type of argument. Two of the more important of these problems 
which we have not dealt with heretofore are 1) Hume's allegation that the 
argument from the apparent purpose and design of nature is mainly one of 
reasoning from analogy, and is therefore weak; and 2) his allegation that 
the argument cannot meet the problem of evil. For the moment we may lump 
these two concerns together to summarize Hume's position. 
We should bear in mind that H1.l1Tle 1 s critical essay attached the "natural 
theology" of·the Newtonian Age. The principal emphasis of.that theology 
was that the existence of an all-good and all-powerful God can be proved by 
the design, order and perfection of nature. Though prior to the modern 
evolutionary controversy, Hume 1s discussion, by finally focussing on the 
problem of disorder or evil in nature, was a criticism that has become a 
continuing, standard type of anti-theistic position, hard to dislodge. In 
substance, Hume said that you cannot reason from nature and her processes, 
as we observe them, with their manifest conflicts, imperfections, dishar-
monies, stresses, pains, and evils, to the idea of the wisdom, goodness, 
beneficence, or perfection of the ultimate Cause. While concluding his 
attack, on 18th century Natural Theology, at the problem of evil, he did 
admit that the presence of good and seeming beneficent purpose in the uni-
verse also constituted a problem for the sceptic, and that there was ingenious 
design everywhere in nature; but yet not. sufficient to warrant a successful 
argument for a Deity of the traditional belief. Hume would only go _as far as 
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to say "that the cause or causes _of order in the universe probably bear 
. * 
some remote analogy to h\1Ill9.n intelligence!! 
His criticism of the theistic argument reflected that raised by 
Lucretius, the Roman materialist, in the -first century a.c. Though we 
may believe Hume overstated the problem of evil, his question is undoubt-
edly the central issue for theistic fatih, and must be adequately met if 
the latter is to prevail in the debate with materialistic and impersonal~ 
istic world views. We attempt a thor9ugh-going analysis of the problem of 
evil in Chapter· tt;kt and reserve uhtil that place. a more adequate reply 
to that aspect of Hume's criticism. 
We return now to the main purpose of our present context, to list, and to 
speak to, some of the problems that arise in considering the premises of the 
teleological argument. All of these premises coITe to light or are implied in 
the discussion between Philo and his friends in Hume's dialogue. 
· 1. ·Reasoning from analogy. Philo points out that the argument rests 
essentially on the premise that "Like effects prove like causes"•~-or the 
argument frorri analogy. For example,·· since the intricate structure of a house 
must necessarily imply the intelligent architect, or the watch (Paley) the 
intelligent jeweler, so this intricate world "house II or "watch" in which we 
live surely bespeaks its intelligent Creator. 
The theist must grant, of course, that the traditional sentiment in the 
teleological argument is indeed that of rianalogy 11 , and that perhaps the argu-
ment is no stronger or weaker than reasoning by analogy can ever be. 11 Analogical 
reasoning is •.• a case of pr.obablo inference which depends on fo.ir sampling" 
(Cohen r.r.d N~gel, }:n I~troduction to Lo_gic and Scientific Method, Harcourt,Brac0 
1934, p. 288) " •• analogy gives only a degree of probability rather than that 
* Hume, Seleotions, ea. Chs. W. Hondel, Jr., Scribners, 1927, P• 400 
*--i~ Hume: Dialogues concerning N-atural Religi.Qll, Part V. 
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kind of certitude which results from careful experiment" (D.S. Robinson, 
The Principles of Reasoning, 3rd Ed, Appleton-Century, 1947, p. 299). 
In the case of the causality of the world as a whole, if we press reasoning 
by analogy too far, Hume believes we commit what modern texts in logic refer to 
as "the fallacy of composition", or reasoning from too .small a sample -- in this 
case human intelligence -- and alleging that an analogous Creative intelligence 
stands within or ·behind nature, as the quality or causality of the whole. 
Philo asks; 
111-Jhat peculie.r privilege has this little agitation of the 
brain which we call thought, that we must thus make it the model of the 
whole universe? 11 i} 
Two points in reply: As Tennant suggests .,, however, the force of the 
teleological argument rests, not on reasoning from any one factor. by analogy, 
but on observing,from a wholistic or cor.erent standpoint,"the conspiration of 
innumerable causes to produce, by their united and reciprocal action, and to 
maintain, a general order of nature". (Philosonhical Theology, Vol II, Cambridge 
University Press, 1937, p. 79). Theism would say that .Hume really misses the 
point in his criticism that the argument rests on inflated analogy and the 
fallacy of composition. 
Pressing this line of reply to the modern desciples of Hume who point out 
that all the teleological argument states is an "impressive analogy between the 
universe and the products of intelligent foresight, 1H~theism would say that the 
mainthrust of the teleological argument is not to call attention to ITere fill§.Jogy, 
remote or otherwise (though the argument does do this admittedly) -- but to 
boldly assert or to find the rationality directly inherent in the structures 
and processes of our world -- e.g. (as we have ~lready discussed .) the 
~~ Hume, Dialogues., Part II. 
** Wallace I. Matson, ~ ~stence ..Q.f ~, Cornell University Press, p. 1965:, 
p. 122 -- as representative critic of theism.· 
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rationality of 11natural selection11 in evolution; or of 11mutation 11 in evolution; 
or the r.,ationality of the relation of 11entropy'1 to growth.* In other words, 
the teleological argument is not an indirect analogical argument alone, reason-
ing_.fi:gm nature upward to a transcending mind above or beyong nature, but is a 
. rational insight in <6.epth, · finding ··.''mind 11. present in., or:.reflected in, the 
"rational structures" and processes themselves of nature, and -of matter. 
The Humean criticism certainly succeeds st one point: it forces theistic 
faith to become more immanental in the conception of God than was the case with 
classic theism. The remaining premises can be stated briefly a's main assumptio1. 
or hypothesis of the argument. 
2. Ours is the "best" world suited to free, developmental proces,§. Hume I s 
criticism finally centered on this issue -- the problem of evil -- and, to be 
sure, this problem must te solved reasonably well, if, in the last analysis, 
the teleological (or any other· theistic) argument is to stand. ·· Accordin·slY we 
attempt such a soiution in chapter e,(..f l.1:-· 
.3. A orocess is better understood by its total outcome or its final resultE 
...,.. the .over-all achievement -- than by siniplor · or earlier stages. The theist 
here on his pa,rt warns his opponents, in their reductive and mechanistic types 
of criticisms, against committing the "genetic fallacy" -- or the assumption 
that origin determines meaning and value, or defines the ultimate nature and 
a. 
sign_ificance of/process. · Here again the justification of the premise rests on 
the beleif that.our world must be considered Oin the light'of synoptic, wholistic 
or coherent reasoning, not alone by analytical reasoning. 
A• A fourth premise of the argUII1ent, and one which we have already consid-
ered at some let;gth is the over-arching or summarizing point that "purpose II is 
the better term, or more coherent explanation, than is "mechanism", for the 
basic processes of our world. 
* See our appendix on this problem, i~ reply to another criticism of lfotson, 
p. 
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Appendix A: "Entropy"* 
. The student may raise at this place a question f!equently posed: How would 
theism or the philosophy of a purposive cosmos speak to the problem of entropy, 
or the second Law of Thermodynamics, to the effect that the available energy of 
the universe is running down or being progressively dissipated? As one of the 
·great, universal 11mechanical laws" of existence where does 11 purpose11 fit that 
process? iiJe citE:l a recent text on physical science to describe it: 
'-
11 Coal burning in a fireplace warms the air of a room; when the fire goes 
out, the wa:rmth persists for a little while, but spreads gradually to 
the walls, .to adjoining rooms, to' t:he outside air, and presently is 
distributed so widely through the surro~nqings that we can no longer 
detect it. From any hot object heat flows in like. manner to cooI$r 
objects about it, spreading indefinitely until it becomes a part of the 
general·molecular motion of.earth and atmosphere. From this reservoir 
of heat we cannot recover even a fraction of the original energy, for 
a perceptible temperature difference no longer exists. The energy has 
not disappeared, but it is no longer available for conversion into 
other forms. 
11W:e may summarize th.ese observations on heat by the statement: In 
every energy transformation·, some of the original energy is always changed 
into heat energy which is not available for further transformations. 
This statement is the law of dissipation of energy ( cal]_.ed in more 
erudjte circles the second law of thermodynamics). The law is merely a 
scientific expression of the everyday observations that other forms of 
energy commonly become heat energy, and that heat spreads out, or is 
dissipated, into its surroundings. · 
"So far as we know, this law of the wastage of energy applies quite as 
universally as the law of conservation of energy. The radiant energy of 
stars, the mechanical energy of planetary motions, the chemical energy 
of food, all are being st!ldily changed into the energy of disordered 
molecular motion. · The law seems to imply that the universe in the past 
had more raaient energy, more chemical energy, more mechanical energy than 
at present. It seems to·imply also that the distant future will bring a 
time when there is no energy but heat energy, heat energy everilydistrib-
uted so that no part of the universe is warmer than another. ( Konrad 
. Krauskopf. Fundamentals of Physical Science, McGraw-Hill, 1948, 2nd Ed., 
p. 142-3). 
This concept has been otherwise described as: 
1J •• • an evolution toward more and more 11probable11 states, characterized 
by an ever-increasing symmetry, a leveling of energy. The universe, 
~~ ;From the Gr. trope. a turning, or change. · 
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therefore, tends toward an equilibrium where all the dissymmetries 
existing today will be flattened out, where all motion will have 
stopped and where total obscurity and absolute cold will reign. 
Such will be the end of the world--theoretically. (Lecomte du No~y. 
Human Destiny, New Am~rican Library, Signet Book.,-'1947, p. 40). 
The teleologist cites the presence of a counter-factor to entropy. What 
:the teleologist sees is an organizing 11 dissymmetry11 ,. a constructing process, 
an evolutionary build-up, to be~ .characteristic of matter or the world proceE1s~. 
as entropy may be; so that you have to say that the world is not only mech~nical 
dissipation of available heat energy (the express point in2nd law of thermo-
dynamics), but also is organic integration and evolution (which, to be sure, 
uses entropy to carry out its processes, or 11purposes 11 ). Living beings 11build-ur,,; 
energy in living or vital forms and in psychic forms by the instrumentality of 
the dissipation of heat energy (o,ntropy). Most significantly, perhaps, at the 
top of the build-up is the phenomenon of 11 mind11 • 11 Mind11 , with its organizing, 
purposing power and activity is indeed connected with, and in part dependent 
upon., our brain cells, and bodies where entropy operates--but our minds certainl. 
do exhibit organizing energy and ability that seems provisionally counter to 
11 entropy11 as physics describes it; indeed cell growth, replication, multiplic-
ation, and integration, and the whole of the evolutionary process, seems a 
counter tendency to entropy. Entropy continues in, throur,h, and down under 
the vital processes of build:ing up the new forms of energy, or the pushing of 
energy up to the new levels exemplified by organic, psychic or mental activity. 
But. ; heat entropy itself may be said to exhibit purposive meaning in this 
relationship t Suear being transformed into the vital and psychic energies, by 
the metabolic processes of the body (entropy), as a phenomenon of food ingestion_ 
makes it possible for the man, Shakespeare, to work at his desk and give us 
Hamlet. 
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In sum, teleological philosophy does not mean (or state) that life or 
mind are ~-entropic.~~ Evolutionary processes are r~ther counter-entropic in 
respect of their build-up toward dissymmetry or organization. This is 
accomplished by utilizing entropy, as illustrated by the oxydation of carbohy-
drates in the cells, or the use of sunlight in photosynthesis in leaves. Life-
a 
growth and evolution is/reciprocal process to entropy, not an anti process. 
Entropy is necessary to the build-up t. This_ discloses it9 teleological meaning; 
just as "natural selection, 11 viewed in its total setting or most coherent light, 
seems 11purposive". 
~~ A term unfortunately used by Hilliam Pepperell Montague in a defense of 
theism in lisht of the entropy phenomenon (Belief Unbound, Yale University Press, 
1930, p. 70f .) , and taken up by Wallace I.Matson in his criticism of theism on 
the same score,.£!?.• cit. p. 111-119 
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APPENDIX B 
.What Is The Meaning Of 11 8y Chance"? 
1. The "fall of dice11 idea: . Actually a totally determined process as in 
any purely 11mechanical 11 motion of inanimate bodies. Could be calculated 
precisely, if we could c·ollate all the forces involved, such as: 
sides and figures of the dice 
thrust of the finger 
direction of the thrust 
tilt of the dice at the outset of thrust 
air resistence, etc. 
2. Probability calcu· lations for such occurrences--i.e. mathematical des-
cription of what to expect given the structure of the entities involved, 
such as the number cf sides and markings of the dice, the number of 
throws, and so on. For example, the theoretical probability that heads 
will turn up in the throw of a penny is 1/2; in the throw of two pen-
nies is 1/4 (2x2); in the throw of two three sided dies in the expecta-
tion of side "3" to turn up in both cases is 1/9 (3x3); in the expecta-
tion of double sixes in the case of regular cubic dice, 1/36 (6x6), 
and so on. 
11In su.ch calculations a common fallacy i:s to assume that the 
probability becomes greater that the next throw will bring 
double sixes because, say, thri ty-fi ve throws have been made 
without double sixes appearing. Unless the dice are loaded 
the probability of each and every throw is 1/36, and this 
does not change. Even though one hundred throws were made 
without the appearance of double sizes the probability that 
the next throw would yield double sixes remains 1/36. For 
the probability in such cases is not determined by the number 
of throws, but by the nature of the die~~ (Daniel Sommer 
Robinson, The Principles of Reasoning, 3rd ed., 1947, D. 
Appleton-Century Co. p. 2tJ4). 
11Jevons made 20,480 throws of a penny and the result was 
10, 353 heads and 10,127 tails. This shows that when a 
sufficiently large number of instances are taken into 
account the probability laws approach complete certainty. 
The results are sure to approximate a definite ratio•••" 
(lb. p. 235). 
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3,.· · Natural phenomena sometimes referred to as II indeterminate11 and "rando:nn: 
Heisenberg's principle of 11 indeterminancy11 of the electron; the 
principle says that we cannot calculate the position and the velocity 
of an electron at the SEUlle time-.. we can_ determine either its velocity 
or its position, but not both simultaneously. The principle is some-
times stated as the uncertainty whether an electron is a wave or a 
particle. Accordingly an element of unpredictability enters the 
physlcal picture of our world at this level, contrary to what has 
been called nature's general law of uniformity. 
Mutation ~ ~ genes is sometimesreferred to as "random." 
Attention is called to the possibility that hydrogen "instability" 
may have something to do with some types of mutation. (An observation: 
Hydrogen cannot be totally or radically or "absolutely unstable," or 
· it could never be the basis of even the temporary bond that is 
necessary in the pre ... mutarit DNA molecu]e). 
Both these cases seem to mean that we do not as yet fully under-
stand these phenomena ..... unless they be indeed, truly 11 chance 11 : events 
·in the following terms: 
4. Philosophical "chance" would mean the total, absolute "randomness" 
of a given motion or process--utter incalculability, unlimited 
inteterminateness, complete or endless unpredictability--
motion or change of a body or process from on~ state, position1 
characteristic, phase, or operation to another without possibility of ever 
tracing any connection, or 11 causality," or perceiving or understanding 
. ' ,, 
the dependency of the second sta_ge . to . the _first, or the. third to the 
second, and so on. Tennant desoribes su~h- a meaning; of.. oh1moe in wic.ost 
. ' ' . . 
oosmologioal ~ense in the following ter~~: real:i.ty,oonoei~ed as 
•i.a self-subsistent and d.ete~inate 'chaos' in i\'i'hioh similar events 
never occurred., none recurred., UI1iversals'had no plaoe,, reliions 
' no fixity, things no nexus of determanation, and 'rea~' 
categories no foothold". (Philosophical Theology., Vol II, P• 82) 
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If 11rationality" be defined·as seeing connections or relation-
ships, and the tendency of understanding to perceive the whole, 
coherency of a situation or phenomenon, then such 11 chance11 motion 
would be totally irrational, without 1tsufficient reason, 11 rationally 
groundless an inexplicable brute fact,• or surd· event~-
Is our universe credible as founded on such principle? Take our 
three hypothetical, primordial characters, llatoms, 11 energy units, or 
whatever they be: 
X------Y 
\ / 
\ / \ zl 
..... . 
- and our 11 awareness of primordial order" 
as a phase of the cosmological 
argument, proceeds, Study Guide.l'//?f-9 • 
5. A psychological meal'ling: Chance as the II capricious, 11 spontaneous, 
unthinking types of activity sometimes of living beings--a moving-
on-impulse type of action. I must walk to Loyal rs Texaco Station 
to ~ick up my car. Shall I go route A, B, or C? I take B for no 
particular "reason11 ., 
At this point we are reminded of the old monkey and the type-
writ~r argument for the possibility of the 11 chance11 creation of our 
universe. The analogy is that given sufficient time (an infinite time) 
the monkey, pounding 11 randomly11 on the keys, could type out Shake-
speare's ~t. Likewise, the supposition is, given enough time, 
essentially chaotic elements or factors, by chance contact, could 
fall into the complex, organized reality of our present universe. 
Our reply is, perhaps so, but it is agreed that it would take 
the monkey infinite time. The monkey couldn't type Hamlet in less 
~1- See F. · R. Tennant: Philosophical Theology, Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 1937, Vol II, P• 82-83 for discussion of various 
meanings of 11 chance 11 in connection with these cosmological problems. 
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than infinite timet But our world is now in mid passage in time~ 
The Universe has been created or brought forth or evolved in less 
than infinite timei So some factor or factors other than this type 
of ttchance11 would have had ,to be at work, i.e. other than those 
assumed in the monkey and typewriter account. 
We could go on viii. th this story. You have to start at least with 
the typewriter ,and the monkey-~both rather complex beings. Wouldn't 
the monkey have beens urprised if, after all his effort, he suddenly 
noticed he had typed out Macbeth, rather than Hamlett 
11\/e now· p·roceed to look at some noteworthy 1 reprosentati ve 
statements of the t·eleological argument. !Is a fitting oonclusi on to 
these rather classic ,versions we append several paragraphs by the 
*-distinguished geneticists, Th. Dobzhansky, clarifying termJ and concepts L Jo 6ri/Lt--vJhi'4--V?-vy71t&&J-U /rf' n.,./1.t?U/J,1... d..e,1Jt.9rt~ 
of the evolutionary theory asre understand it today.AHis use (and 
oopsqious defense}, in the last quoted passage, of the ol~ssi,,o ( 
{ r»lur:A /...1. /2,,7>t4A1,,1. CfJ?/t<.11-1 .. 4,_-r;ly drJ.tJ Nr-wuA ~ Mil-- 0t t:t. 1:f,..-feo..foyk.d 4v,,-.,1e) teleological.:type term., ''creativity"/: appea~~../'{fjia striking and 
.· . ' ' . -Kl~ 
necessary clarification for teleological philosophy, and illustrates a 
point which we in a number of places have endeavored to stress. As he 
says, if we use the term "o:reativity" w_e do not mean thereby any over 
simple (and actually deterministic) "autogenesis" -- but we point thereby 
to the real rationarreedom (as.we would say) inherent in the process 
. .. or 
itself, and expressive of that IIGod"_ 1 imman\3nt in the process/in whom the 
process. is immanent, to which Dobzhansky so eloquently refers. 
/ 
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St. Augustine 
11 The very order, disposition, beauty, change and motion of the world 
and of all visible things silently proclaim that it could only have been 
made by God, the ineffably and invisibly great and the ineffably and 
visibly beautiful" (City of God XI 4). 
11 Ask the loveliness of the earth, ask the loveliness of the sea, 
ask the loveliness of wide airy spaces, ••• ask the living things which 
move in the waters ••• fly in the air, ask the souls that are hidden, ask 
the bodies that are perceptive ••• Their lovliness is their confession ••. 
Lastly, men put their question in man himself, so that they might be able 
to understand and recognize God, the Creator of the whole universe, in 
man himself •••• (Sermons CCXLI 2 & 3) · 
St. Thomas 
(Przywara, An Augustine Synthesis, 
Sheed ond )'fo;rd, 1945) 
· .... 
11 
•• It is plain that they (living creatures) achieve their end, not 
fortuitotj.sly, but designedly. Hou uhatever lacks knowledge cannot move 
towards an end, unless it be directed by some being endoned Hith knowledge 
and intelligence; as the arrow is directed by the archer. Therefore some 
intelligent being exists by whom all natural things are directed to their 
end; and this being we cal} God11 ,. (S.Th. IQ 2, Art. 2). 
Hilliam Paley 
(From Natural Theology, 1802) 
11 In crossing a heath, suppose I pitched my foot against a stone, 
and were asked hoH the stone came to be there: I might possibly answer, 
that for anything I knew to the contrary, it had lain there forever: nor 
would it perhaps be very easy tm show the absurdity of this answer. But 
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supuose I had found a watch upon the ground, and it should be inquired 
how the watch happened to be in that place; I should h_ardly think of the 
answer which I had before given ••• .1-Jhen we come to inspect the natch, we 
perceive (what we could not discover in the stone) that its several parts 
are framed and put together for a purpose, e.g, that they are so ·formed and 
adjusted as to·produce motion so regulated as to point out the hour of 
the day •••• 
"The conclusion which the first .examination of the watch, of its works, 
construction, and movement, suggested, was, that it must have had, for the 
cause and author of that construction, an artificer, who understood its 
mechanism, and designed its use. This conclusion is invincible •••• 
"Every manifestation of design, which existed in the ·watch, exists 
in the works of nature; with the difference, on the side of nature, of 
being greater and more, and that in a degree uhich exceeds all computation ••• 
"As far as the examination of the instrument goes, there is precisely 
the same proof that the eye was made for_vision, as there is that the 
telescope was made for assisting it11 (Paley: Works, pp. 387-391). 
IIll!Tlanuel Kant 
(Kant critized the general teleol0gical argument from design 
and purpose much as Hume had done, saying that you cannot 
rise from the uncertain evidences of 11 design11 in louer nature 
to the idea of an all Hise and beneficent Creator. He did, 
however, restate and accepted the teleological argument when it 
included man and his moral nature as the highest level of evidence 
of design or purpose. It is with thj_s in mind,, in the passage 
below, concluding his .... ·~ · Critique of Judgment, 1790, 
that he distinquishes bet1reen an inconclusive11 physical teleology11 
and a valid "moral teleology11 ). 
11 The commonest judgment of healthy human Reason completely accords 
uith this, that it is only as a moral being that man can be a final purpose 
of creation •••• Since now it is only as a moral being that 1-re recognize 
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man as the purpose of creation, we have in the first place a ground ••• for 
regarding the world as a whole connected according to purposes, and as a system 
of. final causes •••• as regards the reference.,.of natural purposes to an intelli-
gent World Cause, we have one principle enabling us to think the nature and 
properties of this First Cause as supreme gound in the kingdom of purposes, and 
to determine its concept. This physical Teleology could not do; it could only 
lead to indeterminate concepts thereof, unserviceable alike in theoretical and 
in practical use. 
11From the principle, thus determined, of the causality of the Original 
Being we must not think Him merely as Intelligence and as legislative for 
nature, but also as legislating supremely in a moral kingdom of purposes... . .vTe 
shall think this Original Being as all-knowing •••• all-mighty •••• as all-good ••• 
In this way moral Teleology- supplies the deficiency in physical Teleolog;y:, and 
first establishes a Theology •••• 11 (S/ml p. 508-509) 
William Newton Clarke 
11 The discovery of a Mind in the universe through the presence of ends in 
the universe. 
"The universe is one vast order, and abounds in apparent adaptations •••• 
Hence the teleological argument for the existence of God, which has been stated 
thus: 10rder and useful collocation pervading a system respectively imply 
intelligence and purpose as the cause of that order and collocation. Since orde 
and useful collocation pervade the universe, there must exist an intelligence 
adequate to the production of this order, and a will adequate to the directing 
of this collocation to useful ends'. This is one of the familiar arguments of 
natural theology. Finding a watch, one could infer from its elaborate structure 
that an inventive and constructive mind had wrought upon it •••• 
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11 It has always been felt that this argument was valid; liable, perhaps, to 
be overestimated among arguments, but essentially a sound argument; and so it is. 
11Modern science, however, has questioned .the .argument, and has legitimately 
led to some modification. in the form of it, Natural theology assumed that every 
sign of adaptation to an end gave direct evidence that the Supreme Hind had 
planned and created that very adaptation. But it is now c.laimed that adaptations 
to ends often e;row up within the universe, instead of being.always .impressed 
upon it from without ••• It is now claimed that many adaptations that once seemed 
to prove direct creative planning were not made by action upon the universe, but 
were brought about by some experience or unfolding within· it. In the vegetable 
and animal worlds, there has been an age ... longstruge;le for existence. This 
struggle has developed new necessities from time to time in living beings. New 
necessities have led to the seeking of new objects,_.., objects that were not 
ends at all" bei'ore;and with the necessity for seeking new ends there has grad-
ually been developed whatever special power the seeking required. Thus the 
seeking of ends, with the attendant adaptation of poHers to ends, grew up in 
great part within the universe because of incidental necessities' instead of 
being impressed upon it by creative wisdom. In other words, the ends are those 
of the creatures that seek them not those of God ••• 
11Yet certain facts must be met; namely, that living things possess power 
to respond to conditiori.s, develop adaptations, and enter into the seeking of 
ends; and, at the same time, that this power is limited in a remarkable manner. 
This power must have come from womewhere and so mu,st its lirnitations •••• It has 
been decided that life may unfold from stage to stage., and that within certain 
limits living things shall have power to seek ends that may arise in the course 
of the unfolding. If this gigantic conception is ,not the offspring of a Mind, 
then we have no means of knowing what a mind is, or what it produces. Nothing 
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bears clearer marks of organization by a ruling Mind than the univers~, viei:-ed 
with reference to the vast, yet limited, power of endseeking and adaptation 
that exists within it •••• 
11 
••• Evolution is recop;nized as the method of the universe, and evolution 
is end-seeking •••• Many have supposed that the teleological argument is dis-
credited by modern science, and .especially by the doctrine of evolution: but 
the fact is that only in the light of modern science is that argument destined 
'ti appear in its full power and value. Order and en~-seeking on so vast a scale 
give overwhelming evidence of a creative and directing Mind •••• It may be helpful 
to add that it requires a .mind to understand the universe: how much more to 
produce it: ••• But a mind self-conscious and self-directing is personal, --the 
word may be inadequate, but is not untrue. It is the nature of mind to be 
personal, and we speak correctly when we say that the universe is the work and 
expression of a personal Spirit11 (OCT p.113-118). 
Th. Dobzhansky 
On Evolution and Creativity 
11Evolution and Environment11 in Evolution After Darwin, 
of Life. ed. Sol Tax, Univ. of Chicago Press, 1960 : 
• VolI., The Evolution 
11Evolution is, in part, ectogenesis; it is brought about by causes outside 
the organism, or more precisely, through interactions between the organism and 
its environment 11 , p. 405 
11 Heritable variation is the fountainhead of evolution. Evolution is change 
in the genetic constitut.ion of the succeeding generations of a species or a 
population. Natural selection would be futile if the progenies of the surviving 
fittest were no different, at least on the average, from what the progenies of 
the eliminated unfit would have been11 • p. 409. 
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11 The proximate causes of mutation still remain unknown, even though 
mutagens, i.e., factors speeding up the mutation process, have been dis-
covered", p. 409 •.... "although environment may guide the evolution of living 
things, it does not prescribe just what change must occur", p. 41.3 
111t must be emphasi za:1 that the development of an organism cannot be ade-
quately understood as the outcome of a gradual accretion of 'characters', 
each produced by a separate gene. The genes function as members of an 
ensemble, like players in a symphony orchestra rather than like soloists", 
p. 415 
11 The fact that genetically similar populations may respond differently 
to the challenge of the same environment does not inva:J_idate the basic 
principle that evolutionary changes are evoked by the environment. How-
ever, the challenge presented by the environment may be answered in different 
ways or may nmt be answered at all1', p. 424 
"Evolution is a creative response of living matter to environmental 
opportunity. I am aware that some biologists regard the word 'creative', 
borrowed as it is from aesthetics and metaphysics, as inappropriate for 
the characterization of biolologicalprocesses. I am unable, however, to 
find a more apt phrase •.. Creativity implies origination of: novelties, of 
things or events or ideas which are not known to have occurred before, at 
least not in identical form. As shown above, there are good reasons·to 
think that evolutionary histories are unique and non-recurrent, despite 
the fact that elementary evolutionary events are repeatable •••.• Evolution 
by natural selection generally tends to promote the adaptedness of species 
or populations, to increase the consonance between the organism and its 
environment _:... in short:, to maximize the probability of the preservation 
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and expansion of life. This is not contradicted by the shortsightedness 
and the opportunism of the evolutionary process: immediate gains may even-
tuate in future harm and ultimate extinction. The risk of failure or non-
fulfilment is indeed a characteristic of creativity. Anything really new, 
being made or planned for the first time, faces the ha~ard of frustration. 
By a curious misunderstanding, some scholars have rejected the biological 
theory 0~ evolution as being crassly mechanistic and relying too much on 
'blind' chance and have preferred various forms of autogenesis. And yet 
it is the former which visualizes a creative process resulting in the 
emergence of real novelties, while theories of autogenesis assume no 
creativity but merely unfolding of what was preformed from the begirmlhng11 ., 
P• 425-26. 
Dobzhansky in Science Ponders Religion, ed. Harlow Shapley, Appleton-
Century-Crofts, Inc. 1960: 
11 It is really strange that so many religious thinkers wish to confine 
God only to the gaps left in the series of natural events. This makes the 
whole of nature as completely gricJ/ess as the crudest materialists ever 
pictured it. This is perhaps a consequence of the old ascetic view, which 
held that the natural world is evil and corrupt, and that natural man is 
depraved by Original Sin •• ·.Scientific lm01-1ledge is cumulative; the breaches 
between natural events become fewer and narrower. This diminishes a God 
who stands apart from the created world; not so the God who includes the 
Creation in His divine being", 135 
Chapter Six 
Major Arguments ~ God: 
Patterns of Reasoning in the A·Priori Mood 
3.. The Moral Argument . 
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We have just seen how the upper levels of the argument from design 
utilizes the coming of man as a moral being as the largest significant 
evidence of Purpose and spiritual meaning in the universe. It is at this 
place that the teleological merges with the moral argument for. God (or makes thut 
argument moo.ningf'ul. , as. Kant. might have said). In our initial 
classification of the arguments for God on pages 114-115 we stated that 
the moral proof·typically or characte!'.istically falls under the types 
of reasoning which we called a priori -- or those based on the existence 
and sensitivity of oneself particularly as a thinking .and mora.l being .• 
Whereas, to review the matter briefly, the causal and the design argu-
ments are characteristically 11 empirical11 in mood, that is, arise from 
interest in the external world in general and r1;tise questions about the 
proooss~ the moral argument, and the subpequent argument f;om 
existence o:f the world as a ·whole and its/knowledge, start from, and raise 
questions about, the presence and nature of the self, as the self reflects 
subjectively about its ovm powers, status,. and value. There are, of 
course, 11 empirical11 aspects or world-referring aspects, in these latter 
arguments, just as we found the preceding arguments vrere deeply a priori in 
many w;zys. In the discussion which follows we attempt to show both 
empirical' and a priori aspects of the moral and epistemological arguments, 
while stressing that their general and ultimate nature is a priori. 
Recall our general definition of~ priori knowledge as the experience 
of some truth on the l:asis of self-reflection, and that we do not· imply 
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that it is in opnosition to empirical modes of knowledge. As we have said 
it may simply be a further mode of knowledge or experience, after "empircal 
experience", which is undoubtedly our first teacher, germinates and awakens 
the mind to self-awareness and its own activity. Recall also our point 
that a fully inclusive or· coherent 11 empiricism11 would imply the possibility 
of some~ priori knowledge, for an important aspect of empiricism is the 
spirit of willingness to accept that method of investigation which best 
suits a given s~bject matter. ~ priori insight is the natural way the 
self understands things about itself. The sense of its ovm reality as 
thinking and evaluating energy; its sense of freedom and self-transcendcnoy; 
its sense of possessing 11 laws 11 of 11 logical procedure 11 adequate to the 
guidance of its own thought processes toward 11 truth 11 ; its moral insights 
and senses of value (which we are about to examine) represent this dimen-
to 
sion of the a priori. We suggest that profoundest insight as/the nature 
in 
and reality of God comes/a similar way, as ~ priori, and that the first 
level of this insight is disclosed in man I s .moral nature. 
The 1 'oTal Nature of Man 
l'he Universalitl of Moral Conscience. Mm have tended to believe that 
it was possible to discover common moral values, which would define the 
content of a common human conscience. . To point out the fact in its simplist 
historical terms we·find the primary principles of conduct, such as respect 
for life, truth, property, discipline of the sexual side of life in some 
terms, the eleva.tion of generosity, and the criticism of avarice, in all 
of the major cultures of mankind, Hindu, Buddhist, Confucian, Zoroastrian, 
Greek, Judea-Christian, Islamic; and we find these same virtues acknowledged 
in many primitive societies as well./\Fllrthermore, in the statements of 
their great sages, many of these cultures asserted that the commandments 
expressed or reflected a universal cosmic order. We quote at random 
several noteworthy examples from various ancient cultures. 
"The eight means of Yoga are., the connnandments; or Yama, the rules 
.or ijiyomu , the rules ••• posture ••• right control of life force 
••• abstraction ••• attention .... meditation ••• contmplation. Harm-
lessness., truth. to all beings, abstention from theft, from inoontinenoo 
and from avarice., constitute Ya.ma or the five connnandments. Yama ( or 
the five connnandments) constitutes the universal duty and is 
irrespective of race, place, time, or e:rrergency. 11 · · 
(From Patanjali Yoga Sutras. c. the time of Christ. Balloa 148.) 
Now what, brethren, is right belief? 
The knowledge· of. suffering ••• • 
And what, brethren, is right resolve? 
The re$olve to renounce sensual pleasures., the resolve to have malice 
toward none, and the resolve to harm no living creature •••• 
/Ind what,. brethren, is right speech? . . 
To abstain from falsehood., to abstain from backbiting., to abstain 
from harsh language., to abstain from frivolous talk ••• • 
And what., brethren., is right conduct? 
To abstain from destroying life., to abstain from taking what is not 
given, and to abstain from sexual wrong~doing. 
(From the Sutta Pi taka of the Pali Cannon, Ballou 244. ) 
Confucian 
11Thruthfulness in speech and the cultivation of harmony constitute 
what are called 1the things advantageous to men 1 • Quarrels., 
plundering, and murders are 1the things disastrous to men.'~' 
(From the Li Ki, Books of Rites., Ballou, 380.) 
"There are three things which the superior man guards against. 
In youth., when the physical powers are not yet·settled, he 
guards against lust. When he is strong, and the physical 
powers. are full of vigour, he guards against quarr~lsomeness. 
When he is old, and the animal powers are decayed, he guards 
against covetousness. There are three. things:of which the 
superior man stands in awe. He stands in awe of the ordinances 
.of heaven ••• of great men ••• of the words of sages •••• 11 (.Anal~cts, 
Ballou, 414.) 
---- ---- ---------·~-- ~~~--------- ------~~-
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Confucius I statement of the Golden Rule : 11 .a.ow the man of 
perfect virtue (jen), wishing to be established himself', 
seeks also to establish others; wishing to be enlarged him-
self, he seeks also to enlarge others, to be able to judge 
of others by what is nigh in ourselves; this may be called 
the art of virtue." (.Analects, Ballou, 403.) 
What is God-given is what we call human nature. To fulfill 
the law of our human nature is what we call the moral law. The 
cultivation of moral law is what we call culture •••• 
Confucius remarked: "The life of the moral man is an exemp-
lification of the universal moral order11 ••• • 
Confucius remarked: "To find the central clue to our moral 
being which unites us to the universal order, that indeed is 
the highest human attainment". • • • {From the Chung-Yung or 
Golden ~an, Lun Yutanz, Wisdom of China and India, p. 845-6.) 
••• there is no place in the highest heavens above nor in 
the deepest waters below where the moral law is not to be 
found. The moral man finds the moral law begi;nning in the 
relation between man and woman; but ending in the vast reaches 
of the universe. (Ibid. p. 848) 
This appears to me to.be the aim which a man ought to have, 
and towards which he ought to direct all the energies both of 
himself and of the state, acting so that he may have temper-
ande and justice present with him and be happy, not suffering 
his lusts to be unrestrained, and in the never-ending desire 
to satisfy them leading a robber's life. Such a one is the 
friend neither of God nor man, for he is incapable of communion, 
and he who is incapable of communion is also incapable of 
friendship, And philosophers tell us, Callicles, that com-
munion and friendship and orderliness and temperance and 
justice bind together heaven and earth and gods and rren, 
and that this universe is therefore called Cosmos or order. 
(From the Gor~ias,The Dialo~ues of Plato, ed. Demos, Random 
House, Vol I, p. 569.) 
Hebrew-Christian 
A Paranhnase of Moses Ten Commandn:ents: 
"And God Spoke all these words, saying •••• " 
(I) (II) 
(III) 
{IV) 
(V) 
Have no other gods 
Make no image 
Take not God 1s nan:e in vain. 
Rerr.ember the Sabbath 
Honor father and mother 
(VI) 
(VII) 
(VIII) 
(IX) 
(X) 
Do not kill 
Do not commit adultery 
Do not steal 
Do not lie (bear false witness) 
Do not covet 
(Exodus 20) 
11 Hear, O Israel: The Lord our God is one Lord; and you shall 
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love the Lord your God with all your heart, and with all your soul, 
and with all your might. And these words which I command you this 
day shall be upon your heart •• ~- (RSV) (Deut. 6 :4-5.) · 
"You shall not hate your brother in your heart ••• You shall not 
take vengeance or bear any grudge against the sons of your own 
people, but you shall love your neighbor as your self: I am 
the Lord". (Lev.· 19:13-18.) 
"For this·cornmandment which I command you this day is not too 
hard for you, neither is it far off •. It is not in heaven, that, 
you should say, 1Hho will go up for us to heaven, and bring it 
to us, that we may hear it arid do it?' Neither is it beyond the 
sea, that you should say, 1Hho w:i.11 go over the sea for. us, and 
bring it to us, that we may hear it and do it?' But the word is 
very near you; it is in your mouth and in your heart, so that 
you can do it 11 • (Deut. 30:11-14.) 
"This is the covenant that I will make with them after those 
days, says the Lord: I will put my laws on their hearts, and 
write them on their minds". (Jer. 31:33-34 and Heb. 10:16-17.) 
"And he said to him-, 'You shall love the Lord your God with 
all your heart, and.with all your soul, and with all your mind. 
This is the great and first commandment. And a second is like 
it, You shall love your neighbor as yourself •. One these two . . 
cornmandrr:.ents depend all the law an<i the prophets", (Matt. 22 :37-40.) 
Islamic 
A; . 
From the Kor~n: -
"Bestow not favours that thou mayest receive again with increase ••• " 
"Verily this Koran is no other than a warning to all creatures; 
to him among you who willeth to walk in a straight. ,path ••• As 
to the orphan therefore wrong him not; And asto hini' that asketh 
thee , chide him not away •••• 
Heigh therefore with fariness, and, scant. not the balance •••• 
God ••• answereth the oppressed when they cry to him ••• ~ 
----'-----~- -- -- ---~---- __ i -~::_ 
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Consume not your wealth among yourselves in vain things; nor 
offer it to judges as a bribe that ye may consume a part of rr.en's 
wealth unjustly, while ye know the sin which ye commit •••• 
From the Fortv-Two Traditions of An-Nav!.fil!i: 
"No one of you is a believer until he loves for his brother 
what he loves for himself •••• 
Do not be envious of each other; and do not outbid each other; 
and do not hate each other; do not oppose each other; and do 
not undersell each other; and be, O slaves of Allah, as brothers. 
A Muslim is a brother to a ~Ju.slim, not oppressing him and not 
forsaking him; not lying to him and despising him •••• Here is true 
piety •••• A Muslim's life, property, and honour are inviolate to 
a Muslim •••• 11 (From Ballou 1290, 1295, 1299, 1304, 1317, 1337, 
1341) 
!!!£ Rational Sprin~s of Consoienoe. Our strongest insight,however, 
into the reality and nature of 
conscience is rational,,rather than rr.erely historical or empirical. Con-
science arises in the idea of ourselves as free and rational beings. 
Concomitant with reason and freedom is the sense of obligation. Freedom 
implies obligation, which is but another name for freedom in its mature 
sense. Realizing our freedom, and acknowledging our finiteness of per-
ception and judgment, we are constantly anxious as to whether we will 
rightly use our freedom, that is to· say, for the preservation and enchance-
ment of our life •. This 11anxiety 11 is conscience in its elementary form. 
All men have such anxiety or elementary form of conscience, Reason also 
implies a sense of obligation. Rational judgment implies the power to 
judge or misjudge, to judge in favor .of all the revelant facts, or only 
part of them. To judge in part is to make an error, and, in so far as 
it may be possible, the responsibility of rational life is to avoid error.* 
*William Newton Clark ·stated this point, in terms of man's persona]JtY,,l}th i 
extreme clarity in his Outline of Christian Theology, p. 202-3 /u (;rJJJJf..f:,,aJ 
d.;j~/m ~ / . ?-/ 7 t:( I', 
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Obligation is the central experience of life. If we had no obli-
gation, we would never act. If there were no obligation to fly, the bird 
would never do so, and its specieis __ perish. In all life th~r~ is the impulse 
to act in such a way as to conduce to mife. This is true in the highest 
scale with man. To live and act rr8ans that we have to live and act in 
some direction. As living beings we are immediately confronted with the 
problem of which direction? This "which" is the seed of conscience. The 
will-to-live and the impulse to act on the human level has unique im-, 
plications involving man's personal and spiritual nature. 11 Man cannot 
live by bread alone". He is not interested in mere physical survival 
on some lowest plane of subsistance, but in survival in terms of his 
highest; unique capacities as man. In sum, thus far, we have a con-
science because we are living, personal beings. One cannot conceive of 
a free, rational, and acting being, with higher predispositions and 
aspirations, that does not need, and therefore has, a capacity for 
conscience. 
We may speak of this sense of obligation to use our fre_edom and our 
rational powers in the right way i.e. the wa:y conducive to life, happi-
ness, and social harmony -- as the 11form 11 of conscience. As an integral 
freedom such form seems a universal attribute of human nature. (In ethically 
expression of reason and/pathological personality, of course, such form 
has been trained to be satisfied only by the feeding of selfish drives.) 
Implied in this universal form there are two phases of conscience 
which bring to light its content: a "psychological" phase and an 
11intellectual11 one. The emotional satisfaction which sanctifies the 
actual· decisions which we make when we feel they are right and true is 
the psychological 11content 11 of conscience. (Stated negatively, of course, 
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feelings of dissatisfaction and guilt are aspects of the psychological 
content of conscience when we believe that decisions may not hav~ been 
rendered according to the fullest and most coherent judgment, or when 
we believe that performance has fallen short of some character ideal.) 
Such emotional content is a corollary, universal quality of the human 
miud in the area of its rational freedom and conscience, Our central 
problem, however, upon which we wish to focus, concerns the intellectual 
content of conscience, or the problem of truth judgrent in the area of 
conduct. 
As the practical question we may ask, Where will the intellectual 
content of conscience tend to be the same for all men? Is there an apex 
of intellectual life where it is the same? We have just seen how the 
emotional or psychological quality or feeling will be similar in all men 
when acts of conscience are performed. In order to understand how the 
intellectual heart of such emotional content may coincide with men, or 
to test when it does conicide, we suggest the following proposition, as 
description of human ethical life: It is that the most rational deci-
sion possible, ·the most inclusive coherent judgment we can make concern-
ing an issue, helps to define the full content of conscience, and in 
matters of supreme importance tends to be the sall'e for all human beings. 
Ten Sources of Mor,gl Insight. Conscience has varied in matters of 
lesser importance to human·welfare as a whole. A Westerner has no content 
of conscience about the eating of rreat, while for the devout Hindu, Gandhi, 
there. was a keen conscience against :rr.eat eating. In our myriad ways daily 
we individuals illustrate varying contents of conscience in matters of 
merely personal taste or in those of less social importance. One man 
- , , 
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pursues his professional drive or 11conscience 11 as a teacher, another as' 
a lawyer or artist. You may prefer to use your vacation fishing; I 
mountain hiking. But in matters of supreme importance, in the basic 
issues, we have, char~cteristically and historically, tended to act in a 
uniform way. We may repeat with profit the words of Frederick Paulsen, 
"Human life ••• is possible only where all individuals act 
with relative uniformity • 11 (A System of Ethics, p. 13f), 
He offer the following list of some matters of suprerr:e importance 
or concern in which conscience tends to be the same with all men,defining 
its common intellectual content. These are matters about which human beings 
have characteristically tended to make the same decision, or think, reason 
or act in a uniform way, as they strive to live on the highest plane pos-
sible to man. They are practical ways of stating the content of moral 
law. Such rr:oral principles or laws root in the central-most drives or 
desires of personal existence: 
1. As a matter of normal human life there is the universal desire 
for self-preservation and self-enhancement according to our highest cap-
abilities ao individuals. This has given rise to the basic laws against 
murder, founded in the universal wi+l-to-live and in the sense of the 
sanctity of one's own person. 
2. There is the universal desire to have access to facts, or to 
know and to use truth, to have knowledge, to be informed -- to become 
"ed-ucated 11 , as we often say, in one primary meaning of education. 
In their effort to catch. up with the west,;_ the contemporary thi,rst for 
knowledge, in the -form of science., agitating the non- ~western peoples., as one 
• 
of the signifio~nt social phenomena of our t_ime, dramatically illustrates this 
human trait. 
200 
J. There is the universal desire to have others deal truthfully, 
trustfully, honorable., or dependablyl,- with you, and the consequent reali-
zation that we must act reliably with them. No man can long deal with a 
liar or a promise-breaker. This has given rise to the basic laws against 
falsehood in the formal codes, and may be positively stated as the law of 
veracity. 
4. There is the universal desire for recognition, for approval, or 
to have the friendship of others, to be well regarded by one's peers, to 
be liked, to be loved and the consequent realization that we must recip-
rocate friendship and love. This has given rise to the laws of 11reciproci ty" 
or Golden Rule principles in ma~y cultures. 
. t,vn..U,1-<i._1Uaj 
5. There has been the i~Z.t'iQ--human desire for, and to keep one 1s 
mate. This has given rise to the laws regulating marriage, and has tended 
in ·many cultures toward a monogamous ideal. 
6. There is the universal desire to keep one's personal possessions, 
especially whe_n the fruit of one I s own labor. This may be broadened to 
incl~de the principle of economic security. This human drive has given 
rise to the laws against stealing, and the basic sanctity of personal prop-
erty. The c~ntemporary ferrr,ent of the world I s peoples relative to the de-
sire for a better economic lot -- the basic motif of communist revolutions 
themselves -- indicate this universal quality of life and conscience. 
7. There is the universal desire for just judgment or judicial 
decision at the bar of legal or political authority -- whether tribal chief, 
king, commissariat, congress, parliament, or court. This has given rise 
to the concrete laws and structures of "justice" that aim to limit the 
arbitrary power of rulers and governn:ents. 
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8. In the desire to live free ·from· arb1trary force or restraint 
flows the desire to have a vqice ,in the ·political authority that rules 
over us. This has its classic illustration in the rise of demodracy in the 
western world, and presently in the convulstions of former colonial peoples 
in their efforts to secure independence and establish 11 popular 11 governn:E;mts. 
An important prppaganda appeal in contemporary revolutionary moverrents is 
to the ideal of democracy. The Soviet rulers claim to represent the 
11workers 11 in the Soviet Socialist "Republics 11 • The Red government of 
China is hailed as the 11 People I s Republic 11 • 
9. There tenril:s to be a universal human admiration of mercy, un-
selfishness, and love when observed in others, in a St. Francis, a 
Schweitzer, a 8ister Kenny, a Gandhi, arousing in our own conscience the 
sense of sympathy, and that love should be our own supreme motive. 
10. Finally we should cit~ the universal admiration of such humble 
virtues as courage, temperance, perseverance at a worthy task, and other 
such. No society ultimately admires the cowa~d, the uncouth, or the 
dilettante. 
It is true that some of these impulses have not begun to find their 
expression in social movement~ and institutions until lately in historic 
tim@. But that they are beginning to have realization suggests their 
age-old and deep-seated appe,al to the. human heart. Others of the above 
principles are, .of course, ancient as ideals, and began to humanize men 
at an early time. 
In 1957 the Hungarian student; who had been exposed to a Communist 
education since. childhood, wept to the u. N. small~power investigating 
committee: "We were broughb up amidst lies. We continually had to lie. 
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We could .not have healthy ideas because everything was chocked in us. We 
wanted freedom. 11 Sorreti1":e prior to 
ruary 24-25, 1956, in the now famous 
this at the 20th Party Congress, Feb-
then 
expose of Stalin, the /Soviet dictator , 
had himself eloquently appealed to the Communist deputies' sense of truth 
and justice. 
Granted the full context of the Soviet sense of values, in many ways 
very different from ours, in which such statements were uttered, scarcely 
no more classic expression of the human desire for just judgment at the 
bar of political authority, and the desire for truth as opposed to false-
hood could be found in our times than in the Khruechev speech at that 
occasion. We are apt to suppose that people in the Communist society are 
those, particularly, who -- trained in so different a social environment 
represent a branch of humanity with an utterly different brand of con-
science from our own. Yet Khruschev appealed to his hearers in the following 
memorable terms:* 
II 
Stalin originated the concept 'enemy of the people 1 • This 
term auton:atically rendered it unnecessary that the idealogi-
cal erros of a man engaged in a controversy be proven ••• In the 
main, and in actuality, the only proof of guilt used, against 
all norms of current legal science, was the 'confession' of the 
accused himself, and as subsequent probing proved,. 1 confessions 1 
were acquired through physical pressures against the accused ••• 
The formula 'enemy of the people' was specifically introduced 
for the purpose of physically annihilating such individuals. 
u Mass arrests and deportations of many thousands of people, 
executed without trial and without normal investigation, created 
conditions of insecurity, fear and even desperation ••• How is it 
possible that a person confesses to crimes which he has not 
committed; only in one way -- because of the application of physical 
methods of pressuring him, tortures, bringing him into a state of 
unconsciousness, deprivation of his judgment, taking away his 
human digni ty'i 
Relative to the case of Comrade Eike, Khruschev announced that he was 
accused 11 on the basis of slanderous materials" and "forced under torture 11 
*John Gunther, Inside Russia Toda~1 Harper, 1958, P• 94-107. 
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to confess, and damned this Stalinist procedure as an 11odious falsification". 
The Soviet Premier cited two remarkable documents, a letter addressed to 
Stalin by Comrade Eike, written from the latter's cell; and a second letter 
written from another victim, Comrade Kedrov, to the Central Committee. 
Eike in his letter said: 
11 Had I been guilty of only one-hundredeth of the crimes with 
which I am charged I would not have dared to send this pre-
execution declaration: However, I have not been guilty of even 
one of the things with which I am charged and my heart is clean 
of even the shadow of baseness. I have never in my life told 
you a word of falsehood and now finding rr;y two feet in the grave 
I am also not lying. 11 · 
K~drov appealed with these words: 
11
~ torture has reached the extreme. My health is broken.~ .To 
die in a Soviet prison, branded as a vile traitor to the Father-
land -- what can be more monstrous for an honest man? ••• Unsur-
passed bitterness and pain grip my heart. No! No! This will 
not happen; this cannot be, I cry. Neither the Party, nor the 
Soviet Government, nor the People's Commissar, L. P. Beria, will 
permit this cruel, irreparable injustice~ I am firmly certain 
that, given a quiet., objective examination, without any foul 
ranting, without any anger and without the fearful tortures, it 
would be easy to prove the ba.selessness of the charges. I 
believe deeply that truth and justice will triumph. If believe, 
I believe." 
The Russian heart is not greatly different from the American heart. High-
lighting two of the fundamental principles mentioned previously, our observer 
of Russian life pointed to the "insatiable thirst for knowledge" among 
the Russians and wrote that "With a vehemence and a determination almost 
inconceivable to us, they yearn and strive for self-betterment" -- a 
way in which the Russian heart of late may have overtaken the American! 
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Personality as Criterion of Moral Law. Moral law is 
founded in the structure and nature of personal being; it 
expresses the needs of personal life, is integral to the meaning of personality 
and to the experience of beings who are consciously aware. We heard the Old and 
New' testaments in their deepest level of ethical thinking, say something like 
this in passages quoted. {t· /9'Sj 
--f:trJ yf'\ Ital _4Ut1Ay ft'\ ef~al 
Moral law (or if preferred, 1ve may speak of it as moral duty,f\truth, or 
reality) refers to two main things: the fulfilling of all personal lives to 
their finest possible capacity, and the harmonization of life with life; it is 
personal fulfillment, love and justice; or, alternatively phrased, it is the 
fulfillment of persons by love and justiceo At this level of insight the concept 
of moral law and the·cohcept of life's meaning merge. Gordon Gilkey somewhere 
trenchantly phrased the idea of life's duty, meaning, or purpose as comprising 
·0, 
these responsibilities: To realize whatever fine powers are latent uithin us; 
and@to love and serve those whom life puts together with us. This latter we 
attempt beyond and above the legitmate concern which we must have for ourselves. 
To these two levels of meaning in the concept of moral duty or purpose, ue add 
OUT 
a third, reflectinwnature as beings within or of time, and bringing the first 
two princples together into their implied creative synthesis; namely, our duty 
i~to do what we can to tip the balance of the human future for good -- a partial 
definition of the good for persons being suggested by our preceeding analysis. 
111aw11 in its highest moral sense does not mean rigid, inflexible structure that 
judges and punishes. Transcending the idea of judgment, which has a legitimate 
provisional application at certain levels of process, law for living beings 
means regularity or orderliness of life according to the nature and for the 
welfare of .such being. For personal beings 11 moral law11 is subsummed in the 
respect for personality and the love commandment. It is self-regulation, the 
highest work of moral freedom. 
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The Contribution of Immanuel Kant: In Western culture no one more 
forcefully stated that moral law is ultimately discernible ,2, nriori in the 
very nature of human personality as self-conscious mind and reason than did 
Immanuel Kant. His three principles are now cherished possessions of the 
rational and idealist stream of interpretation of man. They were. that the 
test of moral judgments is found in their universal applicability; that 
respect for personality in moral judgment is implied highest criterion 
of moral Vialue; and that moral judgment is autonomous or free. Kan I s first 
maxim, the discovery that the test of moral truth may be seen in its nature 
as a ,Y11iversal idea, (as a maxim of conduct applicable to all men) stems 
from the Socratic-Platonic tradition with its interest in universal ideas. 
universality. 
Tho ten moral principles of our preceeding section stand such a test of/ 
Th re expressions of the human will in terms which disolose tha·t., if 
/uni~Jrgally respected and practiced, all wills (that is, all men) would. 
tend to live in mutual support and harmony; whereas to the extent that 
human wills disregard these laws, aggress on and destroy each other, no 
·· life can stand. 
Kan's second max:im, his emphasis on personality as supreme moral crit-
erion, comes from the Hebrew-Christian side of his thinking. This second 
maxim of the Categorical Imperative: - 11 So act to treat humanity, whether in 
thine own person or in that of any other, in every case·· a:s an end ••• never 
as a means only", is really Kant I s founda.tional principle. It is implicit 
TA.t_ lah;;c 
in, or anterior to, the test of universality, and gives~ principle its 
nltimate fo:r-ce as truth. U:p.iversal moral laws rest on the principle of 
respect for personality, the moral" rule that follows the Hebrew-Chr'istian 
,dr.,,,;-v2{ 
metaphysical affirmation of the primacy of pe:r-sonality in value and being. 
On the ·other hand, the,1~~-of universality -- coming from the Greek side 
of Kant I s thought -- is implicit in the He brew-Christian ethics. They are 
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two principles, a primary one, and a corollary, inhering in our moral 
sensitivity-~ or, if preferred, they are coordinate principles, +wo 
facets of our unitary moral nature. 
-------------------- __ j 
For example, why be truthful? Because it respects the personality of 
the other man in quintessential way. To treat him on the basis of honor, 
trust, and integrity is the supreme way to acknowledge his value and im-
portance as a person. When we deceive a person, we fundamentally mistrust 
him, that is, doubt his integrity as person. \Jhy can basic moral principles 
be universalized'? Because they are principles which, in fundamental ways, 
respect or reverence persons. Our foregoing moral. laws rest on the principle 
of personality, and personality is 11 universal 11 , or at lest a world-wide 
category of being. What was implic~t in the Greek morality at its highest 
narnely, the sacredness of personality (e.g. Socrates in Book I and II 
of the Republic, or in the Gorgias) was explicit in the Hebrew emphasis on 
personality; what was implicit in the Hebrew outlook namely universality 
was explicit in.the Greek emphasis on the search for universal ideas, or 
world-governing, rational forms of order. In any case, the primacy of per-
sonality is understood by both sides of Jesus 1s summary of the law: for 
love of God is love of the creative source of all·personality, which issues 
in the moral claim of love for neighbor. 
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The Cosmic refe'rence cif conscience. We have discussed the historic, 
- -
universal scope and the·origin of conscience as lying in man's rational 
nature. Harking out from this insight we· suggest an initial sensitivity 
to the reality of God. Ue may call it the cosmic reference of conscience 
to consider which will prepare us for a final summary of the moral argu-
ment. 
Cosmic 11 Moral Reality 11 ,. supporting man I s mor.al nature, and from which 
that nature may be derived, is implied by the reality of conscience ·itself 
as rational, psychic process intrinsic to the nature of man. Conscience 
is our sense of responsibility to judge 11according to reality". Thus an 
objective reference lies already in conscience. Our sense of obligation 
-is a given, ~ _griori element of mirid; But obligation or sense of ought-
ness and duty is the term most descriptive of hurnan life from the stand-
point of inner tension as it views an o~tward world in which it must make 
its way. The de sire of conscience the ref ore seems to be to discover some-
thing which will fulfill it. Anticipated in the very given, existential 
nature, or constitutional awareness of obligation on our part as men is its 
desire to respond to, or fulfill something constitutional in the universe. 
And r..1:; we actually find laws of life which- govern life harmoniously and 
well, the growth of conscience toward assurance of some objective n:eaning 
continues. 
At this point conscience-reference ereerges from the shadow of sub-
jective anticipation merely, outward into a more certain realization of 
the moral nature of the cosmos, for it looks around and perceives that its 
sense of obligation is a universal quality of human life. As such, Con-
science notes that it is an expression of cosmic process. Our sense of 
2o6 
obligation is "cosmic" or "objective" in that all rational beings, 
mankind at large, have it. It is outside me individually, because it is 
in the other person too. Like other objective phenomena it is character-
istic of a vast range of existence, namely, the order of human life. As 
a psychological characteristic of rational life wherever found, it seems as 
objective as the human nose. In so far as human reason and freedom are 
outcoir,es of cosmic process, the accompanying "ought", as a psychological 
emergent, is fundamentally cosmic or objective • }Jhy man should be wtat 
he is is a cosmic question. Why we are endowed with freedom and rational 
mentality and the capacity for personality and conscience is an objective 
fact of nature and creation -- we have been made that way. 
C (fnLJ t¼A".,<_/_JJ) . · · 
Furthermore, from 11a-awareness of itself as an expression of cosmic 
process it raises the question of whether it may not also be itself an 
out 
insight into the purposive nature of that process. For we look/at process 
dl (/1\.L.9"1~-tJ-
and it seems to be a moral one: it unfold~into personal beings, with the 
sense of moral duty at the apex of personal awareness. We see nature in 
her history putting forth energies to the seeming end of creating numerous 
persons, and we conclude, in a cbherent value judgment, that this must 
be~, or at least one, supreme end or value. Obligation is the inner 
view that a self has of what from the outside appears to be a creative, 
moral process. Thus does not our finite "moral mind" sense an ampler Moral 
Mind purposing the totality of process and existence? The impulse of con-
science within, seeming to fit the propulsion of reality without, suggests 
that it does. The old prophetic affirmation that conscience is "The Voice 
of God, 11 seems true. If we may de fine our will to live, and to live right-
eously, as the fulfillment of Creation I s Will, then the ought, which is the 
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spring of action is in deepest sense an expression of the will of God. 
' ' ' 
Further, to act morally is to act according to the best and wisest. But 
here again our sense of finitude and imperfection on the side of conscience 
suggests God. For it is often true that we do not ,know the. full truth and 
accordingly do not act in the best way. Our sensitivity.toward the wiser 
and the better implies the ultimate standard of the Fullness of Truth in 
Being. We should strive to know and to permit the wisest and the. best to 
act in us. Thus· deepest in the sense of conscience is the realization that 
11 perfuctnoss of God is the ground of obli~atior! for oll other beings. 11 * 
A ccordingly, theri, have we not discovered a facet of the 
"ontological argument" in its moral kEly in this, the self I s analysis of 
conscience in its relation to the World? 
The Moral Argument : A S~ry 
The full mood of moral reasoning for the reality of God says that we 
discover Moral Mind in the universe through th~ presence of moral order 
in thO universe. -l~* }feral reasoning about God I s reality advances on two 
fronts~ 
an 
Ith~w°~ oriori side, already suggested by our previous discussion. 
y, \j 
Here Ide.express the point of view more succinctly: that the universe is a 
moral order is suggested by .the fact that we are personal beings with 
moral conscience, that is to, say, with awareness 1! priori of universal 
laws that will govern life harmoniously and well, in brief, the law of 
respect for personality; th~s., in itsnost dynamic Hebrew-Christian sense, is 
the law of love. We have se~n that the 1~ of ~espeot:, implying love, 
* William Newton Clarke 
~f Phraseology suggested by ·. 
the causal and teleological 
Scribners, 1898, p. 109f. 
Clarke's classic discussion of 
argurr:.ents, Outline Qf Christian Theol~., · · 
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was implicit in the great oomma.ndments of the 
classical cultures, east and west. Earlier we formulated the practical 
expressions of moral law in ten principles, and dis.;., 
cussed Immanueal Kant's rational derivation of the respect for personality 
as central, moral truth. 
The moral argument also has an empirical side or mood. Looking out 
beyond our single selves at process as a whole, in broadest empirical spirit, 
we observe that the universe is a moral order because it has produced such 
beings as a major outcome of its process; and, on the practical side, we 
experience that we cannot survive in the highest way possible to men without 
practicing the higher morality of regard for one's fellows. Though they 
believed that their ultimate authority came from God's speaking to them 
directly through the inner authority of mbral conscience or moral truth 
(the~ priori depth of their insight) the great eighth to sixth century 
B.C. moral prophets in Israel found the test for moral law objectively 
and concretely iri the workings of history. 'When men and nations collectively 
persist in evil actions they n:eet in the long run with collective ruin or 
disaster. Nations that do right in their individual and collective respon-
sibilities -- that is, apply the Commandments based on respect for person-
ality -- tend in the long run to survive. The great prophet's stated the 
law in both the negative and positive forms here suggested. · Such was the 
empirical or experl~ental truth or law of history as the prophets looked 
out at the world of rren and events. The sure passing of the brutal empires 
of history attests the truth the prophets were uttering. 
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Pulling the two sides of this resume together and again indicating 
its basic~ priori mood in depth, the argument says: being aware of the 
universal laws of personality and love we are aware of moral cosmic Mind 
governing existence. Such Mind may be said to be personal because it con-
cerns persons and their moral order. 
the supreme moral law is Love. . It is 
It may be thought of as Love because 
d'- U\ a.A,t/J t~t.,u/.F 
more thM:A_our mind. l:::ecause moral 
··truth embraces all minds, if they will attend to it; it is other than our 
mind because the idea of love judges through conscience subjectively, when 
men are sensitized to this law, and objectively in the course of history if 
·rr.en remain unsensitized to it. On the other hand., God 1 6 Mind may find 
expression in, or is found in fellowship with, our minds as we realize love 
and respect for persons. 
The essence of the moral argwr.ent is that we sense the absoluteness 
of the 'truth of respect for personality and love. Hastings Rashdall 
SUllllilarized the moral argwr.ent supurbly: 
11 An absolute Moral law or ttoral ideal cannot exist· in material · 
things ••• A moral ideal can exist nowhere ••• but in amnd; an 
absolute moral ideal can exist only in a Mind from which all 
Reality is derived ••• our moral ideal can only claim objective 
validity in so far as it can r8_itionally be regarded as the 
revelation of a.Jloral idea_l eterpallY, existing inJthe mind 
God 11 • {'ZAff1Jj tJL lJ(J'oc( ~,v7-._ {#{.f1 1/;t.;zz:J /' ~;;i., 
It is precisely because we must many times look above and beyond 
immediate empirical verification for our moral ideals that the moral 
argument has its ulti~~te force and validity. Because truth in its moral 
range is often not yet embodied in material relationships, we have our 
highest experience of Ultimate Mind. Nowhere do advanced moral truths have 
full or complete existence or embodiment materially in concrete relation-
ships. Yet they are truths that seem universal, eternal, or absolute in 
are 
their demand; they are yet 11 ideal11 , as we say, or transcendent or/unrealized 
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in process, t,;aiting to have their full expression in process. As such,· 
they seem to lie withingthe Ultimate Mind that overarches process and 
guides its development. That all men should l~ve each other, and practice 
~§., as the ultimate and universal ide~l, is certainly Truth of the high-
est degree. That democracy may yet be_ brought to a more perfected stage 
of development in local areas; or that international organization should 
. . . 
more perfectly approximate a democratic world-government arid system of 
justice; or that race relations can be vastly improved over the present 
i 
11empirical 11 or factual situation, toward complete equality, freedom, and 
opportunity for all races everywhere; or that the vaster masses of n~m should 
con:e to live· in greater freedom from want, and in greater freedom of op-
. portunity for the good life as individuals; or that modern cities should 
the 
be cleared of/aesthetic and moral blight of slums; or that birth control 
should be practi.ced in areas of great over-population, under· the current 
threat of world po!)ulation explosion; or that we must come to use atomic 
energy for productivity rather than for military power -- such are mo:t-al 
truths that have no present, full emb9diment. Such are not seen or known 
by or in any "empirical relationships"; for there are no · such relationships 
at present. where they are fully embodied. Their validity does not rest in 
any present material factuality. Look for them as material facts and they 
are nowhere; look .for t,hem as the insistent voice of Moral Truth and they 
are everywhere. We could not presently know them by exploration anywhere 
on the plane of sense experience in the present material world. Where then 
are they and why and how valid and commanding over life?~he humanist and 
entirely 
naturalist will reply that these ideals which command life are/man's own 
ideals -- the subjective projections of possible go~ds upon the imaginary 
screen of our future hopes. The idealist and spiritual philosopher replies, 
that it is in their quality as "Imperatives" or commands that deepest sen-
sitivity to their,origin in Eternal Vdnd is felt. In his view, they reside 
in the over-realm of ,~he ,Transcending Spirit of God, in the fulr.ess of truth 
r,ut<./_ tf..v., vrnpv~ I fTJ,\ 
in Being.t"I as truth(irJ .our minds by ~ oriori insight. 
Indeed we may forsee, with the naturalists, that our human anticipation 
of possible dire consequences, if we do not speedily. realize the foregoing 
ideals, may be a.source of their in~erativeness, insistence, or command. 
But their insistence or command is not soley generated by this ~ of 
judgment; it does not have its entire origin in the fear of their con-
sequences of our possible failure. They speak as truth above, and prior to; 
consequences. He would not do them because we fear judgment; we would do 
them because they are ]'igh,:!::. Their truth does not lodge in their conse-
-quences, experienced or anticipated; rather their consequences will follow 
from their truth. Whatever their empirical consequences might be, dire if 
we fail these ideals, benigned if we heed them, the gonseguences would be 
For their insistence or command rests on the principle of the supremacy 
of personality in being; in that supremacy they have their full rr,eaning, 
their ultimate heart and significance. It is the calamity to persm which 
is anticipated as the evil consequences of our possible human failure to 
act on them. Accord:inglyreligious idealism feels that the Voice of Eternal 
:Mi.nd speaks in deepest sense in our awareness of the supl:'emacy of personality 
in being. Such then isour statement, ,of the moral argument for God. 
others, 
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The main premises of the_ m<:_ra~ al'\l';Umem are tPO: (1) the aJ'f· i '.:'T.,~< '.> 1. 
· the "objectivitytt or· "univeraality11 o:f morc.l value .. .,. 1:hnt u.lti.':l:2t.ely . ·o -· :-
this mcnn? And (2) the n.f ·:tr.mation that personolit;y is· supreme in vnl1.:J.c., 
(1) Helatd..vc to the .first p:rcrrtioe, recall ·our discussion on the co$mie 
.reference or aonsciaico·; P• 20Sf' o O., ~ atts Cunning:t>.~m,. summarizing on t hr: 
. - ' "' 
vnlidiey of the r.r:>ral ~guntent ao be aces it:, .flp< aks. SUgcestivcly to the 
!"irst point, 
" •• The main rond along t1hich it advances 1a this: .Moral values 
aro. o.b~~tive at least 1n the senae tbo.t thQy- aN eseential p~s 
ot the · ,-rorld""°rdcr 1n so ·tar as human nature is a real part of 
the tt>rld...orderJu.tbe worl.d-o.rder mat consequent~ "be 1n some 
sense a mral order, in the sense;; n~, tb_at there. is room in it 
tor man am the idoal. of g0odness lb ieb is basal to his natu:reJ and 
this could not be unless ·the 1mrl:d-orc1er, is directed b3' a conscious 
ro:bional Deing ilbo wills the .final triumph of goodfiess .. u'" (011 1-I ~ 
Cumlngham, ptoblems• of Philosom. po 421-2'} ct 
In tho pi,3vio1u~ sections of this chapter, we lulve alrendy la'borod to 
pc:1nt out 1n our own way how a rooral t1.r~ for God rest.s on philos·ophicnl 
id ?11lis111, or an idealfstic conception of "'value" - that U ', how tho moral 
sense, within re.fleets ,or sug~csts ·a MO:I'al reality without .. ln :tilile, the p."· ·v :.' · 
rmc'. ~he a~nt itt:1eli' are ncutually vne. and the same thinti they :repre5erF. :_ 
j\mt\amen;tal or priroordial mode Qr manner of readinc our t:orld, namly prim., . ,j . 
s·s a sys_tem of life Md mind ..llnd peroonal spirit and value., rather than om, :. 
sp1ri1,leaa "material" enerr;y,. To cl~enge the argument i,s ,simply to ch.c1.lL 1c 
:lt;lealism itself·. 
(2) '!'he second premise of the. moral c.r~nt ;Ls the 1d~tt: of the suere:~. 
;!O~h of J>!rBOnalitz upon 'Whieh t}'lo .nx,ral law Qf :respect for personality$ and 
its qorivatives. is founded• 
: ' 
.. . :. ·~ 
.,' 
I 
\ .. _. 
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m::>ral nr[;U."Jlent uould reply., by two reasonable or coherent insights, on a priori., 
. nnd the other r,enerally empirical !) The ,:\ priori insight, as l m.S implied 
earlier in this study, is the awareness by the self-consc.ious, personalt,,s;:,~ject 
be . v?I- fl .f.AJC1X.<:-id./) ~"9 
that · · · the locus or creative medium of all valueo Accordingly J1\. aware of 
itself as the creative mediUJ11 of value somcthinp: of its own supremacy :in value 
I 
is inti.1n..-1.ted to it.. And furtherroore, as the unique typo of enere.v t~at knows 
and mediates value., a further awareness of its suprer.mcy in "being" s or its 
relatedness to supreme being, is suggested to ito Finally we might repeat what 
was said on a former page, in "awareness of the self ae thingking energy. in 
comparison to all other observable energies, the self possesses an intimation 
of its ov3l'l superiority in value nnd possibly in being",. 
The empirical insight is that natUJ. .. e seems to be producinc self--conscious 
persont.1lity as a main, prolific activity., Again we return to what was said on 
a former page , tt e awe see nature in her hi.s t o~J put tinr, forth energies to the 
seeming erid of creati."lg numerous ., c ~,. 1 pcrsonsa JI and we conclude thnt ·this must 
be ."!:l!E:.., or at least one 9 supreme e11d or value"., Such conclusion i s made by 
an ovcr-~all coherent judgment, 1u1hich is the only method we have to d:i.scer:n . aey 
'\1-alue:r anywhere, of any kind or decree, 'if we believe that it is possible to 
ascert,ain value ~ CP'Jfl.C(}lM ·d.t., m..NA..i ~ ( 
--tit ~ ~ h~ r11 -& ¼ YrLrlud 
Le;t us hear at thts point ~ ots...o rtby formulations by others,1'J(ant; Vs l! ~!'1;:;l7 
w~ WuJTnL Cf.~ ~ 1 · / 
ar.t:l more :recently A William R.i tchie Sorleyu s ., .After these presentations Pe 
ap:p<~nd tivo topics which will clarti'y fur.at,her t he position of the religious 
ideaH.st concerning the idea of man.as moral nature., 
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Immanuel l{.ant has fo.rmulat~d in classic way the 
thesis of moral or ethical idealism, namely, that 
there, is' in the qniverse objective moral law. 
known by a priori reason. The following passages 
are edited from Kant, Selections, .. Scribner I s Modern 
Students Library, p. 268-87 ., from the up undumental 
Principles of the J}IIetaphysic of :Morals"• 
"Everyone must .admit that if ·a :law is to have moi::al force.,. i.e. to be the 
basis of an obligation, it must .carry with it al>solute necessity; that, for 
example, the precept, 'Thou shalt not lie', is not valid for men alone, as if 
. other rational beings :.had no. need to observe it; and no with all the other mo-ral 
laws properly so called; that, therefQre, the basis of obligation mus~ not be 
saught in the nature of man, or in the circumstances in the worl.d in which he is 
placed, but a priori simply in the conceptions of pure reason •••• all moral phil-
osophy rests wholly •••• pure •••• When applied to man, it does not borrow the least 
thing £tom the knowledge of man himself (anthropology), but gives laws a priori 
to him as a rational being. No doubt these laws require a judgment sharpened by 
experience, in order •••• to procure for them ••• effectual influence on conduct •••• 
" •• What sort of law can that be, the conception of which must determine the 
will, even without paying any regard to the.~ffect expected from it, in order 
that, this. will may be called good absolutely· and .without qualification? ••• There 
remains nothing but the universal conformity of its actions to law in general, 
which alone is to serve the will as a principle, i.e. I am never to act otherwise 
than so that I coµld also will that my maxim should become a universal law. Here, 
now it is the simple conformity to law. in.general, without assuming any particular 
law applicable to certain actions,. that serves the will as i.ts· principle, and 
must so serve it, if duty is not to be a vain delusion and a chimerical notion. 
The common reason of m~.~ ~n its practie:al, judgments perfectly coincides with this, 
and always has in view the principle here suggested •••• 
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I presently become aware that while I can will the lie, I can by no means will 
that lying should be a universal law. For with such a law there would be no 
promises at all, since it would be in vain to allege my intention in regard to 
my future actions to those who would not believe this allegation, or if they 
over-hastily did so, would pay me back in my own coin. Hence my maxim, as soon 
as it should be made a universal law, would necessarily destroy itself. 
"I do not, therefore, need any far-reaching penetration to discern what I 
have to do in order that my will may be morally good. Inexperienced in the course 
of the world, incapable of being prepared for all its contingencies, I only ask 
myself: Canst thou also will that thy maxim should be a universal iaw? If not, 
then it must be rejected, and that not because of a disadvantage accruing from 
it to myself or even to others, but because it cannot enter as a principle into 
a possible universal legislation, and reason exhorts from me immediate respect 
for such legislation •••• 
"Nor could anything be more fatal to morality than that we should wish to 
derive it from examples. For every example of it that is set before me must be 
first itself tested by principles of morality, whether it is worthy to serve as 
an original example •••• examples serve only for encouragement, i .. e. they put be-
yond doubt the feasibility of what the law commands, they make visible that 
which the practical rule expresses more generally, but they can never authorize 
us to set aside the true original which lies in reason.,. 
"From what has been said, it is clear that all moral conceptions have their 
seat s.nd origin completely a priori in the reason •••• 
"There is therefore but one categorical imperative, namely, this: Act only 
on that maxim whereby thou canst at the same time willbthat it should become 
universal law ••••• 
2lle 
"If then there is a supreme practical principle, or, in respect of the 
human will, a categorical imperative, it must be one which ••• is an end in i.tself •• 
The foundation of this principle is: rati"nal nature exists as an end in itself. 
Man necessarily conceives his own existence as being so: so far then this is a 
subjective principle of human actions. But every other rational being regards 
its existence similarly, just on the same rational principle that holds for me; 
so that it is at the same time an objective principle, from which as a supreme 
practical law all laws of the will must be capable of being deduced. Accordingly 
the practical imperative will be as follows: So act as to treat humanity, whether 
in thine own person or in that of any other, in every case as an end withal, never 
as means only •••• 
"This respect-inspiring idea of personality ••• sets before our eyes the sub• 
limity of our nature (in its higher aspect), while at the same time it shows us 
the want of accord of our conduct with it, and thereby strikes down self~ 
conceit •••• " 
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Kant I s Moral Argnmeu:.t 
In addition to Kant I s two formal or explicit--but indi_:rect--
proofs for God*, there is in his writings a more general implicit-type proof 
based dire·ctly on man I s moral nature. It, is intimated in Kant I s ethical thought 
as a whole and constitutes, in the opinion of this writer, his most far-reaching 
argun:ent for God.· The reader's attention is called to the note below summar-
izing Kant's two formal arguments. 
If we were to substitute the word .11duty11 for the word 11 love II in the first 
paragraph of page 209 above, we would then have a resume of Kant I s largest 
thought concerning belief in God, a kind of epitomy of the deepest range's of· 
his moral argument. Norman Kemp ~mi th wrote that Kant I s final thought, expre SfJ( 
in his posthumous works, was that 11God speaks with the voice of the cate.gorical 
' ' ' 
imperative (the moral law), and thereby reveals Himself in a direct manner" 
(Quoted in Kant Selections, ed. Greene, Scribners p. 349). The suggestion of 
such classic paragraphs as the following -- which could be duplicated a number 
of times from Kant I s writings -- is that moral law roots in personality, finite 
and ultimately Cosmic, with Cosmic Fersonality the archetype or source of finit~ 
personality. The following selections are from The Critique of Practictl 
Rea~, Kant Selections, Greene, op cit). 
{1rhe source of the sense of duty or the moral law/11 can be nothing less than 
a power which elevates man above himself ••• a power which connects him with an 
order of things that only the understanding can conceive, with a world which 
at the same tin:e commands the whole sensible world, and with it the empirically 
determinable existence of man in tin:e, as we 11 as the sum-total of all ends ••• , 
This power is nothing but personality, that is, freedom and independence on 
the mechnnism of nature, yet, regarded also as a faculty of being which is 
subject to special laws, namely, pure practical laws given by its own reason; 
so that the person as belonging to the sensible world is subject to his own 
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personality as telonging to the intelligible world. It is, then, not to be 
wondered at tt1;..t man, as belonging to both worlds, must regard his own nature 
in reference to its second and highest characteristic only with reverence, and 
its laws with the highest respect 11 ••• 
"•• .the moral law ••• is holy ••••• We justly attribute this conditionL_of the 
sacredness of persons as enqyoven to the Divine will, with regard to the 
rational beings in the world, which are His creatures, since it rests on their 
personalitv, by which alone they are ends in themselves. 
"This respect-inspiring idea· of personality which sets before our eyes the 
sublimity of our nature (in its higher aspect)., while at the same tin:e it shows 
us the want of accord of our conduct with it, and thereby strikes down self-
conceit, is even natural to commonest reason and easily observed ••••• 
11 Such is the nature of the true motive of pure practical reason: it is no 
other than the pure moral law itself, inasmuc.h as it makes us conscious of the 
sublimity of our own supersensible existence,~ and subjectively produces 
respect for their higher nature in men who are also conscious of their sensible 
existence •••• " (Kant, Ibid., p. 331-333). 
11 
••• the moral laws lead ••••• to the recognition of all duties as di vine 
commands, not as •••• arbitrary ordinances of a foreign will and contingent in 
themselves, but as essential laws of every free will in itself, which neverthe-
less, must be regarded as commands of the Supreme Being •• ,The moral law command:c. 
me to make the highest possible good in a world the ultimate object of all my 
conduct. But I cannot hope to effect this otherwise than by the harmony of rrry 
will with that of a holy and good Author of the world •••• those who placed the 
end of creation in the glory of God (provided that this is not conceived 
anthropomorphically ••• ) have perhaps hit upon the best expression. For nothing 
glorifies God more than that which is th" most estimable thing in the world, 
respect for His comman4.,the observance of the holy duty that His law imposes on 
US •• •• II (ib. 365-67) • -l!-
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~*"Somewhat different from Kant's general argument, implied 
bysuch quotations as the above, he formulated two explicit, 
' but indirect-type proofs for God I s existence. These are the 
proofs for which he is usually remembered. One proceeds from 
the idea of the surnmum bonum, or highest happiness, expounded 
in The Critique of Practical Reason, to the effect that a 
perfectly moral world would require that virtue and happi-
ness be joined. But an obvious inference from experience is 
that they are not joined in this world. Therefore, they 
must be joined in the next world, according to Kant, in the 
state of immortality. Now only God could provide for such an 
ultimate. union of virtue and happiness in an immortal con-
dition of the soul. Accordingly, in this proof God is an 
eschatological postulate for Kant; God is the necessary 
guarantor of the summum bonum, implied as the rational des-
tiny of man 1 s moral nature. The other proof is developed as 
the final outcome of the teleological argument for Cosmic 
Purpose, when such argument is raised to its highest moral 
mood. Along this line of thinking Kant said that moral 
purpose is found in nature in the presence of a creature, 
man, with moral oblieations to fulfill, thus implying a 
Moral Purposer or Creator behind nature. 
Kant's posthumous fragments emphasized the more general, 
a priori argument based on God's immediate presence in the 
moral law or moral consciousness lying at the heart of per-
sonal being. In the fragments we find the following: "The 
imperative of duty proves to men their freedom, and at the 
same time conducts them to the Idea of God11 • 11 God is the 
morally practical, self-legislating Reason. Therefore only 
a God in me, about me, and over me11 • 11 There is a Being ••• 
in me, which though distict from me stands to me in relations 
of causal efficacy, and which, itself free, i.e. not depen-
dent upon the law of nature in space and time, inwardly directs 
me (justifies and condems), and, I as a man, am myself this 
Being. It is not a substance outside me ••• 11God must be 
represented not as substance outside me, but as highest moral 
principle in me11 (Kant, Se1ections, op cit. pp. 374-375) 
It must be admitted that some of these posthumous frag-
ments on God's immanence are sufficiently ambiguousto make 
possible a humanistic interpretation of Kant, to the effect 
that he does not think of God as a trans-human, as well as, 
an immanent reality. In the judgment of this interpreter, 
it may be replied that, however intimately God reveals Him-
self in the moral law, the prevailing trend in Kant I s thought 
as a whole is to believe in God as truly objective, cosmic, 
and trans-human Reality. God in Kant's main thought is the 
transcendent source of the law, which man perceives as uni-
versal and obligatory -- obligatory precisely because we under-
stand it to be cosmic and inclusive, with its ultimate source 
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a larger Mind than our own. Even in the posthumous frag-
ments above quoted, Kant says that God is "distinct fromll 
him. In any case, we trace in these posthumous sayings, 
stressing God's innnanence in, and, in a measure, His identity 
with, the highest in human possibility, Kant's own effort to 
correct the devestating criticism he thought he made, .in 
The Critique of Pure Reason, of the ontological argument. 
By the time hewrites his moral argument at its various 
levels, he tacitly recognizes his .earlier mistake in deny-
ing the validity of an ontological argument for God. He 
reconstructs such an argument of his own in his profound 
moral terms; the posthumous fragments bring this problem 
within Kant into sharp focus. 
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William Ritchie Sorley 
(1885-1935. Prof. of Moral Philosophy at Cambridge. In 
the following passage from his Gifford Lectures, Moral 
Values and the Idea of God, 2nd Ed., 192ll:, Sorley summarizes 
the moral argument. As stated by himit is the culmination 
of the 11 cosmologicalfl argument, and within his context, also· 
, ·· ..., ·, · _. .. the 
culmination of the argument from knowledge and truth, which 
we consider next as our final 11 rational11 type argument for 
God. Accordingly, Sorley' s statement below constitutes a 
bridge to our next level of thinking about Deity), 
11 The argument ••• may be looked upon as a special and striking exten-
sion of the cosmological argument. In its first and most elementary form 
the cosmological argument seeks a cause for the bare existence of the world 
and man: to account for them there must be something able to bring them 
into being: God is the First Cause. Then the order of nature impresses 
us by its regularity, and we come by degrees to understand the principles 
of its regularity, and the laws under which the material whole maintains 
its equilibrium and the ordered procession of its changes; these laws and 
this order call for explanation, and we conceive God as the Great Lawgiver. 
But beyond this material world, we understand relations and principles of 
a still more general kind; and the intellect of man recognises abstract 
truths so evident that, once understood, they cannot be questioned, while 
inferences are drawn from these which only the more expert minds can appre-
ciate and yet which they recognise as eternally valid, To what order do 
these belong and what was their home when man as yet was unconscious of 
them? Surely if their validity is eternal they must have had existence 
somewhere, and we can only supyose them to have existed in the one eternal 
mind: God is therefore the God of Truth. Further, persons are conscious 
of values and of an ideal of goodness, which they recognise as having 
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undoubted authority for the direction of their activity; the validity of 
these values or laws and·of this ideal, hQwever, does not depend upon 
their recognition: it is objective and eternal, and how could this eternal 
validity stand alone, not embodied in·matter and neither seen nor realised 
by finite minds, unless there were an eternal mind whose thought; and will 
were therein expressed? 
};i e:_ 
God must therefore exist and his nature• good-
ness 11 (p. 348-49) 
William Newton Clarke st·ated th~ religious• 
spiritual conception of man's moral nature 
and 'the idea of conscience-in.forceful terms. 
Conscience is natural to rational life, an 
integral e:itpression of man as a "rational 
being". Clarke, 1841-1912, was an outstand-
ing professor·of Christian theology at Colgate-
Rochester Divinity School between 1890 and his 
retirement. The follcw ing passage was taken 
from his widely influential book, An Outline of 
Christian Theology~ first published in 1898, p. 
l 98n2Q8. 
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"Man as a Moral Being. A moral being is a being who is active, free, and 
under obligation with respect to right and wrong. Man is such a being; and the 
elements of his moral constitution must now be examined. The examination begins 
with Conscience, because it is through conscience that man becomes aware of the 
moral significance of his life. 
"Conscience is the judgment of a man applied to his own conduct, affirming 
that acts for which he deems himself responsible are approved or condemned by 
his standard of right. 
"This definition must be unfolded and explained. 
11 Judgment, a work of intellect, is the' discerning of relations between ob· 
jects or ideas, and the affirming of the relations that are discerned. Among 
' 
the relations that man judges is the relation that acts or qualities sustain to 
the conceptions of right and wrong. As he can judge and affirm relations of 
similarity and difference, distance, number, situation, and the like, so he can 
discern and affirm right and wrong in acts and qualities. The power of judgment 
acting upon right and wrong is called the moral faculty. In nature it is not 
essentially different from the power of judgment in general. So far as it is 
peculiar it is so because of the peculiarities of the subject-matter upon which 
it acts. The moral faculty does not create its own standard of judgment, or 
bring to its work any invariable standard, butjudges according to whatever stan~ 
217b 
dard the soul may possess. The soul, which is the man, is the judge, and can 
estimate acts only by comparison with the standard of right and wrong that the 
man has accepted •••• 
"Self-approval and self-condemnation have a unique character among judgments. 
They bring a peculiar pleasure and pain, satisfaction and shame, rejoicing and 
remorse. They have the importance and solemnity that attend the moral quality. 
The testimony of the soul in approving or condemning itself profoundly affects 
its self-respect, and is deeply felt to be prophetic of a higher judgment. 
'~he moral faculty is called conscience when it acts upon the doing and 
character of self, judging, and approving or condemning, in accordance with the 
standard of right and wrong that the soul accepts •••• 
l!The importance of conscience is due to obligation •••• 
l!Whence came the sense of obligation? •••• so far as any man is aware the 
sense of obligation is a native part of the human constitution, as memory is, 
or reason •••• 
"What, then, is the g_round of obligation itself? Why is it that we 'ought'? 
ce 
When/this great and solemn olement in our life? 
"It is implied in what has just been said, that practically man finds a 
ground of obligation in his own being ••• we.,.naturally ask what it is in man that 
brings him under obligation. By virtue of what facts in himself or in his rela-
tions is man subject to duty? 
trThere are two answers to this question. The first extends to so much as 
lies within the limits of the human constitution, and the second reaches beyond 
man to God. 
"The first answer is, that obligation necessarily belongs to personality. 
The elements of personality are such, and so related among themselves, that a 
person cannot avoid obligation. 
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"Personality includes the power of rational ·judgment, which belongs to the 
intellect. Power of rational judgment implies power to judge and to misjudge; 
to use the faculties of knowledge and thought according to their nature, or in 
.· ' ,· . . . 
disregard or violation of their nature; to judge in view of all available rele-
vant facts, or in view of only a part of them; to judge according to reality, or 
not. The power being present, of what nature is the differerice'betweeri one kind 
of judgment and the other? The difference includes a moral element. One kind of 
judgment is normal, the other abnormal; one is the best that can be done with the 
powers and opportunities that are concerned, and the other is not. But where 
there is power of rational judgment, there is an 'ought' between the normal and 
the abnormal, between the best that can be done and what is less than the best. 
The possession of rational powers carries with it the obliga'tion · to use them 
normally and in a well-regulated manner. The power of judging implies the duty 
to judge astruly as possible. The 'ought' is axiomatic. The obligation inheres 
in the constitution of personality, and is strong in exact proportion to the de-
velopment of its powers. 
"Further: the being who has the ability to know, to reason, and to judge, 
has also the power to feel, and to be inwardly moved by what he knows; and, to 
crown the whole, he has the power to act, and is under a natural necessity of 
acting. His judgments, and the feeling that attends them, will certainly be em-
bodied in action. Here also the moral element is inevitably present, for here, 
even more plainly, there is an 'ought' between the normal and the abnormal. To 
act in view of partial judgments and unwarranted feelings is to violate the 
normal law of activity, and thus to be false to one's self, and do what one ought 
not. The power of acting on rational and worthy grounds cannot exist without the 
duty to act only on rational grounds and in a normal manner. In the nature of 
the case there is obligation to act in accordance with the truest judgments and 
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the worthiest feelings. · Here also the 'ought' is 'axiomatic, being involved in 
the necessary relation of action to the actor. 
11Thus obligation is inborn, natural to man. Duty inseparably belongs to 
. personality, and man is a person. · The ground of obligation, being inwrought to 
the personal constitution, will remain as long as the personal being of man con-
tinues •••••• 
11The standard of obligation for an individual at any given time is the best 
that is known to him; for this is the nearest possible approach, in his case, to 
the perfect standard •••• each man's standard is the best that he knows. The best 
that he knows is what any man ought to do, and can reasonably be required to do. 
Ignorance has a low standard of obligation, which is raised by every advance in 
knowledge•• o • II 
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Appendix A. 
Ethfos and "Primitive II Cultures 
Do "primitive cultures 11 deviate so markedly from practice of general 
moral principles as above suggested that the theory of man's moral nature 
and moral law would be seriously undermined? 
The ethical realtivist has been quick to point to the fact that 
11 primitives 11 have sometirr.es hunted each other's heads., eaten one another, 
and engaged in looser sexual customs than 11 civilized0 peoples -- as evidence 
of the absence of a common moral nature of man. Speaking at this sorr:ewhat 
polemical level at the outset we may be reminded, of course., that such things 
as head--hunting v1ere not practiced '1-·i+M.n the tribal group, nor could be, 
if .the tribe expected to endure. Moreover, head-hunting, or cannibalism, 
or the freer sexual activities of primitive societies, sould not necessarily 
qualify as standard for human conduct, when viewed from mank:j_nd' s highest 
mora~ judgment -- the defender of ethical realtivity, on the score of de-
viating primitive customs, should remain alert to the snare of the genetic 
fallacy, W'e wish, however, to push our argument above this plane. 
In a well-:-known \,10rk*on Samoan culture of the South Pacific. the 
following list of Samoan life-situations and "values" appeared, which witness 
to the humanity of the Samoans, and specifically to validity of a number of 
our preceeding principles: 
jealousy 
sorrow 
longing for kindness. and respect 
pregnancy and child bearing 
joy, pride in parenthood and family 
coercive discipline of the very young 
cooperation 
individual responsibility 
personal industry and artistry 
rewards and promotion 
pride in achievement, interest in distinction 
ambition 
*:Margaret Mead, Coming of Ago in Samoa_, The NewAmeric£1n Library, Mentor Book 
1949 
concern with occupation 
sense of permanent and fixed value 
taboo of incest 
respect for personality 
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desire for possessions, especially when fruit of one's labor 
woman's longing for help and protection of mate 
respect for marriage vows (at least in te!r?ms of admitted 
"brittle" or causal Samoan standards) 
monogamous ideal 
prestige of female virginity at marriage, (especially 
with 11noble 11 class) . 
importance of alleviation of anger 
dislike of agressiveness in others 
truth and reliability stressed 
intelligence and industriousness praised 
radical promiscuity oonsured 
generosity 
opposition to theft 
sense of property and possession 
importance of love and friendship 
In reference to the basic human desire for friendship and love --
our fourth principle above, and reflected again in the ninth the study 
just cited referred to the case of a little Samoan girl, who by Samoan 
standards would be called a deviate from her own cultural or social norm. 
The author of this study wrote the following description in the case of 
11Mala 11 , whose parents were dead and who was living in a foster home: 
11 None showed Mala any affection, and they worked her 
unmercifully ••• from her early childhood she had been 
branded as a thief, a dangerous charge in a country 
where thene are no doors or locks, and houses are left 
empty for a day at a 'time ••• She stole; she lied ••• 
Probably she will ••• sinck lower and lower in the village 
esteem and especially in the opinion of her own sex 
from whom she so passionately desires recognition and 
affection. 
Speaking of another, similar case, in addition to Mala's, our author con-
cluded about both girls: 
111ola and Y1ala both seemed to be the victims of lack of 
affection. They both Md unusual capacity for devotion 
and were abnormally liable to become jealous. Both re-
sponded with pathetic swiftness to any manifestations of 
affection. At one end of the scale in their need for 
affection, they were unfortunately placed at the other 
end in their chance of receiving it. 11 * 
Op. cit• p. 120-21 
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Strikingly i:].lustrative of the 11primitive 11 mind's capacity for admiring 
unselfishness and love, and also indicative of its ultimate desire for 
education and enlightenment, and for fair play and justice, is the follow-
ing remarkable account. It is taken from the records of a noteworthy, con-
temporary linguistic missions to South American Aborigenes: The following 
reports are in reference to the work of concerned people who, under the 
leadership and organization of l'fir. William Townsend's Sumrr:er Institute of 
Linguistics, .have labored to teach Peruvian headhunting tribes how to read 
11 
••• the Shapras, v1c1ous killers and head-hunters, were among the 
mos± feared of Peruvian tribes. Their chief, Tariri, had attained 
le~dership by the simple device of slaying his predecessor in cold 
blood, then daring any warrior to dispute his authority. Then one 
day in 1950 Loretta Anderson, with her first co-worker, Doris Cox, 
paddled up to his village in a dugout canoe. Climbing the river 
bank, between rows of glowering tribesmen mon:entarily immobilized 
by such audacity, the two slender white girls faced the chief. 
Using a few Shapra words picked up from a trader downriver, plus 
sign language, they .told him they had come to live among his 
people and study their language. 
"Tariri stared at the two girls in long silence. Then he crisply 
ordered that they be assigned a hut, with a couple of older Indian 
women to help them with whatever they were after. Years later he 
confided to Townsend, organizer of the mission, 'If you had sent reen, 
we would hav~ killed them on sight. Or if a couple, I'd have killed 
the man and taken the woman for myself. But what could a great chief 
do with two halless girls who insisted on calling him brother?' ••• 
"Abruptly one dl:ly Chief Tariri joined a little group the girls 
were teaching. He stood, frowning, as the lesson went on. After 
hearing the first Scripture verse translated into his own language, 
he broke in to ask that it be repeated again and again. Finally, 
he exclaimed, '11v heart understands with a leap!' 
11 To Doris and Loretta he said, 1When you came, I did not under-
stand why. Now I know. What you are doing makes my people happier 
and better able to care for themselves ••• , 
11 I like this white girls' God', he said. 'He has brought us 
many good things. I'm going to stop worshipping the boa'. 
*Clarence W. Hall in Reader's Digest Feature Condensation 11 Two Thousand Tongues 
To God"., August 1958, P• 202., 204,213. Published Harper & Bros., under the 
title Adventurers for God, 1959 
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"In the following months, Doris and Loretta were convinced that 
Tariri was indeed changed. Not only did he put aside snake worship, 
but, one by one, without being asked to, he shrugged off witch-
doctor practice sJ;. outlawed murder, abolished . head-hunting ••• 11 
11 
••• Throughout Peru 1.s Amazonia, Shironkama is acknowledged as 
one of the most powerful and, until recently, one of the most feared 
of the tribal headsmen ••• 11 
11 Since his conversion three years ago, the chief I s rigid rule 
for his large tribe has been: 1No Ir.ore killings; nof more drunken 
feasts; no more raids on other tribes for won:en' ••• 
"Only later did the Hayne Snells (SIL workers with the Hachi-
guengas) learn why Shironkama wanted educ:,tion for his people. For 
years his Machinguengas had been victims of a white nat1.:.Q.ll who 
cheated them blind in trades, worked them for such pitance pay as 
one fishook for a whole barrel of rice, indentured them with debt. 
When the Machinguengas, weary of such treatn:ent, began staying away, 
the natron called in Shironkama, told hin he would have to foree 
his people to work out their debts, gave the chief a gun, saying, 
1 If they won I t work, shoot them! 1 The chief took the gun, shot two 
of the patron's henchmen instead. 1The patron will ~ot make you his 
slaves again 1 , he told his people. 1 You are free. ' 
"Chief Shironkama told me, with Snell interpreting: 'From such 
white men as the patron, I learned that men who had power read books. 
I reasoned that, if one is to avoid being cheated or enslaved, he 
too must have the knowledge that books give, I W!3inted that knowledge 
for myself and my people 1 ••• 1} 
* The report continues: 11 To1tmsend I s aim of 'not taking the Indian out of 
the jungle but talcing the jungle out of the Indian' sounds good -- to all 
save those with romantic notions about primitive peoples' bliss in their 
native. state. One day, after a large audience had been told about his 
work, a hearer arose to bait him with the familiar canard: 'You missionaries 
make me sick! llhy force civilization on people so unspofilled and happy? 
Why not leave I em along! 1 
11 Townsend replied laughing, 1 I think, my friend, you've been no 
closer to jungle Indians than the movies. If you could sit down with 
them as I, have, and hear them tell in their own tongues the woes that 
haunt them through witchcraft, superstition, fear and strife; listen to 
mothers tell of being forced to strangle their newborn babies because of 
some evil omen; see old folks being abandoned to die because they had be-
come a burden; or sense the hatred bred in them by generations of white 
rr.en who took advantage of their ignorance to exploit them, steal their 
lands, r.avage their women and ruthlessly shoot them down well, the, 
my friend, you just might chan:e your mind about Indians as quaint people 
living lives of idyllic happiness I u. 
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We shall refer to one further example from a primitive culture -- the 
one often cited as illustrating a total inversion of moral values the Dobus 
of the New Guinea Archipelago. The following evaluation rests on material 
presented by R. F. Fortune in his well-known and authoritative study, Sor= 
The primary, sociological facts of the Dobuans are the following: 
1. Their principle of inheritance of property through a brother-sister 
unit, composed of a man, his sister, and his sister I s children, and called 
the II susu 11 · ( 11 mother ts milk 11 ) • The children of any male rr.ember of the susu 
must marry out of it. A village is composed of several susu groups. Own-
ership and inheritance of garden plots and fruit palm groves is by susus, 
not be biological families. The newcoreers of a village are terrr.ed "those-re-
sulting-from-marriage 11, i.e. 11 strangers 11 • 2. The second basic fact is 
the ob.session with sorcery -- or belief in the power of effecting ill on 
one I s neighbors by magical n:eans. He shall analyze the Dobuan socei ty, from 
such facts and insights as we gather from Fortune's work, in terms of four 
. of ow primary "moral laws" presented on page -- the desire for truth, 
the desire for justice, and instinct of possession and property, and briefly, 
marriage customs. 
The Dobuan desire for ~rutb is illustrated by the obsession with sorcery 
itself. The sorcery formulas and techniques are the sum of knowledge or 
truth to these people. They seek "knowledge" of sorcery above all else be-
cause it allegedly gives them power over their neighbors. Fortune describes 
how the Dobuans learn the incantations and witchcraft in a most assiduous 
manner and guard this inherited knowledg13 with extreme secrecy as the most 
Expressin~hat we would regard as .of life 
cherished private possession. : ./ · n more normal sidi Fortune I s account 
*E.P. Dutton, 1932 
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indicated that, at the core of their society, i.e. be"tween close kindred, 
the Dobuans fo1md it necessary to practice truth in its positive sense as 
trust or trustfulness, to be non-deceitful or reliable, whereas it was admitted 
that these virtues were disregarded in dealings with people who were remote 
to the inner circle of kin. 
The desire for justice was illustrated by the account of a pig mis-
takenly killed for a wild hog by two men. The owner of the pig demanded 
renumeration from the two concerned, and threatened them with sorcery if 
they did not make payment! Payment was made. The fallowing quotation 
suggests how sorcery is used in a kind of 11positive 11 way to bring truth to 
light and secure justice. The n:ethod here refers to a 11 judicial 11 use of 
divination by water-gazing or crystal-gazing in order to find out who the 
afflicter of a disease may be. 
11 The diviner summons the village, a member of which he has I seen 1 
in his water-gazing. The person divined is charged with the deed 
by the diviner. Then follows a promise of a cessation of enmity and 
of active black magic by the witch or the sorcerer charged, provided 
he or his just complaint against the patient is remedied by the 
patient immediately. The patient pays the black magician and the 
diviner, and recovers -- unless unremedied grudges undivined as ·· 
yet still exist elsewhere. 11 • * 
Possessions and oronerty customs i~dicated the basic human desire for 
these things. Fortune noted that there was assiduous guarding of the fruit-
bearing trees (betel nut and coconut palms) from theft. The technique vias 
to hang charms on the trees that would inflict disease on would-be thieves. 
"Property is best safeguarded by watching over it. The garden is 
protected in this manner. An act'ual garden the if is most heartily 
despised -- that is, one that is caught in the act. It is believed 
that yams can be enticed out of one man 1s garden into another man's 
by the latter I s magic. Everyone, the most respectable included, 
practiced magic to steal the crops of other person's gardens in 
this way. 11 ** 
*Op. Git. p. 155 
** Ib. p. 83 
224 
Marriage customs and problems illustrate the basic human desire for and 
· to tQ,2.Q matQ_§. The Dobuans attempt monogamous marriage but find the rela-
tionship brittle, fraught with jealousy, suspicion, and unhappiness. Fortune 
indicated that there were constant arguments and di vorce·s over sexual in-
fidelity. 
"Jealousy and suspicion of adultery are senti:rcents of great and 
abnormal growth in Dobuan married life ••• the only safeguard of 
fidelity in marriage is constant private vigilance by all con-
cerned, and otherwise good treatment of a wife by a husband." * 
"Theft and adultery are spoken of as admired virtues if one can 
evade detection and accomplish thf!i,m successfully."** 
Relative to this last quotation, the 11 if 11 appears here t.o be the all important 
point, suggesting a basic human conscience at work trying to lift the society 
to a higher moral plane. Relative to marriage customs Fortune concludes 
that "despite the premium on unfaithfulness and its counterpart, jealousy, 
there are some marriages that are happily contracted and happiy preserved. 11 **'~ 
He conclude our examination of Dobu culture with the following dis-
cussion from Fortune's study to illustrate what moral life was like in·. terms 
of fear and suspicion, arising from the obsession with sorcery. 
"Disease and modes of death that are indigenous are well known 
and catalogued by the native. Their production and infliction 
upon near neighbours is one of the customary occupations of the 
people. Underneath the surface of native life there is a constant 
silen war, a small circle of close kindred alone placing trust in one anothe 
a thorough absence of trust in neighbours and the practice of 
treachery beneath a show of friendliness. Every person goes in 
fear of the secret war, and on frequent occasion the fear breaks 
through the surface. 
The whole life of the people istrongly ooloured by 
11 A man imitati the effects of a cruel disease with obvious 
enjoyment in his believed power of inflicting it on his neighbour, 
telling with eclat how his incantation may be placed on a pregnant 
womand and how it will kill the child within her, and bring about 
her end in torture, imitating her struggles and her groans in 
convulsion on the ground, or shrieking in convulsion as he illus-
trates the agonies of a disease that eats away the skin and leaves 
a deformity of such a red mass of streaming and streaked jelly 
where was once a human face, as I saw at least twice, and could 
scarcely look at as the man tried to turn his head a1,my, is a 
vile enough object. This debonair and faithful imitation of the 
*Op. cit. P• 77, 79 '~**lb. p. 249 
** lb. p. 78 
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,wrst effects of disease or death is the ordinary procedure adopt-
ed in the teaching of black magic. It illustrates what can be done 
with the incantation; it is done with fidelity, and with satisfied 
conviction of the power to produce such effects and of having pro-
duced them on previous occasions. The natives followed their custom-
ary procedure in giving me secret knowledge. Thus a man giving me 
a simple for curing a disease would always chew and swallow some of 
it in my sight, and call my attention to his doing it. The fact 
behind this is that treacherous poisoning is a common enough custom. 
A native will never accept food except from a few people that he 
knows and trusts, people who accept his food." * 
11 To sum up, the black art is used not only for collecting bad debts 
and enforcing economic oblig~tion, in vendetta to avenge one's own 
sickness or one I s kinsman I s .death, to ttipe out any serious insult 
offered to one, and for the sake of 'trying it out' to see how it 
workP.. It is also used generally 'to cast down the mighty from 
their seats', There is great resentment of any conspicuously 
successful man in Dobu" .** 
As we look at this culture as a whole we have observed that sorcery is a 
mode of securing justice, of self-protection, and self-preservation, by 
a technique of threatening and seeking revenge. Thus the basic law of 
le~ talionis -- a primitive, but positive mode of justice -- is the princi-
ple of Dobuan ethics. And, accordingly, the value of personality and respect 
for personality are present, though dimly and primitively, to this society. 
In the evaluation of this writer, Fortune I s study indicates the covert 
presence of respect for personality, as a principle which the Dobuans cannot 
entirely disregard. 
"Outwardly there is great respect for personality springing directly 
from the fear of hostile sorcery or witchcraft. But secretly there is a 
covert desire to do the worst by neighbours, springing also from the 
fear of their sorcery or witchcraft. Thus outward respect goes with 
as much as can be done in ill turns without detection. 11 *** 
We conclude that the Dobuans illustrate, not only the basic human sense of 
the value and necessity of personality in a positive way, at least, in the 
case of one's self and one's imn:ediate kinsmen and friends (a number of tirrBs 
suggested in our source); but, in a negative way, they demonstrate what 
*Op. oit. P• 137 
**Ib. P• 176 
***Ib. p. 78 
happens to a society when respect does not go farther, to embrace the 
stranger and those not near; what happens, when, in fact, respect is sub-
stituted by the power of fear and hatred and by the desire to gain an ad-
vantage at your neighbor's expense often a very frightful expense. 
AppE:mdi.x B 
Moral Reason and Experience 
or 
Resolving the Tension Between 
Ethical Naturalism and Ethical Idealism 
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The priority of moral reason was stated classically by Kant in the following 
quotation: 
11 
•••• no experience could enable us to infer even the possibility 
of such apodictic laws ••• how could laws of the determination of our 
will be regarded as laws of the determination of the will of ration-
al beings generally, and for us only as such, if they were merely 
empirical, and did not take their origin wholly a priori from pure 
practical reason? -
HNor could anything be more fatal to morality than that we should 
wfah to derive it from examples. For every example of it that is 
set before me must be first itself tested by principles of morality, 
whether it is worthy to serve as an original example ••• * 
But by affirming that moral reason has an absolute validity over and above 
11 experience11 , ethical idealism does not mean to say that moral truth and insight 
are totally without connection in experience, floating around in a mystic region 
beyond life and reality. Moral idealism has been criticized as if this were mear~ 
May we not, to co.nsiderable extent, resolve the tension between ethical 
empiri.cism or naturalism and ethical rationalism or idealism in the following way 
Empiricism says that ethical truth is learned, by 11 experience"; idealism has 
claimed that it is given, interiorly. At least on the plane of the practical 
interests of both approaches, as 1,e ask the question, What is the relation of 
:moral law to experience, How does the awareness of moral truth a priori relate 
to social life? -- the following insights may guide us: 
1. Man comes to knowledge of moral law through social experience, in the 
course of personal growth and education, this insight recognized the importance 
of the teaching factcr, of the authority of elders, of the forces by which social 
institutions discipline us, and the influence of past generations. 
Kant, Selections, Op Cit. p. 286-7 
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2. But when we come to full rational maturity, we can see the 11 sense11 of 
these truths, that is to say, 11 rationally11 (i.e. 2;· priori: Kant), as founded 
in the moral being. :Man 1 s social experience is such because he is a being of a 
f 
certain kind. His social experience is founded in his being or nature. On what 
are the value judgments of ethics based? Our reply is, they flow from some 
standard 11 above11 or "deeper than11 physical nature in the gross or brutal sense, 
and deeper than social custom. This higher ranee or source of ethics Jies in 
the nature of man himself as individuality and self-conscious personality. 
What, for example, of the problem of the relat,ion of the 11hite man to the 
Blaok . man, so aggitating our country, and South Africa today? How are we to 
draw up some rule which will govern their relationship? Obviously we have to 
rise above the historical and social experience of the past and look into the 
nature of man himself, for our inspiration, into his self-conscious individualitJ 
or personality and its metaphysical freedom. The Negro must be~ because mm 
is free. Kant was right, in our ~lew, in affirming that there are metaphysical 
foundations of morals, transcendent to society, logically prior to 11 experience11 
and rooted in 11 human nature", in man as a transcendent personal and rational 
being. 
Knowledge of the laws of morality, relating life to life, may be initially 
awakened by experience, but they come ultimately to be recognized or discovered 
in the nature of man's being, which founds his experience, or makes his experienc 
what it is. In sum, the ultimate validity of the lmrs are discovered or found 
in reason, which is awakened by experience; experience may further test and 
verify them. In a different context, speaking of ontological concepts, Tillich 
meant something similar to what we have just here tried to say relative to moral 
concepts. He wrote that tt! priori does not mean that ontological concepts are 
knovm prior to experience. They should not be attacked as if this were meant. 
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On the contrary, they are products of a critical analysis of experience11 a< So with 
moral concepts: they are products of a critical, that is, a rational analysis of 
experience, which possesses tts character by virtue of the rational nature of man. 
*Systematic Theolo~y, Vol. I. Chicago Univ. Press, p. 166 
1951 
230 
!J:. The Argureent from Knowledge and the Idea of Truth 
Soreetimes called the Epistemological Argument, and also the. Onto-
logical Argument. The epistemological and the ontological are forms of 
the argureent from Truth. (In a later section we descuss Descarte 1s classic 
expression of the "ontological argureent 11 , and a mordern adaptation of it 
in the thought of 1-Jilliam Ernest Hocking. In the meanwhile we comreence 
with what we believe to be the most general reference to this type of 
argun:ent in the idea of truth.) Again we cite Uilliam Newton Clarke for 
his succinct statement of the main idea of the argument from knowledge and 
truth, as 11 the discovery of Mind in the universe through the intelligible-
ness of the universe to us 11 (Clarke op cit. p. 105). Otherwise stated this 
is the argureent from the rationality of the universe, or through the presence 
and objectivity of Truth in the universe. Like many of our preceeding 
argun:ents it has two facets, an initial empirical front and an a prior 
depth. 
1. On the empirical side the argument notes that 11 ••• we find our;.:. 
selves able to understand the structure and order of things around us" 
(Clarke 1C6). Man discovers the geometrical structure of planetary orbits 
and motions, and on the basis of this knowledge predicted the existence of 
Neptune and Pluto before these outtermost planets were empirically dis-
covered. He observes and formulates many of the basic physical laws of 
nature as precise mathematical ratios, F: : KrnM/d2, E::mc2, etc. On the 
basis of his study of gravitation and mass, as he reformulated and ex-
ma them.uti ca lly 
tended Newton's original work, Einstein predicted/that light would be bent 
,a phenomenon subsequently observed to be the case. . 
in a gravitational fielf. ~hn finds the elen:ents of nature in rational 
order and system as to properties of atomic weight. By the study of the 
periodic table of the elements Helium was predicted as an element that 
must exist to fill the place in the table for the atomic weight 4.002. It 
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was eventually discovered spectroscopically in the sun's atmosphere. There 
is seeming rational order and purpose in much organic process and in the 
. 1./.,_ /J ' +- ;;_, /~·') v<hL,l{,;J 
evolution of life as a whole. Knowledge of ~endel I s laws of inheri tance'I( 
makes heredity predictions possible. When Tycho first discovered the 
elliptical nature of the planetary orbits, and that they swept over equal 
ares in equal times, he exclaimed that he nwas thinking God's thoughts 
after Him". Rational law seems objective. Does this not suggest a cosmic 
Reason or Intellect in or behind nature? Sir James J~ans, the late British 
astronomer, called God the Great Mathematician. Impressed by the mathe-
matical rationality of nature I s basic structures, Einstein exclain:ed that 
God never throws dice. Once more Clarke states the conclusion of the 
argun:ent in its general empirical mood: 11 Ability to trust our own powers 
in knowing things around us implies that the structure ~nd actions of our 
minds corresponds to the structure and method of things around us" (p. 106) .. 
Ii'\ ' l·'W·(l~!j'. 
;2. On its a uriori side the ·argumen~1 be.comes in depth that for 
"Absolute Truth" which "points to an· absolute Mind as its source and founda-
tion" (Harkness CRT 72). We here summarize· two argun:ents for the idea of 
a 
Absolute Truth that have become classic, an early n:edieva:l and/ contemporary. 
In Book II of his essay On the Freedom of the Will, St. Augustine 
defined God in fundamental way as whatever is greater, or higher than, 
man's mind, and then endeavored to show that "truth" itself fills this 
definition and must be God. What Augustine reeant was that in the truth 
experience we perceive an objective reality and power that could only be 
classified by the highest term known to philosophy, God. · The point of 
as it were 
his argument was that. truth is corilrnonlv known .... / 11 seen11 • : · with the "eye" 
of the mind or intellect, by all and · sundry ·who will pay attention to right 
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reasoning. That truth is commonly knovm suggests its objective source 
its metaphysicam objectivity and reality. We can all see and know the 
ranges of scientific truth commonly, and when we think deeply about it the 
ranges of moral truth commonly. Truth, accordingly, seems to be that which 
that is, than 
is higher or greater than man's mind,/ any one,finite human mind. It 
seems inclusive of all finite minds, and our experience of coming into 
knowledge seems like a discovery to us, the exploration · · .... _. of a 
great realm that was there prior to our individual knowledge of it, and 
which existed always. We quote .Augustine's discussion presently so that the 
reader may share not only in the beauty of the expression but in the original 
depth of insight of this particular argument. What was wonderfully adum-
brated in the original Platonic philosophy St. Augustine puts into a syste-
matic argument for God that seems to state in ultimat fashion the possi-
bilities of the rational argument. 
In his noted essay, The Possibility of Error, Josiah Royce, late 
Arrerican idealist philosopher, approaches the problem by asking the question, 
"How is intellectual error possible 11 ? How do I know that I err sometimes 
in judgment, as a common fact of intellectual life?· Royce replies, Only 
because I have an (a priori) awareness of greater, more perfect, or more 
inclusive truth, against which I test my error. · Or another way to put it 
to say that the partial and incomplete nature of our present 
would be/knowledge suggests the more perfect "Absolute Truth". Our present 
knowledge of.1,the ijO~ld is_yartial; for example, our knowledg. e of the cause 
(}I_ IV/1:oi,_I 1..Ld.ye ij tAt_ fU aJ <U6 • 61. ff '-'LaJC&LJ' 
and cure of cancer-1 There .is the ultimate truth about cancer,1that awaits 
our discovery, and so with all othe.r aspects of our present incomplete 
knowledge of things. The incompletion of our knowledge and our imperfect 
awareness of truth .intimates completed knowledge and absolute truth. 
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A related argun:ent from Royce, pointing to the existence of Absolute 
Mind, concerns the problem of the world's ultimate unity or non-unity, and 
closely relates the epistemological and the cosmological argun:ents at the 
level discussed on pages 3. Royce in his Gifford Lectures,~ 
World and the Individual,invites us to study the issue in terms of a r..e·ga-
tive proposition (to show the absurdity of. the opposite proposition is son:e-
times a helpful way to clarify an argument). Let us assume, he suggests, 
contrary to 11uhity11 , that there is diversity, sundering, and non-relationship, 
either absolute or partial, among the elements, objects, and phenomena of 
our world. But in the attempt to assume diversity and non-unity is implied 
all along ~he knowledg§_ as to why the universe is alleged to be non-unified, 
either totally or in part. Such knowledge is precisely the intimation, he 
believes, of the wider Absolute Knowledge or Truth that embraces the whole, 
and renders ultimate diversity impossible, and the philosophical pluralisms 
b~sed on such an hypothesis contradictory. This a priori exercise, Royce 
believes, in addition to ruling out the supposition.that the world is 
non-unified, establishes the fact that it is unified in a certain way, 
narr,ely, in.terms of the idealist's concept of an ultimate spiritual or 
mental unity. Not only formal unity is found, but the quality of such unity 
in Absolute or Cosmic Mind. (WI, Vol. I, p. 399-400). 
Georgia Harkness concludes the _general idealist argument from truth in 
these words: 11With the assurance that truth rests on something solid in the 
nature of things, and with a dependable criterion of truth \E_bherence], we 
may also look with confidence to a dependable cosmic foundation of the whole 
structure of reality arid truth" (CRT p. 72). We are now prepared to quote 
Augustine's and Royces classic statements of the argument from truth. 
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Both men discuss the argument in its a priori depth. _As. the modern Christian 
' ' ,'; . 
idealist philosopher, Josiah Royce, approached the problem from the logical 
and existential standpoint of our human experience of intellectual error, 
or the tlpossibility of error" as ·he phrased it, the ancient Christian 
philosopher, St. Augustine, approached the problem from the positive side, 
the argument from end the presentation of sources by citing Clarke's 
which we may describe as/the possibility of truth. We yli11 'tli:on/ full 
., . ' . ,,. 
summary of the epistemoiogical argun:ent in its general empirical mood. 
Following these sources we will discuss major premises of the argument 
from trut_h, and_ conclude our chapter with se verai appendices that des cuss 
other classic forms of the argument (name.ly, the "ontological") and re-
oognizo a number of problems related to th:i:s manner of thought. 
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St. Augustine on the Argument from Truth 
(In his Book II of the . essay On the Freedom of the Will 
St. Augustine, whose 'g:re at achieverr..ent philosophically 
was to personalize Platonic idealism in terms of the 
Hebrew-Christian idea of God as Personal Being, presents 
the argument for Absolute Truth, or Absolute Mind, which 
is God. Augustine 1 s presentation is · · 
L- L • a basic a priori argument for God, 
conceived as a Mind higher and more inclusive than our 
own. It is a culminating argument to which all of the 
preceding argurr..ents may· , lead. For Augustine "Truth" 
is the highest symbol of the ultimate or the divine, or 
rather the intimate presence of God streaming into the 
mind as light from 11above 11 • From Selections from . 
~edieval Philosophers, vol. I, ed. McKean, Scribners, 1929~ 
--p. ::!c!fJ. 
""Wherefore consider, I pray you, whether you can find in the nature of man 
something more sublin:e than reason a ••• if we could find something which you not 
only do not doubt to be, but also to be more excellent than our reason itself, 
will you hesitate to call that, whatever it is, God? 
11 
•••• If you did not find that there was anything above our reason except 
what is eternal and immutable, would you hesitate to call that God? For you know 
that bodies are mutable, and it is clear that the very life by which the body is 
animated does not lack mutability in various states; and reason itself is surely 
shown to be mutable, since it sorr.etimes attempts to arrive at truth and sometimes 
does not attempt to, and sorretimes arri"es and sometimes does not. It may be 
granted that if reason with the aid of no instrument of the body, not by touch, 
nor by taste, nor by sn:ell, nor by ears, nor by eyes, nor by any other sense 
inferior to it, but by itself, discerns something eternal and immutable and at 
the sarr.e time discerns itself inferior to it, that must be its God. 
rrr will readily grant that that is God than which nothing is known to be 
superior. 
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n •• Wherefore whether there be son:ething above or not, it will be manifest 
that God is, since I shall have shown, with his aid, that which I promised, that 
there is son:ething above reason. 
(At this place Augustine argues that mathematical-- for 
us, all scientific? -- and moral truth is absolute and 
"immutable", that is, metaphysically objective and 
transcendent to the human mind, because commonly known 
or perceived by all sucp rational minds, and concludes in 
the following n:emorable apssages:) 
"Just as, therefore, there are true and immutable rules of numbers, _the 
reason and the truth of which you said are present immutable and in oommon to al1 
who see them, so the_re are true and immutable rule.s of wisdom, which, you replied. · 
a morr.e-nt ago when you were . questioned concerning a few of them· one by one, are · , 
true and manif~st, and you concede that they are present. in common t9 .. be contem-
, '•' ' 
plated by all who are able to consider them. 
"There is a single and immutable truth in all understandings and it is 
superior to our mind. 
"Wherefore you _would certainly not deny, that there is an immutable truth, 
containing all these _things which are immutably true, which yo_u can not say is 
yours or mine or any one man 1 s b4i;, is present and proffers itself in common 
to all who discern immutable truths~. as a secret. and public light in wondrous 
ways: but who wo~ld. say that all that. which is present in common to every o.ne 
who reasons and understands, pertains p:coperly to the nature of any. of .them? 
For you ren:ember, I suppose, what was gone over a little while ago in relation 
to the senses of the body: nawBly that those things which we touch in common by 
the senses of the eyes or the ears, such as colors and sounds,.,which I and you 
see at the san:e tin:e, or hear at the san:e tin:e, do not pert1;1.in .to the -nature -of 
our eyes or ears, but are common to us to be perceived •. So, too, therefore, you 
would never say that those things which I and. you each with his own mind .percei1110 
in common, pertain to the nature of the mind of eithyr one of us. For you can -
not say that what .the eyes of two people see at the,same tin:e, is the eyEis of · 
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this one or of the other one, but a third something to which the glance of both 
is turned. 
11 Do you think then that this truth of which we have been speaking for a 
long time now and in which, though it is single, we see so many things, do you 
think it is more,excellent than our mind is, or equal to our mind, or else 
inferior? But if it were infereior we should judge, not according to it, but 
of it1 just as we judge of bodies ,because they are lower, and we say commonly 
not only that they are so and not so, but that they ought to be so and notso: 
so too in regard to our mind, we know not only that the mind is so, but frequent] .. 
too that it ought to be so. And we judge thus of bodies when we say, it is less 
white than it should have been, or less square, and many others similarly; more-
over, we say of minds 9 It is less apt than it should be, or less srcooth, or 
less veherr.ent, according as the nature of our customs may have disclosed. And 
we judge these things according to those interior rules of truth which we discern 
in common: of them on the other hand no one in any manner judges. For although 
one would say that eternal are greater than temporal things, or that seven and 
three are ten, no one says that they should have been thus, but knowing them 
only to be so, one does not correct as an examiner but only rejoices as a 
discoverer. If, however, this truth of equals were in our minds, it too would 
be mutable. For our minds sometimes see it more, son:etin:es less, and by this 
they show themselves to be mutable; whereas, it, continuing in itself, neither 
advances when it is seen by us more, nor grows less when it is seen less, but 
whole and uncorrupted it rejoices those who are turned to the light and punishes 
those who are turned away in blindness. iJhy is it that we judge of our minds 
themselves according to it, when we can in no way judge of it? For we say of 
the mind, It understands less than it should, or it understands as much as it 
should. The amount, however, that a mind ought to understand is according es 
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it has been able to be movedmore 11.¢,&.r. :to, and· to inhere in, the immutable truth. 
Wherefore if the truth is .neither ;inferior nor equal, it remains that it be 
supe-rior and .more excellent, 
"Roever, I had promised, if you ren:embsr; ·that I should demonstrate to you 
that there is something which is more sublirr..e than our mind arid reason. Behold 
it is truth itself: embrace it if you can, and enjoy it, and delight in the Lord, 
and he will give you the desires· of your heart. What more, in deed, do you seek 
than that you be happy? And who is more happy than he who enjoys the unshaken 
and immutable and most excellent truth? •••• and have we feared to place the happy 
life in the light of truth? 
."By, all .means, since. the suprerr.e good is known and secured in truth, and 
since that truth i.s ·wisdom, let us see ·the suprome good 1~ truth, and let us 
secure and enjoy it'~ · He -is surely happy \.!ho enjoys the supreme good •••• so the 
keen and vigorous perception of the mind when it has gazed ~ith sure reason on 
,many true and ,immutable' things, directs its~lf to .that thruth itself by which 
' . ' ' ' .. 
all things are shoi,m forth, and inherinr:i;'init·, as it were, forgets other things, 
and at .once in it enjoys their! all.~. This is our· freedom ~hen we are subjected 
to this truth: and it itself is our God~ 
n ••• That beauty of truth and wisdom, so long as there is a :r:erservering 
will to enjoy it, does not shut off those who come in a crowded multitude of 
· hearers, nor does it move along in time, nor does it mi0rate in space, nor is it 
interrupted by night, nor is it blocked off by shadows, nor does it fall under 
the senses of the body. Of all the world it is nearest to all those turned to-
ward it who enjoy it, it is eternal to all; it is in no place, it is never away; 
it admonishes abroad, it teaches within; it changes all who see it to the better, 
it is changed by none to worse; no one judges of it, no one judges well without 
it. And it is thereby clear that truth is without doubt more excellent than our 
minds, which are each made wise by it alone; and of it you may not judge but by 
it you may judge of others." 
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R_QYCE;J on the Argument from Truth and Err.?.._r 
(From The Religious Aspects of Philosopgy, Ch. XI)* 
ttThe conditions that determine the logical possibility of error must them-
selves be absolute truth •••• 
11We have not the shadow of doubt ourselves about the possibility of error. 
That is the steadfast rock on which we build. 
11 
••• Common sense will readily admit that if a statement is erroneous, it 
in reference to a higher inclusive thought, which they presuppose, and which 
must, in the last analysis, be assumed as Infinite and all-inclusiveo This re-
sult we shall reach by no mystical insight, by no revelation, nor yet by a mere 
postulate such as we used in former discussions, but by a simple dry analysis of 
the meaning of our own thought. 
11And to sum up, let us overcome all our difficulties by declaring that all 
the many Beyonds, which single significant judgments seem vaguely and separately 
to postulate, are present as fully realized intended objects to the unity of an 
all-inclusive, absolutely clear, universal, and conscious thought, of which all 
judgments, true or false, are but fragments, the whole being at once·AbsolU:te 
Truth and Absolute :tCnowledge. Then all our puzzles will disappear at the stroke, 
and error will be possible, because any one finite thoucht, viewed in relation 
toits own intent, may or may not be seen by this higher thought as successful and 
adequate in this intent. 
11 In short, error becomes possible as one moment or element in a higher truth, 
that is, in a consciousness that makes error a _part of itself, while recognizing 
it as error ••• Either there is no such thing as error, ••• or else there is an in-
finite nnity of conscious thoue;ht to which is present all possible truth. 
* Harper & Brothers, Torohbook, 1958, P• Z · 
' 
11"\rJithout it C there is for nur view no truth or er:co.r. 
conceivable. The words, This is true, or This is false, mean nothing, we declare, 
unless there is the inclusive thought for which the truth is true, the falsehood 
false. No bearly possible judge, who 1o;ould see the error if he were there, will 
do for us. He rrmst be there, this judge, to constitute the error. Without hll~ 
nothing but total subjectivity would be possible; and thought would then become 
purely a pathological phenomenon, an occurrence without truthfulness or falsity, 
an occurrence that would interest anybody if it could be observed; but that, 
unfortunately, being only a momentary phantom, could not be observed at all from 
without, but must be simply felt from within. Our thought needs the Infinite 
Thought in order that it may get, through this Infinite judge, the privilege 
of being so much as even an error. 
11 
••• There is no stopping-place short of an Infinite Thought. The possibil-
ities of error are infinite. Infinite then must be the inclusive thought. 
11All reality must be present to the Unity of the Infinite '.ehought. 
11 
••• Here we have found something that abides, and waxes not old, something 
in which there is no variableness, neither shadow of turning. No power it 
is to be resisted, no plan-maker to be foiled by fallen angels, nothing finite, 
nothing striving, seeking, losing, altering, growing weary; the All-Enfolder 
it is, and we know its name. Not Heart, nor Love, though these also are in it 
and of it; Thought it is, and all things are from thought, and in it we live and 
move11 • 
William Newton Clarke on the Argument from Knowledge * 
"The discovery of a Mind in the universe through the intelligibleness of 
the universe to us •••• 
11 The practice of trusting our 01om powers extends very far, and leads to 
large results. It leads to diligent and continuous study; and the consequence 
is that we find ourselves able to understand the structure and order of things 
*Outline of Christian Theology, p. l05f 
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around us ••• We find that ue can discover and systematize the chemistry of all the 
worlds; we are able to trace and formula·te the laws of universal motion; to 
discern the principles of mathematics tl:at run·through the universe; to trace 
out the vast system of classification that prevails throughout the animal and 
vegetable kingdoms; to explore times and places most· remote, and understand 
what lies far beyond our experience_. In all this process of knowing -- to the 
possibilities of which no limits can be set -- we are sure that our powers are 
to be trusted ••••• 
11 
••• Ability to trust our own powers · in knowing things around us implies that 
the structure and action of our minds corresponds to the structure and method of 
things around us. To say that our powers of observation and reasoning are trust-
worthy is to say that the existing order is an order that we understand. It is 
the same as saying that one rational method is common to our minds and the world 
that ~re observe ••• A rational mind can understand only what is rational. But we 
are compelled for the very purpose of life to assume that we are capable of under-
standing the universe, and by experiment we find our assumption confirmed as 
correct; therefore there must be one rational order in the universe and in us. 
11 But this is only another way of saying that the universe is ordered by 
a rationa Mind, to which our minds are similar. We understand the universe 
because it is pervaded by a rational order, and a rational order could be given 
it only by a rational Mind. Since we can understand the universe, there must be 
in the universe a Mind similar to our own •••••• The assumption of a rational 
order in the universe is one of the necessities of thought, ·and this assumption 
implies a rational Mind in the universe. Without this assumption not even the 
most rudimentary thinking is possible; and all thinking, from lowest to highest, 
confirms the kinship thus discovered between our minds and the Mind of the world 
.••••• Without such kinship, science would be impossible; and the vaster and richer 
i· . . 
our knowledge of the universe, the more solid is the certainty that we and the 
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universe are alike, the universe bearing the impress of a Mind like ours. 
Eternal Being is intelligent. 
"This is an argument that cannot be easily overthrown. The intelligibleness 
of the universe to us is strong and ever-present evidence that there is an 
all-pervading rational Mind, from which the universe received its character ••• 11 
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premises.,· 
Problems , .. ~ of the arg.JJ.rr~nt __ f.r.gm knowl~~-11.lliL.trutlJ.~..,.major/qri:tici,§J11§., 
(1) Considering first the gen~ral empirical level of. the argument 
as set forth so well by Clarke, the fundamental objection might be raised 
that the argument r.ests on the premise that the ob.iective world is a 
"rational orcil:er11 , that is, an order subject to rational analysis -- but is 
this premise true? How far can such a proposition be sustained when we 
examine nature 1s so-called 11 laws 11 and processes closely? Does the world 
conform to 11 law 11 ? Are there not many incoherences, disconnections, inept-
ness in process, abortive events, conflicts and 11evils 11 that belie the thesis 
that nature is throughout an orderly or rational process? Another way to 
state the criticism is to ask, is it not possible that man's "rational 
mind11 imposes its own 11 order11 or system upon nature as he studies her, 
implying order out there for his practical purposes, when actually there 
may not be such order -- or at least the degree or extent of order he alleges 
-- within the helter-skelter of nature's motions and masses? Is not man's 
science and morality an arbitrary kind of human legislation? Clarke him-
self states such a criticism forcefully: 
"It is sometimes said ••• that this finding of a Mind in the 
universe means simply that man projects his own mental processes 
into things around him, and reads in the universe the likeness 
of hirnself •••• It has sometimes been suggested that there is noth-
ing strange in man I s understEJ.nding the uni verse, since he be longs to 
it and is part and parcel of its method. There is no need of a mind 
in the universe to render it intelligible to man, since man, who is 
a product of the system, has the same qualities with it, and might 
naturally be expected to understand it 11 • 
In reply it may be said that the crucial point of this level of the 
discussion is the balance of seeming 11 order 11 to 11disorder 11 or lack of order 
in nature. Do not the critics overstate the case for nature 1s disorder? 
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If nature were fundamentally 11disorderly 11 , or 11irrational11 , how, as Clarke 
asks, could man ever know her at all? Or if man merely imposes order, how 
is he ever sure that this imposition of rational structure is a correct 
one, or even a.n approximately correct one? Hovi is he ever certain of any 
of his scientific judgments? The possibility of knowledge assumes orqQI 
out there. Further the empirical test is that there is much order; indeed 
vast reaches of order and seeming 11rational 11 connectedness objectively in 
the universe. Further, to say that man knows the system simply because he 
is a product of the system is to assume rationality at the outset wit.hin 
the system, The world brought forth man as ,i'ts product; one of man I s high-
est attributes is his rationality or desire for rational experience; man 1&: 
main desire is "to know 11 , that is to say, rationally to understand the 
system, Again at this· place we may well permit Clarke to conclude his 
discussion •. The following comment points out the difficulty of a philosophy 
that would, in sorr..e extreme way, deny objective order or rationality to the 
universe. 
11 
••• This explanation does not account · for · the facts. Man 
studies out the nature of an ellipse, and then di.scovers that the 
planets move in ellipses. For the fact that the planets stand 
the tests that prove their orbits to be elliptical, man certainly 
is not responsible. This is not a mere finding of himself in the 
universe. He could not mathematically demonstrate elliptical orbits 
from the movements of the heavenly bodies if they were not there. 
Man is discoverer, not creator, and the universe bears witness to 
another Mind than his. • • • · · 
11Why should there be any such thing as understanding the 
universe'? Who proposed that the universe should be understood? If 
the order from which man came forth is mindless,· what is there in it 
to give any guar~nty or suggestion of understanding? What is there 
in such an order to bring forth a being who can think of that which 
has produced him? If there is no understanding mind in the premises, 
whence comes understanding mind in the conclusion? ••• If there was no 
mind in the universe before man, two wonderful things ,happened. :tvr.an 
a part and product of the system, grew up greater than that which 
had produced him, with a power of understanding that had never 
been put into the world by any mind or power whatever, and had 
never been thought at all until he discovered them ••• "(OCT p. 108-9) 
Admitting many gaps in our human knowledge of the world and some seeming 
incoherency and disorder or 11 evil11 in natural process, a cautious but posi-
tive conclusion to this stage of our problem would be to say that on the 
whole nature exhibits 11 reasonableness 11 , or knorJ-oble'. form and order. In-
deed, nature exhibits such an extensive degree of knouable connectedness 
1.M Wdj( 
that the argument from knowledge in its empirical mood(ias surely i]general 
validity. The general facts are that nature presents us with £.§_gularitv 
of sucession throughout much of her observable field; and that men formu-
late descriptive symbols and concepts for her processes. Th0s0 seem, at 
least, tentatively right, as our best approximations to what she really is, 
or may be, within her own depth of being. Our scientific approximations, 
which we call "natural laws", are not entirely wrong or irrelevant (though 
someti1r.es they are found to be so and must be changed); rather many of them 
are almost right, are nearly and virtually adequate correspondences. And 
we may advance confidently in our scientific discovery of "nature I s laws11 , 
bolievingthat our own understanding of them may approximate more and more 
to her own inner workings. Error is possible to a degree, in which the 
scientific symbol does not exactly correspond to the event. This of course, 
necessitates sciences's constant reexamination of her hypotheses, and the 
reformulation of them as further discovery demands. The possibility of 
reformulation implies an ultimate inherent rationality, or knowability of 
the world, on the basis of which an understanding of the need for reformu-
lation arises, and a successful reformulation may proceed,. 
Hhat present-day science :n:eans by 11 law-s- of nature" and her ,: "ration-
ality", is her general reasonableness· ahd general knowability. This does 
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not imply that the universe is a rigidly fixed, mathematical-like structure 
throughout, as a narrow or frozen type 11 rationalism11 might conceive her, as, 
for example, Spinoza seemed to . do. Living beings, growth, evolution, natural 
experiments with novel form, striving, conflict of forces, and some defeats 
along the way; plasticity, maleability, a degree of yet unformed structured -
ness, real freedom and indeterminacy are as rationally necessary to our 
kind of world, devoted to the coming to be of creatures of finite freedom 
with real alternative destinies or histories, as ariy factors could possibly 
be. The rationality of the universe does not mean that she is an imobile 
mathematical grid-wor~, but that she is process and history with all the 
wonderful possibilities, as well as the dangers and frustrations, of a real 
history. Is it not something like this that a circumspect science and phil-
osophy would mean by the total 11rationality 11 of the world? Nothing in this 
broader concept of her rationality -- which gives reign to certain loosness 
and freeplay of parts -- is contradictory to the argwr.ent for God from 
knowledge or truth, or to the general law of sufficient reason which an 
open rationalism uses in its exploration of reality. The univers.e 's very 
her dynamio 
ulacj,_:ty and l.QoSeness of process.,/ coherency., is her ultimate 11rationalitv 11 
for because of this, change of form, development toward formo of greater 
complexity and tqereby inherent groat.er capacity, are possible, and have 
proved to be ~t least on the surface of one planet that we know about) the 
actual fact requisite to the coming to be of finite forms of spiritual 
personhood, which defines the creative work of God. 
(2) Another major problem of the argun:ent from truth, particularly 
at that level expounded by Augustine or Royce, is the implication~ 
truth judgments have a stang.§..rd~r, point to a standa:rd 11beyond 11 material 
relationships. Siezing upon this premise critics might raise .the objection 
that objective material relationships themselves, rather than Augustine's 
or Royce's All-inclusive Absolute Truth or Mind, are the standard of our 
truth judgments. Let us endeavor to reply to this, 
cism at several stages. 
kind of criti-
First we would charge the critic to de fin~ what he means by "material 
relationships'', alleged to be apart from,or other than, relationship in 
idea -- we would call his attention to the dogmatic dualism lying covert 
in his critism. The argun:ent for God from truth does not trean that there 
is a radical dualism between truth judgments or truly connected ideas, on 
the one hand, and 11material relationships 11 _on the other, as the cr.iticism 
seems to imply~ Our reply to the criticism based on the first premise just 
tudied indicated that, according to the argument from knowledge, truth 
judgments or true ideas are reflected in material relationships; "material 
relationships" are not one kind of thing, and 11rational explication11 of 
them another. But rather the exnlication and the relationship~ are in 
some sense identical, or at least significantly correspondent, as the 
previous discussion endeavored to show. How can we be aware of any ~·ela-
tionships11 unless we are rationallv aware of them? Unless we are ration-
ally aware, we are not aware at all, and would know of no relationships. 
Absolute Mind or Truth does not entirely (or perhaps not at all) transcend 
nature but has an important expression in nature. At this point we might 
hear Plato or Berkeley ask: What are objects and their "relations" anyway 
but 11 ideas 11 basically? Objects and material relations are so clothed with 
ideas that we never get to the naked substance or ''reality" beneath them. 
Reailiity is ideas, or at least on the side of material relationships, she 
seems to be materially embodied ideas. Do we ever know of any raw reality 
apart from form? Plato posi.ted· o pri:rnal, 11 formless 11 11matter11 (qr 
11 receptical II or 11 space 11 ), but admitted the very great difficulty of 
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conceiving it apart from form*, and hesitated to say that this was possible•*':' 
With grea-ber certainty Aristotle believed that elemental or "prirr:e matter" 
never existed apart from form (Ross, U. D. Aristotle, p. 73-74 }~ethuen, London) 
There is no stark matter or absolutely inchoate being, crouching and hiding 
somewhere beneath the luminous structure of form, ideas, or rationality. 
:? )W radical dualism ·1,my be true, but the , ,, , . burden of proof rests 
{) .e, / (lvvnJ:,eJ;r ,,, (11_ "u.,,,kMr.1 w a__,f-lt 'J 
first on those who assume that there is "stark matter'j\existing somewhere 
in a formless corner of the universe. 
Secondly, _a further point clarifying tho v.rgum0nt in ·the light of' the 
present ori tioi sn\. takes us to the very heart of the problem. Ade-
quately to speak to the criticism that material relationships are themselves 
the standard of truth, we must review briefly the rr.eaning of truth as dis-
cussed in Chapter Two. · There we tried to say that truth is judgmental or 
conceptual correspondence of thought to things, or right awareness of 
relationships. Kow how is this 11rightness 11 or "correctness" or this 11 truth" 
of 11 judgmental11 or "conceptual" awareness established -- i.e. how is the 
frame and picture of thought within us known to be in a~reement with or 
correspondent to the .order and structure of things around us? Only by the 
sense of the total lllind that embraces us and things. Not by the material 
or empirical relationships themselves alone; for, on an empirical basis, 
we are never perfectly certain that we have perfectly conceptualized the 
relation of A to B; there is a limit to empirical experience; there is 
always 11 the possibility of error" (Royce). Only by the standard of the 
Infinite Perceiver, Conceiver, Thought or Mind, which objectively holds 
all things in their proper relationships, and on their courses in process, 
and subjectively discloses itself to us in our true judgments, particu-
larly in our logical and moral judgments, do we find a standard for judgment. 
*Timaeus, Plato, Selections ed. R. Demos., S0ribners, 1927, p. 410-414 
**Parmonides, lb. p. 362 
Finally many of our truth judgments, even in the field of natural 
science, as we have a number of times illustrated in this study, are made 
.12rior to empirical verification of the fact.. Indeed, much logical truth 
seems a priori and the categorjcal form in which the empirical investiga-
tion of nature must proceed. Accordingly, it seems that some truth judg-
ments -- many of them of paramount·importance -- are not ,§.Qle].y dependent 
on an initial observation of material ~elationships. Particularly is this 
true in the realm of moral truth-judging, as we have previously discussed 
in the argument from moral experience, p. 208-210. 
(3) To meet the possible criticism that one could arriv\3 at the con-
ception of "Infinite Error 11 as easily as at "Infinite Truth.", on.Royce's 
own terms -- in the Possibility of Error Essay 
force of his argument, it might be said: 
and thus cancel the 
The higher Inclusive Judgment would cancel.the error of the error (or 
the ignorance of the error), since it would replace the ignorance with 
knowledge, or "truth". That is to say, it would ~ the .111:).;y of the error 
it would have, or know, the truth above the error. Accordingly, yo~ could 
not conceive of "Absolute Truth" as containing, or cancelled by, .or replaced 
ly, or visti~ted by ali· "Absolute E:rror 11 • An error is only an • "error" so 
long as ignorance about this error continues. Once that ignorance is dis-
pelled, it is no longer~ "error", but truth; and this is precisely what the 
Absolute is, according to Royce, in its ultimate life. It is full, com-
prehensive, coherent Truth. It might be said that it contains or has 11error 11 , 
in itself only in the sense that it would, or can, anticipate the errors 
that finite judgers might make, but at the same time it would know why they 
were errors; it would know or be the fuller truth about the ignorance, but 
that naturally, from its standpoint, dispells the ignorance. 
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Such would be the way Royce might attempt to meet the criticism. 
He continue with our own addendi.."u.Error is disconnection or lack of clear 
relationship of ideas. To imply an 11 InfiniteError 11 ; ·or even a wider more 
inclusive error, an erronious judgment would have to "know" its error; i.e. 
why it is in error. This would at once break the hypothetical compounding 
or build-up of errors. "Greater error" could only mean a wider more radi-
cal disjunction or dispersion of ideas and judgments about our world. A 
•ti.:rogress" of thought toward a 11 unity 11 of thought in error is, as a possi-
bility, self-contradictory. A moveITent of thought in error is toward ever 
greater disjunction and dispersion of ideas in judgment; a dire\.ction of ever 
more fragmentation, separation, and plurality of judgments. If one erroneous 
judgment be seen or understood to be conn~cted with another erroneous judg-
ment; a net work of~ relationships is thereby born -- given the erron-
eous premises of our false judgments, from which we have started out toward 
our 11 infinite error"! ("True" conclusions may always be derived 11validly11 
even from premises which are false materially). But truth is then beheld 
at work in the crevices and interstices of our erroneous judgments. By 
the time we have supposed we have arrived at our infinite, all-inclusive 
error, this leaven of truth would have swelled to the point where we would 
realize why we have in hand an Hinfinite error". Such circumstances could 
only imply that we a re aware of the infinite background or totality of 
truth, by which we could ever judge that we had, or had arrived at, 11 infinte 
its 
error 11 ! The process of error itself ,/evolution and destiny tends to swallow 
up its own progeny and give them rebirth and redemption anew in truth 0 
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Appendix C 
On Using the Term 11 Truth11 
Recall the discussion in this Study Guide, pp. esp. pp. 
where we gave as the definition of truth: the correspondence of thought to 
things, of ideas to the way the world is; truth is a psychological judgment that 
tells what reality is. It therefore refers to and inciudes being as well as the 
judgments about being. 
!!Absolute Truth11 or 11Fullness of Truth in Being11 ? We should avoid the 
sentiment of frozen rigidity in the traditional terminoloc;y, 11Absolute Truth11 • 
Human beings do not know or have Absolute Truth -- only God would have or know 
what that is. It may indeed mean a totality of knowledge an·d of being trans-
cending our 01,m, which in part thrq concept of God has traditionally meant. vJ e 
can rest assured that 11Absolute Truth11 would not be an all-devouring, undiffer-
entiated Absolute or a 11 block uni verse11 -- which would deny finite orders of 
being, difference, distinctions, and freedoms. Instead of the expression, 
11Absolute Truth'i (which~oes havifthis unfortunate connotation) it is a better 
· A. qJ , 1tc, v,(R_ 
description of things to refer (as we have previously done in this study) to 
"the fullness of Truth in Being11 • 
Hhat does "the fullnes.s ,of Truth in Being (and in Process)n mean? . 
Uhatever other world~ facts it may mean the 11 fullness of Truth in Beingn 
would include in its meaning our own,reality as personal life in its finitude, 
) ' ' ' 
freedom and experience of growth; and other such lives; created as !1.l.ch by God 
Himself. 
Fullness of Truth is found in moral realities and :relationships. These ne 
can lmow at first hand and can affirm. What further it may mean we can only 
dimly suppose. In any case, we do know what it means in these terms: 
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in our sense of personal identity, its desiring quality, its needs, 
and its. aspirations; its sense of freedom and fact 9f growth, 
intellectually and morally. 
in Love and justice: i.e. our sense of others and our need for them; and 
in our .awareness of the way to relate ourselves harmoniously and well 
to them and they to us. 
11Ye shall know the Truth and the Truth shall make you free ••• 11 -- truth 
is that sense of value that helps us to grow in freedom and grace, toward 
responsibility. 
,· 
The moral life is quality of intention and grov:rth (not a body of completed 
perfect acts).· Jesus' s 11 Be ye ·perfect as your heave~ly Father is perfect1; · 
- ; . 
(Mtt .5 :48) is better rendered by the Luke parallel: 11 Be ye merciful as · 
your heavenly Father is merciful11 • The 11perfection11 of God would refer to 
the Personal Loving source of being and would mean that our basic motive 
and purpose should be 11merciful 11 love, t11at is out-going and serving love 
lilce God's. 
The 11 absoluteness 11 , then, ;o.r fu11nes_s of God's Truth.would best be understooc: 
in, or as, his continuing moral purposes in bringing.forth the worlds and estab-
lishing the conditions for finite process and freedom, and his beconning of life 
toward the ideal, i.e. the harmony of life with life in love and justice. 
If we emplcy the term 11Absolute11 in reference to God, we keep in mind that 
the expression carries meaning only under that of the Divine 11 personality11 • 
God may be called the Absolute because He is fundamentally a Person, the Personal 
Causality of the world. His Personality defines His absoluteness. vfo give 
Knudson's eloquent words on the absoluteness of God in terms of His Personal, 
moral self-limitation:: 
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a 
If the idea o.Jo/metaphysical Absolute is to be retained, it should 
be in a causal sense of the term; and in this sense there is no in-
consistency between it and the idea of personality. From the .causal 
point of view the Absolute is the independent ground or cause of the 
universe ••• Everything is depenecent upon it .for its existence; and it 
is this that constitutes its absoluteness. But absoluteness thus 
understood does not exclude self-limitation. And the same is to be 
said of the power to know arid the power of self-control. These powers, 
,,.;rhich are the essential constituents of personality are also essential 
to the Absolute, if he be regarded as absolute in power ••• The common 
judgment must, then, be reversed. Instead of saying that personality 
is inconsistent with absoluteness, we must say1_,'. rather, that perfect 
personality is possible only in the Absolute. The contrary view rests 
upon a mistaken conception of what metaphysical absoluteness is.·* 
Addendum on the Definition of Truth 
Can we define 11 truth11 only in the terms 11 That which is 11 ? (Thus llerror11 : 
11 That which is not11 ?). uThat which is 11 would be a partial, incomplete definition 
of truth .. llThat which isll implies knowledge of what is, or of being --how can I 
say Tlwhat is 11 unless I mean I know what is? If I say 11X isl!, I mean I .know that 
Xis. Thus our 11 correspondence11 
correspondence of our thought to 
definition of truth is implied -- truth is the 
Ct!A>L --~"--'-':!.!'.·· .!L wlv,;,,.f (r;i-,,<( i,.)/'Cl_f- l'4,)4_ 
what is, or to things.A (Likewise, llerroru is 
not what is not, but error is erroneous processe~f judgment, and these sometimes 
aret as psychological facts). 
In any case, llthat which is 11 is not solely material facts and their relat-
ionships; accordingly truth even under this definition includes psychological 
process, judgmental thought, value thought, and the whole realm of what we call 
11 spirit 11 • The deepest instinct about truth is that it has a moral implicntion: 
truth is not only what is, bu-t what ought to be. 
To be sure, I can ref er to nuts in the for est as examples of what is, that 
I do not directly (or empirically)~, or are aware of; or I can refer to ob-
jects and n1awsn or orderly processes and relationships of nature, that, as a 
scientist I do not yet know, or have discovered, or have acquaintance with 
directly such things we must declare 11 must be 11 apart from our present or 
*Albert c. Knudson, The Doctrine of God, Abingdon Press, 1930, P• 304-5 
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or immediate knowledge. But when I venture to talk about nuts or as yet undis-
covered scientific objects and laws -- beyond the point of their unadorned 
11 thereness 11 -- I ~m at once 'involved in quality perceptions (primary and second-
ary), in judgments as to their pro~erties and relations, qualitatively and· 
logically, and am involved in the experience of a subject, myself, as "knowing11 , 
or as endeavoring to get his thought f~rms into corrsspondence with these things. 
And we are thus back in the realization that. truth is an implicative system, 
meaning a subjecf-thinking-or-endeavoring-to-c;onceive-reality; and that we 
cannot in over simple sen8e say merely that truth is "what is 11 • In the realm of 
"what is" I cannot leave my own subjectivity out, with its basic drive to lmow · 
what is, 
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Appendix 1., 
* The Ontological Argrursnt 
a resume 
The discovery of :M:i..nd in the universe through the presence of truth 
and the good in the universe--summary of arguments from truth and mor~l: 
Whale has stated the over-all mood of the argument well, where he 
said, 11 The very idea of God is possible to us only because God (himself) 
already stands behind' it. 11 (Whale: Christian Doctrine, p. 26) 
The classic "ontological argument" used strict., logical implications in 
examining the 11God idea": as "the Being greater than which nothing can l:::e 
conceived; 11 therefore His existence is implied in the very idea., since an 
existing 11being would l:::e greater than11 a non-existing--St. Anselm. (11th 
cent.). Descarte I s (1596-1650 AD) version in the idea of "Perfect Being, 11 ** · 
we ~tutein the larger setting of our discussion thus fari· ·.:Descartes deepens 
the argument by putting it in a ~sychological key, transcending the flat 
11 logical11 note of Anselm. The problem is to examine the content of the 
11God idea" as: 
Absolute Truth: Experience of truth and error--incompleteness of our 
knowledge implies complete, perfect or 11absolute 11 knowledge/truth. Thus 
Descartes says - ~ •.• these excellences do not pertain to (or make the 
smallest approach to) the idea which I hate of God in whom there is nothing 
merely potential (but in whom all is present really and actually); for it 
is an infallible token of imperfection in my knowledge that it increases 
little by little •••• 11 • 
Absolute Good:cr Perfection: Experience of judgment between better and 
worse implies absolute good. Thus Descartes says again - 11 •••• when I reflect 
on myself I not only know that I am something (imperfect), incomplete and 
*From the Greek 11 on11 and rrontos 11 ·meaning being. 
iHi-Descartes Selections, ed. Ralph Eaton, Scribers, 1927, p. 118-125, 
from l!Ieditations III. 
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dependent on another, which incessantly aspires after something which is 
better and greater than myself, but I also know .that He on whom .I depend 
posses in Himself a:11 the grea:t things towards which I aspire (and the ideas 
of which I find within rn;rself), and that not indefinitely or potentially 
alone, but really, actually and infinitely •••• 11 
Absolute or Originating Power : Experience of our fini tude of power 
and b!3ing implies .the Infinite Power and Being, upon whom we- are dependent. 
Accordingly Descartes writes again: 11 •••• from the. fac~ ;that I was in exis-
tence a short time ago .it does not follow that. I must be. in existence now, 
unless some ca.use at this instant, so to speak, produces me, anew, that is 
to say, conserves n:e ••••• All that I thus require here. is that I should 
interr.ogate myself,, .if I wish to know whether I possess 1?-· power which is 
capable of bringing it to pass that I who now am shall still be in the 
future; •••• if such power did reside in me, I should certainly be conscious 
of it. But I am conscious of nothing of the kind, and by this I know clearly 
no{:: 
.. 
that I depe-- on some being different from nzy-self. 11 
"Possibly, however, this being on which I depend is not that which I 
call God, and I am created either by my parents or by some other cause less 
perfect than God. This cannot be, because, as I have just said, it is 
perfectly evident that there must be at least as much reality in the cause 
as in the effect; and thus since I am a thinking thing, and possess an idea 
of God withinf me, whatever in the end be the cause assigned to my existence, 
it must be allowed that it is likewise a thinking thing and that it possesses 
in itself the idea of all the perfections which I attribute to God. 11 
The perfection of ·Tnought, Character, and Power is what Descartes 
means when he says he has an idea of "the Perfect Being". We summarize 
his argument thus: 
a. Aware of his own finitude or imperfection of thought, character, 
and power, he is 
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b. Therefore aware of "Perfect Being" as the Ultimate Standard by 
by which he tests or knows his ?Wn imperfections in these respects. 
c. The idea refers to ob.jective reality, beyond his own mind as its 
cause, for the idea of 11 perfection 11 could not arise in him, an 
imperfect being. How high up from the gound are .you unless you 
see 11 the ground 11 in order to make the judgment? How can you 
tell black, or shades of gray, unless you know something about 
white against which you make the judgment? '.1'.herefore God Him-
self is the ground of our idea of God -- the very idea itself is 
the 
•the presence of God in/mind. ttThe presence of the Ideal is the reality 
· of God within us." (Pringle-Pattison: Idea Qf. God p. 246.) 
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Hocking on 
The Ontological Argument--il-
Hocking b~dens Descartes basic reasoning. He states it in terms of the 
fyul)LIIM) 1..,,"-t 
general imperfection of the world at large, rather than/\merely on the sense of 
the imperfection of oneself -- thus Hocking believes he puts the argument on 
an empirical foundation:--· 
Our Human feeling of being alien in an imperfect vo rld--the sense of our 
own and the world 1s·imperfection at large--leads to the idea of the transcendent 
Good. Hocking insists that this is an empirical broadening of Descartes' 
argument. Absolute Perfection, o::r Good is implied as a prior idea and standard 
of our judgment upon the world in our encounter o:r our experience with it. 
11 Because· the world is· not /jet perf ectio.!!7 God is. 1t Hocking' s paragraph follows: 
•••• other argurments reason that because the world is, God is. It is 
not from the world .as a stable premise that we can proceed to God. as 
a conclusion: · it is rather when the world ceases to satisfy us as a 
premise, and appears as a conclusion from something more substantial, 
that we find God -- proceeding then from the world as a conclusion to 
God as. a premise. . We have no other premise to begin with: no proof 
of God can be deductive. It is because neither my world nor myself 
can serve as a foundation for thought and action that I must grope for 
a deeper foundation. And what I learn in this groping is, that my 
consciousness of those defects will reveal, though in faintest degree, 
the positive object which is.free therefrom. 
We conclude with a personalistic implication, (which Hocking does not 
elaborate): it is the human, personal imperfections of the world in life and 
society that bears in upon our consciousness. '\r,Jhat we want is a perfected 
human, personal order or existence. Therefore our category of the Transcendent 
Good, since it concerns personal beings and their welfare, is 11 personal1' in its 
deepest meaning. 
--i~ T11e ¥.eaning of God in Human Experience, p. 312-315. 
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In the following terms, Immanuel Kant gave W!]-at is often accepted as the 
valid criticism of the ontological argument: 
•.•• Now the unconditioned necessity of judgments is not the 
the same thing as an absolute necessity of things. (p. 245) 
The concept of a S~preme Being is, in many respects, a 
very useful idea, but being an idea only, it is quite incapable 
of increasing, by itself alone, our knowledge with regard to 
what exists. It cannot even do so much as to inform us any 
further as to its possibility ••••• it being necessary to look 
for the characteristic of·the possibility of synthetical know-
legge in experiences only, (p. 251)* 
•••• all speculative proofs end in •••• the ontological; •••• 
In wiatever way the understanding may have reached that concept, 
it is clearly impossible that the existence of its object could be 
found in it through analysis, becm1se the very knowledge of 
the existence of the object implies that it exists outside our 
thoughts. (p. 265-266) · 
(Kant Selections, pp. 245, 251, 265-266.) 
The rebuttal to Kant, as ue have previously shovm, p. 131-2, points out 
the nominalist,ic arid dualistic prejudice of his thought at the time he wrote his 
~~ 
famous criticisms of the classic argument,s for God.
1 
·That he himself moved 
toward an immanental theology, in which he could find a valid argument for God 
in moral experience is, of course, now history. The late British idealist 
Andrei.r Seth Pringle-Pattison, in the following memorable commentar-J, suggests 
the significance 
fztA nL~,7-l 
7 
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Ef:ingle-Pat:t,1',son on The Ontological Argument 
THE IDEA OF GOD, by A. Seth Pringle-Pattison, Oxford University Press, 
1920. 
"We have most o.:f; us, I suppose, as good moderns and children of the 
light, had our gibe at the ontological argument, and savoured Kant's pleas-
antry of the hundred dollars. But this fundamental confidence of reason in 
itself is just what the ontological argument is really labouring to to 
express -the confidence, namely.,that thought, when made consistent with 
itself, is true, that necessary implication in thought expresses a similar 
implication in realty. 
"Fundamentally, it is the conviction that I the be st we think, or can 
think, must be' -- a form of statement which perhaps enables us to see the 
real intention of the old scholastic argun:ent that 1a perfect being nec-
essarily exists'. In other words, the possibilities of thought cannot exceed 
the actuality of being; our conceptions of the ideal in their highest range 
are to be taken as pointing to a real Perfection, in which is united all 
that, and more than, it has entered into the heart of man to conceive. 
"Admittedly, however, such a conception transcends the empirical 
reality of man's own nature or of the factual world around him, ••• " (p.241) 
"Whence, then, are these ideals derived and what is the meaning of 
their presence in the human soul? Whence does Man possess this outlook 
upon a perfect Truth and Beauty and an infinite Goodness, the world of 
empirical fact being, as Bacon says, in proportion .inferior to the soul? 
~an did not weave them out of nothing any more than he brought himself into 
(j,)(_ 
being. 1 It is He that hath made us, and not;t ourselves 1 ; and from the sarr,e 
fontal Reality must be derived those ideals which are the masterlight of 
261 
all our seeingf the element, in particular, of our moral and religious life. 
The presence of the Ideal is the reality of God within us. This is, in 
essentials, the famous argument for the existence of God which meets us 
·at the beginning of modern philosophy--the argument from the fact of man's 
possession of the idea of a Perfect Being, which forms the center, indeed 
the abiding substance, of Descartes's philosophy. This idea, Descartes 
reminds us, is not just an idea which we happen to find as an individual 
item in the mind, like our ideas of particular objects. It is innate, he 
says, in his old-fashioned misleading terminology. He means that it is or-
ganic to the very structure of intelligence, knit up indissolubly with that 
consciousness .of self which he treated as his foundation-certainty--so that 
our experience _as self-conscious beings cannot be described without implying 
i t.11 (246) 
11 The finite self, in short, with which Descartes appeared to start as 
an absolute and independent certainty, is not really an independent being 
at all. It can neither exist nor be known in isolation: it knows itself 
only as a member of.a larger life. The idea of God, Descartes says else-
is innate in the same sense as the latter. The absolutely 
where, originates along with the idea of self and/finite, if the paradoxi-
can expression may be pardoned, would be entirely shut up within the four 
walls. of its independent. entity: it 111ould be a universe to itself with 
no qonsciousness of any Beyond, and of course, therefore; without the con-
sciousness of higher or lower. But man is not finite in this sense. Man 
is by contra: ta finite-infinite being, conscious of finitude only through 
the presence of an ihfinite nature within him. The possibility of aspira-
tion, infinite dissatisfaction and its obverse, the capacity for infinite 
progress--these fundamental characteristics of the human and rational life 
are based by Descartes on the existence of a Perfect Being revealing him-
self in our minds. 11 (page 247) 
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"We may well admit that we do not rightly know in what Perfection 
consists. It is sorr.ething which we feel towards, whose characters we di vine 
along the lines of our own highest experiences; and our idea is, to the 
end, something approximative, a hint, a suggestion, a bare outline. If by 
a positive idea Descartes is supposed to mean a clear, precise, and ade-
quate idea, then it is certain we possess no such idea of a Perfect Being. 
We should require to be God in order to construct it. But what Descartes 
really meant by his epithet was that the idea is not a mere negation--as 
if we simply clapped a 'not' before the finite, and said that the infinite 
is what the finite is not. The idea is positive up to the very limits of 
conception, including all that is real in the finite and infinitely more • 11 
(page 248) 
"The human idea of God or of perfection is, as Locke said in an.apt 
phrase of our idea of infinity, 'an endless growing idea', one which grows 
with man's own growth, acquiring fresh content from every advance in know-
ledge or in goodness, opening up fresh heights and depths to him who presses 
honestly forward; but he who penetrates farthest wili be the last to say 
that he has attained, We are never at the goal., but as we move . the dir-
in whioh it lies becomes more and more definite. The moveme:rrE and the directio1 
ection/imply the goal; they define it sufficiently for our human· purposes; 
and in direct experience we are never at a loss to know what is higher and 
what is lower, what is better and what is worse." (p. 249) 
Chapter Seven 
Major Arguments for God 
5. The Religious Argument 
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Its rational na~. 
or psychological argument. 
We are now prepared to consider the religious, 
In somewhat loose, but popular, terminology 
we. may call it at this stage the "mystical argument"; we might even, with 
due caution call it the l:'lmotional argument". Continuing traditional ter-
minology for the moment, it would be the discovery of Mind in the universe 
throught the experience of 11salvationll, or moral salva.tion. This approach 
to the problem of theism is by no means an irrational one, at least in its 
highest and finest sense. The connection of this argument with the pre~ 
ceding mo~ 11 objective 11 or rational evidences lies in the realization that 
if there exists a loving Personal Source of being, as the preceding dis-
cussions have suggested, such Creator of life and persons would, as a high-
est aspect of His rational relation to the world, seek to reveal Himself 
through "emotional II or "psychological II certainty, or through the experience 
of "salvation" of his creatures from evil. If God is real, and an objective, 
cosmic source of value, it would be His ut·most rational act to want to 
help finite life, by some immediate experience of 11perception 11 , assurance, 
or revival, into an awareness of, and some realization of highest value 
or good. 
,Ihe general n:eaning of salvation in all religious systems has a neg-
ative and a positive side. On the negative side, salva=l3ion in all reli.gions 
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has meant escape from evil of s,ome kind or degree,and attainn:ent of ultimate 
eecurity or protection from it. On the positive side, salvation has 
·.r· 
connoted the process by which men' con:e to stand within the favor or securi,ty 
of the highest value and its source, or the divine reality. What consti-
tutes 11 the divine favor" is defined differently at different historic levels 
of, for example, the Old Testament, or by different religious systems, 
according to their varying conceptions of God 1s nature and requirements. 
(recall chapter one) Ultimately for western, Hebraic religion, the. problem 
of whether man is a religious being involves his possible knowlecige of, and 
fellowship with; a Cosmic, Personal source of values, who may help him .to 
overcome life I s evils, natural, personal, and social. Such overcoming -of •. 
evil and ultimate fellowship with the Divine Reali~y would define ;:ialva-
tion in the traditional, or classic Biblical sense. "In the highest r<eaches 
of Old Testament and New Testament thoug~\ salvation is intimate, personal, 
;,1.:1.yt-A H. rJy lf ::0{4,. . 
ethical fellowship with God. PhilosophicallyPand inclusively the general 
idea of salvation includes the following levels of ~eaninJt: 
1. - The finding of purpose o; meaning f~}"·1i(1t:~}p::sonally. 
2. - Growth in freedom from hampering, oppres!ng environmental 
determinations of life, and utilization of environmental 
forces and laws to this . end: , , e.g. in education and · · 
science as factors of sa~vation. 
3. - Growth in freedom from inordinate self centerGdness or 
11 sin11 , and from social evils, toward personal joyousness 
and social harniony; .or sta.ted somewhat more· positively, 
growth in the influence or' love perspnally · and socially. 
4. - Recognition and acceptance of powers that aid in this 
attainment, powers or forces natural; pe~sonal, social, 
and divine. 
5. - Fellowship with God as ultimate source of all value 
and reality. 
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we are presently considering 
As with the foregoing arguments, tho one/also has two phases, an 
objective, empirical side, and a subjective form. 
1. The general empirical evidence is the religious nature of man. 
Man seems to be a being who fundamentally' looks for a permanent source and 
standard of value in the universe, from which he may obtain help in the 
struggle to overcome evil in personal and social life and to realize value, 
and with which he seeks some ultimate association or 11 fellowship 11 • Religion 
has been universal with men, and so far as we can tell, is a unique quality 
of human life. Once again, and for the concluding time, we quote the 
trenchant William Newton Clarke, ,-rho states this argument on its objective, 
11 anthropological 11 side in unusually clear terms. 
11 The evidence of the existence of God from the religious 
starting-point ••• The discoveryof God through the religious nature 
of man. · 
11Religion ••• is natural to man, and practically universal. •• 
Religious worship, obedience, and aspiration are as normal to man 
as sensation or reasoning. Any one of these powers may be misin-
formed or misdirected, yet they are genuine powers of man ••• In 
a world of reality every power has its counterpart, -- the eye 
has light, the reason has truth, and the ·religious nature has God. 
If the religious nature in man has no real being corresponding to 
it, no one who is worthy of the adoration and trustful obedience 
that man is moved to give OnE? above him, then we can only say that 
man was born with his highest nature looking out into empty space 
••• Moreover, it is the highest in him that is false. But if 
human nature is false in its highest region, -- false by being 
made so in its very constitution, -- then we cannot be sure that 
it is true in any department of its activity. If we say that man's 
highest nature naturally deceives him, we resign all right to rely 
upon our nature or the validity of our powers, and confidence in 
our mental processes is at an end ••• Just as the mind of man has 
proved itself adapted to a world that is constructed according to 
methods of mathematics, so the spirit of man has proved itself 
adapted to a world in which there is a good.God, with worthy 
power and authority over human beings. Man comes to hi$ best 
life only in proportion as such God is recognized0 (OCT 118-120) 
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2. Above all the others, the religious argument is the subjective 
argument for God,~ Its general thesis is that there is a' oos1nio power for 
good in the universe on whic~ man may rely for heliJ in the human struggle, 
and that 11 saving assistance 11 flows into life through the subjective flood-
gates of the mind and emotions~ This 
saving assistance co~es as a larger Presence and reality that gives support 
to the finite soul through the inner experience of new found strength: moral, 
physical, emotional, and intellectual; renewed assurance, keener purpose, 
higher joy, peace and exaltation; even sometimes ineffable ecstasy. The 
argument at 
e,Z;_J 
of prayer I ilc 
this level. rr.erges into the problem of the nature and reality 
i J ,- . 
(/)\. 11..I I . . 
Traditionally, this· typo of exper'ienco hes ·oft on included o sense 
of the saving 11grace 11 of God,. felt as the removal of guilt,f'ollowing 
repentanoe fo~ sin or misdemeanor •. Grace also means the largest sense of joy 
and fulfillment in life apart.from the remission of specific guilt or sin. 
Normative religious experience. 
the Bible · has , · been 
·1n· our ·western culture 
the fount of inspiration concern-
ing man's religious experience. Let us ,look therefore at its teaching.-ir In 
discussing this area of the experience of God we are dealing with the Old Testa-
ment idea of salvation at its personal, psychological heart. The Old Testament 
discloses two primary modes in which. Dividrie _Power personally is felt. Fe have 
the concept of religious experience: 
-ie-Benr in mind that the Old Testament BUggests answers · in·· outline to the 
question, 11 How is God known or apprehended?" without presenting full-dress philo-
sophical dissertations on the subject. The elements, however, of the three class-
ical types of "reasons" for belief in God are present in the Old Testament. These 
are not arguments of a logically abstract kind; they are rather dynamical., affirm-
ative declarations, representing what the Biblical authors believed to be profound 
experiences of God, on various planes of awareness, intellectual and emotional. 
Thus:---
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(1) As beginning and continuing in a sense of moral well-being, sustained 
by God's presence. Such noted, joyful Psalms as Nos. 1, 15, 19, 23, 24, 26, 27, 
100, 119, 121, 139, 141 suggest this type of experience. This outlook is pres-
ent in part a.lso in such books, concerned with the inner life, as Hosea, Jer§:'lmiah, 
Job, and Ecclesiastes. William James ts chapters on ''The Religion of Healthy-
Mindednessn, in his well known 1,rork, J'he Varieties of Religious Experience, 
describe in modern terms and examples this type of experience. For the Old 
and 
Testament the Divine Presence/renewal is also sometimes felt:--
Footnote continued --
a. The awareness of God through experience of nature: a mode of reasoning 
based on external or empirical observation of nature I s 11 order", "perfedtion11 , 
"design" or "purpose", leading to the idea of its intelligent Cause, or Maker,e.g 
Gen. 1, Ps. 19:1-6; Ps. 104. 
in such passages we have the substance of the 11 casual" and 11 teleological11 
arguments for the existence of God. The following further reason suggested in 
the Old Testament for belief in God are ascending or deepening modes of intel-
lectual experience or perception. 
b. The awareness of God through moral experience or experience of.moral 
value: a mode of reasmning based on the inner moral experienaB .Qf awareness of 
values and conscience, suggesting moral 11 law11 , and Cosmic Moral Mind as Source 
or Ground of the law; with the added empirical observation that history seems to 
attest the presence of such law, in the fact that men and groups which do not 
practice neighborliness and love do not, in the long run, survive; or conversely 
and positively, when men collectively practice kindness and love, their society 
tends to survive. The substance of the classic "moral argument" for God is found$ 
. as we have already pointed out, implicit in such books as Amos, Hosea, 
Isaiah, and other prophets. 
c. Awareness of God through religious experience: derived from a sense of 
God 1 s help to oneseli' personally in leading a moral and a well poised or 
triumphant life, discussed above. 
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(2) As beginning in a sense of moral self-dissatisfaction.'"'" Many of' the 
....... --!t 
Psalms suggest an experience of God as forgiving love in life, that relie,res and 
renews conscience, when burdened with a sense of moral failure or sin; and that 
reintegrates, or re-establishes selfhood, in poise, inward security and well-
being. 
In sum, on such levels of experience, bearing on psychological and mental 
well-being, the sense of. the Divine Reality is accompanied by a feeling of new 
assurance, a stabilizing sense of all-rightness with the loving Source of Being, 
regardless of past errors, failures or sins. Such experiences of mental and 
emotional renewal of the soul were acknowledged as the VC) ndrous uplifting of the 
Di vine Spirit. God I s Presence was deeply lmo1,m in the removal of anxiety and 
fear. The com:1ng of a new mind, or release from anxiety,. could not always be 
calculated., or scheduled. The Biblieal authors realized that the Divine Spirit 
must v-D rk in .and through the complexity of our freedom; they often said they had 
to wait 11 in !)atience11 to find relief and renewal. In any case, such may be the 
meaning of many of the timeless lines of the Psalms and Prophets, such as, 
Ps. 25; Ps. 42, 46; Ps. 51; Ps. 103; Ps. 130; (Ps. 139) II Isaiah 40: 27-31. 
Add to these references such others as Is. 26:3 or Ps·. 40: l-5f; I Isaiah Ch 6, 
II Isaiah Ch. 55. 
On either of these levels, such experiences, if true, would not mean t.t.at-
God,. :.or .. :the Divine Spirit, is an external, coercive force that destroys our free..-
dom as men. Rather the implication of all such passages would be that God speaks 
as an inward voice of truth, which strengthens our freedom by giving it new in-
sight and power. This inward lD rking of the Di vine would not detract from the 
belief that God is the objecti:ve source of truth and value, in ultimate Mind beyo1 
the finite self. In contrast to some oriental thought, Hebrew mysticism was 
~H~ clarification of the Biblical concept of 11 sin11 and the role of 11 repent-
ence11 as therapy is here in order. 
The overall point of view of the Hebrew-Christian Bible is that, being a 
free spirit, man can choose evil or 11 sin11 • The Hebraic definition of sin is 
footnote continued--
evil disposition or malice, and may be expressed socially as aggression on 
neighbor, or disrespect for personality. Sin is not bodily passion, as with 
the dualistic systems; though body and passions may bEr~th"e instruments of sinful 
pride. In Biblical thought sin is often understood to be the prideful usurpa-
tion by men of the place of God, ~s they set themselves up above other men to 
lord it over and aggress upon them (as the story of Cain and Abel); or to stand 
as individuals withoutdue humility or respect before God the Creative Power 
(as in the story of Moses when he smote the rock that gushed forth with water). 
In profoundest Hebraic thought, sin, however, is not an inevitable condition. 
it may be avoided in life, so that, on the whole, one may lead a life free from 
sinful pride and aggression. Many of the Psalms already cited, 2.nd other passaer~. 
imply this. (Indeed, some passages in the Old Testament suggest that sexuality, 
or some other quality not defined, constitutes something originally 11 sinful'I in 
human nature, as e.g. verse 5, of the famous penitential Psalm 51. Such places, 
however, should be balanced with other sayings, particularly those of the great 
prophets, Jeremiah in Ch. 31:29-30f, or Ezekiel in Ch. 18, where the concept of 
11 original sin11 , in the sense that there is something 1-h ich inevitably determines 
us to sinful action, is ringingly repudiated.) The point is, ra:bher, that man 
should cultivate righteous intention or motive, which will guide him in 11 paths 
of righteousness 11 • Such great Psalms as the 1st, or the 19th, or the 23rd, and 
many others, proclaim this possibility. 
The Biblical concept of pride in its relation to sin should be further 
clarified. The Old Testament does indeed recognize our common, or 11 natural11, 
human tendency toward inordinate pride, in its various ranges: pride of power, 
of wealth, of position, of class, even of intellect and spirit, that is to say, 
11prideful" attitudes which tend toward selfishness and unloving relationship 
with others. Such pride may lead to situations of sinful aggression. In sum, 
the Hebrew Scriptures point to our com.men moral sloth, our faiure to understand 
human need, and failure to express or respond to love. In view of this tendency 
it urges men to seek the Divine help to overcome these weaknesses. But the Old 
Testament does not mean, as it is sometimes misinterpreted, that all 11 pride 11 is 
sinful. There is a natural pride, which is not sinful, but psychologically 
necessary, as normal self-esteem, or self-respect, expressing our very nature 
as aacred persons under God. Every-1,here, both Old and New Testaments teach this 
sacredness of one I s own person, which is source and seat o 11 normal11 or 11 norma-
tive pride 11 • The age old cry of the human heart for the moral establishment 
and maintenance of its selfhood in 11 normative pride 11 is expressed in the familia: 
lines of the 139th Psalm: 
11Search me, O God, and know my-
heartt 
Try me and know my- thoughts! 
And see if there be any wicked 
way in me, 
and lead me in the way ever-
lasting.11 (Pslarhs 139:23-24) 
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always profoundly moral. The idea of man's possible oneness with God meant 
identification of moral will and purpose, .with God and fellow. men in ethical 
fellowship, rather than the identification of man 1 .• s 11 being11 ~ toto, and loss of 
his personal nature, in the Divine Being. God speaks .to man,· and is present 
in, or to, human life through moral consicience. The life of God and the life 
of man conjoin in the common experience of Moral Truth, Jer. 22 :13-19. In this 
passage, Jeremiah, contrasting the tyranny of Jehoiakim with the righteous 
reign of his father, Josiah, says: 
11He judge.9- the oause .of the poor and 
needy; 
then· it was well. Is not this to know me ? 
says the Lord.11 .(v. 16) 
footnote continued--
Likewise, when·the Old, or New Testaments, refer to repentance as a desir-
able and necessary moral quality, they do not mean that persons need have, or 
must develop, .a hyper-- or morbid sense of self-dissatisfaction, or consider them-
selves gross sinners or criminals in some way, before they may be recipients of 
the Divine love, grace, or favor; or before they can otherwise know, or have 
experience of God 1 s presence in life. In addition to contrition for possible 
gross sin, such ,as the 11 blood guiltiness11 or crime alluded to in Psalm .51, re-
prentance · may stand for the general psychological value of being willing to ack-
nowleflgE;i our mistakes and shortcomings. It means 11 to think again11 , that is, to 
examine ourselves, and be prepared to acknowledge ways in which we might improve. 
There could be no psychological or moral.growth of any kind without such normal 
11 repentance 11 as a natural part of our spiritual experience. To experience re-
pentance need not mean that we must look around within ou;rsel.ves in.- order to 
bring to light some imaginary dark, or gross evil, which we must get rid of. It 
may mean sometimes, of course, that human beings should feel sorry or contrite 
for injury done, so that the breaches of fellowship between men and neighbors 
may be healed, and the full moral will of God realized in, and between, persons. 
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My,:sticism. The argument from religious experience has involved us, of 
course, in the subject of filiJstic5-sm. Preseritly ue Pill call upon two eminent 
spokesmen to assist us further in our understanding of these subjects, the late 
noted psychologist and philosopher, William James, and the late practicing mystic 
Rufus M. Jones. Here ·we will point out that the main emphasis of mysticism is 
on the immediate experience of God. 
Generally speaking, it is doubtless correct to say that in the history of 
religions there have been two types of mysticism, one characterized mainly by 
the eastern religions and tending to imply the ultimate trans-personal or im-
personal nature of deity (recall our discussion, chapter three, Section II); 
and another exemplified by western, 11prophetic11 religion, and on the whole im-
plying, or mointaining, as its prime faith standpoint, the ultimate personal 
nature of God. 
The one variety has sometimes been called monistic £E ontological mysticism. 
This type emphasizes the feeling of one 1s metaphysical identity with God and 
the cancellation or obliteration of evil and suffering by virtue of this ultim-
ate oneness of the finite self Hith God. In addition to the tendency to stress 
God as impersonal Being, eastern religions (ar,id here we mean, principally, the 
classic expressic:m .of Hinduism and Buddhism) tended to stress otherworldliness, 
escape from this life of suffering, and denial of the validity of individual, 
material existence in the here and non. ( In· ~their practical moral injunctions, 
of course, these systems 11ere highly ethical). 
The second type of mysticism could be appropriately called per,sonalistic, 
moral or ethical -- the rnyst:Lcism characteristically of the prophetism of the 
Old Testament, and profoundly reflec-ted in the religion of the New Testament. 
Its main motif has been the possibility of the experience of oneness -- not 
necessarily of our being in total identification with God 
purpose or will with God's ethical will;,· or.··.:l:rn6ral 
but of our moral 
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law, or nature as love, so that He may overcome the world's evils and suffering, 
by moral activity in life. This mysticism has been personality affirming in 
both man and God; it is self-preserving in the best sense, life affirming and 
life saving, not only in a possible hereafter, but in the here and now as well. 
In .sum."1~ the one has been the mysticism of union, or the feeling of ontolog-
ical oneness with the Ultimate with bliss, rapture, ecstasy, transport as 
chief psychological content of the experience. The other has been the mysticism 
of communion, with God and fellow creatures with the joy of moral oneness or · 
the union of motive,· purposes anµ acts uith the Divine in social love, as 
characteristic -psych6lo:gical contel'.lt,. 
Someti~e~ the term 11mysticism11 ha·s been .reser.ved to designate the former 
type of religious experience, that of ontological unity; while the term 
' . . 
0 prophetism11 or 11 prophetic religion", is held· tq indicate the latter form, or 
the experience of the ethical unity of will, or pur.pose •** To be sure, 
practicing mystics have differed in their implications asto whether man1 s 
immediate experience of God on the "mystical 11 pJa ne was one carrying the sense 
of the 11personal11 , or the contrasting awareness of the trans-personal or 
impersonal nature of Deity; or the sense of the impelling nature of ethical 
duty, ascpposed to the realization of transcendence of value or ethical duty 
in our practical human terms. Indeed, for the Sankhya Hindu mystics there.is no 
deity at e.111 Accordingly, aswe use the term 11mysticism11 we no doubt ha.ve to do 
so with some looseness or ambiguity. Be this as it may, however, interpreters of 
mysticism often point to three characteristics, . ·, .. , which may be 
said to be the more or less common ingredience of the experience: 
1
~The author here recommends the splendid analysis of Harris Fro.nklin Rull 
in Christianity, An Inquiry into its Nature and Truth, Scrtbners, 1944, p. 6lf. 
i<*Rall, Ibid. 
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The immediate knowledge of the Divine presence in intense 
11 feeling", resembling perception in the sensory area. 
Awareness of God's immanence,or availability in the world. 
all 
A feeling of optimism -- that/is, or will be, ultimately right 
with the world and the self., containing: -
a sense of a supporting Presence, 
heightened., or deepened sense of insi. ght into truth., 
enlarged understanding, clearer judgment., 
expansion of the self, mind., soul, spirit, moral nature 
into ineffable wonder, joy,oompassion, peace, 
new sense of power., either to rise above the evils of 
the world in the manner of the east, or ethically 
to attack itsevils in the manner of the west. 
Some theorests have explained that, in the mystical experience, 
the Divine presence wells up into conscious life through the subconscious 
mind -- so William James in his Varieties of Religious Exre rience. Accordingly, 
we may appropriately conclude this chapter with James's classic description 
of religious or mystical experience in its universal :form. We also include 
an exposition of a committed, modern mystic., Rufus Jones., who in the 
subsequent passage beautifully summarizes the philosophy and outlook of 
mysticism .. 
William James on Religious Experience 
(1842-1910. James was a universal type of personality, 
an outstanding psychologist,.philosopherf and religious 
theoretician of his day. He taught at Harvard from 1873 
to 1907. The following passage is from his Conclusions 
in The Varieties of Religious Experience, 1902) 
11 
•• Is there, under all the discrepancies of the creeds, a.common nucleus to 
which they bear their testimony unanimously?, ••• 
11 
•• There is a certain uniform deliverance in which ,religions all appear to 
meet. It consists·,of two parts:-
1. An uneasiness; and 
2. Its solution. 
1. The uneasiness., reduced to its simplest terms, is a sense that there is 
something· wrong · 
ally stand. · 
about us as we natur-
2. The solution is a sense that we are· saved from ,the wrongnes.s by making··· 
proper connection with the higher powers •.•.• 
11 The individual, so far as he suffers from his. wrongness and criticizes 
it, is to that extent consciously beyond it, and in at least possible touch . 
with something higher, if anything higher exists. Along with the .wrong part 
there is thus a better part of him, eveni though. it may· be but a most helpless , 
germ •. 1'Tith which part he should identify his real being is by no means obvious 
at this stage; but when stage 2 (the stage of solution or salvation) arrives, 
the man identifies his real being with the germinal higher part of himself; and 
does so in the following way. He becomes conscious that this higher part is 
conterminous and continu:ous·with a MORE of the same-quality, which is operative 
in the universe outside of him, and -which he can keep in-working touch with, and .. · 
in a fashion get on board of and save himself when all his lo,,rer being has gone 
to pieces in the wreck •••• 
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nso far, however as this analysis goes, the experiences are only psycho-
logical phenomena. They possess, it is true, enormous biological worth. 
Spiritual strength really increases in the subject when he has them, a new life 
opens for him, and they seem to him a place of conflux where the forces of t1io 
universes meet; and yet this may be nothing but his subjectiv-e way of feeling 
things, a mood of his ovm fancy, inspite of the effects produced. I now turn 
to my second question: What is the objective 1truth 1 of their content? 
11 The part of the content concern:ing which the question of truth most 
pertinently arises is that 1MORE of the same quality' with which our higher self 
appears in the experience to come into harmonious working relation. Is such a 
'more' merely our own notion, or does it really exist? If so, in what shape 
does it exist? Does it act, as Hell as e.xist? And in what form should we 
conceive of that 'union' with it.of which religious geniuses are so convinced? 
It is in answering these questionsthat the various theologies perform their 
theoretic work, and that their divergencies most oome to light. They all agree 
that the 1more 1 really exists; theough some of them hold it to exist in 'the 
shape of a personal god or gods, while others are satisfied to conceive it as 
a stream of ideal tenden~/ embeded in the.eternal structure of the world. They 
all agree, moreover, that it acts as well a13.exists, and that something really 
is effected for the better 1vhen you throw your life into its hands. It is when 
they treat of the experience of. 'union' with it that their speculative difference 
appear most clearly. Over this point pantheism ,:md theism, nature ·and second 
birth, works and grace and karma, immortality and reincarnation, reationalism, 
and mysticism, carry on inveterate disputes •••• 
11 
•• The subconscious self is nowadays a well-accredited psychological entity; 
and I beleve that in it we have ~~actly the mediating term required. Apart from 
all religious considerations, th.ere is actually and li tercilly more life in our 
total soul than we are at any time aware of. The exploration of thetransmargin-
al field has hardly yet been seriously undertaken, •••• 
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11 Let. me then propose,. as an hypothesis, iqhat:. whatever it, may be on 
its farther side., the 1more 1 with which in rel_ig_:Lous experience .we .. feel 
ourselves connected is on its hi~~ side the subconscious continuation of 
our conscious life •. Starting thus ~Jith .. a :recognized psycholog;ical fact as 
our basis, we seem to preserve a contact· with 1 science 1 which the ordinary 
theologian lacks. At the same ti~e the theolmgian 1s contention that the 
religious man is moved by an external power is vindicated, for it is one 
of the peculiarities of invasions from the subconscious region to take on. 
objective appearances, .and to suggest to the Subje~t an .external control. 
In the re;tigious. life the ,control is felt as 'higher:'; but since on our 
hypothesis .. it-: is pr,imarily the higher faculties of our. own hidden mind 
"J'.; ' . 
which a re controlling,_. the sense of union with the power. beyond us is a 
sense of something, not merely appa:- ently, but literally true •••• 
11 
•• Here .the over-beliefs begin: here mysticism and the conyersion-:-
rapture and Vedantism .. and transcendental idealism bring in their monistic 
interpretations and tell us that the finite self. rejoins the, absolute se~, 
for it was always on~ 1:rith. God and identical with the soul. pf the world. 
Here the prophets of all the different religions: come with their vis;ions, 
voices, raptures,.and other openings~ supposed by each to authenticate his 
own peculiar fai.th ••.•• 
,, ' " 
11Disregarding: the over-beliefs, and confing ourselves to what is 
common an,d, generic,, :We: have in the fact that the conscious person is . 
continuous, v,JL th a wider self through which saving experiences come., a 
positive Gonte_nt ~i :r;~ligipus experience which, it seems to me,:is 
literally and objectiv~ly true as far as it goes. If I now proceed to 
state my o,vm. p.ypothesi~. about ~he farther limits of this ~xtensi?n of. our 
personalit:Y,. I shall. tie, offer_ing, my own. over-beliet"".-thoug):1,}: ):mow it will 
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appear a sorry, under-belief to some of you -- for which I can only 
bespeak the, same indulgence which in a converse case I should accord to 
yours. 
11 The further limit~ of our being plunge, it seems to me, into an al-
together other din:enSion of existence from the sensible and merely 'under-
standable 1, world. Name it the mystical region, or the supernatural region, 
whichever you choose.· So far as our ideal impulses originate in this 
region, (and most. of them do originate in it, for we find them possessing 
us in a way for whic.h, we cannot articulately account), we belong to it in a 
more intimate sense .than :that in which we belong to the visible world, for we 
belong in the most intimatE;J sense wherever our ideals belong. Yet the 
unseen region in question is not merely ideal, for it produces effects 
in this. .world. · Hhen, we commune with it, work is actually done upon 
our finite personality, for we are turned into new men, and consequences 
in the way of conduct.follow in the natural world upon our regenerative 
change. But that. which .produces e_t:fects within another reality must be 
termed a reality itseJf., so I feel as if we had no philosophic excuse 
for calling the unseen or mystical world unreal. 
"God is the natural appellat~qn, for us Christians at least, for the 
supreme reality, so I will call this higher part of the universe by the 
name of God. He and- ~od have business with each other; and in opening 
ourselves to his influence our deepest destiny is fulfilled. The universe, 
at those parts of it which o,ur per1:1onal being constitutes, takes a turn 
genuinely for the worse or for ,.the better in proportion as each one of 
us fulfills or evades God I s demands. .As far as this goes I probably 
have you with me, for I only translate into schematic language what I 
may call the instinctive belief of mankind: God is real since he pro-
duces real effects ••• ~ 
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"That the God with whom, starting from the hither side. of our own 
extra-marginal self; we come at its remoter margin into comrrerce should 
be the absolute world-ruler, is of O])urse a very considerable over-belief ••• 
11 
•• What the more characteristically divine facts are., apart from 
the actual inflow of energy in the faith-state and the prayer-state, I 
know not. But the over-belief on which I am ready to make nzy- personal 
venture is that they exist. The whole drift of my education goes to 
persuade me that the world of our pre$ent. ccm~ciousness is oniliy one 
out of many worlds of consciousness that exist, .and that those other 
worlds must contain exp~riEiinces w,):lich _have a mea~~ng for our life also; 
and that although in the, main their. experierices and those of this world 
keep discrete, yet-the two become continuous at certain points, and_ 
I 
higher energies filter in •••• Assureqly,, _the real world is of ~ different 
temperament~- more.intricately. built ~han physical science allows. 
!1, .. ,; 
So my objective and nzy- subjective conscience both hold n:e t,o the over-
belief which I express. Who knows whether the faithfulness of indi-
viduals here below to their own poor over-beliefs may not actually help 
God i~ .~urn to __ be more effectively faithfui to his own greater t~.s s?" 
fiufus M. Jones on :Vwstical Exnerience 
(b. a note'd, ·contemporary Christian 
mystic and philosopher of nzy-sticism. The following piece 
taken from 1bg Atlantic Monthly, May, 1942, is a classical· 
expression of nzy-sticism and nzy-stica+ theory. The first 
part of it is also an able description of the spiritual ''' 
. concept of mind ~nd man)• ·· 
_
11Hhen we pass from the superficial theory of the mind as a receptacle, 
as a kind of bird cage, to the true conception of mind as self-conscious 
spirit with capacity for free creative scope, the change is a momentous 
; '1 ,' • • ·,. , •• •• 
one. i1ind as we actually know it is self-transcendent. It sees and 
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goes beyond what is before its footlights, what is given' to it. It 
·, 
is not only receptive of sense data, but· it has its own range of self-
activity and organizing power. It produces from within 'free ideas' 
and the non-sensuous universals through which it organizes and expands 
itsexperience and makes it 'knowledge' of the order of truth. There 
is no knowledg~ until the mind has done its 0reative organizing work 
and rises to the insight, 1 know this. The mind cannot and does not 
stop satisfied with anything merely 1given 1 • It has a thrust, an urge 
for more, for a beyond. If we expect to arrive at any significant 
goal of life, we must first of all passover from the lower-case 
co~ceptions of mind, as a causal product of the material order and a 
mere enlargerr.ent of the animal type, to a higher-case in~erpretation 
of mind of unique spirit scope. This change of out~.ook is not got by 
a leap in.the dark, but by a more careful diagnosis of.what is involved 
in mind itself in its profoundest operations. 
11 This insistence upon the unique operation of mind its,elf does not 
imply any tendency to belittle the sphere of the senses. The loss of 
a sense is a real limitation of the range and·scope of experience •••• 
11 It is probably true, too, that we should not, finct ourselves either, 
should not know ourselves as,spirit, if we did not develop our person-
ality in and through relations of give-and-take to a world of nature. 
It is there that we get our discipline. It is there that we get our 
.· . 
intellectual nurture. That is the locus in which we find our values of 
life. It is there we get our stock of working knowledge. But in so far 
as we find ourselves and know ourselves as so.tri,:t it is not through the 
approach of the senses. We have no senses for the ,apprehension of self. 
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It is through a direct awareness, 'knowledge of acquaintance 1 , that we 
know ourselves. I do not arrive at the knowledge that I_am I by look~ng 
in a mirror, or by grasping my foot by my hands, but by an incontro-
vertible and irreducible inner· experience, which is utterly unique. 
Mind as spirit in its essential nature is self-conscious as well as 
. merely conscious. It knows itself in its own sphere and in ways quite 
unlike the way of sense knowledge. When the level of self-consciousness 
is reached there is a unique transition from all lower types of con-
sciousness •. Something utterJv n~ corr.es into operation. There on 
this new level is a type of mind that knows itself. 
"There does not seem to fo any ·insuperable reason_ why spirit of 
our type may not meet and directly commune with Spirit of the eternal 
• ,·· • '··', ' • r., 
type. . It becon:es rr:erely a question of evidence of fact. If tele.,pathy 
between human minds were a common and well-attested mode of communica-
tion, direct correspondence between minds would be taken for granted 
without further argument. But telepathy at best is a rare occul7rence, 
still questioned by strict scientists, and at the present :l:ltage of 
verification a duoi6us ground of support~ It is a fact, howe:ver, that 
we recognize.other minds. We are in raopqr~ with other minds, b, y. 
methods which transcend sense and lie beyond mere inference. The con-
. . . 
sciousness of 1self 1 and the consciousness of 1other 1 are born together, 
' 
and we cannot use one of them as the searchlight to find the. other. 
There comes a leap of I acknowledgrcent I of other persons . which is of 
a very different order from our attainment of the sense of the reality 
of external objects. Deep calls unto deep within us ,and like knows like. 
If it is granted that we know ourselves by an irreducible and i:q.con-
trovertible experience, and if we know other minds by an equally 
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irreducible and incontrovertible operation, there would seem to be ground 
for the expectation that spirit would have mutual and reciprocal cor-
respondence with an Over-World of Spirit. 
11 From time irnrr:emorial persons have been aware of correspondence with 
a Beyond, with a More than themselves. Sometimes it has seemed like an 
invasion, an incursion into the individual mind from beyond its margins, 
bringing a sense of exaltation or rapture; and sometimes it has seemed 
as though it were a thrust of the individual mind through a gate, or 
drawbridge, into the central Keep of the universe, _with a corresponding 
sense of exaltation. 
"Saint Teresa in her Autobiography has given many accounts of this 
first type 0.f invasion. 'A rapture', she writes, 1is absolutely 
irresistible. It comes, in general, as a shock (that is a something 
unexpected), quick and sharp, before you can collect your thoughts, or 
· help yourself in any viay, and you see and feel it as a strong eagle, 
rising upward and carrying you away on its wings•. 
"Richard of St. Victor in the twelfth century speaks of his ex-
perience of having his mind 1rapt into the· secret closet of the divine 
privacy, while it is on all sides encircled. by the conflagration of 
divine love, and it is intimately penetrated and set on fire through 
and through. It (the mind) strips off self and puts on a certain 
divine condition, and being configured (or transfigured) to the beauty 
it is gazing upon, it passes into a new kind of glory'. 
'_'The experience of the celebrated mystic of the Eastern Church, 
Saint Simon the New Theologian, is an excellent typical illustration 
of invasion. 'Suddenly', he says, 1God carr:e and united Himself to rr..e in 
a manner quite ineffable; He 'entered into every part of my being, as 
. ·.:.i, 
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fire penetrates iron, or as light streams through glass ••• I am filled 
with light and glory; my face shines like .that of my Beloved and all my 
n:embers glow with heavenly light 1 • 
"There is a remarkable passage of this first type in the Dia.rx 
of Josiah Royce I s mothsr, amid the perils of her pioneer journey across 
the continent. Face to face 1:iith an apalling danger, she suddenly 
found herself environed by invisible forces. She says: 'Whence this 
calm strength which girded me round so surely? ••• I had known what it 
was to believe in God and to pray t~at He.would never leave us. Now 
He came so near tha,;t I no longer simply believed in Him, but kllilli 
His presence there, giving strength for whateve.r might come.~· •• That. 
C8:lm strength, that certainty of One near and all sufficient hushed 
and cheered me 1 • 
11 Here is the testimony of a young man who was sentenced to an 
English prision be~ause· he ·refused to ta.ke military service: - · 1A · 
Cell, Police Station·, In England, September 3, 1941. 1 I have just 
had a wonderful experience. · I cannot adequately describ~ it. I have 
gradually been becoming aware of a Presenc.e in the cell, and suddenly 
the whole room was charged with infini~e Power. I was as if in the 
midst of a vast congregation; yet utterly intimate. The place was 
illuminated and yet not physically so. T.he emotion of my happiness 
was so powerful that it struck me through and through, and I ·had a 
very storm of weeping in my weakness. Yet :through it I have gained a 
'' 
profound strength ••• This cell is now~ holy place to n:e, and I am 
overcome with an impulse to glorify-and worship •••• I know now how the 
saints were upheld whatever their condition. In the words ~f George Fox, 
1 I had great openings 1 • Only those will understand who have been through 
it themselvei 1 , ••• 
11 St. Augustine in his famous biographical account ••• is a good 
illustration of the second type, which I have called the 'thrust' from 
within ••• In the Confessions, St. Augustine describes how step by step 
he passed fr,om external things and bodily sense, from the changeable 
to the unchangeable and 'thus with the flash of one trembling glance 
the soul's inward faculty arrived at That which is'. 
"Nobody has given a better account of this second type than that 
of Jacob Boehme the Silesian shoemaker the most remarkable of all 
Protestant mystics. He says in the !l'.t9.r.§: ''While I was in affliction 
and trouble, I elevated my spirit, and earnestly raised it up unto God, 
as with a great stress and onset, lifting up my whole: heart and mind 
and will and resolution to wrestle with the love and rr:ercy of God, 
and not give over unless He blessed rr:e -- then the Spirit did break 
through. vfuen in my resolved zeal I made such· an assualt, storm and 
onset upon God, as if I had more reserves of virture and power ready, 
with a resolution to hazard my life upon it, suddenly my snirit did 
break through the Gate not without the assistance of the Holy Spirit, , 
and I reached to the innermost Birth of the Deity and there I was em-
braced with love as a brideeroom embraces his bride. 1 
"Boehrr:e's account implies throughout a mutual and reciprocal 
correspondence betvieen the human spirit· and the divine Spirit·, and 
that would be true of almost all accounts of both these types of 
experience. They differ only in the degree of the objective or sub-
. t. h ' II Jec.ive emp asis •••• 
At this place we interrupt Jones's article to insert another con-
temporary account of a mystical kind, or what seerr:ed a 
direct communion with the Divine Spirit, known to the author of this 
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book at first hand. It comes from a you.rig divinity student I s experience 
of some years ago. The testimony is, as he records it, 11 I had, for sorr,e 
weeks been deeply engrossed in the study of several great contemporary 
philosophers of religion in prepartion for a paper for my beloved 
teacher, Nels Ferre, who taught me to understand the rreaning of Agape 
as the central Christian message. The theme of the paper was to be 
'God as Cosmic Mind'. During the reading and preparation,attempt had 
been made thoroughly to absorb the concepts of Whitehead, Boodin, 
Hocking, and several other great., modern minds on the idea of God". The 
testimony continued: 11 1 had become saturated with the most elevated 
theological and ethical thinking of the day; until my whole being seemed 
filled with their understanding of the Supreme Reality and the Supren:e 
Goodness that lay behind, or just within, the visible texture of physi-
cal nature. Then, suddenly, one night, in the late mystic hour.s, at 
the closing portion of some trivial dream -- the contents of which has 
long since passed out of memory -- the scene was suddenly changed, as 
if a great curtain of horizon girdling extent had quickly lifted upon 
a new stage or direension of experience, and I felt my spirit elevated 
and expanded, to fill, as it were, the whole space of the room, over-
flowing the house where I was visiting, passing through walls and roof, 
as if they were not there, and on beyond into the outter world of this 
blessed night". Our source then testifies that he "was not conscious 
of leaving his body, but that his body, prone in a half wakefulness, 
seemed to have at that moment a fitting receptivity and response, by 
which his mind could become alert to the Truth and ultimate Reality 
within whose presence he stood. Above alle.nd surrounding all was 
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·sense of the vast supporting Personal Presence and Good Will, as if the 
absolute love of a gracious elder brother o:r FaJ,her, with whom 
conversation, communion, fellowship was joyous and.complete, a union 
that was peculiarly intellectual and moral. · When the privileged gather-
ing up and gathe1?1 subsided, and I found myself completely awake in 
the gray dawn of another real day, I was in a state of profound humility, a 
sense of benediction, and physical perspiration, yet thankful that such 
an experience, so unusual and unexpected, yet totally real, had been 
granted :rr.e. The descent from this height was accol)lpanied by new assur-
ance of the loving reality of God our heavenly Father, and a renewed 
purpose that intellectual and moral striving and love would be more sincere, 
intense, and continuing for me 11 • Testimonies to the Baptism of the Holy 
property in the history of Christianity, and there are parallels 
. Spirit are common/in '-dbher faiths. The testimony was that the experience 
just r~counted might possibly l:!2! interpreted in these terms, with the 
caution that such experiences, if they are real, should in no wise be 
abused by being inordinately saught, so· that attention is diverted from 
life's more practical and pressing tasks. 
He return now to the concluding paragraphs of Jones 1s moving report. 
"These two divergent aspects of mysticial expe'rience are very well 
brought to light by the two rival words for lo.YQ which have run through 
the whole history of Christian life and thought. Saint Paul took an 
ancient Greek word for love (b_gap~), often used in former times with a 
lower significance, and raised it to a unique height of reeaning. It 
becamer. especially in the thirteenth chapter of the First Corinthians, a 
new word and a new wonder, the full glory of which Christians themselves 
are only beginning to grasp. Agape lies at the heart of Christ's life 
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and in His parables. It is 'the thing itself' which we call Chris-
tianity. It expresses the movement of love d0vmward, from the Heart of 
God. It is the new splendor in God, the immense outreach of grace, which 
Christ has revealed. It is the perpendicular confrontation of man by 
the unfathomable love of God. It is spontaneous, uncalculating, ad-
venturing, sacrificial love, giving itself for others, not in return 
for merit, or desert, but just for love I s sake. We love, if in the 
true sense we do love, because the birth of God has taken place in us, 
'for God is Agape 1 • 
"Plato wrought a similar transformation in the other Greek word for 
love, .Ero~. This word usually rceant desire for the opposite sex --
1the maiden passion for a maid 1 ; it was essentially desire for some-
thing for the sake of the self. It was egocentric love. Eros, unlike 
.Agape, moves from below up. Plato, in a passage in the Sv111oosium ••• , 
which in its glory of style and beauty is one of the noblest pieces of 
prose in all literature, raised this Eros type of love to its loftiest 
meaning. Here Eros is the passion in us for eternal beauty, for eternal 
reality. \~ are here in this lowet world of sense, -- far from the tr~e, 
the beautiful, and the good, but we have in our inmost soul (Nous) 
something divine which makes us long for our true ho.tr,e, our dear Father-
land. This is the noblest message of Greek thought. It was caught in 
its fullest sense by Saint .Augustine and expressed in imperishable 
fashion in the opening words of his Confessions: 'Thou, 0 God, hast 
made us for Thyself and our hearts are restless until they find re st 
in thee'. That is the very heart of the urge of upward-striving 
mysticism. 
· 287 
11 There are, then, the two ways: the way down (Agape) and the way 
up (Eros), the double search. Both ways are essential to vital 
Christianity, but the most amazing thing is this Agape passion in the 
heart of God which the. greatest mystics have discovered and experienced. 
"The major difficulty these types of 'direct experience' have to 
face in the rough-and- tumble world, and even more in the world of 
exact science and in the laboratory of the psychologist, is the diffi-
culty of transmission, of establishing validity, of making an inner, 
private experience overt and explicit and universally convincing. A 
drama which is enacted in the soul of man, from the very nature of the 
case, cannot be made public for spectators in a stadium or be put on 
exhibition for a general audience. The .experience I am.talking about 
is not a conceptual type of knowledge, which can be brought under 
and transmitted to evgrybody. It is rather a penetration of spirit 
universal categories/through intimate fusion with the Object, by which 
the mind enters the stream of life itself and shares in its flow. It 
is knowledge. of acquaintance 1t1hich con:es I lifewise 1 , and it is tested 
the superabundance of life which attends it, the increased vitality, 
by/the extraordinary dynamic quality of it, the flare of radiant energy 
that corr.es with it, rather than by the new stock of ideas which can be 
communicated to others. 
"This must not be taken to mean that the experience in questi<:>n 
is reduced to a I feeling I or an emotion, or the active push of tbe will. 
The innermost nature of the whole undifferentiated self is in operation. 
It is the emergence of a new and deeper level of consciousness rather than 
the functioning of one aspect of mind. There is a matrix of the life of 
the mind (Nous) in us which under lies 1·bhinking I and I fee ling 1 and 1 willing 1 , 
out of which these processes err.erge. Knowledge and action always involve 
a wider context of experience. There is a foundational re.ental structure 
288 
in us, deeper than reasoning or arguing or proving, which is the·mother 
ground of our forms and categories. In this matrix consciousness v~e 
transcend, or fuse together·, subject and object, and live and move and 
possess ourselves in these moments of identity, which all great poets 
and creators as well as mystics experience. 
11 11v late friend, Professor Charles A. Bennett of Yale University, 
called this type · of experience the I total-working I of the mind, as 
contrasted with the 1part-working 1 which characterizes most of our mental 
operations. Bennett gives the following account of the 1total-working 
experience 1 : (1) In it the mind apprehends as a whole.· It is synop1,ic. 
It is intuitive, not analytic; noetic, not discursive. (2) The knowledge 
it confers is inarticulate and-cannot readily be translated into con-
ceptual terms. (3) Yet this knowledge is destined to become articulate, 
for the two types of knowlege are not incompatible, though they are 
distinguishable. (4) Even when inarticulate it is positive •••• 
11 I am standing ·forth as a. champion of the mystic I s experience, 
not because of the comfort and serenity which that experience brings. 
I am profoundly interested in it because I am convinced that at its 
highest and best it is a pathway to the truth of life and the reality 
of God. I believe and am persuaded that mind as self-conscious spirit 
has, as it emerges into being, brought with it something whose essential 
aspects are akin to eternal reality, that like knows like, and that, 
however far inland we may be from the shores of the Fatherland, ever 
the twain -- spirit with Spirit -- may meet •••• 
11 
•• What happens ••• is that the direct contact with the Fountain-
Source of life heightens the whole significance of life, reorganizes the 
content of the mind, melts and.fuses the materials of thought into new 
form and brings fresh creative power. This is seen especially in the 
lives of the greatest prophets of the race. They did not receive 
magically communicated messages or forcasts of the future. There was 
rather a creative fire kindled in their soul. They became the spiritual 
statesmen of their critical epoch. They saw God and then saw what the 
nation ought to be and §.g ••• 
11What I am concerned to maintain in this essay is the thesis that 
mystical experience may quite naturally be expected to occur from the 
fundamental nature of mind as self-conscious spirit in relation with 
its:-; ground and origin in the Over-World of Spirit ••• It is not an affair 
of a few rare souls, who possess a miraculous gift or endowment. It 
is the way rather of health and normality. The range and 'quality of 
the experience vary from low to high, from slight to mon:entous, as is 
true also in the sphere of aesthetics or mathematics, but some sort of 
comrr.erce, of mutual and reciprocal correspondence, with the Beyond 
attaches to our essential nature as persons ••••• 11 
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The Argument for the Personality of God: 
A Conclusion 
We have endeavored to show in the five great, traditional arguments for 
God the· existence of Ultimate Intelligence and Love. . .. • In this brief closing 
section we try to pull together or summarize the argument for the existence of 
God as Pernonal. Fe do this in the two over-all moods which we have indicated 
as the objective and empirical on the one hand, and as the subjective or §1 
priori on the other. Within this second mood we may generally include the 
religious argument just recounted, for it is, above all others, the especially 
subjective approach to knowledge of God, and we have found that it :i.s by no meam 
anti-rational or irrational. Indeed we have said that a religious argument woulc: 
have highest place among rational arguments themselves for God, since, if God is 
real, one of the highest expressions of his rational life and activity would be 
the direct disclosure to or connnunion of Himself with, his finite creatures, in 
the general way that religious arguments or mysticisms affirm. 
On the empirical side, then, ne may summarize and conclude in this way: 
Cosmic history and the ultimate meaning and nature of existence cnn be evaluated. 
by the emergence of finite personality. Indeed the hypothesis, that progress 
·toward the personal is the meaning and intent of cosmic process, has a general 
empirical foundation, which tends to throw the bv.rden of proof on those who 
deny it. This evidence is the existence of a world of manifold individualities, 
high among which stands man, as a creature of 11 personality11 , potential of fur-
ther personal development. Fe may then, with reasonable empirical assurance, 
conclude this stage of our sunnnary with these two broad, cosmological proposition; 
One, process is personal -- personality has appeared and is a dominant form 
of finite existence. 
:, ~· 
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Ttro, a personalized process sur,gests a personal explanation. It is hc1rd 
to explain the personal development that cosmic process manifestly is unless 
there be, as Bo,me once sa.id, a cosmic "coefficient of personality as a conditioD 
of the development11 • In other words, already suggested, the cosmic ground or 
conditions out of which personal beings come must be such as to make personal 
beings possible -- this would be our minimal empirical evaluation of ultimate 
reality. B~t further, the cosmic ground of being is no passive condition, but, 
looking at cosmic history on the whole, there is a general suggestion that it 
is an active condition, working with conscious foresight. Every-Kh:ere the 
conditions appear as a kind of active preparation for finite beinc to take the 
form of individuality and ultimately personality, as ·we think of atoms, or starn 
the emergence of plants and animals, and finally men. In brief, God as personal 
is known in His essential world-activity -- in His man-making. Activity is the 
essential medium of personality. And as any personc:lity other than our own is 
known by inference through its actions, in the environment tha,t it moves and 
orders, so the Infinite 1 s individuating and personality-making activity is wit-
ness to His unseen, Personal Presence. Such is the empirical argument for God 
in broadest terms. This summary just presented is similar to that c;iven at an 
earlier day by themodernAmerican idealistic and personalistic philosopher, 
Borden Parker B01me. 
On a more subjective, a priori, or immediate depth of insight some human 
beings believe they have a degree of innate awareness of a Supreme Being, whom 
we may call God, in the full persorn:ilistic meaning of that term; for ue are 
,aware a priori of certain fundamental things: 
At the depth of the causal argument 1,re found we i>rere aware of Ultimate 
Being, Power, Order, and Purpose as rational categories necessary to explain 
the existence and the coming to be of things as they are. First, in the depth 
of our mental life we know that nothing can come from nothing, which c;ives the 
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idea.of Absolute, Ultimate, or Eternal Being. Second, the general contingency 
of the world of nature.suggests a non-contingent Source and Origin, conceived 
either as a transcendent Reality or as an abidinc;, immanent Power of organization 
itself. Further, we know that mechanical, infinite regress· is not a sufficient 
explanation of the evolutionary unfolding or emergence of the worlds and the 
/;ri.)UL 
objects within them; nor can we rest with the;tdescription of the unfolding or 
emergence as an adequate explanation. Thus we arrive at the notion of Absolute 
Origination, Causality or PoHer. Third, still within the framewo·rk of ccsn:.olcg-
ical, or original, or ontological ideas we next become aware of P:cimordial Unit.:z 
or Order. Present relationships and integration implies original coherence and 
unity: ·our present order of the world. could not have arisen out of absolute or-
iginal disorder or chaos. Noreover, the principle of integration must be 
sufficient in its wisdom and power to account for the ·actual scope of integratior. 
we in fact find in our world, in order to explain the advanced areas of coherent 
groHth and evolution into higher wholes, culminat:ing; in life, mind, and finite 
persons. This. suggests Supreme Purposiveness. And the meaning of such purpos-
iveness 1fe grasp from our m·m interior sense of ideal ends or· truths, both 
scientific ,md moral, that urge our lives toward· the fulfillment of things 
wise and ,good. Such is our cutter and inner vision of the Supreme Actuality by 
which Aristotle named the cosmic reality 1'nd its process. 
l;Je cannot get this far in our s11minary without also having already implied 
the fullness of Truth.in Being that our experience of partial, but growing 
knowledge and increasing intellectual awareness of the world sugeests. Nor, when 
we move practically and particularly into the moral sphere of thinking, can we 
lorig remain unaware of the Ultimate Good or Righteousness implied in the moral 
. ' ·•, 
law of respect for persons, which governs life. Next, near the end of our 
searching, the concept of Absolute Love arises within us as ultimately character~, 
izing the previous meanings of ultimate Being and Order. For Absolute Love is 
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implied in the fact that we do exist and that the pooer behind or within the 
universe has seen fit to legislate existence rc1ther than non-existence, and 
further has made possible our personal existence,.and has striven to prepare 
the opportunities that bring us forth. Absolute Love is also further disclosed 
in the immediacy of religious mysticism, as the s~nse of the saving Presence 
and Pouer of God, emotionally 1 comes down, surrounds, and lifts us upward. 
Finally the full coherent breadth, . heighth and depth, of all the preceding range 
of thought and experience, and suffusing them with ultimate significance, is the 
awareness of Ultimate Person or Personal Spirit; for if the Fullness of Being, 
Power, Order, Truth, Goodness and Love are not 11 Personal11 , then ue have no way 
of lrnmving what 11 personality11 is. Tendint: to substantiate the final venture of 
rational faith we have the intuitive sense of the supreme worth of our own 
finite personal beings, and accordingly the sense that personal being must be 
the very foundation and structure of existence, its basic meaning and fact. 
God is the cosmic ground or condition, as we said a while ago, the ultimate set 
of relations, that makes finite personal beings possible, and judging by the 
influence of ideals in our lives, this Ground seems to see to it that process 
moves in the direction of moral persons as its outcome. God is the Greater 
Personality, of course, far more than we. The sense of ourselves as imperfect 
persons someone has said somewhere, persons in the making -- incomplete but 
growing in knowledge and character, or at least uith the possibilities of such 
growth, implies the Perfect or Ultimate Person, who becons from 1"Jithin, and 
from beyond, our imperfect expressions of intellect and love. The last few 
sentences have suggested the substance of the ttontological11 arguments for God 
from Plato, to Descartes, to Hocking, and many others. In sum, do we not 
discover God through various intellectual and practical perspectives? 
9 ( 
I 

Chapter Eight 
The Problem of Evil 
The Logical Problem 
And A Proapeoti vo Solution 
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If the world is created~integrated, and ordered by the power and love of a 
Divine Mind or Person, why is there evil? If there were no God, or if God were less 
than self-conscious, i.e. less than Personal,- loving mind, there would be no problem 
of evil intellectually speaking. There would in that case, of course, be a problem 
practically speaking; namely, the problem of how to get rid of specific evils, such 
as pain, mental disorder, social disharmony, and how to control floods, and winds, 
and earthquakes that destroy life and property. Only when God is postulated as 
the personal loving Creator and sustainer of e:xi stence, i.e. when conceived ::i.s an 
11all good" and 11 all-powerful1' Being, or as righteous omnipotence, does evil become 
an intellectual problem, viz. a problem for faith. The attempt to solve such a 
problem has traditionally been called a "Theodicy 11 ~ 
Theism must make adequate reply to the following, now classic, criticism of 
David Hume: 
.)/4-
(From Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion 1779) 
Demea: 11The whole earth, believe me, Phi los, is cursed and polutted. A 
perpetual war is kindled amongst all living creatures. Necessity, hunger, 
want, stimulate the strong and courageous: Fear, anxiety, terror, agitate 
the weak and infirm. The first entrance into life gives anguish to the new-
born infant and to its wretched parent: Weakness, impotence, distress, 
attend each stage of that life: and 'tis at last finished in agony and horror. 
"Observe too, says Philo, the curious artifices of Nature, in order 
to embitter the life of every living being. The stronger prey upon the 
weaker, and keep them in perpetual terror and anxiety. The weaker too, 
Fr om the Greek 1Theos 1 God, and 'dike 1 , justice. 
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in their turn, often prey upon the stronger, and vex and molest them without 
relaxation. Consider that innumerahle races of insects, which either are 
bred on the body of each animal, or flying about infix their stings in 
him. These insects have others still less than themselves, which torment 
them. And thus on each hand, before and behind, above and below, every 
animal is surrounded with enemies, which incessantly seek his misery and 
destruction. 
11Man alone, said Demea, seems to be, in part, an exception to this 
rule. For by combination in society, he can master lions, tigers, and 
bears, whose greater strength and agility naturally enable them to prey 
upon him. 
11 0n the contrary, it is here chiefly, cried Philo, that the uniform 
and equal maxims of Nature are most apparent. • •• Man is the greatest enemy 
of mana Oppression, injustice, contempt, contumely, violence, sedition, 
war, calumny, treachery, fraud; by these they mutually torment each other: 
and they would soon dissolve that society which they had formed, were it not 
for the dread of still greater ills, which must attend their separation. 
11 But though these external insults, said Demea, from animals, from 
men, from all the elements, which assault us, form a frightful catalogue 
of woes, they are nothing in comparison of those, which arise within 
ourselves, from the distempered condition of our mind and body. How many 
lie under the lingering torment of diseases? Hear the pathetic enumeration 
of the great poet. 
'Intestine stone and ulcer, colic pangs 
Demoniac frenzy, moping melancholy, 
And moon-struck madness, pining atrophy, 
Marasmus and wide-wasting pestilence •. 
Dire w2s the tossing, deep the groans: Despair 
Tended the sick, busiest from couch to couch. 
And over them triumphant Death his dart 
Shook, but delay1d to strike, tho' oft invok 1d 
With vows, as their chief good and final hope 1 
(Milton: Paradise Lost, XI) 
11Were a stranger to drop, on a sudden, into this world, I 'Would show 
him, as a specimen of its ills, an hospital full of diseases, a prison 
crowded with malefactors and debtors, a field of battle strewed with car-
cases, a fleet. foundering in the ocean, a nation languishing under 
tyranny, famine, or pestilence •••• 
11And is it possible, Cleanthes, said Philo, that after all these 
reflections, and infintely more, which might be suggested, you can still 
persevere in yourAnthropomorphism, and assert the moral attriubtes of the 
Deity, his justice, benevolence, mercy, and rectitude, to be of the same 
nature with these virtues in human creatures? His power we allow infinite: 
whatever he wills is executed: but neither man nor any other animal is 
hapoy: therefore he does not will their. happiness. His wisdom is infinite: 
he. is never mistaken in choosing the means to any end: but the course of 
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nature tends not to human or animal felecity: therefore it is not estab-
lished for what purpose. Through the whole compass of human knowledge, 
there are no inferences more certain than these. In what respect, then, 
do his benevolence and mercy resenble the benevolence and mercy of men? 
Epicurus' old questions are yet unanswered. 
Is he willing to prevent evil, but not able? Then is he impotent. 
Is he able, but not willing? then is he malevolent. Is he both able 
and wi 11 ing? whence then is evi 1? •••••••• 
11 No! replied Cleanthes, No! ........ 
t1The only method of supporting divine benevolence (and it is what 
I willingly embrace) is to deny absolutely the misery and wickedness of 
man. Your representations are exaggerated: Your melancholy views mostly 
fictitious: Yourinferences contrary to fact and experience. Health is 
more common than sickness: Pleasure than pain: Happiness tr.an misery. 
And for one vexation, which we meet with, we attain, upon computation, 
a hundred enjoyments. 
11Admitting your position, replied Philo, which yet is extremely 
doubtful, you must, at the same time, allow that, if pain be less 
frequent than pleasure, it is infinitely more violent and durable. One 
· hour of it is often able to outweigh a day, a week, a month of our 
common insipid enjoyments: And how many days, weel-rn, and months are 
passed by several in the most acute torments? Pleasure, scarcely in one 
instance, is ever able to reach ecstasy and rapture: And in no one 
instance can it continue for any time at its highest pitch and altitude. 
The spirits evaporate; the nerves relax; the fabric is disordered; and the 
enjoyment quickly degenerates into fatigue and uneasiness. But pain 
often, good Cod, how often! rises to torture and agony; and the longer 
it continues, it becomes still more genuine agony and torture. Patience 
is exhausted; courage languishes; melancholy seizes us; and nothing 
terminates our misery but the removal of its cause, or another event, 
.which is the sole cure of all evil, but which, from our natural folly, we 
regard with still greater horror and consternation11 (Hume: Selections 
m/1,,p. 360-368): 
Whether God's relation to the world be conceived in more idealistic or monistic 
terms, or in pluralistic or realistic terms -- in other words, whether He exercises 
control by an immediate immanence of being, or by sheer transcendent or transitive 
power -- He is still responsible for his world. Theism on either terms must answer 
the qu~stion why G~d ·has created, or brought forth from Himself, a world with the 
possibility of evil process within H; i.e. why He has made the world as it is. 
*Hume, Selections, ed. by Charles w.Hend$l, Scribners, p. 360-368 
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Materialists and sceptics have formulated the problem in terms of a dilemma. We 
heard Hume say above: 
11E.picuru.fs_old questions are yet unanswered. 
Is he LGo~/ willing to prevent evil, but not able? then is he 
impotent. Is he able, but not willing? then is he malevolent. 
Is he both able and willing? whence then is evil ••• 11 
Some theists, notably Edgar S. Brightman and others in modern times/ frankly 
accept one horn of this dilemma, namely, the first proposition: 
11If God is all-good, he is not all-powerful''• 
Brightman claims that, though God is all good with respect to his intentions for the 
world, He is not all powerful in His ability to deal with evil by perfectly controlling 
process. This is known as the doctrine of the finite God. (Theism, of course, could 
not accept the second propositions, that 1 if God is all-powerful, he is not all-good'.) 
We will consider the doctrine of the finite God presently. Suffice it for now to ask: 
Need, theism accept the dilemma by accepting this horn? The dilemma may be countered, 
we will argue, by passing through or 11 escaping between the horns", as logical studies 
phrase one method of dealing with logical dilemmas. This type of reply to Hume's 
dilemma is accomplished by a third proposition, involving the idea of God I s self-
limi tation, which may not impale us on either horn. 
We pose, as our type of solution, an alternative hypothetical proposition whfch 
ty-r,asses the horns of the Lucretius-Hume dilemma, and possibly states a truer picture 
of the cosmic order than the 'finite God' idea: 
~*" E.g. John Stuart Mill, F. C. S. Schiller, William James, Henri Bergson, Alfred North 
Whitehead, A. Tsanoff, Peter A. Berte.cci. (See Brightman APR, P• 295-301 for 
discussion of the history of theistic fin~tism.) 
If G.QQ. :i,s 1all-good 1 §ind 1all-powerful!4 • His relation' to the world ma~ 
Q!.)..§LQf self-limitation. 
Indeed, we will end up by believing that it must~ one of self-limitation, if 
God is 'all-good', that is, conceived to be moral in character. Brightman would call 
such a position "theistic absolutism". To avoid problems suggested by the word 11 ab-
solutism11, however, to which we have previously pointed, we believe it better to 
refer, more simply, to the idea of the adequacy of God's Goodness and Power. Before 
we present this type of theodicy, which refbcts the main spirit of the classic 
.>c 
tradition", we will first consider Brightman I s view of the finite God. Our procedure 
will be to reverse the usual way the subject of evil is divided for· discussion, 
namely into the problem of: 
(1) Moral evil, or why man's inhwnanity to man is permitted by a good and just, 
creative Father? and 
(2) Natural evil, or why the pain and suffering inflicted by disease, natural 
calamity, abortive and inept physical process, is sanctioned by such a God? 
\Je will begin with the deeper, or more difficult level of this problem as suggested 
in No. 112 11 above -- natural evil -- and subsequently deal with level "l1', the prob-
lem of moral evil. 
i• In Biblical thought, some aspects of Augustinian philosophy, and in many modern 
theologians, such as, Albert C. Knudson, D. C. Macintosh, F. R. Tennart, Harris 
Franklin Rull, and, more recently, John H. Hick. 
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The Thendicy nf the 1Finite 1 God* 
Brightman uses the alternative expressions 11finite God" and 11 finit!:l-infinite 
Godn. ** The following sentence describes the finite and the infinite features: 
God is a Person supremely conscious, supremely valuable, 
supren:ely creative, yet limited bo,th by the free choices *it>" 
of other persons and by restrictions within his own nature. " 
By,the first clause, Brightman doubtless means for one thing that, in compari-
son to man, God is supreme in consciousness, value, and creative activity. Also 
God is supre~e simply as the creative source of the world. Although from an ultimate 
if 1t 1}-¾- • 
standpoint of faith, God may be the creative source of the world, for Brightman, 
when we corr.e to wrestle with the problem of evil, in looking at the details of God I s 
relation to the world in its present temporal process, we must refine our definition 
of Deity. In Brightman I s system we therefore have God presented as F.tbsolute in his 
will for good but finite in his power, with the area of creation not yet fully under 
the divine control called 11the Given11 • 11 If we suppose the power of God to be finite, 
but his will for good infinite, we have a reasonable explanation of the place of 
%i}i*** 
surd evils in the scheme of things". 
The second and third parts of the previous quotation summarize the deeper way 
Brightman understands God to be limited or finite. One suggestion is that if this 
is a universe of many persons, God is, by definition, limited in a sense by others' 
* Edgar S. Brightman, The Problem of God (1930); A Philosoohy of Religion (1940). 
*-l~ Bri~htman, The ProblE3m of God (PG), 1930, p. 127 & 191. 
-iHrn Brightman, PG, p. 113 and see p. 124. 
*-iHH} For example see Brightman, PhR, p •. 332 and esp. 337. 
,HB}H Brightman, PhR, p. 319. And see p. 313. 
;•" 
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point 
free choices. : Another/is that limitation,is characteristic of 'personality' in 
21.nd of itself, and that would include, again by definition, the divine case as well 
as the human. This may be summed by saying that, to Brightman, the finiteneS./' of 
conscious personality as we know it in ourselves is the central clue or analogy 
among "four main types of evidence" for the finite God. >Hr The four types of evidence 
adduced by Brightman are: 
The religious evidence runs to the effect that the attitude of human worship 
itself has sometin;es suggested a dark, unfathomable side of God.'-HH, Brightman cites 
the experience of some mystics, who, while in the mystic rapture or ecstasy, in ex-
periencing God as supreme Good or Love, felt a terrifying, dark, abysmal depth in 
Divine. Presence. Another line of evidence is that all process, natural and historic, 
is movement and contrasting movement; thesis, antithesis, and then synthesis, effort, 
opposition, and victory on a higher level. This historic 11 dialectic 11 of contro.dic-
tion and struggle reminds us of the Hegelian theory of the life of the Absolute, but 
principally reflects the fact that God struggles, is sufferer. God's ngoodness 
is not merely an abstract quality but the constant victory of constant effort 11 • 
A further and very decisive evidence are "the facts of evolution" in detail. 
Disteleology and surd evil in its process positively prove that the Creative power 
is at least delayed, 11 a spirit in difficulty", .itir:zr~lo: in its progr€if.l of world build.:. 
,:. Brightman, PG, p. 131-5; PhR, p. 364-5. 
,H:. Brightman, PG, P. 126. 
*1H< Brightman, PG, p. 136-8. See Brightman, Th~ Finding of Ggd (FG), 1931, p.115f 
and chapters VIII and IX. 
,HHHH* Brightman, PG, p. 135. 
,HHHHH< Brightman, ·pa, p. 126-31 and see PhR, Chapter X. 
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But centrally important in the hypothesis of the finite God is the 
c'.lue that the nature of consciousness itself offers. BriGhtman says., 
"Assuming ••• that there is a personal God, I wish to show from the nature of conscious-
ness that he must be finite 11 • ,,, At this level of analysis, he pre sen ts two reasons 
which in general describe the Divine Personality from the finitistic point of view. 
(1) The fact of human freedom impels him to write: :1t ••• confidently I express the 
view that if man is truly free, God must be finite as regards his knowledge ••• Han's 
freedom .is an actual limitation on the foreknowledge of God 11. '-'* But more profoundly 
than the fact of freedom on just man's side, there is the implication of what free 
consciousness would mean anywhere - even in God. If God himself, as a personal 
consciousness, is free, there is much in the example of human choice, with its re-
sults that go beyond our powers of prediction and control (making us tragically 
'finite'), that suggests nsomething analogous in the divine freedom, although only 
remotely So rr • .:lHH< Th" f th t G d h • • f lt 1s assumes, o course, a o c oases in ignorance o resu s, 
as human choice is often made. Brightman concludes that God I s 11foreknowledge t1 is 
1 . . t d -ll-*1<* 1mi e • 
(2) The 11 nature II of God (as one 1 s nnature t1 does for any conscious being) con-
ditions and limits His 11will'1. This "nature II is composed of His reason, His temporal 
' ,,1;7~ 
activity, and 11 the Givenn. Apparently here Brightman uses the word 11 limit 11 in a 
particularly literal sense. Accordingly, if God's nature limits His will, God must 
be conceived as finite in His Power. He attempt to illuminate the point in greater 
depth by the following analysis. 
* Brigh~man, PG, p. 131. 
** Brightman, PG, p. 1.32. 
Brightman,PG, p. 131-2. 
,HH, ii- Brightman, PG, p. 131-2. 
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All consciousness possesses active and passive factors. In our human case it 
is clear that the passive is due to a considerable extent to senso.tion. .In God I s 
case, we cannot attribute an external factor, such as sensation, but must resolve 
the problem by believing that there is the passive, contrary factor within the Divine 
Nature itself, thus explaining the struggle of creation throughout cosmic history. 
11We must 11 ; he wrote, 11 acknowledge a duality of nature at the very eternal heart of 
things, in which the active is indeed in control, but maintains its control with 
struggle and pain. 11 '~ 
The above description may be summarize in Brightman I s own words: 11Every person, 
· d h h 'l t b t f" d n** .human or ivine, as experiences which is wi 1 does no 12roduce. u in s. 
own conscious personalities are analogous to the finite-infinite consciousness of 
God. 
This, then, is the structure of our human spirits; they are 
active wills dealing with passive experience and laws. Our 
activity is directed on the content of sensation, ond is sub-
ject to the limits of rational possibility. He are thus finite 
beings; whose wills are limited by what is given to them; yet 
we are also in some ways capable of the infinite. Not only can 
vre grasp the meaning of the mathematical infinite, but vre can also 
think of eternal and self-sufficient beings. Our ovm spirit 
with its active-passive nature is also finite-infinite. Now the 
faith with which religious idealism confronts experience su:sgests 
that the small segment of the universe which we call ourselves 
is truly a sample of what the whole universe is.*** 
Brightman's is a vigorous and cou~ageous attempt to deal realistically with 
Our 
the problem of evil at its most acute spot - the surd, unnecessary evils of physical 
process. He believes that only theistic finitism can cope adequately with such 
facts as cancer, or the enormous waste and cruelty disclosed in the evolutionary 
history of the world. Back of Brightman I s discussion, of course, lies the classic 
* Brightman, PG, p. 134-5. 
Brightman, PhR, p. 364. 
Brightman, ~sonality and Religion, Abingdon, 1934, P• 83 
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the Epiourea11s, 
attack on the ism by / . and in modern times by Hume, in termn of the logical 
dilemma that - given the world as we find it - either God is not all-power:ful, if 
all good; or He is not all-good if all powerful. Brightman solves the: ,dd:l~ by 
,.3.ccepting the first horn of the dilemma, in order to save the goodness of God. As 
an historical analogue to his principle of the Given, he uses Plato's concept of the 
'material receptacle I found in Timaeus. However, he avoids the sugzestion of world-
dualism in Plato by affirming that the material element must somehow be within God, 
who constitutes a 11monism of purpose and personal identity11 _-~ The Given refers to 
God's nunwilled, non-voluntary consciousness 11 • ** Brightman feels that this solution 
rroceeds along empirical lines and is the most coherent interpretation of the co-
existent facts of good and evil in our world.'ll''l'l''!t' 
In conclusion., Brightman believes that the Finite God is progressively over-
coming evil, through the work of moral salvation and the material elimination of 
evil. God's spirit, the cosmic source of value and personal being, works through men 
of good will, in both the moral and the scientific areas, in a joint effort of bring-
ing evil under more and more control.· Although Brightman was primarily a ·philosopher 
of religion, who attempted to find answers to the questions of existence through 
rational inquiry~above and beyond any specific religious tradition, he did, however, 
in the lo~;::;lysis, fip.g, po.rticular inspiration in the Christian theological outlook~ 
* Brightman, PhR, p. 339. 
** In hisj'hilodophy of Religion, Brightman lists the context of the 'Given' aspect 
of God as: - P• 337 
1. "the eternal uncreated laws of reason11 • 
2. "the eternal and uncreated processes of non-rational consciousnessn - e.g. 
- "sense objects'' or qualities _ _ 
-
11 disorderly impulses and drivesn Lthe sub-consciou11/ 
- "pain and suffering 11 
-
11 space and time 11 
3. "Whatever in God is the source of surd evil". 
Brightman, PhR, P• 309 & 314. 
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;esus's ·teaching o:f love, nnd the centrcl Chri.stian idea of suffering_., or the Cross, 
~vonJ.d s;ymbolizo for Brightman, tho wny God is 11 nlowly nnd painfully!! overcoming 
, ... \..,.. t 
the ovils of tho world,* .. 
_Criticism of Bright121a:n I s Finite God: (1) Is a limited, or finite God the ad-
equate object of religious devotion or whorship? If it is true that God has such 
a dark or unruly , Given side, this would be the less admirable aspect of the Divine 
nature. How, consequently, could the religious emotion, implying reverence and de-
votion to a 11 holy 11 and an adequate Divine Reality arise? (We have heard Brightman I s 
reply that the religious emotion itself, 1rhere it implies acknowledgement of 11 mystery'1 
er incalculable depth in God, supports his theory.) (2) Brightman claims that a 
finite God is a more 11 coherent 11 solution to the problem of evil than a belief holding 
to the 11 infinite 11 power as well as the infinite goodness of God. But is it? Would 
not Brightman I s 11Given 11 put God at variance with, or within, himself? Brightman I s 
description of the Given leaves us with a God who is not rationally coherent. How 
does the Given relate coherently to God I s absolute ·will for good? If God has such 
an absolute will for good, could He not do something, more promptly and directly, 
about his own Given by bringing it under his complete control? How in this theory 
does the 11 imperfect 11 relate to the more uperfect" side of God? 
We summarize our criticism by saying that Brightman I s is net a pure finitism, 
based on a 1netaphysioal dualism,·· as, .for example, were. the Platonic or the Zoroastrian 
systems; or that,of the Sankhya Hindus. Brightman splits the personality of God in 
such a way that the outcome is not coherent, as he anxiously hopes that it might be.%* 
As Knudson suggested, to escape a duality of the world, a metaphysical duality, 
• *1H< Brightman posits a duality in God, a theological duality. ' He separates the Divip.e 
Experience from the Divine Will in such a way as to leave us with a difficult antinomy. 
Fould not God I s Hfinite power 0 , as Brightman defines it, reflect adversely upon the 
hJJothesis of His .11infinite goodness"? 
* Nature and Values, Abingdon, Cokesbury, 1945, p. 165-166. 
*~, c--;;-~pare Brightman, PG, p. 185-7. 
*,H, Knudson, DG, p. 273-5; Brightman's system ilcan hardly be regarded as satirfactory 
either religiously or intellectual1y 11 • 
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It is precisely the concept of God 1 s 11goodness 11 that leads us to the alternative 
· solution to the nroblem already outlined, namely, that if God is 'all good' (by 
which we mean c·ceative Agape), He, as moral rationality, 11 limits 11 Himself in His 
relation to his finite, but moral, tha,t is,, freely developing world. Accordingly, 
,} 
Brightman (and before him Hurne, et al.) Jhave confused, and mistated the problem 
of evil, in terms of the dis.iunctive proposition: 'God is either all good, or all 
powerful' -- whereas we pose the forn:er, and possibly simplor, .b:lpothetical pro-
position as the proper way to state the solution to the problem of evil: If God 
is morally adequate as Creator and sustainer of the world, His relation to it must 
ce one of moral self-limitation or forbearance. In what follows we elaborate this 
type of theodicy. 
God, Freedom, and Pain* 
For many people the problem of evil is a major stumbling block to belief in 
God.. A history professor asks, 1)hy did a good God permit Hitler to incinerate 
millions of Jews? A parishoner wants to know why his beloved wife must lie dying 
of cancer? A femal Pepsis wasp plunges its stin~er into its tarantula victim, in-
jecting just enough venom to paralyze, but not to kill, the spider host, so that 
the wasp larvae may eat the living but helpless body. Why has the syphilis germ 
come to be in the course of the evolution of life? It lives, survives, and thrives 
only in higher organic hosts, which are its victims. Treat so:me kinds of bacterial 
disease with our moder 11 miracle drugs 11 and, in reaction to the medication, mutating 
genes produce· new, hardier strains of the destructive microbe. Why is there pain--
eapeciallywhen it seems "excessive, 11 11 prolonged 11 and 11 unnecessary 11 ? If God is 
good and loving, and if His power is adequate, Why is there physical and rr.ental 
suffering in our world? If the evolutionary process is the divinely appointed, 
,i, fhis essay first appeared in The Harvard Theological Review, April 1962, P. 
143-159. 
c:coative :,:ethod, why has so much of it taken a course of brutality and aggression: 
Raising the question at the most fundamental level of process, Why has evolution 
taken place by 11 mutations11 , many of which must be classified as 11evil" when they 
reSLLl..t in the suffering of living forms? For many minds the fact of pain, and b.ack 
of it, the phenomenon of 0 evil 11 , or 11 inept 11 mutation remains the unhealed core of the 
problem of evil, and a barrier to religious faith. 
Theistic faith must make adequate reply to the inquiry of sincere doubt regard-
ing pain, and one of its more obvious cosmic origins in what we here provisionally 
cP.11 11evil mutations 11 • Facing the fact of pain in our world, are there rational 
@:rounds for belief in the ioving goodness and the sufficient Power of a Creative 
Person? 
The type of argument upon which one form of Personalistic Theism has tradition-
ally relied, is to say that pain is basically a good, not an evil. (Recall that we 
have rejected the concept of 11 the finite God 11 as religiously inadequate.) It is a 
normal kind of organic--and psychic--mechanism that prompts adjustment to unfavorable 
situations. Pain is a warning, a· 11 red flag 11, as it is often explained, to all forms 
of finite life that something is going wron:s, that danger is near, and that steps 
should be taken to remove the d:rnger, or get out of its way9 As the late Douglas 
Clyde Yiacintosh wrote, ''a special sort of sensation, sharply stimulating to change, 
is called for, 11 if finite life is to survive. Uould infant animal life without the 
pain reflex have much chance to reach maturity? ~edical science has discovered that 
persons with low pain reflexes are constantly in grave danger of injury and disease. 
While the foregoing argureent, which points to the general purposive value of 
:r:;ain, seems reasonably true or satisfactory, theism must respond in more extensive 
way to a number of questions, and logical alternatives, which its sincere critics 
:i:'aise. The present discussion attempts to meet some of these issues concerning 
r,.. ural evil, and centers po..rticularly on the questions, why pain as such seems 
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necessary in our kind of world; why there is sometimes intense and prolonged pain; 
and finally why evil mutatlons which give rise to pain occur in process. 
The necessity of the pain reflex constitutes one of the most important ideas 
in the solution to the problem of evil from the standpoint of theistic philosophy. 
Sometimes, however, theism hears from its critics that, logically or ideally speak-
ing, pain may be unnecessary; that the world of life could have been constructed on 
some other plan than that of the pain reflex. To this kind of question theism would 
reply: consider whether some alternative to pain is rationally conceivable in our 
kind of finite, developmental world? 
A life of llsensation11 seems to imply pain as a possibility. Pain is the nneg-
ative 11 aspect of sensory life. It arises when senses are over- or excessively stim-
ulated. Given finite sensation, po.in and pleasure, are its intrinsic meaning. 
Sensory life implies possible pain. What, for example, would the situation hnve 
been were there no pain reflex in sight, eating, or breathing? Staring wide-eyed 
at the sun (a temptation which living beings with eyes do have) without a pain reflex 
relative to sight, would have resulted in destroyed organs of vision. Or consider 
the fundamental process of eating. Had there been no pain reflex in the elementary 
form of hunger, or in connection with the eating of harmful substances, it is diffi-
cult to see how life could have survived. Had there been no pain reflex accompanying 
breathing as an elementary aspect of life, it is again hard to understand how there 
could have been life at all. Pain seems to be a normal, inevitable, and valuable 
kind of experience for individual sentient forms. On a basic moral level the experi-
ence of pain seems important too. If the baby pulls the cat's tail, there are painf'ul 
reprisals for the infant, teaching it that other sentient individualities are in 
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existence too, whose life and feelings must be respected. Can a finite world of our 
kind of sentience and individuality be conceived without the pain reflex? · It seems 
to this analyst impossible, theoretically, to imagine or construct a world without 
pain. 
At this point, the sincere critic of theism might change his direction of in-
quiry to ask: Why did not God (or nature, if she is benevolent) produce organs of 
vision which would have withstood the destructive penetration of too direct and 
prolonged exposure to solar rays, or human stomo.chs that might have "digested" tacks, 
rocks, or dirt, with no ill or pe.inful effects; or create arm. bones big and strong 
enough to have lifted mountainsides, or be able to ,·ithstand the crusing fall of a 
tree? Such questions as these may be summarized by asking, 1rJhy ar'e not living forms 
more substantial in physical power and capabilities'? Could not God have made them 
this way? Essentially, the question implies, Why is not life more 11 infinite 11 than 
it is? And the reply of theistic faith could be to point out that finite life is, 
by definition, situated in a surrounding llenvironment 0 • Hhere would the critic stop, 
short of the very infinite itself, in his hypothesis that living forms could, and 
should have been made more substantial? An arm bone, for example, of any finite 
size or degree of strength is always ill§ substantial than some feature of the envi-
ronment that surrounds it, and may be a source of evil to it. Any degree of health 
of a fin,ite creature, has, by definition, its upper limit, given boundaries of space 
and time, qualities of temperature, of wat~r or atmospheric media in which it lives 
including the nature and character of beings, fqrces, or organisms external to it. 
The concepts of 11 healthu, 11 staminau, or 11 immunity 11 have meaning only in.relation to 
the characteristics of the environment which a living being inhabits. Qualities of 
environment, temperature and weather, diminishing or changing food supplies., hostile 
organiems or non-living forces, may con:e to exceed what an organism can sustain in 
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health, endurance, or iwJUunity. Environment, therefore, m2ans that there is some-
thing that limits life from the outside, that restricts, hampers, and confines it; 
that upon occasion bombards, afflicts, and blasts, calling for, as Macintosh wrote, 
as a rational promise of life, a 11 special sort of sensation, sharply stimulo.ting to 
change." This proposition seems supported by coherent experience, and the 11facts 11 
of life, at least in terms of all that the world llfact 11 and 11finite life 11 can possibly 
mean to us. 
Still, however, the critic of the proposition that pain is rationally necessary, 
given a finite world, might raise a third theoretical possibility at this level of 
our argU!J":ent. Why, he might continue, could not the Creator have instituted some 
more pleasant type of 11warning 11 , or sensation, or experience, that would have "sharply 
stimulated change 11 ? Is it not possible, for instance, to conceive of the principle 
of sensory 11 pleo.sure II or 11 good feeling", to have been a sufficient stimulus of change 
in the presence of dangerous circumstances and forces? Might we not conceive, for 
example, of some neutral device, like the flashing of a vision of amber 11 light 11 in 
the mind when danger, either internally or e~ernally, is present to the organism, 
as a sufficient or adequate warning? 
To this phase of the question the theist would reply that part of the logical 
meaning of "pleasure 11 (and the hypothetical, mental light above mentioned would be 
a kind of neutral pleasure, warning of danger) is also the possibility of its opposite 
or deprivation of pleasure; and if deprivation is extreme or acute enough, do we not 
have the pain concept on our hands a,5ain? It must be admitted, of course, that the 
feeling of positive good or pleasure, or its anticipation, is for livins beings 
often sufficient stimulation to import~nt modes of action and change of situation. 
This is true in anticipation of sexual pleasure, normally of eating pleasure, or 
si:rr.ply in the anticipation of a pleasant swim on a warm day, and many such other 
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pleasures. Does anticipation, however, of reere pleasure seem sufficient in cases 
of :cmdden and acute physical crisis? Uhen the boulder is loosened and is plunging 
doirm the mountain side toward a man, there is needed the anticipation of acute pain, 
and even of total loss of life, in order to stimulate sufficiently quick chan1e to 
a place of safety. (Integral to · this kind of experience is, of course, also the 
anticipation of the well-being or "pleasure II that will be experienced in the safe 
spot when it is reached as one realizes that one has narrowly escaped. serious 
injury and perhaps even death.) In such circumstances, the fear of the danger and 
consequent pain seems to be a logically integral or necessary coefficient in our 
formula, 11a necessary stin,ulus of change. 11 
What 1:1e have just said suggests the problem of "psychic pain, 11 e.g. fear, dis-
appointment, realization of one 1s ignorance of facts which are necessary to one's 
survival, etc. Here again our insight is that psychic pains are logical implications 
of finite existence as such, and of its basic will to live. If there is finite life 
at all, or desire to live, implied in such life is fear of forces that may assail it; 
disappointment when drives toward objectivas are frustrated_; frustration when one 
realizes that he is ignorant of the facts vital to fulfillment of drives. In sum, 
neither physical nor psychic pain is avoidable, given finite existence; integral to 
the logic of finite existence is the pain reflex, on both a physical and psychic 
level. 
The Problem of Intense Pain 
Having discussed the general necessity or. rationality of the pain reflex in a 
developmental world of finite, or limited sentient individualities, based on finite 
structure and the possible breakdown of structure, we must next consider the problem 
of what may seem to be, from the standpoint of a sufferer, 11excessive 11 , 11 unnecessary 11 , 
:nm 
or intensified and prolonged pain. If God is good and loving, and if his power is 
adequate, why is there in our world such pain, e • 1 • as caused by cancer and other 
debilitating and uselessly prolonged disease, bodily and mental? Such have been 
called 11 surd 11 or irrational evils. The deeper aspect of the question, as we have 
already indicated, concerns evil mutation. 
In speaking to these issues, we should distinguish two levels of concern: There 
is (a) the problem of the "intense pain 11 or the suffering itself as such, and (b) ·. 
the somewhat broader problem of the cosmic causes or agents of such suffering as 
cancer and other disease. Ultimately the causes of pain are disease germs, chemical 
imbalances or deficiencies, and the mutations that have given rise to disease germs 
or weakness of body. 
(a) The problem of why intensified, or prolonged pain, which we may be inclined 
to call excessive or unnecessary, exists in our kind of world is in part a semantical 
problem. We do not mean by 11 semantical 11 to rule out the emotional and sentient 
reality of such pain, but we should make the effort to clarify terms precisely so 
that we may understand just exactly what the intention is of such expressions as 
11excessive n or 11 unnecessary 0 , relative to pain. 
Commonly, these terms indicate the point beyond which continued pain ceases to 
be a mere warning, or fails to contain ren:edial good as warning. Sentiently and 
emotionally to mariysufferers there is pain which seems 11 excessive II or 11 unnecessary. 11 
Such expressions refer to intense discomfort beyond the .apparent usefulness or pur-
•ing 
pose of pain as a necessary, biologically sharp stimulation urgently cal1/for change. 
Scientifically considered, however, the logic of pain in a finite world implies the 
possibilitv of its intensiveness under certain conditions. Accordingly, if intensity 
in pain is nossible, the situation should not suggest the moral failure of the 
Creator, or His world. The term intensity is one of necessary description and simple 
fact. The problem of "excessiveness" of pain should really be stated as the problem 
of 11 intensity 11 of pain. 
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Finite process must sometin;es suffer 11 intense pain11 as an extreme possibility of 
sensitivity's very nature and rationale, This is understood when we realize that 
pain reflex has a range, from 11 mild 11 to 11 intense 11 • Given the pain reflex in general, 
as a necessary form of experience, if finite beings are to learn to survive in an 
environmental world, it seems obvious or reasonable that pain reflex have a ran~e. 
fo general philosophic terms, degree of organization is the coefficient of pain; 
pain is an accompaniment of broken structure or smashed integration. \!hen ingressive 
forces are violent enough and organic integration is complex enough, pain will be 
severe or intense, as the inevitable resultant of violent and extensive breakdown 
of normal, organic balances or structure. A mechanical kind of analogy (though, of 
course, it must not be pressed too far) may assist us at this place. The collapse of 
an apartment house, with its high degree of organization and complexity, would cer~ · 
tainly be a 11greater 11 , more _"severe O , or "intense II kind of destruction than the fall 
of three matchsticks propped up to support each other. This may illustrate the prob-
lem of extreme pain. Acute pain indicates that larger destructive forces are at work 
upon, or within, the organism, and at areas which threaten greatly the total organ-
ism and its continued life as a whole. Given finite sentient (and psychic) integra-
tion, pain must be proportional, more or less, to the amount of disintegration and 
the degree of violence of the agressing or ingressing forces that disrupt organic 
tissue and processes. 
In swnmation thus far, it seems to this writer that the possibility of "intense 
pain" is a rational corollary inhering in the pain reflex itself, which seems neces-
sary to finite sentient life, in its limited, but high degree of organization and 
complexity. Given the factors of finite sentient life and its implied pain reflex, 
it follows that such reflex will have a range, with its uppel:' levels. That a greater 
pain should call attention to a greater danger seems of logical value. That pain 
have a range, and upon occasion may reach a level of ttsevere intensi ty""'seems a ration-
~-
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al consequence of the finite structuredness of existence. Intensity of pain refers 
to the possible range of negative sensitivity which the sensitivity principle implies., 
It is questionable whether we should ever use the term "excessive II or "unneces-
sary" relative to p1:3-in. Pain is always logically llnecessary," if organic beings are 
to be duly warned of threatening destructive forces. If those forces are larger, more 
aggressive themselves, the pain involved becomes simply mor~ necessa.r.y, rather than 
less., Frequently, the idea of unnecessary pain refers to excess or intensity of its 
duration, and accordingly we should speak next of this. 
The problem of prolonged pain, or intense pain temporally, like the preceding 
problem of extremity in "amount" or 11 quantity 11 , is best understood in terms of its 
logical possibility, given a world of sentient cxper:lence. The fact is that finite 
sentient existence is dominated by the basic will-to-live. Aggressive forces of 
disease, when they attack organisms, attack this, the deepest and strongest principle 
of finite existence--the will to live, the struggle to be. It seems inevitable that 
the conflict may be, and often is, prolonged, or temporally severe, when aggressive 
forces a.re violent and the breakdown of integration is extensive. By 11will-to-live 11 , 
of course, we do not mean fully conscious or voluntary command over the issues of 
our own life or death, as a possibility of direct or imreediate, internal willing. 
He cannot will our death as a normal possibility; although the voluntary or mental 
giving way of the desire to live is a frequent precursor of organic death. The depth 
of the will to live is psychically sub-conscions and rooted in the organic. In cases 
of intense suffering, there is frequently hone that the illness, or the affliction, 
or adversity, may abate, disclosing the stubborn will to live. The hope is normal; 
without it life could never have survivJd. The conflict of life 1 s hope with the 
hazards of existence is our reason for the prolongation, often times, of pain. 
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It must be granted, o:f course, that there comes a point when hopelessness may 
set in, and at this point the wisdom and humaneness of the medical prolongation of 
life which is hopelessly suffering may be questioned. Prior to the days of modern 
medicine, 11 hopeless sufferers" died more promptly. Of course, "hopeless suffering" 
is a factor of inverse proportion to the extent of medical knowledge. It is not an 
absolute quotient, and the glory of modern medicine is that the elements of hopeless-
ness, intensity, and necessity of suffering are being greatly reduced. In the view 
of a broad theism, it may be said that, during the days prior to modern medicine, 
the Creator did intervene in the cases of more hopeless suffering, as He worked through 
normal psychic and organic laws to effect an earlier and rrerciful death. Since the 
advent of modern medicine such a theism wou.ld see the love and purpose of God at 
work in modern medicine. 
What has just been described about organic integration, its possible breakdown, 
and its suffering intense and prolonged physical pain, may likewise be affirmed of 
psychic integration, relative to mental pain and illness. Given the higher complex-
ity of psychic integration in human beings, there is present the possibility of 
breakdown in rational coherence or in psychic structure. Again a mechanical analogy 
may not be wholly adequate, but there seems much general truth in the assertion that 
the fine and more complicated the piece of machinery,the more subject it is to pos-
sible breakdown. The human being's more complex psychic organization is the basis 
of his higher freedom, but possessing this higher organization and freedom we run a 
greater risk of nervous and mental breakdown than what seems true of lower animal 
life. 
Furthermore, the problem of human mental illness is compounded by the complex 
social environment which men have created for themselves, o.nd to which individuals 
must adjust. Nervous complexity and the complexity of the social environment makes 
very difficult the problem of tracing the causes of mental illnes:=:; and of suggesting 
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its cure. Once again, however, our general point remains the same as it has been 
from the outset of our discussion, narr.ely, given finite or limited, structured 
existence (in this case emotional, psychic, or rr.ental structure) we have implied the 
possibility of breakdovm. 
The recent indications that some mental illness is caused by chemical problems 
tends to bear out the principle thesis of this study thus far, that, pain, both organ-
ic and psychic, is a factor of our finite structured existence. The discovery seems 
wonderfully to reduce the enormity of mental illness, on the side of understanding 
its causality. If much of its causality is 11 ll'.echanical 11 , as suggested by chemical 
imbalances, there appears to be nothing inharently absolu~e or inevitable about 
menatl illness, in our kind of higher, but finite psychic life; the road seems open 
toward eventual extensive relief from this kind of evil through advance in psychiat-
ric and chemical medicine. The moral and social causality of mental breakdown is, 
of course, a more complex issue, which only the moral and social sciences can in the 
long run help to explain and to relieve. 
We are now prepared to discuss the deeper level of the problem of excessive or 
prolonged pain which we indicated at 11b 11 above~ We said that the issue concerned 
the cosmic causes of pain, such as disease germs, or chemical imbalances er defic-
iencies; and behind this the 11evil mutations 11 that give rise to germs in the first 
place, or those that fail to strengthen valuable forms of life against organic disease 
and imbalance by strengthening hereity. This profounder plane of our problem will 
present certain ultimate 11 theological 11 questions, relative to why God created the 
world and invested its process with freedom and limitation. 
The Problem of Evil Mutation: 
The Rationality of Finitude and Freedom 
The preceding analysis of pain suggests that this form of evil is due to the 
finitude and freedom of natural process. Essentially, evil occurs when one type of 
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free process aggresses upon and destroys another. Thus, it seems reasonable to 
explain excessive organic pain and disease in these terms. Disease caused by microbes 
and even the more mysterious diseases like cancer, whose full causes still remain 
unkno-wn, are due fundamentally to ingressions by destructive process, imbalances 
somehow .in nature's laws. Bacterial disease is now largly UJ:'lder scientific control. 
How stirring to us to realize that medical science is approaching the control of can-
cer by chemical means. Actually the problem of cancer or other disease that may be 
such as certain forms of insanity II when once the imbalance 
due to chemical imbalance/is understood and a cure foreseen, will not present so for-
bidding an aspect of the problem of evil as disease caused by microbes, or by destruc-
tive viruses, those_;active structures half way between living and non-living levels 
of process. Why did evolution produce the leprosy bacillus? Hhy is there such 
"evil mutation"? 
In our attempt to clarify this no doubt deepest pehnomenon of evil, the first 
thing we should recognize is that on its level of bacterial life, such mutation is 
a 11 successful 11 adaptation to a new situation within its environment. It is in this 
vein of thought that we discover some rational understanding of the problem of evil 
mutations, a vein which we must brines more into light in our remaining discussion. 
Having presented these initial insights the honest critic of theism will ask at 
once, ilhy docs God allow such mutation, which, from the higher standpoint of the 
personal value that it destroys, must be classified as an 11evi1 11 ? The answer that 
seems reasonable is to affirm that such mutation, apparently, is the risk God must 
run in creating or bringing forth a finite world of freely developing process. The 
over-all rationality of such possibility seems born out by the thoughtful conclusions 
of genetical science itself. The geneticists Dunn and Dobzhansky write: 
Harmful mutations and hereditary diseases are thus the price 
which the species pays for the plasticity which makes con-
tinued evolution possible. 1~ 
{~ Heredity,. Race. and Society, Y.entor, p. 81, 1952. 
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\Jhat we say from here to our conclusion is the theological illumination of this 
scientific judgment. 
Accordingly, from the standpoint of theism's solution to the problem of evil, 
the above quotation contains the idea of ,tm neutrality Qf mutations as a necessary 
principle of., and relative to, physical process. The mutation of the genes makes 
the survival of life possible in the long run in any environment, or amid environmen-
tal changes, within, of course, upper and lower limits of temperature and other ab-
solute environmental boundaries for life. In theistic faith, and from the standpoint 
of values, this 11neutrality 11 of mutation would itself seem pruposive, since its affect 
is that life does survive. To theistic faith, the immanent rationale of mutation is 
that life shall survive. Such seems a sufficient rational explanation-in terms of, 
and behalf of, life I s free experimentation with adaptation--of the problem of 11evil 
mutation 11 , the problem of evil at its core. No mutation as such is evil, unless it 
destroys higher organized value, pointing toward personal value. The principle of 
mutation it,self is good. Life as a whole would have been impossible without it. 
At this place, however, the critic will ask, Could not the Creator have given 
some life the power of mutation and denied it to other·0 forms? To which we would re-
ply that mutation seems inherent in finite life as such; the principle of mutation is 
included in all the forms that have arisen out of the first 11life germ11 • The general 
will to live of all orders of finite life, of which mutation seems the central expre s-
sion, · is good--such a general will to live in all forms would be the primary basis of 
any finite creation •. Without it a finite creation is unthinkable. It is only when 
an impersonal force, or the will-to-live of one creature painfully destroys another, 
that the problem of evil arises. An ultimate question, then, which the critic asks 
of theism is, Why, in the first place, does God bring forth a world and the consequent 
possibility of pain? Actually there are three questions involved at this level of 
o·ur analysis, which constitute the heart of the rationality of our proposition above 
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stated, that evil is due to the finitude and freedom of natural process. Accordingly, 
at this place we must consider the following primary theological issues (and we at-
tempt to do so only in the spirit of reservation proper to discussion at such level): 
First, Why does God create or bring forth at all? Belief in a Personal,~ 
Creator helps us to answer this question. God creates or brings forth the world out 
of sheer, outgoing love (Agape). Not only because of 11 the yearning of the divine 
for fellowship, 11 as Seth Pringle Pattison has suggested, 1' does God create; but God 
may create a finite order, and the conditions for the emergence of finite personal-
ity also for the sake of its own ultimate being and enjoyment of freedom. Of course, 
the enjoyment of freedom is realized only in and through the fellowship with God, 
ultimately, and that is why we can never wholly escape God I s love. "Though· I make 
my bed in hell, behold, thou art ther-e. 11 But absolutely speaking, it is as if God, 
in order to fulfill His 01,m nature as 1ove would continue to create a finite world, 
in which finite persons can come to be, even if all such beings in some ultimate 
pride were to forsake Him. Would not the love of God create a finite world, and the 
conditions for finite persons to be, endlessly for their ovm sake, and not alone for 
some response the Divine expects? 
Second, Hhy does God bring forth finite, limited beings and not in the first 
place, some more perfected infinite being or world like Himself? We touched upon this 
type of problem earlier in our discussion. He suggest further here that Reality has 
to be One, or a single power, if there is to be rational world order. If God is con-
ceived to create at all, He does not or cannot create other infinite.Gods such as 
himself. That would violate His own living Unity and result in many and confusing 
-3}7f 
standards of the Real. Rather, if God creates at all, He creates beings of a finite 
* The Idea of God, p. 395 1 Oxford, 1920. 
*'t If we conceive that He created other infinite beings like Himself, perfected in his 
Type of character and power, there would still be _the .QE~ ,type of Divine Nature, 
Love, and Purpose. Ho.uld not the principle of unity underlie the conception so 
that we would not depart from monotheism, but re-affirm it? 
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and subordinate order as an implication of His nature.* It is good that God creates 
the world, not only as an expression of His own deepest nature as Agape, but also for 
the sake of the finite life and freedom in His world which His creative Agape implies. 
But finite existence means limitation, conflict upon occasion, toil, and pain, and 
doubtless intensive pain, where conflict in finite process is acute, and a higher 
order of finite structure and value is at stake in the conflict. These are the primal 
risks that a God of Love must run in conceiving and creating a finite world. 
Third, Why does God create an order of freedom? Another way to state this 
question is to ask Why God has not commenced with a world Hmorally perfected" at its 
outset, and continue it as such throughout its history? Such a question takes us into 
the intrinsic idea of 11moral 11 , and we perceive that the idea of a moral world or moral 
process is intimately related to freedom. Sometimes it is supposed that a llperfected 11 
moral world would be one in which neighborliness and love were automatic or pre-deter-
mined effects. But such relationships could be guaranteed in this sense only if there 
were no finite freedom. 'I'he world must be in some real sense free; for, if it were 
not, it would not be possible for creature with a moral nature to arise within it, to 
grow, and to become responsible agents on their own account. A world absolutely 
mechanically guaranteed as to its moral relationships by some kind of obtrusive, Divine 
fiat, would not be a moral world at all. It could only be a world of material atoms, 
net one of free persons. As Harris Franklin Rall writes, 11 ••• the good can never be 
handed over as a finished product to a passive recipient ••• it can only be an achieve-
ment.11~rn The very meaning of 11 love 11 and 11neighborliness 11 stand for affection and help-
fulness fr~el;y given. No relationship is 11moraiit if it is not founded in a free motive. 
Our world must be one in which finite beings freely achieve the good, if it is to be 
a moral world. 
i} This is why we say that the question, Who made God? is "childish", i.e~ irrational. 
The concept itself of God renders illogical the idea of Gods creating Go.ds in infin-
ite regression. Creation needs only one God of adequate moral purpose and power; 
more than one such God would be superfluous, and therefore irrational. The concept 
of God means His eternal purpose and power, . e.nd this implies his single nature, and 
rationally excludes the idea of others .like Him or prior to Him. 
iH, Christianity, p. 327, Scribners, 19/4.1. 
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What we have just said recalls the frequent Christian emphasis on the moral 
necessity of freedom as the proper explanation for moral evil or sin, and what we 
are here attempting to do is to ;:ipply the criterion of freedom as explanation of 
11natural eviP at the lower ranges of process in animal evolutirm, out of which man 
has organically sprung. The basic premises or criteria of moral existence at the 
human level would logically apply, to some extent at least, to the antecedent levels 
of process which gave rise to the human level. If there is continuity between life 
and all process, as evolution seems to teach, freedom on the higher levels of personal 
life would have had its preparation in a commitment of the world process to freedom, 
or descending degrees of freedom, in sufficient depth, no doubt, to account for the 
emergence of our "evil mutations 11 above described. The law of freedom must underly 
the universe as a whole, .if it is a place of moral process and growth. 
Basically we must define 11 moral 11 in terms of the values of free choice and the 
responsibility that comes with choice. The evolution of life is the evolution of 
the experiment of choice, of the practice of choice. May we not understand the prin-
ciple of mutation itself to be the· profoundest or most universal level of 11 cho:j..cell? 
What is true about the mqral requirement of freedom and responsibility on the human 
plane of life, may be applied, at least by way of analogy, to the evolution of life 
as a whole. 
When a certain development in the evolutionary history of living forms 11 chooses 11 
an ill-adapted mutation, the inevitable consequence of that selection or development 
is death to that species. In other words, what is represented constantly on our own 
level of higher freedom in the case of human choices, seems also illustrative, at 
least to considerable extent, of the evolution of life as a whole. To say that what 
applies to life at its highest level must also to some extent apply to life at lower 
is 
levels and as a whole seems reasonable, if all life/ to be continuous with itself and 
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our world a coherent one. When the mutation occurred that took that particular 
evolutionary development leading to the dinosaur group, all the risks were accepted 
by that phase of organic process at that juncture--the 11positive risks 11 that size 
and strength would take those species far and long, but also the "negative risks" 
that lack of brain capacity, or the incapacity for the evolution of intelligence, 
might eventually contribute to their extinction. Evolution has created life by 
educating life. 
Concluding Premises 
The theistic explanation of pain and evil mutation rests on certain premises. 
These seem rationally necessary as the fullest, or most coherent judgments concern-
ing basic matters of process and reality. pone of these is the empirical judgment 
that all life has continuity or unity. 'Another is that some device was necessary 
whereby life could freely adapt itself in orderfor there to be (1) organic evolution, 
development, or adaptation, and (2) ultimately spiritual evolution or moral adaptation, 
as the inherent possibility of higher human freedom. Such a device we find in the 
principle of muto.tion, with its mysterious fecundity, implying a near limitless 
possibility of form, and resident in the 11first life germ, 11 and present even possibly 
at sub-living levels of nature and process. If these premises or principles be grant-
ed, and they seem to describe the very heart of the evolutionary process, we have in 
them considerable justification of the world as she has gone on, and is. Such a 
picture may help us to see, at least to some extent, why in the course of process, 
even such a thing as a disease germ, harmful to its host, might arise as a necessary 
risk within the total or unified stream we call 11life 11 and its 11evolution'1 or 11 crea.;.. 
tion 11 • Our ultimate of the presence of disease germs must be understood in 
the context of mutation; and we understand that the world of life as a whole could not 
have come to be without mutation. But a world such as ours, even one in which there 
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lies some risk of evil mutation, if the product as a whole would have been impossible 
without the risk, seems a justifiable world. 
Our second premise above is that the principles or causes of evolution as we 
know them have after all been 11 ideal11 means for the evolution of life toward respons-
ible moral intelligence, for they are the only princples conceivable that could 
account for organic evolution. Inherent in it was all the possibility of moral 
growth which we empirically perceive and also subjectively experience as possible. 
The factors or cause of evolutionary change, in the mutation of the genes, are pre-
cisely those that have made finite freedom possible, with all of its higher potent~ 
ialities that we acknowledge as men. These therefore seem the utmost rational factors, 
and, accordingly from the standpoint of value, factors of utmost good. If the pro-
duct, finite freedom, could have come to be in no other conceivable way than by 
mutation and evolution, then tlie process as we know it is moral. The end must surely 
justify the means, in this case, if there is only~~, which,furthermore, in 
and of itself, seems to be rational and without intrinsic evil. 1,Je have suggested 
above how the means, mutation, as a general principle is intrinsically good. 
The final premise of a faithful, rational theism, regarding the mutational mode 
of world development must be the following. It relates to the ultimate question 
regarding evil, to which we have already alluded, and which we rephrase here. "Why 
cou.Ja.not Deity, by employing some kind of transitive power, at once destroy a mutant, 
immediately when it appeared, which could only be an evil to itself or to higher 
organized value? Our reply is, that given mutation at all~ we must have mutation 
throughout. If mutation is in life by necessary premise, abovf:t its consequences 
also must appear, and its operations carry through to their end. If the Creator 
denied its operation, or the fruits of its operation (even though those fruits some-
times must be classified from the standpoint of higher systems of value as 11eviP) 
at one point in life, would he not have to deny it.at all points where the outcome 
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seems doubtful? Would not, however, such a transitive approach by God jeopardize 
life as a whole? If Deity experiments t,ith finite freedom at all, His major purpose 
in so doing is to see what such freedom will make of itself. There is always the 
possibility, given the plasticity of evolution as we know it, that a form which is, 
or seems, now evil, may in the future mutate further in such a way as to work ultimate 
good for itself or to others concerned. That mutation which determined the develop-
ment of man's puny size, relative to some animal forms, was compensated by the muta-
tion which eventually resulted in his brain, the superior organ of intelligence in 
the animal kingdom. In our present conclusion we have been talking in part about 
mutation toward harmful parasites. We should recall therefore that the original type 
of mutation which produced harmful parasites has produced many parasites that live in 
symbiotic and necessary relationship to their hosts. Furthermore, it now seems a fact 
of genetical science that evil mutations, even evil parasitic mutations, tend to kill 
• 1< themselves off by the operation of natural selection. 
The general facts of the necessity of mutation as the basic principle of life 
and its adaptation; of the general wisdom and good inhering in the very concept of a 
finite order of structure and individuality, such as we have been describing our 
world to be; these larger positive facts of existence as we know it seem to justify 
the over-all conclusion, which may be uttered with a fair degree of moral certitude 
and faith, that our world is, after all, regarding necessary process, 11 the best pos-
sible world'!; for, in many ways, it seems the only kind of world imaginable in which 
freedom is possible, and not only possible, but has been and is a major fact. And 
moral freedom can make it a world of~ value in ultimate fulfillment of its pos-
sibilities as now a world of ~ orocess. 
In conclusion, we suggest that the foregoing line of reasoning renders unnecessary 
Brightman's "Finite God" idea, with its hypothesis of the Given, or the dark abysmal 
side of the Divine Nature. 
-i~ Dunn and Dobzhansky, .Q.!2. cit., pp. 66-67. 
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The Problem Pi~Moral Evil 
The problem of moral evil or sin, to put it in the classic ·,Jay, is to ask why 
God permits 11 man I s inhumanity to man"? Fundamentally moral evil or sin may be de-
fined as disrespect for personality, and, specifically in its social meaning, as 
aggression by human beings on other human life. A rational theism believes that it 
satisfactorily explains this phenomenon in terms of _b.gman freedom as a moral necessity 
of man's nature. The accumulative factors that make for or add up to man's inhuman-
ity to man, are, of course, on the personal side, the factors of ignorance, of indif-
ference or inertia toward the needs or the sufferings of other, and of positive mal-
ice; and on the social side, evil laws and institutions, bad cultural habits and 
patterns. (He prefer to limit the term 11 sin 11 to positive malice; leaving the expres-
sion "social evil'1 to stand for other ranges of inhumanity.) All of these agencies 
and instrumentalities of man's inhumanity to his fellow men, of 11 sin", or 11near-sin 11 , 
and social evil are -- in the over-all picture -- a result of human freedom; and, 
they may, by striving, be overcome by man 1 s freedom, both in individual and in social 
li.fe. 
St. Augustine, in Book II of his essay On the Freedgm of the vJill, asked in a 
classic way, Uhy did God create man free to sin? and replied that freedom is the pre-
mise of a moral universe: 
11 
••• if man is something good ahd can not act rightly except when 
he wishes, he ought to have a free ."l'.rill without which he could 
not act rightly. For it is not to be believed that, because sin 
is committed by it too, God gave free will for sin., Therefore, 
since without it man can not live ri5htly, there is cause enough 
why it should have been given. u 
In more modern terms it has been said, 11 moral evil is the product of finite free will 
which is itself a good 11. * Or 11it is better to be able to choose, think, discern, and 
decide wrongly than not to be able to decide at all". *i~ 
-lf Pe.ter Bertocci, Introduction to the Philosonh:y of Reli11ion, 1951, p. 401, Prentice 
Hall. 
iH, Noreen Uelch, student, 1959 .. 
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The foregoing thesis of the moral 11necessity 11 of freedom, if ours is to be 
A moral universe, seems a satisfactory answer to the moral level of the problem of 
evil. The meaning of man as a "moral ceing 11 , and the meaning of the universe as a 
whole as 11 moral°, includes at its center the idea of human freedom. The universe 
would not be a moral place or process if it did not have finite rational freedom of 
our human kind, with its consequent responsibility and possibility of -:;rowth and 
development. Lacking finite freedom at the level we are now discussing it, the univ-
erse would simply be at best an amoral place. This seems to be good logic, and good 
moral philosophy; it is coherent and sufficient. 
But lest the sincere agnostic or humanist critic yet believe that the above type 
of reply to the problem of moral evil represents a too facile traditionalism, let us 
paint the picture of man's inhumanity to man or moral evil in some graphic and dire, 
and yet true historic form. For example, why did God permit such a thing as a medie-
val torture chamber, or Hitler's murder of millions of Jews, and the torment of mod~ 
ern concentration camps? Why does he not dispatch "legions of Angels" or employ scnr.e 
other direct divine power to deal with such specific forms of moral evil, in order to 
alleviate some terrible and innocent human suffering? Truly, such a picture as this 
or some other which one might imagine, arouses righteous indignation and even a 11 holy 
wrathtt. 
The response of a rational theism to a ;uestion of this kind turns once again 
to the fact and necessity of freedom in life, if life is to have a moral quality. 
And a counter question may be fairly raised, if you allow that divine povrer should 
morally have directly intervened in such cases of innocent suffering. He may ask, 
where would one stop with the judgment that divine power should intervene in the cas-
es of man's inhumanity to man? Just as logically, in each and every single case of 
inhumanity -- whether gross, or less gorss, dire or less dire -- the world over and 
throughout all history; in every family relat:Lonship, when, for example, in the hard-
ness of parents' hearts a Romeo was kept from his Juliette; in every relationship of 
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neighbor to neighbor, in each and every instance of a.group 1s oppression of another 
group of hwnan beings, of a king I s sending an innocent commoner to the Tower; of a 
nation's agression against another nation; of Soviet tanks suppressing the Hungarian 
freedom fighters; of a cheating and deceitful business transatt:tion; of the total 
sorry treatment of men by men, in personal, political, or economic power situations--
the critic could not, with consistent logic, deny our insistence that God should _1nter-
JZ~ to make the world a 11 perfe ct 11 but, of course, .a puppet order. If God should 
have intervened at Dachau or Buchenwald, he should have intervened in the Little Rock 
school integration crisis, or in any other. Hhy would God not strike any injustice 
in the face with a lightning bolt? But what would such all-powerful, direct, and 
universal intervention do to hwnan freedom and our ultimate moral responsibility and 
personal integrity as men? Presumably., as we have said, God I s relationship to the 
world at its upper levels of such freedom cannot be in terms of coercive, transitive, 
or mechanical power. 
As Rall in his trEnchant analysis points out, God's power is not irrestible, 
externalistic, or compulsive; God 1 s power is not abstract, but of a specific kind, 
conditioned by his nature:, as creative, bringing for,th a finite world and lesser 
beings, 11 he limits himself by that very fact: for creation means giving something 
of his own life to lesser bein~:s, and life in any creature meons a certain power of 
its own 11 • As reason, 11 s0 he"acts according to that reason and order which form his 
very being 11 • As goodness and love he chooses only high ends and "uses appropriate 
rr:eans 11--sympathy, sacrifice, even suffering and persuasion. In sum, in His relation 
to the higher orders of freedom God acts through truth, which "waits upon the receiv·-
>< 
ing mind 11 , and through love, which waits upon the receptive heart." 
In swn for moral evil, two premises or foundational insights stand out for our 
guidance in this area of reasoning: 
1
, Christianity, Schribners, 1941, p. 325"6 
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Recall that 
1. The moral superiority of freedom to non-f_;uiedorn. /this point was well said 
by a former studenV 11 It is better .to be able to choose, think, discern, and 
once again 
decide wrongly than not to decide at all 11 .~' Or/as Peter Berto.cci phrased it: 
11 Jvioral evil is the product of finite free will :which is itself a good<'' 
'-.1\,_,:,., ,: .. f, , 
rather than mechanical, i.e. persuasive.f,rather than compulsiv~-'. He call the reader 1 s 
attention to the full passage by Harris Franklin Rall on this point, p. 
again cite the inspiration of a former student: 
11 If God desires good in man, yet permits evil, it must be because 
, and 
he is a God of love, who prefers persuasion rather than co1npulsion. 
Compelled goodness would not be genuine, and would defeat God's purpose. 
True, if our conduct were mechanically perfect like a machine, such harmony 
would fulfill the purpose of the m_gker, but it could_not fulfill any ideas 
of its own •••• the exclusion of ,Lthe possibility of/ moral evil in this world 
would make the world something other than a moral order •••• u,HH, 
A Personalistic Definition of Evil 
It is not sufficient to say merely that evil may be defined as failure or abor-
tion of natural process (as Aristotle might have defined it), or even to say, as St. 
Augustine did, that evil is a privation of being, or disintegration of organized being 
and value. He ultimately want to know what 11proper organization 11 and value are? 
Accordingly, we are faced with the necessity of a 11personalistic 11 definition of evil. 
Evil is riroc.52ss on any level which hinders the coming to be _personal growth4 health, 
and social harmony of finite personal being~. A tornado sweeping over a barren rock 
at sea is not evil. Accordingly, any factor that disrupted or hindered the evolu-
tionary development of the world toward this major end or value, would be evil. Evil 
1* Moreen Uelch, Spring 1959. 
*i~ Introduction to Philoscphy of Religion, Prentice Hall, 1951, p. 401. 
Barbara .Ann Brown, Paper, Spring, 1958. 
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would be the deprivation of existence and process of the ultimate possibility of 
becoming personal, that is to say, of issuing in finite persons, and providing oppor-
tunity for their personal well-being. 
There does not seem to have been, of course, judging by general empirical evid-
ence, such a total evil as the preceding definition implies, since process has issued 
in personal life.. There have, of course, been many temporary evils that have hindered, 
retarded, and challenged this process, in the course·· of human history and in the 
course of nature prior to and below history. Process faces such evils today, and 
will tomorrow. But pro?ess toward the personal has gotten a good start, in spite of 
evils, and there is much intimation of the coming ultimate victory of good. (Our 
subsequent c,hapters on, n:i:m and moral value will help to define the 11well-beingn im-
t 
plied in the foregoing definitionr) 
Finally, in some defense of this definition, we should say that it need not be 
a narrowly "anthropomorphic" understanding of evil, which leaves out the entire animal 
kingdom below man. On the contrary, it is so stated as definitely to include that 
lower order of life. Evolution has taught us that there is continuity of our life 
with that of the animals; there is organic and intimate relationship. Our life could 
not have been without the preceding eras of nature's prolific experimentation with 
many kinds of living forms prior to the appearance of man. Accordingly, in a general 
sense, what may be evils for man would be evils for the totality of life, or that 
living phase of existence that has prepared for man. And also, putting the matter 
in another way, it is a simple fact of observation that what is evil for man is very 
often evil for animals too. The animal species have been necessary steps toward the 
ultimate personalizatiol'.t of finite being. The will to live is common to both the 
higher and lower orders of life, and, in general, the will to live is the first 11good 11 
of the uni verso., ~Jithout it, a finite developmental process of 111ife II could not be; 
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but with it, or out of it, comes the eventual personalization of life. Accordingly, 
our personalistic definition of evil expressed above includes the total context of 
life in a universe which makec personalistic life ultimately possible. 
Some Reolies to David Hume 
Douglas Clyde_Macintosh'' on. the Organization 
Of the World, the Understanding of Evil, 
.§n_d the Process by Which Evil is Overcome 
110ur final topic under theological theory is the question as to whether our 
view of the nature and character of God and of his relations to man and the universe 
will stand the test of criticism in face of the evils which exist in the world. The 
most insistent problem with regard to evil is undoubtedly the practical pro.blem --
how to get rid of it. But the more theoretical problem of evil -- the problem as to 
how, in the presence of so much evil in the world, it is not unreasonable to believe 
in the existence of a God both great enough and good enough for the religious needs 
of man -- this, too, becomes in the end a practical problem, since .the vitality of a 
theistic faith for thoughtful people depends in no small ~easure upon their finding 
a tolerable intellectual adjustment at this point. 
"This religious problem of evil is one in face of which some systems of theology 
simply collapse in self-contradiction. This is true, for example, .of the theology 
which affirms on the one hand the absolute moral perfection and absolute omnipotence 
of God and his complete predetermination of all facts and events, the evil as well as 
the good, and yet maintains on the other hand that for the moral evil which has come 
into existence in human life men will be punished with inconceivably sever and absol-
utely endless torments. 1:Iell may the problem of evil be given up in such a system as 
insoluble •. 
'' From Theology as an Emoirical .Science, Macmillan, 1927 ed., Part III, p. 216-229. 
:Macintosh was the noted professor of Theology and philosopher of religion at Yale 
University Divinity School from 1909 to 1942. 
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11 In undertaking to consider the question as to whether any self-consistent view 
is possible which shall at once meet the requirements of our empirically founded re-
ligious assurances and square 11rith the experienced facts of evil, it is easily evident 
that certain doctrines are virtually excluded from the outset. This is particuiarly 
true of that exaggerated and misguided optimism which would maintain that even at 
present 1all's well with the world', that the world we live in is in all respects the 
best possible world -- in short that 1whatever is, is right'. But on the other hand 
our theological theory would suggest the question as to whether any view is not un;;. 
duly pessimistic if it holds concerning the world (at least in its general constitut-
ion and as it is dependent upon the willed activity of God) that it is not a good 
kind of world or even.the cest possible kind - in which to have man begin his 
development. In distinction from both of these positions, the unduly pessimistic and 
the inconsiderately optimistic the thesis we would undertake to defend is this: that 
while this world is far from being as yet the best possible world, nevertheless in 
view of its general constitution it may be regarded as the best possible 1ting of 
world in which to have man begin his development, and that the evils which exist in 
the world furnish no good reason for abandoning belief in a God who is both good 
enough and great enough to meet every real religious need. 
11 The best possible kind of world must be a world of law and order. This seems 
a pretty obvious assertion with which to begin. The physical world, as a world of 
law, gives all living beings a steady and dependable platform upon which to stand. 
To its uniform processes the organism may adjust its activities and learn to make 
habitual the most favorable adjustments. Indeed, if the world were not thus essenti-
ally dependable in its processes, it would seem that no real or permanent progress in 
the constitution or a.ctivitiJs of organic beings could be looked for. No habit could 
be any better than any other habit; no character any better than any other character. 
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11But the ruthless proce3ses of natural law, admitting of no exceptions in order 
to spare the individual organism or any other object, inevitably tend and not infre-
que ,ntly lead to the injury or even to the violent and premature death of organic 
beings, human as well as other, and to the destruction of objects which have value 
for living beings. The lives of me n and animals and the existence of objects of 
value are exposed from time to time to various I accidents 1 , in all of which the im-
partial, law-abiding processes of nature are involved. Earthquakes, volcanic erupt-
ions, tempests, floods, fires, extremes of heat and cold, diseases of all sorts --
these and other disaster-bringing events are incidental to the world we live in being 
a world of undeviating natural law. 
"Now it is all very well to enlarge upon the desirability of a world of law and 
order, but would it not be well if there were a way of intervening in this world of 
mechanical and chemical law, for the guarding of life and objects of value from the 
injury and destruction that would otherwise befall them? And in order that this 
intervention should not break up the orderliness and dependableness of the world, and 
thus lead to confusion and stagnation, might it not be well that it should be not a 
process of suspending the laws of the physical world, but one of introducing new 
factors whose processes would themselves be according to their own laws and uniform-
ities? 
11This may seem a good deal to ask -- an intervention in a world of law, which 
would yet be no breach of law, but itself the exemplification of law, a sort of law-
abiding miracle -- but as a matter of fact it is just this which we find in existence 
in the world in which we live. In the processes of sensation we see this law-abiding 
miracle for the protecticn of the living organism and its possessions. Sight, hearing, 
sensations of taste, smell, touch, heat and cold, pleasant sensations and sensations 
of pain -- these are the desired protective processes made, as it were, to order. 
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Miraculous as they ai.~e from the standpoint of the merely rr:echanical, chemical and 
physiological, they are nevertheless perfectly orderly and law-abiding, being defin-
itely conditioned upon certain events in the nervious system, and exhibiting certain 
inner uniformities (physical laws) of their own. 
"The serviceable function of sense-processes is well kno1im. Sight, hearing, and 
the sense of smell not only enable men and animals to avoid many enemies and threat-
ening dangers; they also make it possible for them to secure their own food and the 
other necessities of life. Sensations of sight, smell and tast are associated with 
the activities involved in satisfying appetites which in the main operate to preserve 
the life of the individual or of the race. And one of the most indispensable of 
sensations is the sensation of pain in its various forms and combinations. Where 
quick or decisive reversal of conditions is necessary, if injury to the organism is 
to be avoided, a special sort of sensations, sharply stimulating to change, is called 
for; and this is what we have,as a blessing in disguise, in the sensation of pain. 
If the burning of the flesh, exposure to extreme heat or cold, bodily exhaustion, 
hunger, thirst, wounds and conditions of acute disease were not normally accompanied 
by the sensations of pain, all the 'higher 1 and more complicated forms of animal life 
would soon be killed off by the ruthless operation of natural forces. Indeed, in 
the light of the now well-established evolutionary view of the origin of species, 
the human species included, we can say that a world without any pain in it would have 
been a world in which-man·could never have appeared; his animal ancestors would have 
been killed off long before the biological conditions for the appearance of the human 
species had been reached. 
/ 11 It seems clear, then, that a world in which there occur, in a law-abiding way, 
sensations of many sorts, including sensations of pain, is a much more desirable kind 
of world from the standpoint of the well-being of physical life and all that depends 
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upon it, than any world of physical law without such processes of sensation. But it 
may be objected that in this law-abiding character of sensation there is involved a 
good deal of pain which is not of immediate use to physical life. For example, just 
because, when certain bodily conditions exist, certain sensations appear, there is 
often much pain in connection with incurable disease, o.nd even in curable cases pain 
may continue for some time after the appropriate remedy has been applied. More·cver, 
biologically necessary operations are often accompanied by intense suffering. Of 
course, it is to be recognized that pain which is not directly and immediately valu-
able for the life of the body may still prove, in the case of man, valuable for moral 
discipline. Theoretically, it vrould seem, this ought to be true of all human pain 
ultimately. Besides, most systems of education and reform p:rovide for the deliberate 
addition of pain of one sort or another, for the sake of correction and discipline. 
Thus much pain that is not immediately and directly useful for the life of the body 
may come to have biological value, ultimately and_J:ndirectly. And yet, when all has 
been said, it would seem that there is, by virtue of the law-abiding processes of 
sensation, a good deal of suffering, human and animal, which, it is not unreasonable 
to suppose, the would would be much better without. While it is not easy to prove 
that any human suffering will be abs ~,1utely useless, there can be little doubt that 
much of it is needless. 
"Would it not be well, then it may be asked, if there were a way of intervening 
so as to regulate the life of sense, and especially sensations of apin, in order that 
needless pain might be reduced to a minimum? It would be desirable, however, on 
general principles, that any such intervening process should not involve a suspension 
of the laws of sensation, and that it should proceed according to laws of its 01,m. 
This amounts to a demand, once more, for a 1law-abiding miracle'; but it is a demand 
which we find already granted. Just such a factor of modification in the life of 
sense, intervening without suspending the laws of :sensation and in a way that is ac-
cording to laws of its 01-m, ue find to exist in the activity of thought. 
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rtThought observes sensations and their conditions, remembers them, and antici-
pates future possibilities, probabilities and certainties. Such thoughbleads to 
knowledge of the conditions of pain, and when combined with consideration of what 
pain, on the one hand, is valuable for guidance or discipline, and what pain, on the 
other hand, is unnecessary this knowledge tends to lessen the amount of needless 
suffering. By· taking thought man can anticipate and avoid unnecessary and disagree-
able experiences. For example, he can learn to avoid the pains that follow excess in 
the pursuit of pleasure. By 'taking pains' enoush to study the causes of undesirable 
effects, he has been able, on behalf of others as well as for himself, to provide 
against very much greater future pains. The discovery of anaesthetics is simply a 
conspicuous example of the law-abiding intervention of thought in the processes of 
sensation. 
"But thinking is a means of intervening, not only to prevent pain and modify 
other sense-experiences for the betteri it can work against physical disasters dir-
ectly. Especially in the overcoming of disease, scientific investigation has accom-
plished wonderful results, and it is probably not too much to say that science has 
made it possible for twice as many people to live twice as long as formerly. And 
science, of course, is not the whole of thou:sht, but only its more methodical devel-
oprr:ent. 
"But while thought is a most important means of intervening for the prevention 
of needless suffering and for the more effective safeguarding of life and property, 
it must be admitted that it is not always as successful as could be wished. In fact, 
there is evil in the realm of thought, intellectual evil in the form of ignorance 
and positive error, and this further complicates our original problem. Sometimes 
error as t0 the ends to be pursued, or as to the means to be employed, or mere 
ignorance and vacuity of mind may cause an immense amount of unnecessary suffering 
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and disaster to life and objects of value. Not only is there often failure, through 
ignorance, to remedy remediable evils; there is often the imposition of additional 
suffering and destruction of life as the direct result of erroneous ideals. 
Religious persecution is a case in point• 
"But not only are ignorance and error, as results of inadequate thought, them-
selves evils and the occasion of further evils in the way of suffering end disaster. 
Exact, scientific thinking may serve to make injurous processes all the more potent 
and disastrous. Science serves to make crime more skillful and to make war so des-
tructive as to threaten the future existence of the race. 
11 Doesit not seem desirable, then, that there should be some intervention in the 
life of thought, such as might direct it into beneficent channels, making information 
more accurate and complete, and the whole process of thought more effective for good? 
No doubt such intervention would be desirable, provided it did not unduly interfere 
with the dependable order of the universe in the realm of the physical, or in the 
life of sensation or thought, but took place only under definite conditions and 
within narrow and discoverable limits. 
wrhis third call for normal 1miracle' has also been anticipated in the constitu-
ion of human nature. In the human will, or capacity for voluntary attention, we 
find a way of intervening for the direction and concentration of thought, so that 
ignorance and error may in the normal and dependable way be progressively overcoITe, 
and the whole thought process directed towards eliminating needless suffering and 
disaster and realizing in a more positive way the truest human ideals. 
"This miracle of human free will carries with it immense possibilities of making 
the world a better place for man to live in. Our doctrine that the world in its 
general constitution is the best possible kind of world does not mean that it is as 
good a world as it ever can be. While remaining a world of physical law, and one in 
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which there occur the orderly miracles of sensation and thought, our world may be made, 
by virtue of human free agency, a much better world than it is or ever has been. If 
all human wills were as good and efficient as, by virtue of their freedom, they might 
be, thought would become so much more effective for good, that the life of sense would 
be so unified for the better, and physical evils so guarded against, as ultimately to 
make the conditions of life on the earth in most respects a.lrnost ideal. Apart from 
the final inevitableness of physical death -- a fact which involves problems which we 
must presently consider -- it may be said that if only the wills of men were as well-
... 1¥ 
disposed as they might be, there would be little or nothing to regret, ultimatf, in 
such injurious accidents and biologically unnecessary sufferings as might still per-
sist through man I s not yet having learned how to prev.ent them. Is it not better that 
man should have the training in mind and character involved in finding out how to com-
bat disease and other causes of pain and disaster than that by some arbitrary and purely 
magical miracle these evils should be removed without any human effort, and so without 
any training of the human intellect or will? Moreover, the possibility of training in 
fortitude involved in the facing of unavoidable danger, and in the endurance of unpre-
ventable pain, is surely not a thing to be regretted. Neither does it seem desirable 
that the race should be without any such training in social sympathy and helpfulness 
as is made possible by the fact of actual or threatened suffering and loss. Nor, 
finally, would it be well for humanity to be without the. socially unifying spectacle 
of individuals, voluntarily and for the good of others, undertaking courses of action 
which necessarily involve great suffering for themselves. 
11With the exception of the problem involved in the inevitable death of the indj-
vidual, our general problem of evil might now be regarded as solved, if this f~ ,h(i.11 
of man, to which we have referred, were always at the same time a g.9o_g. will. But the 
very fact of free will, 'which is the necessary condition of good choices, and consequ-
ently of the development of moral character and a good will, also makes evil choices 
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possible, with their many unfortunate consequences, including the development of 
immoral character and an evil will. Moreover, this evil will tends to make evil 
choice habitual, and so to aggravate its 01,m evil condition. Besides, moral evil is 
very potent in increasing the other kinds of evil to which we have referred, viz., 
needless injury and disaster to life and its values, needless suffering, and needless 
ignorance and error. Through man 1 s inhumanity to man, the world is far from being the 
best possible world. Universal and permanent good will in man would make heaven on 
earth, but the evil human will has gone far -- in war, for instance -- toward making 
hell on earth. 
11
.And yet what is desirable is not the taking away of human freedom of choice and 
action. Other things being equal, a world of human free agency is the best possible 
kind of world. Without it moral personality would be impossible. Man would be a mere 
-es 
mechanical puppet, some of whose actions were mysteriously accompanied by process/of 
completely predetermined sensation and thought. But a world of moral freedom is one 
in which it is possible for man to learn the right way of life, if not through the 
preferred way of anticipatin:s possible evil and avoiding it, then throuesh the bitter 
consequences of thoughtless or wilful wrong-doing. The case, then, is similar to that 
of intellectual evil. There is danger in free thought and investigation, lest one 
fall into error, with its unfortLmate consequences. There is danger, similarly, in 
free choice and action, lest one fall into sin and its many consequent evils. But it 
is better to think than not to think, and better to choose than not be able to choose. 
The possibility of moral personality and of continual progress towards an ever-devel~ 
oping moral ideal is without doubt worth the risk of individual choices of moral evil. 
11But in view of the seriousness of moral evil and its consequences, and consid-
ering the costliness and uncertain efficacy of learning to do right through experienc-
ing the painful consequences of doing wrong, it seems highly desirable that there 
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should be yet another way of intervening, this time in the life of the human will, 
to guard against this peculiarly serious form of evil, viz., human sin. But it is 
desirable also that this intervention should occur without destroying the orderliness 
of nature or of the life of sense and thought and without interfering with the free-
dom of human choice and action. This again may seem a great deal to ask, but it is 
not too much. Provision has been made for just this sort of normal intervention, in 
the miracle of moral salvation through the right sort of religious dependence.* This 
experience of salvation from sin through the right adjustment of the life to God is 
not forced upon anyone; human freedom is not violated, and happily so, for there 
could be no moral salvation if it were. But if all individuals were to fulfill as 
fully as possible the religious conditions of salvation from sin, the world we live 
in would come to seem to us so nearly the best possible world, that it would be easy 
to believe it to be the best possible .lri,nd of world for the first sta~es of man I s 
development. If, then, the world is not what it would be if man were to make as 
full use as he might of the source of moral renewo.l in religious experience at its 
best, the fault is his 01.m. The world as a world of humo.n freedom, even in the mat-
ter of choosing or rejecting moral salvation, is a better kind of world than one of 
any other imaginable sort would be, whether it were a world in which developing 
creatures could never need salvation because they were not free and so could not sin, 
or a world in which there was sin but no provision for salvation, or a world in which 
an external 'salvation 1 , so called, was forced upon the individual ·without his choice 
or against his will, and so at the expense of his moral personality •••• 
"But there is still another element of the problem of evil which would remain 
to exercise our minds, no matter how fully moral evil were overcome through educative 
discipline and religious dependence. There is the problem involved in the universal 
and inevitabL fact of physical death. However the good will with the aid of scien-
tific thought may guard man against violent and premature death, the limit of the · 
*Macintosh's conception of the 11:right sort of religious dependence", or the normal 
miracle of "moral salvation" is the theme of this great book as a whole -- perhaps 
best summarized in Part II, Chapters 4 e.nd 5., respectively ontitlec'., 11Re~relution 
in the Christian Experience of Salvation" and "The Laws of Empirical Theology", 
PP• 132 ... 166,. 
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power to live is nevertheless soon reached. Every human individual, however valuable 
he may be as a means of human betterment or as an end in himself, must ultimately 
part with this material body and disappear from the earthly life of the race. 
11 Now so far as the well-being of the human race on earth is concerned, it is no 
doubt better that all must ultimately die than that there should be no such thing 
as bodily death. If the latter were the case, the earth would soon be full of old 
people, there would be no room for new generations, and the resulting racial stagna-
tion may be left to the imagination to depict. If only it were possible to be assur-
ed that all the essential values of individual personality were somehow conserved, 
in spite of the death of the body, it would be possible to maintain that even a world 
in which physical death is universally inevitable is still the best possible kind of 
world in which to have the human individual pass the first stage of his development. 
11But is it possible to find a :.ceasonable basis for believing that the death of 
the body does not rr.ean the end of those values that are bound up inseparably with 
personal existence? Hhat is called for is one more normal and universally dependable 
miracle, viz., the miracle of personal immortality.~ •• Hence we would conclude that 
even a world in which the ultimate physical death of all human beings is inevitable 
may still be, so far at least as that is concerned, the best possible kind of world 
to be the scene of the first stage of man's developn:ent. The death of the body may 
be but the liberation of the spirit to enter upon a further and possibly more untram-
rr.elled stage in its development. 
11We have thus indicated the solution of the religious problem as to how the fact 
of evil in the world is compatible with the sufficient greatness and goodness of God. 
It may be well to summarize briefly the main course of our discussion. A physical 
world of absolutely dependable law and order is a better basis for the development 
.~ Macintosh presents the case for immortality in Part I, Chapter IV, and Part III, 
Chapter r;/ of TES •.. 
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of physical life than any alternative that can be sug~ested. But the working out of 
the natural processes in such a world tends to prove disastrous at times to physical 
life and to objects having value for life. A means of guarding against such disasters 
without violating physical law is to be found in the facts of sensation, including 
pain. Sensation itself occurs according to law, and consequently under certain cir-
cumstances there tend to be instances of needless pain. A means of guarding against 
such needless pain, and. <:1-lso against disaster to life, is to be found in thou1ht. 
The processes of thought occur according to physical law, and consequently under 
certain circumstances there tends to be erroneous thought. A means of guarding 
against error is to be found in the capacity of directing attention, within necessary 
limits and yet in a free and creative way. This free agency, however, while indis-
pensable for the development of moral personality, also necessarily involves the 
possibility of moral evil, which when it becomes actual, carries with it a train of 
error, needless suffering and disaster or injury to life and objects of value. A 
means of guarding effectively against moral evil is to be found in the religious 
experience of moral salvation, an experience which occurs without violation of the 
laws of nature or of mind, and without violating the free agency of man. But in 
spite of these normal miracles of sensation, thought, free will, and the religious 
experience of moral salvation, there remains the inevitable fact of physical death. 
The complete solution of the problem if evil thus requires the postulate of the 
further miracle of the soul 1 s survival of bodily death -- a miracle assurance of 
which may be found in a type of religious experience which is universally valid and 
accessible to all who are willing to fulfil the necessary conditions. Thece are the 
miracles we can be assured of, and they are the only ones we need to be assured of to 
be able to maintain that however far, through man 1 s misuse of freedom, the world may 
fall short of being, as,yet, the best possible world, it is nevertheless the best 
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possible kind of world to be the scene of the first stages of man I s development. 
And through man I s co-operation with God, undertaken in dependence upon God, this 
best possible kind of world may be brou7,ht more and more into conformity with the 
ideal of the best possible world 11 • 
Harris Franklin Rall, W.R. Sorley, and F. R. Tennant 
on the Idea of "Divine Power 11 and the 11Goodness 11 
of the tJor ld 
11The * whole problem of evil needs a new consideration involvin's, first, an analysfr 
of underlying ideas whose meaning has been taken for granted, and, second, a better 
use of our present knowledge, that is, of the great Christian insights on the one 
hand and of moder knowledge on the other. The underlying ideas that demand our study 
are the good as it relates to man and the ideas of goodness and power as they refer 
to God. It is not only the popular writers but the philosophers whose treatment has 
been superficial; and too often the high insights of the Christian faith have been 
lacking in the discussions of the theologians. 
11 1. What do we mean by the good for man? Back of most discussion is the hedon-
istic assumption: hardship and tcil and pain are the great evils of life, pleasure 
and ease are its great good. Thus for John Stuart Mill the benevolence of God means 
that the one aim of creation is 'the happiness of his creatures.' Against this we 
must set the Christian conception: Life is the only good, life in which man I s high-
est possibilities are being achieved. That means vision and desire, truth as liber-
ating insight and never-ending search, love that brings both joy and pain, ideals 
that are infinitely above us and that yet are our only true life. It means God, the 
~* Rall: 
An Inquiry into its Nature and Truth, Scribners 1 1941 
Christianity,/pp. 321-337. 
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God who casts down and lifts up, who is our judgment and our hope, our endless quest 
and our only peace. But one thing it is not, this good that is life: it is not 
something outside us. It is not any possible creation of engineer and architect, 
though this were Qod himself ••••• 11 
11 2.. What, we must ask next, is our conception of the goodness of God? It is 
certainly not that sentimental indulgence which often passes for this with men, 
eo:peciallY in the idea of parental love. The goodness of God is, indeed, as tender 
as that of a mother, as patient as a fat her I s love, pitiful as be longing to one who 
knows.· all our need and enters into all our pain, and wide as the heavens above and 
the race of men below. But this love is ethical, redemptive, creative. His goodness 
is good will, that is, it is a high and fixed purpose aiming at the supreme good of 
man. It is redemptive and therefore set a7,ainst all evil. It is creative: it is 
goodness at work, active, unswerving, sparing no toil or pain in itself or in its 
object, seeking to give its own life to this creature man, not intent on granting 
pleasure and sparing sorrow, but rather on tho creation in men, and the sharing with 
men of its own life, the life of truth and wisdom, of holiness and love. 
11 3. The concept of the power of God needs even closer scrutiny ••••••• · Power 
is thought of in the abstract, as power in general; it is conceived as absolute, 
irresistible; it is treated as external force. The criticism of these ideas will 
help us to a true conception. 11 
11 (1) It is a mistake to talk of pouer in the abstract: power is always of a 
1Jpecific kind. To speak of power in and by itself is simply to deal in words. Power 
is the ability of any being to act or function according to its peculiar nature and 
to accomplish its ends. The strength of a Hercules is physical. His five-foot wife 
may possess a moral power which can wrap him around her finger. An 1absolute 1 dicta-
tor with all his armies cannot compel confidence and affection. The idea of power in 
the abstract is like that idea of being in the abstract, or 'pure being, 1 which, 
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taken over by theology, led to the idea of a God wholly opposite to man and utterly 
remote, to whom, since every determination was supposed to mean negation, not even 
moral character could be ascribed because that would limit his pure 'being.' Such 
a God is no God, is nothing. All being is determinate being, being of a definite 
kind, and that is true of God. So the power of God is determinate, since it is his 
being in action and thus is conditioned by his nature. 11 
11 (2) The idea of irresistible power is equally unmeaning and untenable. It is 
a part of that abstract absolutism which has afflicted theology. There is an absol-
uteness which belongs to the Christian concept of God as one from whom all things 
come, upon whom all things depend, and who is perfect in goodness. But the tradit-
ional absolutisn:, with its denial of every kind of condition or limitation, is of 
another kind. Power, whether human or divin~ is conditioned by the nature of the 
being that. acts, by the ends that are set, and by that with which it works. It is, 
therefore, never absolute or irresistible. Hhen God seeks a moral end, the idea of 
irresistible power is ruled out by that very fact; instead, God 'stands at the door 
and knocks. 1 Hhen God wishes to create, he limits himself by that very fact; for 
creation meanc giving something of his 0vm life to lesser bein3s, and life in any 
creature means a certain power of its own. Similarly he is conditioned by his own 
being. He is reason, and so he acts according to that reason and order which form 
his very being. He is wisdom, and so he must by his very nature choose high ends 
and use appropriate means. He is love and so he must suffer in sympathy and must 
toil and sacrifice. At none of these points can it be a matter of bare will acting 
with irresistible force •••••• 11 
11 (3) Underlying these errors is the third, the conception of divine power as 
externalistic and compulsive. This is to think of power on the lowest plane, as 
physical force. Only physical force can be conceived as irresistible. Power on the 
higher levels from its very nature is not irresistible: truth waits upon the receiv-
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ing mind, love is not compulsive. The pouer that develops life and shapes character 
must work indirectly. The conception of a divine compulsion working from without is 
as mechanistic in its way as the old mo.terialism. It must be given up for a concept 
in which the transcendent God is seen to work immanently; and that mE;ans not irresist-
ibly. It 
11 Jmd now the outline of our problem begins to grow clear. We leave aside as 
non-Christian the hedonistic conception of the good; and the idea of God I s power as 
an irresistible force that can accomplish any end by direct action we perceive to be 
a childish transfer from the physical world to the moral realm where it is simply 
irrational. Our problem now become~ not so much that of evil, as that of the good. 
If the good can never be hand dover as a finished product to a passive recipient, 
if it can only be an achievement, then a good world will be one which is adapted for 
such attainment. '£hen our zreat question is: Hhat kind of a world is fitted for 
this end? •.••.•••• n 
111. In a world where good is to be achieved, there must be freedom •••••••• 11 
112. A good world will be one of toil and struggle and resistance ••••••• 11 
113. A world fitted for the achievement of life must be one of order, and an 
order that is universal and dependable ••••••• 11 
11 4.. A good world must be one of social relations and social solidarity •.••••• 11 
11 5. A world that is fitted for the achievement of life will be one of suffering 
and pain ••••••• 11 
"The-I} character of a free agent is made by facing and fighting with obstacles; 
it is not formed along the line of easy successful reaction to stimulus. Facile 
adaptation to familiar environment is no test of'character nor training in character • 
. Macmillan, New York, 1921, Second Edition 
'3, Sorley: Moral Values and the Idea of God,/pp. 343-346. 
The personal life cannot g;row into the values of which it is capable without facing 
the hardness of circumstance and the strain of conflict, or without experience of 
failure •••••• The question at present is not the kind of world in which perfect 
goodness can exist, but the kind of world in which goodness can begin to grow and 
make progress towards perfection. Perfect adaptation would mean automatism; it is 
in-
not and cannot be a school of morality. It is even /consistent with morality as I 
have conceived it, which implies freedom and the personal discovery and production 
of values. And I will hazard the statement that an imperfect world is necessary for 
the growth and training of moral beings. If there were no possibility of missing 
the mark there would be no value in taking a true aim. A world of completely unerring 
finite beings, created and maintained so by the conditions of their life, would be a 
world of marionettes. They might dance through the span of existence to the amuse-
ment of a casual spectator (if such may be imagined); but their movements would be all 
predetermined by the Maker; they would have neither goodness nor the consciousness 
of good, nor any point of sympathy with the mind of a free spirit. Not such are the 
beings whom God is conceived as having created for communion with himself.... These 
spirits have had their beginnings at the lowest levels of organic life. They must 
fight their way upwards through the long stages of man's development. In this pro-
gress they have to attain reason and freedom, so that the good may be known and 
chosen; until, tried by every kind of circumstance, they find and assimilate the 
values which can transform the world and make themselves fit for the higher spiritual 
life •••••• 
11 Are we justified in saying that the imperfect and puzzling world that surrounds 
us is an unfit medium for the moral life -- if by the moral life we mean the triumph 
of the spirit -- or that it makes impossible the adoption of an ethical point of view 
in interpreting reality? I do not say that experience of the relation of natural 
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forces to moral ideas and moral volitions justifies of itself the inference to divine 
goodness at the heart of all things. The mere fragment of life with which we are 
acquainted is too scanty to llear so vrei::;hty a superstructure. All I have argued is 
that our experience is not inconsistent with such a conclusion. J\nd, if there are 
other reasons for saying that goodness belongs to the gound of reality and that the 
realisation of goodness is the purpose and explanation of finite minds, then the 
structure of the world as we know it is not such as to mako us relinquish this view; 
on the contrary, a view of the kind is $Upported by the general lines of what we 
know about the world and its history. 11 
a 
!ll.nc"t * if the moral ideal ce the best or the highest that/world conceivably can 
fulfil, the process by which alone it is attainable is also good, despite the evil 
incidental.to it. Theism requires that the world be an imperfect or mixed world, in 
that it takes the purpose of the world to consist in the realisation of the highest 
value~ by finite and developing. creatures, with which an omnipotent establishrr.ent of 
non-moral or static perfection would have nothing in common. 
11 
•••• Confronted with the choice between the happy and innocent life of the brute, 
without thought before and .after and pinin:.; for what is not, on the one hand, and 
the life of moral endeavour and spiritual progress, on the other hand, human beings 
would be practically unanimous in deciding that it is better to have risen above the 
non-moral level an¢! to have tasted of the tre_e of knowledge: ••••• n 
~~ Tennant: Philosophi
1
0GJ. The_ology,_ Vo~,. II, · Cambridge University Press., 1937 » p,. 
191-192 
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Chapter Nine 
Further Perspectives 
On God's Relation to the Uorld 
I. God and Matter 
It is frequently pointed out in our day that theistic philosophers and philosoph-
ical theologians find it easier to converse with the natural scientist (probably more 
easily with the physicist than with the biologist or psychologist), than in more 
recent modern times. This is due to the fact that the old Democritinn wooden-like 
atom, as the description of matter has, of course, long since gone by the board. 
1. The Need for a Mediating .'.J;'erm: Energy. 
That concept of matter, which, by definition, was so utterly unspirit like, 
could never really be harmonized with idealist, spiritual, or religious.philosophies. 
These claimed that reality was of another form in its depths or heights, namely, 
11 spirit 11 • The best that could be done with the older view of matter was either to 
say, as did Lucretius, Democritus's Roman disciple, that there were 11gods 11 , but that 
they were totally extraneous and without relation to the knovm universe of material 
atoms; or to solve the problem in some classic deistic or dualistic fashion as did 
Plato. In the_Timaeup_dialogue, God (Plato's eternal, active, creative principle) 
looked to the ic'teal laws, or forms of being subsumed under the idea of the Good (the 
second cosmic principle); and impressed the ideas on an eternal but originally incoate 
or formless ttmatter 11 (The third of his metaphysical principles). The Deistic Newton-
ian cosmology, with its description of the world as absolute masses moving in absolute 
mechanico.l order in an absolute or static space and time, could only conceive of 
Deity as a remote Causal Intelligence, who manufactured the world machine. God 
manufactured and wound up the cosmic watch (to use Paley I s famous analogy), set it 
in motion, and then retired. In such dualistic or deistic schemes, where would 
Deity have relat on to the world·; Could prayer or providence, for instance, have any 
truth or reality in such a view? More like modernnaturalistic theologians, Newton 
himself, of course, profoundly identified God with the universal space-sensorium. 
Popular agnosticism has often followed the belief that total Reality is best 
conceived as 11mass 11 in mechanical motion, devoid in its original state of t1life 11 , or 
11 mindrr, or 11 spirit 11 or 11 consciousness 11 • Life and mind are tenuous, derived, or 
epliemc,ral products of material stuff, like mist rising and vanishing from a dark 
bogg on a chilly morning. 
The problem of Deity, in its relation to matter, has at least in part its anal-
ogy in the problem of the relation of mind to body. The classic definitions of 
matter as inert mass and of mind as inert spiritual substance (as tabular~), 
making the two orders of reality totally different in kind, kept the two apart. The 
problem will surely remain, if we persist in interpreting either matter or mind as 
completely disparate types of realities -- the difficulty with all rigidly dualistic 
systems. The problem is not so much how to ;,;et mind (in the older sense) related to 
matter (in the older sense) as how to understand either or both in terms which will 
mediate the one to the other. The essential problem is to get the hardness and 
inertness and mechanism out of the concept of matter (as indeed modern physics 
seems to do), while at the same time relieving the concept of spirit of its ghostli-
ness, otherworldliness and vaporous formlessness. 
Today, of course, we are· told by the scientists that the 11revolution in physics 11 
has taken place. Matter is now 11evanescent 11 (Dampier); the older idea that she is 
some kind of hard, inert, stuff is gone. Matter is now a dyanmic, and in many ways 
an illusive reality_; you can not any more point the finger at her microscopic 
instances and declare them to be precisely nthere 11 in absolute finality, as one 
would hold up a base ball or a cannon shot and say, ttHere is matter n. For we are 
told that some of her microscopic instances disappear in one energy level and reappear 
in another, and moreover that some of these movements have tho appearance of indeter-
minateness or incalculability. The concept of particle or l!.2§.§ has become (at least 
alternatively) the concept of J2.QJ::!Q! or fil_lergY, and even the concept of freedom has 
crept in as a possibility. 0ir William Dampier wrote: 
11 
••• The old materialism is dead, and even the electrons, which 
for a time replaced particles of matter, have become but dis-
embodied ghosts, mere wave-forms. They are not even ·waves in 
our familiar space, or in Ma."Cwell Is aether, but in a four di-
mensionsal space-time, which our minds cannot picture in com-
prehensible terms. 
11 
••• Thus matter, which seemed so fo.miliar, resistent and eternal 
to nineteenth-century materialists, has become incredibly com-
plex; it is scattered as minute electrons in the vast empty spaces 
of atoms, or as wave-groups which somehow pervade the whole of 
them, and moreover, is vanishing into radiation, even from our 
Sun alone at the rate of 250 million tons a minute 11 ! 
Hi~Y of Science, 3rd ed. 
p. 470-1. 
Such announcements by the scientist have encouraged the religious philosopher, 
idealist, and theist. The larger insight now is that Reality is orders, levels, 
echelons and 11 heirarchiesH, .Qf ~gies. In modern terms, which have now become 
classic, we have thought of these orders or echelons of energy as the 11 inorganic 11 , 
the "organic 11, the 11 psychological11 or 11mental1', and the 11 spiritualll levels. The 
energy concept brings the various orders of beings or realities nearer to each other 
in kind. Energy has become the mediating term. 
In the definition of the real, we take ~ and individuality to be major 
descriptive predicates. Scientific thought continues its assumption that atoms and 
sub-atomic forces are types of 11indi viduali ties 11 ; but we know them, however, as 
---
realities largely by their powers/in our age of atomic concerns, by their explosive 
effects. So far as atomic things are concerned, 11individualities 11 are indirectly 
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seen as vapor traces of particles moving in scientific vapor chambers. (Individual-
ities at these levels of scientific concern are delt with primarily as statistical 
crowds.) At the hi,o-her ro.nr:re livincr forms are also individualities and orders of 0 Q ,;) 
power. 11 inally, from tho standpoint of our mm interior awareness of ourselves cJ.S 
finite self-conscious beings, we sense our peculiar and distinguishing quality to be 
our individuality, with its inherent ,.J;?Ower or activity of will and purposive life • 
.Spirit, as we know it from the inside is self-ordered energy: it is not form-
less vapor. A solution to our problem, then, lie~ in the .direction of conceiving 
the world as a hierarchy of energies, with mind or mental energy at the top. The 
general distinction, that there is an aspect of our world whi_ch may be called 
11material 11 , and another which may be termed 11 spiritualu, can no doubt be retained, 
but without thinking of these differences in such hard and fast fashion as to make 
them mutually exclusive. He cannot reduce the world to the older concepts of matter 
and mechanism, or raise it to an ill-defined and out-of-sight "spiritualism11 1 without 
doing violence to certain o.spects of the real on either side. No doubt, from the 
standpoint of our interio:r.· subjectivity, the precise way in which mind or spirit 
relates to, and influences, body, and vice versa, v.Jill remain a mystery (perhaps 
because it is e. place where God himself stands); but to conceive the real in terms . 
of energy or energies, materiological, biolo~ical, and psychological, helps in the 
solution of the mind~body problem, and also in the God-matter problem. The problem 
of relation and influence then becomes one of a transference of energy forms, and we 
know that that takes place. Examples are found in the transference of n~echanical 
energy into electrical and chemical forms. James Arthur Hadfield, sometime Surgeon 
in the Royal Navy, and contributor to the symposium on Immortality, edited by Canon 
B. H. Streeter, suggested a striking analogy of the relation of consciousness to 
material energy. He wrote in that book: 
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11 Consciousness is ••• a phenomena of intensification: it is 
produced when our sensations are raised to a sufficiently 
high pitch of tension. It is due to mental friction: to 
the effort to cut a new channel through the brain. Heat 
and light may both be produced by the transmission of a 
current of electricity along an electric wire: they may, 
from the physical point of vie\:!', differ only in the length of 
their waves and in velocity. But the essential feature of 
our analogy, imperfect as it is, is that in its resultant 
expression light is a different fo,rm of .§ller£y from neat, 
and therefore stimulates an entirely different system of 
nerve-endings in our bodies. Consciousness is thus a 
different form of energy than nerve energy, though it may 
have arisen out of it; it is, in fact, psychic energy, 
which is impossible to describe in terms of the physical. 
"This dramatic leap from the physiological to the psycholo-
gical is the most important factor in the evolution of mind. 
It is the decisive factor which once and for all turns the 
balance and establishes the supremacy of the mind over the 
body ••• 11 , p. 65, Streeter, et. al., ImmortaliiY, Macmillan, 
1922. 
2. Emerging Idea of God and Horld 
How does the mind-body problem bear upon the relation of Deity to matter'? 
Advanced ideas of God have claimed that value experience in human life -- truth, 
value, aesthetic value, and moral value -- is a clue to the meaning of Deity, or is 
a point where human experience bJcomes aware of Deity. At this place, however, there 
have been two great watersheds of thinking about God, or use of the term 11God u. 
One major alternative is that value experience, to be sure, emerges at the top 
of the syl:ltem of evolutionary energies which is the cosmos; but that value experience, 
or value energizing, is totally human or subjective. It is a self-enclosed, internal 
process with no reference to any correspondent form of reality or energy out in nature 
below man, or prior to him in natural history, or above him in the stars. There is 
no glorious self-luminous cloud of inter-galactic value - where Truth, Beauty, and 
_c 
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the Good have their transcendent home - beyond the human psyche. Value is purely 
and totally a human psychological possession: man in his highest and best social 
self is 11 God 11 -- so John. Dewey in our time has classically formulated this type of 
solution to the idea of Deity and matter. No doubt such a view will appeal to many 
ccientific minds in our day, and -to name Christian theologians.* 
The other major watershed, however, and the older one, of thinking about Deity 
has been that value is indeed in some sense cosmic, or t~ans-hun:.an. The idealist, 
spiritual, or religious traditions of the race· have believed this. ·rhis type of 
faith has said that our human sense of value at its best reflects what is intended, 
what is trans-humanlv .Q.tooagateq as higher purpose, and what is to be preserved in 
the totality of the systems of energy. Accordinly, 11God as Cosmic Mind 11 , source and 
sustainer of value, has become standard phraseology in 20th century theology, par-
ticularly that embued with the naturalistic spirit, or an empirical scientific out-
look. Modern philosophies of religion, instead of attacking the evolutionary 
hypothesis, have turned it to their ovm account, as we have endeavored to show,. 
3. Immanence and Transcendence 
Otherwise stated this question may be put into a form which we have earlier 
raised, Hhat is the sto_tus of Nature in an idealistic or theistic philosophy? Does 
nature as a whole have an independent, derivative, and real, though created existence 
of its 01-m, or does it have a kind of phenomenal existence more immediately depend-
ent upon the Divine Being and \Jill? 
There are those within theism (the naturalistic theologians) who tend to accept 
the more 11realistic 11 view of nature, while others have clung to the more 11 phenomenal11 
view -- er the view that nature I s absolute independence is more 11 apparent 11 than 
actual (the traditional idealists). It must be acknowledged that this question takes 
us to one prominent limit of finite understanding. As for us, we are inclined to 
*It seems to us that the 11death-of-God11 theologies of :radical immanence of the 
19609 s (Altizer,et al,) is a revival of Dewey's humanism in Christian verbage. 
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raise the question and then to leave it there. Do we need to know the intimate de-
tails of God's exact relation to nature? That there is some 11 connection 11 from with-
in the Divine standpoint would be an obvious and ultimate article of a rational faith. 
We can of course only speculate. From the standpoint of theism, nature may be either 
of the above alternatives. She may even possibly be a combination of the ti:ro, with 
certain aspects of her being standing more independtly of God I s immediate control 
than others! In either case, she may be regarded as an evolutionary emerging sys-
tem, integrated and hierarchically ordered. But we venture a bit further. 
There are undoubtedly the two aspects of God's power in his relation to the 
world. We have mentioned these previously. He is, on the one hand, 11efficient power 11 , 
or 11material power 11 , if the reader prefers the term, who founds and sustains exist-
ence on the level of basal nature under the general rule of law. Space, time, gravi-
tational and atomic energies, the principle of mutation which differentiates living 
f ' 1 t. ** . th f 1 f d · .-1,,h th h . 1 1 orms in evo u ion -- i.e., e mystery o i e an its grow~ on e p ysica pane 
-- all may be understood as aspects of God's efficient causal power or being. Whether 
God~ s control over His world is an immanence of 11being 11 or an iml:!lanence of 11 powern 
(do not these amount to the same thing?), God fills up the lower levels of the hier-
archy with 11natural necessity" and physical determination, up to and beginning with 
higher life. At this point two factors become operative: finite freedom on the one 
hand and God's 11final'1 or nideal power" or presence on the other. The latter type 
of power may appeal to and persuade, but does not compel, freedom. 
God's dealing with existence at the higher levels of finite freedom cannot be 
by the direct, coercive method of His efficient, creative or basal sustaining power, 
but, rather, by the indirect method of moral purpose. We call this final, teleological, 
moral, ideal or spiritual power. It is, in t,he over-all sense, the power of truth 
re-
that leads and develops existence persuasively or/ demptively after it has attained 
*Recall our discussion in the last chapter on the idea of the self-limited God. 
**In detail., of course., we imply the mutation-natural selection polQri ty as the 
fuller statement of evolutionary causality. 
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the capacity for· free; intelligent, and moral grovtth. In our chapter on evil we 
pointed out, wher~ freedom begins to opera'\;,e, · when life appears, or even prior to 
' 
life, if freedom can be said to be P;esent at mo:re elementary levels, '.God leaves His 
world to its own devices, from the standpoint of an efficient causality. This relinq-
uishing or limiting of his direct power or control is for the sake of the world I s own 
free growth or development into higher ranges of finite form and freedom (at this 
level of insight the problem of evil may have its solution, as we earlier saw). God 
limits himself in His relation to the world in its upper levels so that finite free-
dom may become responsible and moral. In the meanwhile, God patiently waits to enter 
hfo world again at the top of the hierarchy through moral truth as the finite spirit 
becomes willing to walk with, perhaps some would prefer to say,. receive the Divine 
Spirit. In the meanwhile He does indeed exercise efficient causality in the discipl-
ines of historic process, where it may be necessary to goad man's inertia or judge 
his sins. 
II. God and Human Freedom: 
Moral Autonomy and the Divine trill 
This phase of our discussion follows from our earlier presentation of the moral 
argun:ent for God. duch an a:rgun:ent in the Kantian setting as was ours, in consid-
erable part, faces the problem of the relation of 11moral autonomy" to the 11Divine 
Will". He endeavor now to clarify this issue as best we may by referring again to 
Kant, and presently to the philosophy of Josiah Royce. Royce endeavored to solve tbe 
problem of the relation of the Divine to the human 11wills 11 in terms reminiscent of 
Kant. His position seems to us of profoundest insight. He refer to Kant first. 
Kant I s third statement of tho moral imperative emphasized the freedom of the 
human will in moral thought and decisidn, and spoke of it as 11 the idea of the will 
of every rational being as a universally legislating will'1. He continued to say11 
speaking; of the moral ma.m 
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11 
••• the will ••• itself is universal legislator. Thus the will is 
not subject simply to the law, but so subject that it must be re~ 
garded as itself giving the law, and on this gound only, subject 
to the law (of which it can regard itself as the author) ••• 
• • • the .laws to which he is subject are only those of his Oim giving, 
though at the same time they are universal and ••• he is only bound to 
act in conformity with his mm will; a will, however, which is 
designed by nature to give universal laws". (Greene, ed., Kant, 
Selections, 1929, pp. 3·Ji ... ,:32) .* 
I:) g.- ~:y 
He would agree with Kant here that moral reason is autonomous or legislates the 
law itself because true freedom and reason are the same thing. Moral law is a deriv-
ative of rational freedom. But a question concerning the meaning or intent of Kant's 
moral philosophy as a whole arises. 
His principle of autonomy or freedom could be interpreted as a "humanistic ethic", 
which is 11non-religious 11 , making 11religious ethics", or the idea that moral laws or 
truth are founded in the will of God superfluous. 
In reply to this it may be said that Kant's is not an "autonomous ethic 11 in the 
sense that there is only man and not God. Such would indeed be an extreme humanistic 
interpretation of Kant. Everywhere he refers to God and in stirring passages implies 
that the moral law is founded in His will. It may be possible to interpolate Kant in 
a humanistic direction, but he himself certainly did.not intend to advocate a non-
theistic or radic~lly humanistic ethic. Let us then support Kant's deeper insight 
along this line with our own brief excursus. The situation between human moral free-
dom and the Divine intellect or will is here perhaps clarified by stressing three 
implications of Kant's philosophy beyond the points we have already brought out in 
previous chapters: 
First, if God I s mind is free and rationa.l like our own, He himself would legis-
late the moral law as we do. His legislation of it is prior to that of any one of 
us and in that sense would be the cosmic standard. The moralln.w is the legislation 
of all free spirits -- God I s and man I s together. If they 11reason11 the 11 1aw" similarly., 
that is because "reoson11 is the transcending reality; and that., according to an 
idealist-religious philosophy., is precisely what has come to man from God,. 
*Scribner I s 
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Second, God has created our mind in H:i,s image, that i,s to say, with the same 
moral freedom and :r,ationo.li ty or propensi i;,y and capacity to legislate morn,l law as 
Re does. ~ven though we legislate the law freely we do not thereby deny God his 
place or abrogate our responsibility toward him; we are not nautonomous bein1s 11 in 
the sense of some non-theistic humanism, since we are dependent upon and owe our 
natures to God as our creator. Our sense of finitude saves a religious metaphysics 
and a religious ethic. In willing moral law we remain aware of our finitude and our 
derivation from cosmic ontecedents, the ultimate nature of which as love our very 
intuition of moral law on its highest plane suggests. 
Third, what do we mean, then, when we s~y that the moral law is founded ultimate-
ly in the will of God? and that God 1 s will is our standard? .And with this, we revert 
to a point earlier made. Personality is the supreme work of God in creation -- its 
coming to be, and its success, happiness, and salvation express God's highest will. 
Therefore in every act in which we strive to respect and consciously further the well-
being of persons we express or do God's will, that is, we fit in with the manifest 
intent of creation. (Kant would have put it: in so far as we do our duty we express 
God's will.) 
\.le conclude this digression into Kantian philosophy by bringins our discussion 
around a1ain to a point emphasized in Royce, but employing the Kantian line which we 
believe was the inspiriation for the Roycean solution to the problem of the wills: 
Kant wrote, 11every being that cannot act except under the idea of freedom is 
just for that reason in a, practical point of view really free 11 • '' 
In the history of Idealism in a later context than Kant, Josiah Royce attempted 
to solve the problem of the relation of the Divine to the Human 11Wills 11 in terms 
,< Greene, Kant, Selections, p.335. 
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similar to those we have just sug:;ested. Kant spoke in the context of a more trad-
itional dualistic theism, or personali9m, with God understood as something other or 
transcendent to his world, with the world and man as the created product of the 
Divine Will. Royce spoke rather in the context of Absolute Idealism, with God or 
the Divine Mlnd understood as being in some sense the total life of the Horld raised 
to the concept of an Absolute Consciousness. 
We are all free, yet we all have the idea of freedom commonly. Moral or respons-
ible freedom is the Idea of Ideas that connects all men and constitutes the Life of 
God on the side of the Divine individuation or concretion into a world of finite 
persons. 
We are 11 inil the 'bein,s,; 1 of God, in the sense that we are a part of the Divine 
Meaning or Idea for the world. But thi$ meaning or idea is precisely that we should 
be free. We endeavor to clarify further this insight of Royce by- the following 
analysis. 
The clue to Royce 1 s thinking in this particular was his teleological under-
~ding or definition of personal selfhood in both the finite human case and the 
Di vine or Cosmic Case. Royce considered the nself 11 , on both the Divine and the 
human planes, as a teleological process that comes into 11reality11 in man 1 s case, or 
achieves its cosmic destinty in God's case, only through growth toward realization 
of a supreme life plan, or purposive 11 idealtt-. , Gocl1s 11 life planu would be the total-
ity of meaning of the cosmic process as a whole. 
That process must be described as Infinite Personality in the act of releasing 
or realizing its 1purpose 1 or 1idea 1 , namely, the· creation of finite lives, with 
their release, in turn, of finite purposes and ideas in progressive enrichment of the 
whole. God is the willer of the conditions (of whatever sort necessary, both material 
or otherwise) of finite freedom. This is the distinctive nature of the Absolute Life 
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and Activity. Individuality, in both man and God, is defined by its fulfillment of 
a single pu:::-pose, in. constant realization of some over-all or commanding 1idea 1 • The 
single or all-commanding 1:mrpose on a cosmic scale, which would define its_ greater 
Individuality, is its aim to will into being, as the supreme Idea, finite indi,vidual-
1} 
ity and the conditions of its freedom. This means, in subs~ance for Royce, that 
God is defined as the gound or condition that makes personal being possible. 
Paul Tillich I s trenchant phrase, God as the Ground of Being, or the Pm.;er of 
Being, describes, I believe, what Royce said earlier in our century concerning a 
fundamental definitional notion of God~ The valae of Royce is that he analyzed this 
notion from profoundest introspective standpoint, that gave to his philosophy its 
special intellectual power and appeal. 
Royce went on to say that the difficulty of understonding the relationship be-
tween the 'wills' is cleared up when we realize that the 'power of will' or :1causal-
ity' cannot be conceived n:echanically or quantitatively -- that is, in terms of bil-
liard balls or 1forces 1 hitting each other. In mechanical terms the problem of the 
wills is indeed insoluble. Rather than the idea of 'causation' with its connotatfon 
of material forces, we must use the spiritual conception of 1meetning 1 .,,{, Thus the· 
Absolute Cod does not 'cause us 1 ; He 'means us 1 • This spiritualizing of the concep-
tion of force or causality is, I believe, a necessary step toward the solution of the 
problem of the wills. Royce says that being is deeper than causation understood in 
..'tJtf· 
any mechanical sense.""' He are 1in 1 the 1being 1 of God" in the sense that we are a 
part of the Divine Meaning. 
.H ... H.,.\ 1~ 1( 
But this meaning is precisely that we should be free.""' 
-i, Royce, HI.I, p. /4.59-70 and CG, p. 201-3. 
,H, Royce, PC. 2, p. 6lf and WI.2, p. 269. Bri~htmon G-EJ·P35'oborat~s this general point 
&~~~ where he says that inter-a<:itivity and communication are not literal 
merging. The inter-activity of personality with other personality is a spiritual 
phenomenon, without proper analogy in the physical realm of gross forces, PT, p. 60, 
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Furthermore, we should recall that for Royce, selfhood doe"S not have a thing-
.:Like reality, of either material or spiritual quality. Royce is against any 'real-
istic' doctrine of the self. It is not a hard core of inexplicable fact; it is nno 
more datwn 11 • '' On the Cosmic as on the finite scale it is essentially 11 a meaning em-
bodied in a conscious life 11. ,H, Thus God on his side is not conceived as a kind of 
divine Substance which 'willst as a secondary and derivative function of its "being 11 ~ 
He does not posses a solid kind of being, or fixed, realistic entity, which later 
bestirs itself ond sends forth its pov1er. Rather for Royce it would seem that the 
Cosmic Being and the cosmic Willing and Individuation are one and the same process. 
God has a 'being' of' 'function' and 1meaning 1 identical with his 'power' and purposes 
just as finite individuals do. For Royce, the cosmic process of individualization 
and personalization is possible only because in its ultimate reaches of meaning it 
itself is Conscious and Personal. Royce would answer Bosanquet I s dictum that 'to 
will a will is to 1.-!ill its content I by saying that such a way of putting the problem 
is too materialistic or quantitative, too mechanical. Both God and men are purposing 
spirits; and the purposes of two personal beinzs can, in a manner of speaking, 
become identical, e.s spiritual ideas, without implyi:i;i,3; the mutual destruction or can-
cellation of their respective selfhoods. 1. -
We summarize and conclude on Royce's solution to the problem of the wills. In 
The World and the Individual he wrestled most strenuously with the problem of his 
alleged "absolutism11 , or as his critics have put it, his "block universe II thoory of 
reality, in behalf of both human freedom and the divine freedom. He endeavored to 
so:)..Ve the problem by ruling out any notions of mechanical causality for · . " ... · ·: · · ::-:-
describing the relationship of the Divine to the human 11will 11 • He substituted rather 
~ Royce, PC. 2, p. 61. 
'lH(· Royce, WI.2, p. 269. 
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th0 concept of a spiritual or moral relationship, centered in the idea of freedom 
itself, the Idea of Ideas (reflecting an emphasis in Kant), where the divine and 
·bhe hu"W:ln realities, or orders of being, may.JI without logical or metaphysical 
confusio:r:., be conceived to meet. God ::rnd man are mutually self-expressed in the 
11meo.ning11 -for-freedom, which is the central spirit of the ·world process .. We believe 
·bhat a solution to the problem of the wills must f'ollow Royce in this thinking. 
To rcund. ou:b the picture of Royce's sig,nificant contribution to theistic 
philosophy., in terms of his own life-long development as a philosopher ;we conclude 
vJi th the following: 
In his la st work, The Problem of Christianity ( 1913)., Royce's earlier term., 
11meaningu, becomes 11 interpretationn. The social process in its profound.er operation 
is one where persons mutually understand each other in the dimensions of empathy 
and. love so that a common, on-going life may be secured (p. 16ef., p. 100-1). 
11 Interpretationu or the will to interpret is included under the will to reflect 
logically and coherently and the will to love; it stands as the divine impulse 
(p.217 f.) because its end. is 11 complete mutual understanding" (p. 220). In The 
Problem of Christianity, Royce joined his id.ea of "the Community of Inter:r;r etation11 
-- his central theme of that book -- to his former conception of God the Absolute. 
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If in one body of Royce 1s writings we find the conception of the differentiation 
or disperslon of the divine nmeaning 11 into finite freedom as a kind of supreme cosmo-
logical principle, we cannot overlook his final and complementary conception of God 
the Absolute as the community of 11 interpretationn. He says that "this essentially 
social universe, this community 11 is 11 the -sole and supreme reality": the Absolute 
( The Problem of Christianity, Nev! York: Macmillan, Vol. II, 1913, p 296). This form-
ulation stands in the middle of his general discussion of the principle of 11 Interpre-
tation11. As the principle of to.r;;etherness, of community, without which neither the 
community nor the individuals whom the cormnunity nourishes could exist, Interpretation 
is therefore 11 absolute 11 • It is the very principle or power of ethical existence or 
the moral relationship. Royce's "Absolute Truth" has here been thoroughly warmed up 
and moralized. It is spiritual process.; it is love. It is not the passionless, 
cosmic Thought of the Early essay, llPossibili ty of .Error. 11 In The Problem of Christ--
ianity Royce may sound sometimes as though he is saying that God, or the Absolute, is 
but a verbal hypostasis of his principle of Interpretation. Yet on the whole I think 
he meant to retain his belief in Divine Spirit as Cosmic Rality, · now viewed, however, 
less abstractly or less merely logically, but rather more in psychological dimensions 
as immanent Spirit, called in his own words, 11 God the Interpretern (pp. 219-21). He 
close this section with his memorable words to this effect: 
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11
.b.nd, if, in ideal, we aim to conceive the divine nature 
how better can we conceive it than in the fo:cm of the Community 
of Interpretation, and above all in the form of the Interpreter, 
who interprets all to all, and each individual to the world, and 
the world of spirits to each individual. 
In such an interpreter, and in his community, the problem 
of the One and the Many would find its ideally complete e:icpression 
and"solution. The abstract conceptions and the mystical intuitions 
would be at once transcended, and illumined, and yet retained and 
kept clear and distinct, in and through the life of one who, as 
interpreter, was at once servant to all and chief among all, ex-
pressing hi,s will through all, yet, in his interpretations, regard-
ing and loving the will of the least of these his brethren. In him 
the Community, the Individual, and the Absolute would be completely 
expressed, reconciled, and distinguised • 
•.• If love for this community is awakened, - then indeed this 
love is able to grasp, in ideal, the meaning of the Church Universal, 
of the Communion of .Saints, and of God the Interpreter ••• 11 • (1'he 
ProbJem of Christianity, Vol. II, Macmillan, 1913, p. 219-21). 
Royce i.s not just the academic philosopher,; he obvfously became the Christian 
theologian, who attempted -- along with others such as Borden Parker Bowne, who worked 
from slightly different perspectives -- a grand union of Judea-Christian personaUstic 
sentiment and categories ~ith those of nineteenth and twentieth century philosophical 
idealism. 
III. God's Will as Ethical Standard 
Hhat does a religious philosophy mean when it refers to God's will as highest 
ethical standard? The clue to its thinking in this area is the central position 
perE;onality holds among values. Stated in the most comprehensive way, a Hebrew-
Christian personalistic philosophy says: 
1. Personali tv or the coming to be of personal beings is the sunreme work of 
creation: that is, expresses God's will. (More finely, not only their coming to be, 
or purpose· 
but their well-being, happiness, or 11 salvation 11 is the supreme will/rmd Hark of God. 
Two basic insights support this affirmation: 
(a) An~ oriori factor: that I am a person in the process of becoming, or growing 
is the central fact and rr;eaning of at least my existence. There is no more important 
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fact to me. But this my worth I do not myself create; it is here with my presence; 
it was given me by all the creative forces that made me, most of which I have not 
solicited. 
(b) An empirical factor: general empirical evidence to this effect I see in the 
-th 
development and progress of nature at lareg. Nature brings for/individuality, lays 
the foundation for personality, which history takes up and refines. In the simple 
presence of other personal beings like myself I indirectly infer a self-valuation 
like my own. The arrival of numberless personal bein::;s of moral possibility indicates 
or suggests the personal and morc1.l meaning or purpose of cosmic process. 
(2) The ref ore we can say that the will of God is our standard in life with 
real meaning. May it not be said that there is in simple experience a connection 
between the Divine Will, the Will of Creation, and our own 11will 11 -- our o\-m effort 
at life -- if we limit the issue to its 11 moral sense 11 and center it in a personal-
istic philosophy? lfJay it not be said that my will 11 coincides 11 with God I s (with that 
of Creation) in every instant that I supremely respect and consciously further the 
principle of personality -- in myself and in others,whom I find sharing existence with 
me? In every act in which we strive to respect and consciously enhance the happiness 
of' persons 
and social well-being/we do or express God's will -- we fit in with the manifest 
intent of creation. 
(3) Regarded in a 11naturalistic 11 and non-religious way, the 11will of God 11 would 
be a metaphor for what nature seems to be doing in bringing forth individuality and 
personality. But if philosophy can show that existence is derived from Personal 
Being, then the concept of God I s will is more than a metaphor for an impersonal pro-
cess. It could then be taken · ."" · literally; it would suggest the personal origin 
and purpose of this process. Our previous chapters have boon· stud~"ing imoh 
a philosophical alternative to naturalism. 
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When I say that God acts or 11wills O through me, I do not m3an this in a mechan~· 
ical, but in an ethical sense. Goel is not a billiard cue, and we the ball_s. The 
concept of human freedom breaks dm.m if the attempt is made to think out the relation 
of the divine to the human will on any such mechanical plane. The only uay wills can 
act together or 11 coincide ii is to respond conjointly to ~- The way we have poi1er 
and influence over each other I s lives on the finite plane is in this way. Causation 
between minds could only come about by the power of the 11 ideas 11 held in common by 
those minds. If I conceive a 11 trutl,I 11 to which you assent and upon which you may act, 
then I have influenced you. The influence of one mind upon another -- without sacri-
fice of freedom -- is one of the commonplace and most certain of experiences. Would 
not the analogy hold for the relationship of the Divine Mind to the finite mind --
with the added factor that true ideas are an expression of the Divine Mind? Truth, 
as we have seen, is not coercive, but persuasive. This is because the nature of God 
is fundamentally llperson 11 and "love 11 • He does not obtrude himself; he glli..§ himself. 
The Divine Mind would influence the finite mind, net by coercion -- any more than one 
finite mind influence another by coercion -- but rather by the truth and its persuas-
ion. Finite willsare free to move 11within11 or by 11 truth 11 , which in a measure stands 
for the Divine Will. Finite wills morally acting are the highest expression of 
truth as process. 
Recall that we have said that a personalistic idealism does not stop with the 
conception of truth as impersonal cosmic structure, any more than it would leave the 
concept of love on this plane. Rather a personalistic idealism has the conception of 
Ultimate Personality, of which truth in its moral rr:e.aning seems to be an intimation. 
To review briefly our chapter on truth, truth is knowledge of the world and its re- .. 
lationships in various ways sentient relationships, scientific relationships, and 
moral relationships. Truth in the moral or valuational meaning is awareness of the 
world as bearing an order of life (of which oneself is the inro::ediate example) and of 
the relationships between such lives that would make for their well-being and harmonzr. 
Truth, then, having to do with the personal and its relationships, as the personal 
being realizes his own existence and assists others to realize theirs, implicates 
itself with the fundamental condition (God) that makes personal being possible. 
Thus far, then, let us say that the relation of finite personality to a divine 
Personality cannot have a 0 structurall' or 11material11 analogy. Godl.s will does not 
support ours as rafters support a roof. There is, however, an 11intellectual° and 
ItspirituaP analogy in the conception of God as the life of truth itself, and we may 
all experience a sharing and a sense of dynamic self-fulfillment in that. 
A further way to clarify the problem before us is to ask with W. R. Matthews 
nwhether in fact we find it possible to will freedom for others 11 ?-i' In Matthew1 s 
analogy what we do is will the conditions of freedom, for example, for our children, 
by, in part, controlling the physical and social environment in which they grow up. 
On a wider scale in the cosmic and historical environment, it may be conceived how 
God wills the conditions of freedom for finite moral beings: first, on the level of 
cosmic activity, by bringing forth a world with creatures capable of intellectw3il 
and moral development; and second, by conditioning the historical order directly 
through finite individuals themselves in their experience of the power of love (in 
personal and social ways) to harmonize existence. 
Somewhat like this, St. Augustine, on the freedomist side of his thought, in a 
memorable passl::!-ge discussing the Divine Will as an all-encompassing category, said 
that men stand within ;the Hill of God and that that will 11cooperatesa with ours 
where we attempt to do the right -- in brief (in terms of our present thought) fulfill 
our obligations to personality in coordination with Moral Order and the meaning of 
existence. But even where men disregard, singly or collectively, that highest prin-
ciple, they still stand within the Di vine Hill, though that is said."'to II operate 11 
* w. R. :Matthews: The Purpose of God., Scribner's,1936, p .. 159 
against us _in the form of Horal Order, founded in porsonali ty, which seeks to main-
tain itself ip the judgments and disciplines of history. i, 
St. Anselm, the medieval Augustinian theologian, stressed the same point on it~ 
negative side: 11 .And so, should any man or bo.d angel be unwilling to submit. to the 
divine will and rule, yet he cannot e.jcape from it; for when he would ·escape from 
under the will that commands, he does but run under the will that pLmishes. 111"' The; 
great Augustianian theologians conceived of 1:oral truth andits order as expressing 
the 11divine wilP. The joyousness of life when in harmony with that will is an ex-
pression of the moral order · confirming itself. The judgments and disciplines of 
life when out of harmony with God 1s will is an experience 
order -.. maintaining itself. 
IV. ~deas of Divine 
:: ; ::. · of moral 
Predestination, P:•ovide~, Foreknowledge, and Omnipotence 
What meaning, if any, does a religious philosophy now-a-days assign to these 
rather traditional terms? 
Predestination, I believe, should drop out of the religious vocabulary as a 
confusing, if not a malicious term. It harbors too much the old conception of theo-
logical determinism -- that God foreknows and therefore 11 predestinesn every human 
thought and action. This was a central belief in orthodox Mohammedanism, and in 
Christendom it reached its worst expression in the Protestant theologian John Calvin@ 
Calvin believed that there was an exact number of elect souls predestined for Heaven 
under the prevenient Grace of God, and an exact number automatically predestined to 
hell by His wrathful judgment. 
*Grace end Free Will, 33, 42-43, from Ni cine and Post-Nicene Fathers, ed. 
Philip Schaf'f's Scribner's, 1908. 
**Cur Deus Homo, Bk I, Ch. X!v, trans. by John Baillie in The Place of Christ in 
Modern Christianit_y, p. 153 
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Theological determinism, of course, runs counter to our sense of "freedom" and 
11responsibil~ty 11 • Such a belief would make untenable the idea that man is a .illQl'..?-1 
.fiein..g. Hhen we speak of man as a moral being we mean that he is in some degree re-
sponsible for his actions, and he is accountable for his actions only if he is some 
sense 11free ti. Theological determinism, no less than the determinism of an entirely 
mechanistic or materialistic philosophy, really destroys the idea of man as a spirit-
ual being. 
Undoubtedly, one of the ori5ins of predestinationist thinking in Christianity 
is found in St. Paul I s letter to the Romans, chapters 9-11. This extensive passage 
treats the problem of election and predGstination in terms of the question, How will 
Israel fit into God 1 s plan of redemption through Ghrist? The matter profoundly 
troubles Paul -- erstwhile Pharisee and mw Christian :missionary. Though he by no 
means answers the question clearly, he does see great historic good or purpose coming 
out of Israel's 11 tr&pass 11 in rejecting Christ. It is through this rejection that 
11 salvation has come to the Gentiles 11 , or the whole world, i.e. through his, Paul I s 
preaching. In the end., Israel herself will be saved, because -- by presmnption in 
Paul's thinking -- what is predestined is the love and faithfulness of Godl Actually, 
taking this clue -- the everlasting provision of the Divine Love ..... we may move to 
our second, more useful term. 
Providence. \Jhat are the 11 Providences 11 of God? What has God "provided u as the 
good order, necessary to the outworking or fulfilling of his loving plan for creation, 
the world, and men He ::rncge Gt severed ascendine;, or deepening levels of meaning 
to the idea of Providence. 
1. God has provided a stable natura,l environment, the physical laws of existencE3, 
and their outworking, upon which living beinss may stand, and upon which they can re-
ly, as a dependable platform;i in the midst of which they learn to make "the most favor,, 
able adjustment" (Macintosh) for survival and groDth. Gravitation will be the same 
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n1aw 11 tomorrow that it is today; so will be the laws of chemistry and other physical 
laws -- we can depend on these things and must conform our lives to them. 1.!ere 
gravity or the air we breathe one thing today and something. else tomorrow; were the 
elements of water one type of compound today and something radically different and·un-
stable tomorrow -- life could never have arisen in the first place, much less main-
tained itself, or advanced. . No doubt the rrpermanency 11 of the laws of nature is a 
relative thing; perhaps there has been, and continues to be, slow change -- as in 
For example, 
fact we know to be the case. /o.nvironmental change has forced life to adapt. But 
change cannot be so abrupt or so radical as to make viable, or rational adaptation 
impossible. He are therefore speaking of the general, over-all or long range per-
durability of the laws of nature. These have constituted an environment of sufficient 
stability for living bein~s to arise within it and make their way successfully. T4is ;~h, \, 
is the first level of the meaning of God 1 s providence. 
2. Rising out of this, and partly comprehended within or implied by it, are the 
laws of the cominS; to be, or the integration of the elements into living forms --
their emergence, evolution and organization into personal life and freedom. lfotation, 
natural selection, and any other processes rationally conceivable as ingredient to 
this development, are here understood. The Possibility of dynamic and multiform 
development of material energy into living beings of many kinds, with the most com-
plex forms representing ITental and spiritual adaptation, is a further profounder mean-
ing of providence. 
3. Again.,rising from this spiritual adaptation, or implied in its meaning, are 
the aesthetic and moral laws or values that may inspire and guide the life of spirit-
ual beings into fullest personal joy and social harmony. Love and ,justice are the 
spiritual energies that provide for the happiness and order of personal beings. Love 
is provided as the ultimate law of our being, and in faith we deem that it expresses 
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the ultimate nature of thin~s. From the Divine Love we have come forth in the cosmic 
order; by love we relate ourselves creatively to our fellows; and through the gate of 
love we will pass at last into the Divine presence. In brief, moral reality is £9!~ 
ordained. Love is sure to heal and to save under ordinary circumstances -- hatred 
is sure to divide and kill. Such is the providential law or meaning of human history. 
In and through love,God has established the basis for the success of our freedom, if 
we respond to its challenge and its promise. 
Accordingly, we are now prepared to state the meaning of Providence in practical, 
personal life. Vzy- friends and acquaintances, people near and far, by their decisions 
create the situations in which I must make my decisions. They are instruments of 
God 1 s Providence for me when their decisions are constructive anc.1 helpful, loving and 
just. I have to go the way of their program for me; certain doors are open for me 
c1nd others are closed; but I am free to decide within boundaries and limits. Think, 
for the moment, of the vast Providence that the founding Fathers of our co~stitutional 
democracy ordained for us as individuals -- by their decisions back there for the 
orderly regulation of freedom in a free society! Or think of the Providence that a 
University, this very institution of lea:cning, that faithful men and women of a pre-
vious Oregon generation, around 1870, founded for the continuing generations of stu-
dents and teachers -- for you and me -- a place for you to learn and prepare your-
selves for a useful and satisfying life -- a place for me to earn a living and :r. 
to fulfill my particular calling. Or consider the very special providences that our 
deeper friendships, or a happy marriage, are to us. 
On our part, when the decisions of others, relative to us seem shortsighted or 
unjust, then Providence may flow through our side of tho equation as we react with 
justice and love. This was the point of the beautiful story of Joseph in the Old 
Testament, where Joseph, now prime minister to the Pharoah, said to his brothers, after 
he had disclosed himself to them, who had sold him into slavery into Egypt: 
11 But Joseph said to them, 'Fear not, for am I in the place 
of God? As for you, you meant evil against me; but God 
meant it for good, to bring it about that many people 
should be kept alive, as they are today. So do not fear; 
I will provide for you and your little ones. 1 Thus he 
reassured them and comforted them. (Genesis 50: 20-21) 
Summarizing the idea of Provide.nee we may say that God acts in and through the 
context of hwnan freedom and society, through the instrumentality of values perceived 
by the human mind and embodied in social structure and order. 
Divine foreknowledge otherwise sometimes termed the orrniscience of God. 
The problem of the divine foreknowledge is intimately tied to the idea of time. By 
saying that God must sorr:ehow have 11f oreknowledge 11 , if He is to be God, is to say, it 
seems to us, that God must be subject, somehow, to ~ -- that tirr:e is a transcending 
reality, outside, above, or more absolute then God Himself. To spenk of a divine 
---. in front of 
11foreknowledge 11 is to imply that time is out/ _ · God, somehow, that he is a 
"finiteil being relative the the time concept or reality, nnd caught in its flow, as 
we seem to be irnmeshed. To assert that he has ii foreknowledge II is to say that He, God, 
does battle, in a manner of speaking, with the primeval dragon, Time: conquerc it, 
subdues it, brin3:s it under his absolute ken, so that He can divino its secrets, 
right now, 
before, and after, along the time intervals at any designated position, behind,/or 
in the future. 
But is not the problem of God I s 11foreknowledge II cleared up, if ue perceive that 
time itself is an ultimate expression of the Divine being or reality -- a primal as-
pect, .and a'.n immediate experience on our part,of the Divine reality? 
Then strictly speaking there is no magical 11 foreknowledge 11 • There is only the 
Time front, itself sensed as "moving 11 , intuited as the opportunity for creativity --
a moving 11 now", with openness and indeterminacy as the meaning of any quasi 11future 11 
that we can anticipate? This brings our thinking back to a previous point .. It 
must be ostrue to say that God is Time itself as to say that He is Freedomitself, 
or that He is Love. At least principal points of convergeance of the Divine nnd 
the Human are the ideas of time, freedom, and love. Perhaps it is most reverent to 
say that God is the fount of time, freedom, and love. In any case we return to our 
discussion of time particularly. 
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If we go in the other direction and say that God is above time, we mean that 
the Divine is some kind of Absolute 11Eternity 11 • This, of course, v!ould make time an 
illusion. But if time is a reality and God is a reality, they must be conceived to-
gether, with time as an intimate expression of His very 11life 11 as God. God would 
therefore experience His own time-Self as from the 11 inside 11 , precisely as we ourselves 
do. He would anticipate or 11foreknow 11 a 11future 11 only in the sense that he, as we 
do, may be aware of alternative values and purposes as yet unrealized, which would 
constitute a 11 future 11 state of things, if an when realized. So conceived, God's 
11 foreknowledge II does not determine a future; it can only anticipate alternative 
11 futures 11 , and their ramifying 11 consequences 11 , just as we 11 foreknow 11 without fore-
determining our own finite futures. It may be conceded here, of course, that the 
Divine life in this area is far richer and profounder than our ovm, but not essent-
ially unlike our own. 
Ue conclude that a Divine 11foreknowledge II cannot determine finite action; this 
would destroy freedom. Furthermore, it need not do so any more than my relative and 
limited foreknowledge of what a f:n.·end of mine might do would destroy his freedom. 
What God foreknows is the consequences for good or ill of action in a moral univerrJe, 
the nature and laws of which he knows intimately. 
Is not our human situation vis-a-vis the Divine anticipation of the Future (for 
we had better speak of nanticipation 11 rather than 11foreknowledge 11 ) something like 
the following. diagram? 
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The branches repr<i3sent the ordinary c_hannels of circumstance that 0 :uide, and some-
times absolutely control, life. A,B,C, an_d D, are the consequences, the outcome of 
our activity, which an 11 omniscient 11 God would comprehend. The :x' e represent life I s 
limited choices, however, which, we are absolutely free to make within the circumstance 
of each choice. Indeed, the problem involves again the idea of God's self-limitation 
in certain aspects of His relationship to finite free persons. 
Omgiootence. A the close of our chapter on evil we discussed the idea of God I s 
11 power 11 , p. \Je add here the following quotation from the noted British preacher-
theologian, Leslie D. lJeatherhead in his memorable essay, The 1.Jill of God: 
11Hhat is meant by the omnipotence of God is that he will 
reach at last his ultimate goal, that nothing of value will be 
lost in the process, however man may divert and dam up the 
stream of purpose nearest him, and that God -- if he cannot use 
men as his agents -- will, though with great pain to himself 
and to themselves, use them as his instruments. 1 I know that 
thou canst do all things, and that no purpose of thine can be 
restrained. 111 (The Will of God, Abingdon-Gokesbury Press, ·· . 
p .34 , 1954). 
This eminently practical conceptualization of the Divine omnipotence suggests a. last 
topic germane to this chapter, and here a:;ain we will refer briefly to the above 
essay. 
V. The Ide a of_Qod I s Hill 
and Hwnan Circumstan2~ 
Weatherhead I s five sermons on the will of God are in fact a practical treatise 
on the problem of evil,· a topic which we have already considered. at some; length. 
tleatherhead approaches the problem from-the commonplace standpoint of t!3.ligious piety 
which is often heard to say that this or, that event, circumstanc.e or experience 
whether good ·or: ill '-- 11 must be the will of God 11 • He clarifies that there are three 
levels of meaning to "God I s will II in this type of .life-context for the man of faith. 
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First there is God's 11intentional will 11 ; then God's lfcircumstantial will 11 , if 
His immediate or intential will cannot be fulfilled; finally there is his 11 ultimats 
will", which the eyes of faith may discern as working in, through, around, and beyond 
circumstances. in fulfillment of God I s larger plans for :;;ood, pershaps in altered but 
nevertheless in su:ce, and loving terms. Among others he uses the classic illustration 
of the life and career of Jesus. 
Thus it was God's intentional or more immediate will, not that Jesus should be 
martyred, but 11that he should be followed 11 • Weatherhead then continues: 
"The circumstantial will of God, God's will in the circumstances 
which men 1 s evil provided, was that Jesus should accept death, but 
accept it in such a positive and creative way as to lead to 
11God I s ultimate will -- namely, the redemption of man, winning 
man back to God, not in spite of the Cross, but using the Cross, 
born of man's sin, as an instrument to reach the goal ·of God's 
ultimate will. (JJ:?j&. , p. 32) 
This, of course, is a particular theological illustration drawn from within a 
special stream of religious tradition and belief. Analogous illustrations could be 
drawn from the lives of the founders of other religious traditions -- Moses, for 
example,· or Buddha. In any case, Heatherhead I s homiletic purpose or interest here 
could illuminate any life which is lived from within the standpoint of faith. Each 
man may scan his career, looking back, and perceive the concentric loving spheres of 
God I s "intentional", "circumstantial 11, and "ultimate will" embracing, and at work, 
in his life. 
God's ultimate will (this side of the religious hope in a heavenly destiny, of 
course) is that each of us live joyous lives personally, and harmonious lives socially, 
fulfilling whatever fine powers are latent Hithin us, and l,oving and serving those, 
both near and :ar, with whom life relates us (Gilkey). The circumstantial will and 
the intentional will are concentric. spheres within this largest ambit of our divine ... 
373 
hwnan °meaning;1 or Hpurpose 11 • Each man may perceive or sense in his m-m uay, of 
com·se, the providential ·circumstances or the divine 11intent 11 at any given moment 
or point in his life j and we here refer to our previou·: discussion of the idea of 
God 1s providence. 
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Chapter Ten 
Various Philosophies of Man: 
Historical Typologies 
I 
Greek, Hebrew-Christian, Naturalistic 
The ideological warfare between liberal democracy and the totalitarian 
systems of communism, and lately fascism, have highlight~d, for our time, 
the importance of the question, 11What is man? 11 So fa.r as contemporary his-
tory is concerned, the doctrines of man could be well analyzed first in terms 
of the liberal, democratic, and Hebrew-Christian views as opposed to c0lll1llun-
istic and fascist philosephies. However, we will summarize the ideas of man 
on a somewhat broader basis and subsequently in our chapter relate democracy 
and the two totalitarianisms to our more general analysis. 
One way to classify the doctrines of man, at least so far as western 
thought is concerned, has been by a three-fold analysis under the headings: 
the classical Greek view, the Hebrew-Christian view, and the modern-naturalistic 
" * view. Let us examine each of these views as they cover the following problems: 
1. the idea of mants uniqueness 
2. man's relation te the divine 
3. mants relation to the body and nature 
4. the source of evil to man and sin 
5. the idea cf salvation from this evil 
6. the idea of human history and destiny 
The Classic Greek Idea of Man 
Man's uniqueness. The prevailing conception of Plato and Aristotle, 
as major representatives of Greek philosophy, is that man 1s uniqueness lay 
*A typology used by Reinhold Niebuhr in his Nature and Destiny of Man, 
Vol. I, Chapter 1. 
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in his "rational" capacity a Aristotle defined reason as man's ability to form 
general concepts. According to the Greeks, this is the capacity that espec-
ially distinguishes men from animals, and best defines what 1r1e mean by 11 soul11 • 
His relation to the di vine. In his Republic Plato identifies the II image 
of God11 in man with man 1s reason. The 11 divine11 aspect of the universe is its 
uncreated, eternal, rational structure, which Plato calls by the technical 
term II ideas". Plato thought of the ideas as patterns transcendent to nature, 
in which nature somehow 11participates 11 • Aristotle, Plato's pupil, thought of 
the ideas or "forms" as immanent in nature. The ideas or forms are analogous 
to what we would term today the universal laws of nature, including moral as 
well as physical law. Recall our earlier analysis (Chapter Three) of Plato's 
I 
and Aristotle's conception of God. Following Plato and Aristotle, the Stoics 
" 
~mphasized particularly the conception of God or Zeus as the immanent form and 
man's 
order of nature. In sum for the Greeks, /. form-discerning reason - · is 
that which is mnst like God. 
His relation to the body and nature. Man's reason, soul or mind is sharply 
distinguished from body. Particularly in Plato~~ ti ... dualism is 
We ma7 think of it as 
emphasi~ed / 11horizonta111 in terms of the dividing line that can be drawn 
between mind above and body below: 
Man: reason/ mind; the divine, good principle 
sense/body/material nature: the evil principle 
The source of evil to man and sin. Man's body as an aspect of material 
nature t-ends to be identified with 11 evil". Man sins because of the inertia 
//, 
of rilatter as it weighs upon spirit. The drag of bodily passions pullathe mind 
/ 
,/ 
// down. This at least was one prominant phase of the thought of Socrates and 
*At least in his more ascetical dialogues, e.g., Phaedo. 
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Plato, and comes to light best in the dialogue Phaedo. Aristotle, however, 
and also the great dramatists, Aeschylus and Euripides, like the Hebrews, find-
ing much of the trouble in man's "will" and its "pride", analyzed sin more pro-
foundly than did Plato. 
Salvation from evil. In one sense Greek thought may be said to be opti-
mistic about salvation, at least in certain sides of Socratic and Platonic 
doctrine. Socrates znd Plato tended to believe that, reason alone could and 
would control the passions ~f the body, and thus that all would be well with 
life. We have the famous Socratic dictum that virtue is trowledge -- that to 
know the right is to do it • Aristotle, however, criticized this doctrine as 
oversimplified and naive. In broadest perspective, as indicated especially in 
the dramatists, we may conclude that pessimism is also a prevalent note in the 
Greek view. The Greek outlook contained a chronic melancholy about the brevity 
and evils of human existence. For Aristotle a temperate, rationally controlled, 
perfectly integrated and self-sufficient life would be the ideal for which we 
must strive. 
The idea of history and destiny. We turn to the Stoics particularly for 
the Greek idea of history as cyclical. In the Stoic miyth:ology every world 
epoch begins and ends in a universal conflagration, after which there is a new 
formation of world, animals, men and human culture, in another eon identical 
to the preceding one. The course of "history" is, first a golden age, then 
progressive decline, finally universal evil, with an ending and a beginning 
again in the Cosmic Fire. The Stoic view singularly dramatizes the lack of 
any significant conception of history as directional or linear. 
Although we may refer to the Stoic view as standard for the Greek conception 
of history, Plato in the Phaedo speculates most beautifully on the possibility 
of personal immortality for souls which have managed to free themselves from all 
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sensual, bodily taint. In the same dialogue Plato also mentions the doctrine 
of reincarnation in various animal forms, according to one's reward (which 
Hindu and Buddhist philosophy has esl;)Oused), as a P?ssibility for those persons 
who have not freed themselves from bodily passions. Whether Plato himself 
believed this as a literal possibility is not entirely certain. In any case, 
for Plato man's highest duty and destiny is to catch a vision of Truth, the 
eternal Ideals. As this is achieved the soul participates in that which is 
"eternal" by definition, and is thus "immort;al". 
The Hebrew-Christian Idea of Man* 
Man's uniqueness. The Bible suggests that man's uniqueness is found in 
the freedom of his will. To a degree far transcending all other creatures man 
is free. Another way to say the same thing is that man's uniqueness is sugges-
ted by the sacredness of his personality: "even the hairs of your head are all 
numbered ••• you are of more value _than many sparrows" (Matt., 10:30 ... 31). 
Reinhold Niebuhr states that the Hebraic conception of the image of God in 
man refers to man's freedom and "self-transcendency" rather than to his 11rea-
son11.** In the opinion of the present writer the idea of man 1 s will and self-
transcendency is indeed a more ample description of the image of God in man 
than possibly that of "reason", if taken in too narrow a sense; however, under--
stood in fullest way both reason and self•transcendency are "factors within 
*For a classic discussion of the Biblical idea of man see Harry Emerson 
Fosdick: Guide to Understanding the Bible, Harper, 1938, Chapter II. 
** Nature and Destiny of Man, Vol. I, Chapter 1. 
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* intelligence", two facets of the same essential nature. The Greek and Hebrew 
views are actually complimenatary to each other rather than contradictory .. 
RE'!lation to the divine. What is alike in both God and man is free per-
sona.lity; though in the divine case "personality" would be far more in power 
and goodness than what it means ordinarily in man. In the Bible the prevail-
ing implication is that God is not the eternal rational order immanent in the 
universe, but rather the transcendent Will which creates the universe. God is 
the infinite Spirit past perfect searching out by the finite mind of man. 
Everywhere, however, in the Bible the. affirmatioµ is that the Creator is good 
and his ways reasonable. His creative intelligence and good will, if not im-
manent in, are most certainly reflected~ his creation (e.g. Ps. 104). In 
sum, if the Greek view seems to be in terms of a two-story universe, with body 
and matter below and mind and divine reason above, the Hebrew conception is that 
the universe is an order on three planes. Man stands on an intermediate or 
derivative plane between God and nature (e.g. Ps.8 - a view also shared by 
other ancient religions, e.g. Confucian, Zoroastrian). There is a creative 
mind, above man 1s mind, upon whom man depends for his being, to whom he owes 
reverence and love and whose righteous laws he must obey. The Greater Mind 
is disclosed to man's mind in the truth experience, particularly moral truth 
(Amos et al). 
Relation to the body and to nature. In the Hebrew system there is unity 
rather than duality of body and soul. Often in the Old Testament the material 
concepts, "breath" or "wind", stand for soul and spirit. Man is a psycho-
physical whole. He is not a dualistic being of "soul" versus "body". Body is 
not evil inherently. Body is an expression or instrument of the. contro-
-le 
A phrase here borrowed from Denison Maurice Allan's excellent discussion 
in dialogue with Niebuhr of the similarities and contrasts of Greek and Hebrew 
views of man, in The Realm of Personality, Abingdon-Cokesbury, 1947, p. 43. 
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lling spirit, which animates it. Man's will unifies his nature, he is a uni" 
' .. 
tary spirit, not merely a collection of physical and psychic states (as e.g • 
. in original Buddhism). 
The source of evil to man and sin. As the Hebrews see the problem of 
existence, man's body and ~he material universe are not evil, for God declared 
that_ the created world of nature was good (e.g. Gen. 1). Sin is not so much 
caused by the inertia and sluggishness of "matter", reflected in the "passions" 
of the body, as by malicious will, by evil intent. "Out of the heart 11 , that 
is, out of the spiritual side of man's nature, "are the issues of life", life's 
major decisions both sinful and righteous. The Hebraic conception of sin is 
more subtle than the Platonic. In contrast to the Platonic doctrine that know-
ledge of the right will somehow guarantee the doing of the right, the Biblical 
thinkers realized that man can and often does go against his own knowledge of 
the right. Rather than defining man as Plato does in the Republic) in terms 
of reason as highest in human make-up and spirit (or will) second, which is 
always allied with reason against the passions of the body, the Hebrews reali-
zed that man's will may join the baser drives of the body (symbolical of all 
selfish interest: St. Paul) against his reason or better judgment (Rom. 3). 
Thus to the Hebrews sin in its profoundest sense is nots~ much an expression 
of the physical side of man as a possible development within man's spiritual 
nature itself. The body is relatively innocent; but it is the "soullll, that is 
to say, the possibility of malice in mind and will, that would define wicked• 
ness .,~ 
Salvation from evil. Salvation is peculinrly a t2mporal~p:rocess. It 
means a change in the whole of man's nature, body and soul, or, rather, such 
~~ A somewhat fuller commentary on the idea of "sin" in the OT follows here: 
(OT Guide, p. 175) 
a change or reorientation of the attitudes of his m,ind or soul as tend to 
guarantee greater perfection in all ramifications of bodily existence. The 
,-,,l, ' 
change.of soul·ts'lwrought by the ingression of the perfeGt righteousness of 
God himself into the 'human "heart". In the Hebraic system, then, !{t i::: ;_, ·change 
from the ."old mari11 to the "new11 -- body and soul together remade into "newness 
of lifeir or transformed personality.. Essentially, · in the Hebraic view 
man is a creature of nearly unlimited possibilities for good 2!. evil, depend-
ing on whether he permits God's Love to enlighten his mind and sanctify his 
acts (1st.Epistle of John). 
The idea of history and destiny. In contrast to the Greek, the Biblical 
view is that this is a purI)osive universe .. Rather than cyclical we may call 
' the Hebraic insight linear and eschatological -· that is, there is a doctrine 
of purpose, direction, and end in its conception of history., The process which 
is natur.e .and history is working itself out according to a Divine plan, begin-
ning witl}.a creationt advancing in a direction, and ending in a consummation 
in tr8:nscend~nt time and'place, ~nd perhaps even on earth. Human sin may 
frustrate the process for a time, perhaps even change its .. direction, but ulti-
mate victory is assured,' in Western religious terms,. through the power of God 
at work in synagogue·and'church. 
The Modern-Naturalistic Idea of Man 
The modern view of man is in part a transformed, naturalized Greek view~ 
·, 
Its philosophic ancestry goes back mainly to the ancient naturalistic or mater-
ialistic school of Democritus (c_o,n.temporary of Socrates) , Epicurus, and Lucre-
tius, with some influence from Aristotle. 
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Man is not unigue in this system in the sense that he has something in 
his make-up·- whether it be rational mentality (Plato) or free transcendent 
personality (the Hebrews) -- that in any absolute way sets him above the rest 
of nature. Man has reason, to be sure, with its logical and evaluative powers, 
but reason is understood to be a phenomenon of the processes of nature herself. 
These ancient naturalists explained "mind" in terms of infinitely fine and 
smooth material "atoms", different in degree by way of size and shape from 
the grosser atoms that make up the rest of physical nature, but in no sense 
different in kind. Death was defined as the disper$ion of such "soul atoms" 
upon the disintegration of body. It is but a step from this ancient material·· 
istic psychology to the modern conception of "mind" as essentially an expres-
sion of organic process. 
Man's relation to the divine. More it seems out of deference to popular 
belief than anything else, the ancient atomists said that there were "gods", 
but that they had absolutely no relation to this world. They neither create 
it, nor are their divine purposes found anywhere in it. Nature rather is a 
mindless, purposeless mechanism, from all eternity independent of the gods and 
moving by her own fixed "laws". Indeed, the main burden of Lucretius' famous 
poem~ Rerum Natura is to free the mi11d of man from "religious" superstition 
or fear by helping 1.1.Gn to understand that causation is purely "natural". 
Practically speaking he believed that in atheism lay the secret of peace of 
mind and happiness. 
Perhaps typically, then, "naturalism" has come to mean that there is no 
"God" in any significant, traditional sense. Some modern naturalisms,however, 
continue to use the term "God". One school defines 11God',i as nature's energy; 
another as human ideals, and both affirm that man 1 s highest, "religious" duty 
is to achieve the "values 11 which are- latent in nature's process Still 
other naturalisms (depending on how·the term "naturalism" is defined) are more 
theistic in the traditional sense (recall chapter 3 on various ideas of God). 
Man's relation to the body and nature. The distinctive belief of natural-
ism is that this is a one-story universe. As we saw abovet man's ·1ife of 
thought, his mind, reason, or personality is an expression of natural, bodily 
process., "Mental energy" is but a phase of natural, material en~rgy., What was 
~ . . . ' ' ~ ..,. 
but vc;;uclyunderstood in ancient:·cosmology as the "evolutionary" character of 
and well defined 
natural process has become a pro~inent/feature of modern scientific and philo-
sophic thought., In summary'at this place, then, we can say that modern natural• 
ism stresses manrsevolutionary origin, the continuity of his life.and be~ng 
with that of lower nature.. Though .the concept of "matter" has undergone great 
refinement in the modern period over and above ancient atomism, the. point of 
view at present in many quarters is· still "materialistic 11 • The essential char .. 
ac·ter of nature . is that she behaves according to entirely predictable forces, 
energies, or pressures. However. much many of the newer 20th century natural-
isms wish to suggest .the.spontaniety and 11 freedom 11 of organized matter at the 
level of life and mind·, their, point of vi.ew remains haunted with. an older 
mechanism arid determinism, which they cannot completely shake .off. 
The source of evil to man and sin. Actually the belief in the exactly 
predictable and deterministic character of nature throughout all her levels 
has been a boon to naturalistic thought on its ethical side. Modern naturalism 
found itself in a particularly optimistic mood in the late 19th and early 20th 
centuries. Unlike Platonic and more like the Hebrew-Christian understanding, 
modern naturalism has not regarded body and the forces of nature as in themselves 
evil. But unlike the Christian and more like the Greek, naturalism has tended 
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to oversimplify the problem of sin by defining it essentially as 0 ignorance". 
Also like Plato and Aristotle moder.n naturalism has recognized the interrela-
tionship between individual conduct and the character of the state or society, 
as a whole, realizing that the problem of life involves "social 11 as well as 
personal ethics. Modern naturalistic thought, however, has believed that sin 
is caused largely by evil environmental conditions rather than (to cite the view 
of sorri.e classic Christian theologians) by any perversity of human nature itself. 
Salvation from evil. Remove these conditions, therefore, transform en-
vironment by science through education, and human life may be remade. Essen• 
taally this may be accomplished by the discovery of nature's impartial "laws", 
physical, psychological, sociological, and historical, and the reordering of 
life according to them. Probably the most famous of modern naturalistic human-
ists, John Dewey, proclaims that what is needed most is the application of 
"scientific intelligence 11 to all areas of life. 
Characteristic of much modern naturalism is its indifference, if not its 
opposition to religion as traditionally understood and organized. The pre-
vailing tendency in modern naturalism has been to affirm confidence in filfill 
himself, in human education and science, as sufficient to save us from our ills, 
without sense of a transcende.nt or superhuman source of help in God. This loss 
uncritical 
of "Christian humility", ex.cr.iplifisea · by the/ · self .. confidence of demo-
~~-i:n century : .. 
cratic western man in/the 19th /. , becomes the inordinate ~ee of the 
' J,ft,,% 
communist in the Marxian developmentm:- of the fascist in that related form of 
totalitarianism. Both of these systems seek to employ the wonderful power of 
science (the gift of modern naturalism) without restraint of either Christian 
or Greek forms of humanistic morality, though fascism in our time has sinned 
more egregiously in this respect than has communism. 
Its rel like to modern 
western naturalism for its easy optimism, and idea of more or less "inevitable 
progress", brought about by operation of the factors mentioned above. Modern 
naturalism should indeed be criticized for its over simple definition of pro-
gress in terms of technological achievement in the realm of science, and insti-
tutional humanization in the field of society. Scientific humanism has found 
purpose in the universe, but only human purpos~. Believing this to be suffi-
cient, the thought has been that man may progressively alleviate the tensions 
of life by humanizing or democritizing his economic and political relationships, 
with a relatively stable, free world order as outcome. Human events since 
World War I have, of course, increasingly called into question this easy-going 
expectation of a more or less automatic progress. 
inclusive 
a ::-core / · definition of progress than that of 
For one thing the need for 
expansion scientifically 
merely technological/ or 
. and lllibera.lization" socially 
institutional expansion/has become evident.* Not only naturalism but also much 
modern idealism may be criticized for its too easy optimism. 
Synthesis of the Foreg_oing Ideas of Man 
Is synthesis of the preceding views possible in light of the largest 
and best insights of each? A general "yes" may be tendered in answer to this 
question as qualified by the following analysis and criticism. 
First, it. probably should be pointed out tha~ both the Hebrew and the 
Greek views (at least on the Platonic side) may be classified as "transcenden-
tal" or, in general sense, "idealistic", in contrast to the naturalistic con-
ception. A transcendental or idealistic view of man may be defined as one 
which holds to the idea of the supreme reality and permanent significance of 
man's 11spirit", in some sense over and above the sum total of functioning 
* See our discussion,p. 
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physical parts or 11body 11 • In contrast to the prevailing naturalistic assump-
tion that "mind" must be understood as a function of the bOdy, could the higher 
truth be that body should be defined as a function of mind and 
/ spirit, as idealisms tend to do? In any case, the problem becomes one of de-
fining clearly what is meant by "spirit". (We attempt such a task in our sub-
sequent chapters) 
Plato would have meant by spirit man's generalized, abstract thought; 
the Hebrews meant rather man's personal ·self, of which we should probably say 
abstract thinking is a function. The self seems to be that power which relates 
and coordinates ideas as if from a deeper, more mysterious center. Plato lacks 
the sense of importance of individuality. In many places he dismisses it as an 
expression of bodily materiality and therefore--somewhat in the manner of clas-
sic Hinduism--as illusory, or at least thinks of it, along with other pyhsical 
objects, as a far inferior kind of reality than abstract ideas. (Recall our 
earlier discussion of Plato in chapter 3). We see therefore that certain kinds 
of idealism, of which Plato's is a variety, as well as much naturalism, with 
its emphasis on nature's impersonal forces, may be criticized for their loss of 
the sense of individuality. The trenchant warning of Reinhold Niebuhr cautions 
as at this place: 
As the idealists lose individuality in the absolute mind, so 
the naturalists lose it in "streams of consciousness" when deal-
ing with the matter psychologically, and in "laws of motion" when 
thinking sociologically •••• A genuine individuality can be main• 
tained only in terms of religious presuppositions which can do 
justice to the immediate involvement of human individuality in all 
the organic forms and social tensions of history, while yet appre-
ciating its ultimate transcendence over every social and historical 
situation in the highest reaches of its self-transcendence.* 
In the view of the present writer the above quotation would have to be 
qualified at certain points, chiefly by saying that, as we have seen, there are 
*Nature and Destiny of Man, Vol. I, op.cit., p. 23. 
several types of modern'idealism. Some indeed are impersonalistic; but others 
are personalistic. Modern idealisms are usually a coml:!inat.ion, in .g-i:eater or 
"" f 
less proportions, of Greek rationalism, in which}persongl nature of ultimate 
reality was never clearly understood, and Hebrew personalism. 
On the whole, in spite of some shortcomings, there were great values in 
the Greek philosophy of man which must not be overlooked. Undoubtedly, chief 
of these is its emphasis on "reason". D. M. Allan memorably summarizes this 
Greek contribution in the following lines: 
••• the wisdom of the classical view comes to us with renewed 
force in an age of unreason. The great truth which.Plato and Aris-
totle bequeathed to the ages is that reason within us is the prin-
ciple of order., It is no mere negative .restraint upon animal 
impulse within man's nature. It reaches up and out to a cosmic order 
that lies abdve and beyond us~ ..... 
Curiously enough, tlie psychologists.of today are rediscovering 
this ancient insight. For whether they hold to one or many factors 
within intelligence, they agree·that its function is to grasp rela"! 
tionships--that is, "forms of order"--within wholes of many kinds~ •• 
The mood of distrust of reason.,· therefore., so prevalent in our day, 
is deeply wrong in its attack upon reason, right only in protesting 
the deification of reason or its perversion to inhuman ends.* 
Second, the "persortalism'1, and. the emphasis on sympathy and love ar0 the 
outstanding contribution of the Hebraic thinkers of the Bible to the philoso-
phy of man. Even more than the Greeks the Hebrews, with their emphasis on the 
supremacy of personality, insist upon the of man as. '"transcendent 
in this study. 
Third, 11 science" has been the contribution of modern naturalism,. The main 
point of the naturalistic·philosophy has been that man £§!:!l ~ and, to a con-
siderable extent, can control the forces of nature for the benefit of life. In 
so far as this is accomplished, it is, of course, of pa,ramount value. 
It seems to this writer that the philosophic "reason" of the Greeks, plus 
the dynamic "love" and "personalism" of the Hebrews, plus the "science" of 
'*The Realm of Personality, op cit., p. 43-44. 
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modernity may suggest the synthesis for which we are looking. Could the love 
and personalism of Hebraic Man become the conscience of Scientific Man, both 
together redefining in a larger synthesis the general good sense or ''wisdom" 
of the Greek, Rational Man, which Plato and Aristotle had as their ideal? 
II 
~.§!!!ocracy. Communism, Fascism. and the Ideas of Man 
Communism and fascism, in contrast to democracy, have been the live options, 
symtomatic of the tragic tensions of modern history, that have competed for 
man's intellectual allegiance on every level of interest, personal, social, 
political, economic, and cultural. 
Perhaps deepest in the democratic understanding of man is the belief that 
he is a "spiritual being'i. This view has had at its center the idea of indi-
vidual freedom, which is rooted in the Biblical emphasis on man I s spiritual 
transcendency and supremacy of personality. Accompanying the idea of freedom 
has been belief in a reasoned, orderly, and social minded approach to life, in 
the spirit of ethical responsibility to all one's fellow men. This comes from 
Greek thought at its best as well as from the Hebrew. Of no less importance, 
however, has been the emphasis of naturalistic philosophy on experience and 
experiment. If a principal ideal of democracy has been "equality" in terms of 
allevaation of slavery and human toil, natural science (gift in part of 
naturalistic philosophy) in its brighter results has made possible an ever 
greater equalization of life and freedom from toil. Not only has natural 
science in the spectacular ways of technological assistance to man's upward 
struggle toward freedom been a boon to democratic history, but more quietly, 
and perhaps more significantly, the scientific spirit of caution, of experience 
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and ,experiment, has motivated much of the growth of democratic political 
institutions, notably in one a,rea the development of English common law. In 
a very real way, then, the democratic' achievement has come about as a graft• 
ing together and a floweri:qg, of the best in the three traditions, Classic, 
Hebraic, and Naturalistic. 
Possibly the simplist thing to say about the communistic idea of man is 
that he is not a "spiritual being". This view sees only the physical dimen-
sion of life. Man is entirely a bodily earth-bound being, a complex piece of 
psychological machinery, w!th p~imari).y·economic interests, whose history has 
been largely materialistic.* Communism press·e·s the materialistic, mechanistic 
and deterministic side of naturalism·; which many naturalistic philosophers of 
the west have long since sought to modify toward a freer, humanistic position. 
But communism is not only a perversion of liberal naturalism; it is also a dis-
tortion of Greek rationalism, and it has even been called a Christian heresy. 
It distends the idea of man's rational sufficiency suggested by Platonic 
and Aristotelian philosophy into a dogma devoid of metaphysical depth and Greek 
humility before the cosmos~ quite foreign in attitude to the open, enquiring 
spirit of Greek rationalism. There is indeed a superficial resemblance between 
Plato's "Republic" and the present Soviet state. But there is this all-import-
ant difference: that Plato was attempting to found his ideal state on the prin-
ciple of "justice", which he believed reflected transcendent reality ,beyond 
time and place. Certainly Stalinist philos·ophy recognized no cosmic, trans-.-
human i•metaphysical" standard, nor such basically liberal conceptions of justice 
.as Socrates appealed ~,e in .the 91'.Tgias, l!Nil.d· in Book I of the Re2ublic, in his 
1(We cit!= the readet' to the materialistic psychology expressed by two authors 
of .. two ,Soviet text books iri psychology publiched respectively tiY 1946 nnd .. 1950 
• We realize we are perhaps 
here characterizing the philosophy of N. Lenin or N. Bukharin, rather than Karl 
Marx. In a notew1orthy study, ~rx 1 s Concept of Man, 1961, Erich Fromm takes 
great pains to point out that Marx was essentially a liberal "humanistn, not 
an egregious materialist·, as he has been caricatured in popular thought. 
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argument with the totalitarian thinkers Callicles and Thrasymachus. Finally 
the ideas of love, equality, and social, economic justice, explicit in Hebrew-
Christian thought, communism removes from their personalistic and theistic, 
religious grounding in the Judaeo•Christian tradition. It expects these liber-
al values somehow to be achieved in the inhumane, metaphysical vacuum of 
soviet power politics. -1, 
The Nazi-Fascist conception of man. If Marxism can be partially traced to 
the naturalistic, and, in certain respects, to the idealistic movement of wes-
tein thought, the origins of fascism are usually located in "romanticism", 
itself a philosophy with both naturalistic and idealistic elements. Romanticism 
at its best suggests art, music, poetry, and immediate apprehension of God 
through mystical, religious feeling; and in the realm of human relationships 
fellowing-feeling, sympathy and love. It may stand for the brighter and 
lighter, spontaneous side of human nature. In a person like Rousseau it may 
even suggest the vital, passionate struggle of freedom and democracy with auto-
cractic monarchy. Any high and noble emotion could be analyzed in terms of 
man's "romantic" side. Romanticism, however, may also imply irrationality and 
darkness. 
..ly 
According, the romantic view at its worst implies that man must be inter-
preted solely in terms of, and should give vent irrepressibly to, his sub-
rational vitalities. In this view roan himself is more a being of sheer "life 11 
and brute "iropulse 11 than a creature of 11higher reason" or "transcendent spirit". 
Fascism stems in part from this darker side of the romantic tradition throug~ 
Nietzsche and others. 
*wetliealize, of course, that this paragraph probably describes the Stalini.st 
era ro 0 than the contemporary, more "liberal", thawed-out, and dis-unified 
Communism of this decade. 
!n spite of these historic connections, however, fascism I w-0s a 
reversion essentially to a barbaric, primitive view of man, more ancient than 
the developments we have been studying. Even more than Stalinist Communism, 
fascism in deepest sense may be interpreted as a total break w:i.th the entire 
Classical, Hebraic and humanitarian naturalistic stream. For example, its 
superior race theory was but one central aspect of a conscious and absolute 
inversion of all the "liberal values" that the three great systems, in their 
various ways, have attempted to uphold. If communism is in some sense a 
development within, but a distortion of, the Graeco-humanistic-scientific trad-
ition, exploiting certain of its defects and errors, fascism was a complete 
denial of the rational tradition. Indeed, the unlimited capacity for evil of 
the late Nazi and Fascist states, and the "mystical" implication that they 
sought to attach to their concepts of "nation", "master race 11 , '';leader", and 
"war" suggested a kind of inverted, "spiritual II philosophy, ,w1d.eh--has doubtless 
~best been characterized 
pointed out the quasi-religious character of both fascism and communism. 
Practically speaking, there has been little difference between the fascist 
and, thinking of its Stalinist form, communist systems in their devestation of 
liberal and humane values. If there is some dist:i.nction., however, it might 
be said that whereas communism (at least in its initial stage of revolutionary 
violence), was an oppressive development in the guise of universalistic, human-
itarian "ideals", fascism was naked slavery, with no humanitarian pretense 
whatever. The common element in these totalitarianisms was the idea of the 
§.!ili as supreme in reality and value rather than the individual. They repre-
sented the tendency in most dire and concrete manner of some phases of modern 
philosophy to press to extreme the sociological as opposed to the personalistic 
*See Aurel Kolnai: The War Against the West, Viking Press, 1938, for a 
documentary study of Nazi philosophy. 
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conception of man. The rise of these forms of oppression in our modern day 
must give the adherents of the elder views of man (liberal idealism and liberal 
naturalism) pause~ challenging them at once to a more searching criticism of 
weaknesses in their systems, while at the same time encouraging a more stren• 
uous defense of their excellences. 
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p. t t' l' t . I' J:id,rlendum an 1.~xis en 1a is views o_ man. In one form existentialism :is a 
combination of Hebrew-Christian emphasis on freedo:i:p. and modern naturalinm' s atheism. 
Man can develop humane ethical life (Sartre) as a sheer act or his own will (a Kantian 
influence) 3 but there is no ult im8 te vision of thetotal personal and moral 
meaningfulness of existence. Life is ultimately absurd (Canms). 'I'here is the 
dictum in existentialism, "existence befar e or above essence 11 • '.!.'his is to say that 
vitalities and freedom are the prime 1 first, or ttexistential 11 factors of reality 
over and above 11 reason 11 » "ideas", or the rationally organizing sophistfucations of 
intelligence. This is anti--Platonic in tradition .. It is nom.i..nalist. It is also 
romanticist in tho p1a ceing of vital freedom at the foundation of ·things. Actually 
there are two types of existerrtialism. lifhat we have, just described is the seculnrist, 
non-rolig;ious, or non-theistic variety. 
Nelig;ious or theis+;ic existentialism is represented by such f'ig;ures as 
Kierkegaard, Barth, Bultmann, Heinhold Niebuhr, Tillich (in part), and Buber. 
These men add to the abo ,J6 description of the human situation the dimension of reHr;ious 
nfai th 11 • Briefly stoted, faith in the ultimate personal meaninr5fulness of existence, 
under God, is what :is needed if man is to overcome his existential anxieties and sins, 
and the sense of the ab sux·di ty of life., 
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APPENDIX A 
Oriental Conceptions of Man in the Universe 
. !, Resume 
Hinduism: Two Schools of Thought 
I. The idea of ~eing: 
A. Idea of Ultimate Reality: 
B. Idea of Man: 
c. Idea of Nature and 
world process: 
"· II. . "The idea of knowledge, 
truth, or wisdom: 
III. Ideas of value: 
A. The idea of the Good: 
. ~<lant-'!,··· 
Brahma monism, 
impersonal 
absolute idealism--
God as impersonal 
Whole of Being. 
Sankhya 
Dualism: matter 
vs. spirit--
ultimate non-
.significance of 
the personal 
factor, though 
"selves" con-
tinue as imper• 
sonal, non-
conscious re-
alities. 
Impersonalistic, Personality not 
personal identity ultimately 
ultimately lost in significant in 
Brahman Sankhya system 
Bound by the past determinations of 
karma, man not fully free and res-
ponsible. 
Maya: illusion 
that matter is .. • 1...r:. 
Maya:: illusion 
that soul. is 
real. bound by matter, 
Sansara-karma: which is real. 
evil on negative side; ideas of basic 
law on positive side that insures 
justice; punishment for sins committed, 
... reward for virtues. 
To overcome avidya or ignorance that 
keeps man in above. state of ullusion. 
Intuitional, immediate, non-logical, 
non-discursive. Ultimate truth is 
mystical raptur~, not scientific 
knowledge. 
Above man and life--union with the 
infinite--submersion of the personal 
self into: 
Infinite whole.of 
Being in Vedanta 
Infinite un-
conscious state 
of self in 
Sankh.ya 
B. The idea of Evil: 
c. The idea of Salvation: 
D. Ethics: 
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Entanglement in sansara-karma; sep~ 
aration of the finite self from: 
the unchangeable and 
eternal Being in v. 
the unchangeable 
and eternal self 
ins. 
Through negation of the self, or fi-
nite individual existence by intel~ 
lectual or philosophic "illumination"/ 
emancipation: moksha-
Through union with 
the infinite above 
and beyond all fi-
nite distinctions--
absorption into 
Brahman by intel-
lectual annihilation 
of matter. 
- T.hrough intel-
lectual isolation 
of soul. from 
matter into an 
eternal uncon-
scious state 
for Sankhya. 
Kindly, but dispassionate relationship 
to others on practical plane of ethics. 
The Five Rules of Dharma, stressed as 
the necessary ethical preparation for 
ultimate philosophic vision defined 
as identification with God, or sup-
portive of the self from matter. 
Respect for: Life 
Truth 
Property 
Chastity 
Non-avarice or gener-
.,osity 
Buddhism: Two Schools 
A. The idea of ultimate 
reality: 
B. The idea of man: 
Hinayana 
(Original Buddhism) 
All is process, 
change, flux--no 
eternal unity of 
being. A sophis-
ticated materialism 
more theistic 
No unity of psychic 
being: only the 
11 skandhas 11 or trans-
ient states of con-
sciousness. An im-
personalistic, as-
sociationist theory 
Mah~ 
(Developed Buddhism) 
An eternal com-
passionate Buddha 
Mind (Suchness) be-
' hind the pheno!(lSnal 
world (cp. Vedanta) 
An absolute idealism 
theistic in tend-
ency. M9.nifesta-
tions in the ma:my 
Bodhisattvas. 
Oneself and all 
others a part of 
the Absolute Buddha 
Mind (cp. Vedanta). 
Mahayanist afterlife 
includes provisional 
perso~al immortality. 
C. · Idea of nature and · 
process: 
. ·' 
: )p. 
II. l',lie idea 0£ knowledge truth 
and wisdQ211: 
. (;'. 
III. Ideas of Value: 
A. The idea of the Good: 
B. The idea of evil: 
of the self, more 
critically im-
personalistic 
than Hinduism. 
Yet man free to 
end Karma. 
See A above--
in a sense there 
is only nature 
and process. 
viz. rebirth and 
karma. 
:Maita1-. ysical 
knowledge not 
important (op. 
modern positivism) 
but psychological 
knowledge is : 4 
truths, 8-fold 
path the way to 
release and peace., 
The 4 truths: 
that existence is 
pain--d~a 
caused by desire--
tanka 
can be overcorre--
sambodi 
by ethical and 
and contempla.:..· 
tive life--
dhamma 
Hinayana 
Release from pain 
and the desire 
that causes it--
NirvanA: an ul-
timate psycho-
logical condition 
in which all a-
wareness of per-
sonal existence 
has been ex-
tinguished, 
The world process: 
of rebirth, with 
its pain; desire 
as such is evil, 
·physical and. 
psychical exis-
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until final Nirvanae 
Man needs the help, 
or grace, of Bodhis-
attva forces to end 
Karma. 
Rebirth and karma are 
real so long ~s part-
icular forms, qualities 
and finite individu- · 
ality are not noted 
as illusory (op.Vedanta~ 
Awareness of ulti-
mate Buddha Mind 
corr.es by immediate 
enlightment-cannot 
be known or exper-
ienced by logical, 
analytic~l reason 
(Zen) Knowledge is 
ultimately intuitive 
and n:wstical. 
Mahayana 
The impersonal reality 
of the Buddha Mind 
transcendent to the 
phenomenal world: to 
share the compassion 
and love of this Mind 
is the highest aim, 
is Nirvana. 
Same as Hinayana plus 
ignorance of the Ul-
timate Buddha Mind 
behind the world, and 
failure to participate 
in its compassion. 
tence are evil. In 
sum the ego or indi-
viduality, which de-
. fine s existence for 
living creatures, 
is evil. Evil is 
emotional in qual-
ity: unsatisfied 
de sire--gives 
rise· to all the 
practical evils 
of life. 
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Yet a practical 
acceptance of life 
while it lasts 
this side of ulti-
mate enlightenment--
the "layman's i.deal 11 
is to suffuse life 
with Buddhist quie-
tude and compassion. 
C. The idea of Salvation: Suppression of de-
sire. The arhat i-
deal in which self 
effort (or accum-
ulation of merit: 
compassion, char-
ity, study, asce-
tic practice) is 
the basic tech-
nique. Karma op-
erates positively 
in conjunction 
with free will or 
self effort too-
vercome desire and 
rebirth--karma a 
law of grace and 
freedom; Nirvana: 
nothingness('?), 
Suppression of de-
sire plus dispelling 
of ignorance about 
the ultimate nature 
of the world as 
Buddhist Mind; by 
means of: a)'faith 
I. The Idea of Bein&: 
A. Ultimate Reality: 
Confucianism'>'( 
in the Bodhisattvas 
(the spiritual 
beings or saints) 
and their compas-
sionate, saving 
grace, and/or 
b) immediate en-
lightenment apart 
from merit or works 
(i.e. charity, study 
ascetical practices) 
though these may be 
practiced on side. 
Nirvana: oneness 
with the infinite 
compassion of the 
Buddha Spirit. , 
Karma (cosmic law) 
becomes persona-
lized in the Bod-
hisattvas, or its 
effects transcended 
or annulled by them. 
A restoration of 
optimism. 
Low~r nature, human hature, Heaven are an or-
dered whole governed by the moral law,~-
B. The idea of man: 
C, The idea of nature: 
II. Idea of Knowledge: 
III. Ideas of Value: 
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Tao is known and felt in moral c,,i'v'.:·· ~,::nee as 
"truth." Tao is thus the sum tot.·J ,:;f the 
rational structure of existence. 
Related to Heaven through tao, which is ex-
pressed in his _conscience; thus a "spiritual 11 
being, in his higher mind. Naturally good, 
The body and physical life not evil, but a de-
finite part of man's nature as good. 
]?hysical nature is good. Unlike· the high Indian 
systems, Hindu or Buddhist, the Chinese "have · 
cultivated an aesthetic· appreciation of nature" 
(Noss). · Lower physical nature is not ultimate i 
for them, but has a valuable role, and a real, 
not a deceptive, structure, The Chinese!£_-
cepted nature .. ,.· (Recall .. that the. Indian· thought 
"tends to give the value of illusi,on to. nature-.;..· 
or at least yearns to ·triumph over it''· (Noss). 
Indian thought tended to deny natur":.,/':lS un-
worthy and unreal.) 
There is ultimate or absolute truth in Tao, 
Moral knowledge is the complete form of know:':'. 
ledge. Tao is known untuitively but may be 
tested empirically. 
A. The idea of the Good: Total existence is good by virtue of Tao. 
No inherent evil or evil process •. 
B. The idea of. evil: Manis lack of harmony with Heaven and nature 
.and their ordered moral law, Tao. ·Practical, 
social, hun:a:n evil is a res~lt of bad. envi- · 
ronn:ent and bad education. 
o. The idea of salvation: Man and nature· are organically related: the 
way of salvation is to find the secret .. of harmony 
between lower nature, human nature, and heaven. 
The practical and moral content.of Tao may be 
expressed in several terms counting moral vir-
tues, such as 
li: feudal and family propriety 
shu and chung: negative and positive reciproci 
hsin and ch 1en: truth, integrity, sincerity 
jen: perfect virtue summarized in 
self-respect, generosity, trustworthiness, 
diligence; ; clemency 
Heaven sends judgments when the laws of Tao a:re 
broken. Righteous personalities in governtr~nt 
will guarantee righteous social order. Sum~ 
organize positively the factors of earthly life. 
· (Contrast the Indian theme that man must esca:r;e 
from nature and the factors of earthly.'"J;j,fe a1:1. 
way of salvation). · · ,. 
11 
.·., .Man: can attain salvation through the reali-
zation of his essential nature. 11 
(JJ_fe ·magazine, April 4, 1955} 
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Chapter E.leven 
Major Tpeories of Mind: 
What is "Selfhood"7 
Another way to analyze various conceptions of man is to focus on technical 
theories of "m:1.nd" that have been presented by philosophers and psychologists. 
We will analyze the main philosophies of mind under the headings: (1) the 
spiritual substance theory, (2) associationist and behavioristic theories, 
(3) the functionalistic theory of Aristotle, (4) sociological theories, and 
(5) per$onalistic theories. 
I 
Mind as Spiritual Substance* 
The venerable spiritual substance theory of soul-mind is a thoroughgoing 
dualistic conception. It may be roughly pictured by two concentric circles, 
the outer area representing the body and the inner one the immaterial, immortal 
soul, or mind !!!l!!., resident for a time in the body, and, from theethical side, 
often an opponent of it. This is the theory of selfhood in much traditional 
religious thought. It is essentially Plato's view, and has had its modern 
exponent in Descartes. 
Synopsis: 
·-1·:.. 0 t-l V 
. ) ' ,... ! 
1. Mind is an interior spiritual unit, immaterial, indestructible, 
other than body: dualism. 
*c. A. Campbell, On Selfhood & Go§~, Macmillan, 1957, for modern version 
of the theory of the substantive self. See Campbell essay, 11The Mind's Involve .. 
oent in ~Objects': An Essay :i.n Idealist Epistemology" in ed Jordon M. Scher, 
'I'~ie.£._~f t~~- Mind, Macmillan (Glencoe Pr~·3S), 1962, pa 376-398c 
2. Frequently, body as an oppooont of mind -- sensations, 
passions a drag on body: ascetic in tendency. 
3. ~requently, mind a passive entity tabula~ 
on which knowledge, or experience is written. 
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Critical Note: is dualism necessary; is mind passive; is body in opposi-
t:i.on i.e. baJ? 
II 
Mind as a Nc:;.1 -Unified Relation of States 
Associationist theory. David Hume's analysis of mind represents the 
classical criticism of Descartes' conception. Hume's view has been variously 
called the associationist or relational idea. In essence, for this theory the 
mind is a collection, not a unity. For Hume it was a "bundle of impressions". 
The numberless physiological and psychic states (sensations, emotions, abstract 
ideas, etc.) are assoicated together by the laws of "resemblance", "proximity", 
and "causation". Several merging circles, representing our various experiences, 
none of which, however, are permanent and for which there is no one center, might 
picture this theory. It could be said that there is a quasi or hypothetical 
center, representing the present moment of consciousness, where the interlock-
ing circles or states are thickest. Remove the circles, however, one by one 
and we finally have nothing left-· no real, abiding self. Such related ideas 
or mental states may still be "immaterial" principles (as they may have been 
for Hume), but they lack ultimate integration and unity. In ancient 6th 
Century India Gautama Buddha developed a psychology and philosophy of mind 
qui.te like this. The idea of a complex relation of various elements or factors 
will remain an important aspect of the general theory of mind. 
Behavioristic (Materialistic) theory .. Hume's view was taken to a mater-
ialistic extreme with some forms of behaviorism in the belief that all so-called 
7 
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"mental states" are but disguised physiological .. --(e~g. laryngeal)---movements 
Mind is simply brain·subjectively functioning. Or as it might be phrased, 
mind is equivalent to encephalic currents. From the ancient atomistic theory 
of soul, bOst set forth by Lucretius, through Thomas Hobbes' conception of the 
* self as essentially "spring ••• strings ••• and wheels", through the 18th 
century French materialist La Mettrie and others, to the physiological behav-
iorists, John B. Watson and his disciples, the materialistic point of view in 
western thought may be traced: 
("lt'Q' ,-, 1';;;,c:C.L•.~ r,J I '--, '-, '~ .,.J \C .. ·.:J , 
Synopsis: 
l., Mind an aggregation of parts -- conscious states -- related 
by the laws of association; no unifying self. 
2. Two variations: 
a. Hume: a collection of psychic states·- ideas, feelings, 
etc. -- which may be thought of as immaterial forces, as 
Hume, by his silence on the specific point, more or less 
allows. 
b. Behaviorism: mind equivalent to material, physical states 
of body (brain and nervous system functioning), disguised 
physiological movements, e.g. of the vocal cords in the 
larynx (Watson), or a more refined view, as encephalic 
currents. 
Critical Note: how do the separate psychic states or physical movements 
become "associated"? Does not "associated conscious states" imply a 
unifying consciousness? (See our fifth theory later in this chapter. 
A further reply to the materialistic conception of mind is tendered in 
our next chapte~) 
*Hobbes, Selections, ed Woodbridge, Scribners. Modern Students Library, 
page currently unnoted. 
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The "functionalistic" (often synonymous with 11materialistic 11 ) view of 
mind is considered in its eesential terms in the following theory. 
Inter-
Mind as/ ActivO· 
III 
Function, or Process 
Environmental and process theories -- general position. Several theories 
of mind with a wider outlook than physiological behaviorism, but based primarily 
on its "functionalistic" and relational conception, may be called "objective .. 
functional", 11environmental 11 , or "sociological" "process" theories. These in 
their various forms understand the related factors to be more than subjective, 
internally a~sociated psychological elements. The relational system which is 
. i1mind" has an external or> environmental spt:ead. '1Mind11 has both a subjective 
and objective locus. 
Aristotle's functionalistic conception. This point of view was suggested 
at an early date in western thought by Aristotle. His functional conception 
of soul is tantamount to a theory of mind. In his eye and axe analogies of 
soul, the "soul" or spiri~: of the eye is the "seeing", of the axe is the 
"cutting". The:active form of a thing is its "soul". · Essentially in this 
,-- "-·. ' 
view organism and environment are functionally and i~'ieparably related. "See-
ing" implies both seer and object seen, the "within11 and the "without". For 
Aristotle the hi~hest level of "soul" in man is the act of "rational thinking", 
the function and process which' relates him in a unique way to his world. In 
this case, the subjective pole of mind is man's "reason"; the objective pole 
is nature's impersonal active 11f6rms", her "rational" structure, laws, pro-
cesses---reason's outward counterpart~ 
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§_ynopsis: 
L The "soul" is the function of the organism interacting with the 
· environment -- the eye analogy: 
2. What is the highest phase of interaction between an organism and its 
environment? Ans: the rational thinking of man. The human being 
functioning in his highest capacity, i.e. thinking rationally, de-
fines soul as a whole for man. (Also "mind" has a certain impersonal 
objectivity in nature's forms for Aristotle } .,.: ... : : ; ;'·. , •. ·,;.;; 
Critical ~: Aristotle affirms that there is a "capacity" for rational 
thought in man. This seems to assume that there is an interior distinc-
tive, or prior, "reality", that we may call "mind". 
What functionalistic theories of mind are trying to emphasize is the 
deeper truth that mind is activity or energy rather than a passive immobile 
"thing'' or "substance". If functionalistic theories of mind imply that there 
can be a kind of abstract ghostly function without something that is. function-
ing, or process without being, it seems to this writer. that they are incomplete 
----------
in their analysis of mind or mental life. Aristotle's soul-of-the-eye as its 
process of seeing could not be without the eye itself that does the seeing. 
IV 
Social Mind Theories 
Sociological theories of mind are built on the concepts relation, function, 
inter-action, and process. 
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An idealist view: Not unlike Aristotle, modern Hegelian idealisms have 
emphaRJzeg the conception of mind as the interactivity and process of a total 
world environment, a cosmic milieu which is essentially ''minded". Mind is a 
phenomenon of environment (conceived as dynamic and growing) rather than iso-
lated selfhood. For example, some persons are "Christian" in mind and spirit 
because of the Christian environment in which they have been nurtured; or 
"democratic" politically because of upbringing in a liberal social order. 
"Individuality" is defined by the greater "social whole". Again a system of 
circles might represent this viewpoint. This time, however, the circles stand 
not only for subjective states of consciousness, but.also the "thinking" of the 
social "organism" as·a whole as embodied in its concrete institutions .. Indivi-
duals might be thought of as points on the circumference of such circles. The 
circles pulsating, interacting, in process of expansion into the institutions 
of 19th century Prussia would be Mind or'Spirit in its objective meaning to 
Hegel. 
Beyond, of course, its narrower embodiment in concrete human institutions, 
the absolute idealists understood the Absolute Mind to have a wider cosmic actu-
ality of its own. Human institutions'merely approached or approximated rather 
than fully defined or exhausted it. Tb Bosanquet, for example, knowledge of 
the Absolute in its full nature lay somewhere beyond man's-higher artistic and 
religious intuitions. Man's hlgh~st civilized feelings suggest what is Absolute. 
In any case, the Absolute Mind has a cosmic margin of its own out beyond finite 
historic process. 
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Mind as Social Behavior 
Nat1:,.calistic view: Remove from this 11idealistic II sociological version, or 
"sociB1 mind" theory, the notion that environment itself is "minded" or "spiri-
tual" in any literal trnns$human sense beyond tangible, material institutions--
omit tbe "mysticism" of absolute idealism--and we have in essence what John 
Dewey calls "social behaviorism" and to him the most adequate type of natural-
istic conception of mind. Mind is a function of the ubody 11 of society. Mind 
has a kind of quasi embodiment in speech and the other media of social inter-
action. A red traffic light, for example, meaning that I should stop my auto• 
mobile, would suggest the practical context and meaning of "mind". Mind has a 
primary physiological pole in the "rod" that I see as organism; a higher "mean• 
ing" context, common to all, to me and the rest of the town, in the "idea" of 
danger that it contains; and an objective locus or place environmentally or 
socially in the stop light, the power plant of the community, and the t·own or-
dinance that established these things. "Mind" is a symbolic term, not a literal 
one. 
Our system of merging circles, somewhat like those for absolute idealism, 
may serve once more for this conception; but in the present case they would be 
dotted, indicating that mind is not ureal" or "substantive" or cosmically pri• 
mordial or in any way a literal reality independent or beyond human interrela~ 
tions. The old-fashioned noun word "mind", connoting substance and reality, is 
simply philosophical license, for Dewey. We should rather use active, verbal 
terms such as "thinking", "sensing", "relating", etc., i.e. Aristotlian func-
t:!.onal language, when referring to conscious processes. 
I _.,,. 
I 
~-
/ 
\ 
I 
' ,,,_ 
j' 
' 
399 
e"'7 
- ...... 
/ 
" 
,,,,.--
/ 
-· ·-
---· ''\. .,,,,,,.. 
\ \ 
... / \ 
.I \ 
\ \ 
./ I 
~· \ / 
\/f ~~ \.,,.i 
i. ;· ,J_ Vr '.i - b h ,, ') ; ,, ::-, I 
l t ·,; r· / ·~ ..,_ \ · I 
YY) I }'\ d 11• 
\ \ I I 
·, I I ··, 
,/ / / 
' '· 
~" 
--. 
-· -
-· 
Synopsis of sociological vie~s of mind: 
1. ,Emphasis on relation (Hume), on interaction and function (Aristotle) 
and on social and historic process (modern conception of evolution 
and history): mind has to be understood in terms of the total his-
toric and social development of man. Mind is a thing of environment 
rather than isolated selfhood. 
Ari example c,f the way ''mind"/"personality"/"selfhood" is con-
ditioned by, or derived from, the social environment: a parti-
cular person's "mirid", as a Protestant Christian, or a Reform 
Jew, is due to the Christian or Jewish environment in which he 
has been reared. 
2. Two main branches: 
a. Absolute Idealist: Hegel, Bosanquet, et al. The "social mind" 
theory -- our mind~ are parts or expressions of the soci~l mind, 
which comes to self-realization in the concrete institutions of 
history: environp:1ent itself as literally "mind". 
b. Naturalistic: Dewey, et al. The social theory divested of the 
notion that mind is a trans•human metaphysical reality, i.e. 
shorn of the "mysticism" of former view. 11Mind11 not a "thing" 
in any terms -- rather refers to'speech l;lnd the other media of 
social interaction, by which a thinking organism gets itself 
related to an environment: "Social behaviorism". 
Critical Note: 
a. With respect to Absolute Idealism: are we. just hypothetical "points" 
on the greater circles with no reality of our own? Recall our earlier 
criticisms of impersonalistic idealisms. 
b •· With respect to t:he' naturalistic view: is not subjective thought, con-
sci'busness, mind as ~ unitary power O·f some kind and to some degree 
assumed all al'ong in this theory? Recall our previous criticisms of 
John Dewey's philosophy. 
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v. 
Personalistic Theories: 
Mind as Telic Energy 
The old spiritual or soul-substance theory was 11personalistic" in so far 
A.G it stressed "unity"''as the primal ingredient or meaning of mind. More 
adequate personalistic theories, however, must include the concept of miU:d 0 as 
complex "relation" and 11function," that is, "process," as well as unitary or 
unifying principle. Several major contributions to such a theory of mind have 
come from both philosophers and psychologists in our time. We review some 
of these. 
T):ie philosopfik personal ism of Borden Parker Downe. Bowne I s position can 
be classified by two terms, "personalistic" and "transcendental" (or perhaps 
"holistic"). He set forth a theory of mind that was "personalistic" because it 
stressed the personal unity of mind or spirit above or behind or around the 
v2.rious "states" of consciousness; it was "transcendental" because it believed 
that essential mind or spirit is ~ ~ either physiological process on 
the one hand or social interactivity or behavior on the other. Improving 
upon the spiritual substance theory, this philosophy would say that the mind is 
a higher whole, inclusive rather than exclusive of body. If we were drawing 
circles again, it might not be inappropriate to say that mind is.the outer or 
controlling sphere, and body the inner instrumental sphere. To the entire 
sociological school (absolute idealistic as well as naturalistic) it would say 
1:hat mind or spirit may be related to, and nurtured in, but is not limited, or 
totally defined by, environment; it has a distinctive dimension of its own 
perpendicular to or transcending environment§ or it ma.y oome to have such a 
transcendence as the outcome of its genesis. 
The Hebraic thinkers of the Bible, St. Augustine, Kant, to mention some 
of the classic names, and modern personalistic philosophers, theologians, and 
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psychologists in their various ways have contributed to this general person-
rdistic v:i.ew of mind-spirit.. The nub of personalistic thinking about mind 
i.s that an active, unitary inclusive self is needed to organize ideas and re• 
late experiences, else such things as grammatical and logical thought, memory, 
psychological growth, in a word, coherent knowledge, experience,,and science 
~X'e inexplicable. Hume's associationist view lies at the basis of most nat-
uralistic and behavioristic theories of mind. Against these Borden Parker 
3owne'argued powerfully that if the several conscious states or processes ever 
get "associated" this implies a mutual, inclusive "consciousness" which does 
the associating. For example, on the most primary level of thinking experience, 
to bring two ideas or thought$,!_ and e_, into grammatical or logical relation-
shi~ reveals, as it were, beneath the judgment, the conscious Subject, "which 
is neither a nor b,, but embraces both in the unity of its own consciousness."* 
There are not only "states of consciousness,"but also, he said, "consciousness 
of states." 
Without this unity, preoise and conclusion would fall hop-
lessly asunder, and the possibility of thought would perish. 
••• Consciousness ••• •• exists only through acts of relation, 
and hence only through the unity of the subject.** 
., 
In our next chapter we will stress such an anlysis as constituting the~· · 
necespary start;ing ·point for a "spiritual" defi1:1i:t!on of selfhood. 
~ ;"' -·~, 
The personalistic view mind. 
Dotted circle for body is to 
suggest that there is no 
rigid dualism between mind 
and body as in the spiritual 
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~~. T):1.eory of Thought and Knowledge, Harper., -'.(ggf~ p. 21. 
substance theory, 
but rather that 
body is a function 
of .mind~ 
** Bowne: Metaphysics, Harper, 1882~ p. 367. 
of the personalistic view see Peter A. Bertocci: 
sonal Mind," p .. 398-420 in Jordon M. Scher, ed.: 
(Glencoe Press) 1962. 
For a more recent exposition 
"A Tempc,ralistic View of Per-
Theories of the Mind, Macmillan 
l. Mind is a unifying power/ as 
thought process., 
· transcending, functioning 
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self: illustrated in the simplest 
bodily 
2. Mind a/whole greater than the 
than exclusive of body. (For 
body as an instrument of mind 
sum of its/parts, inclusive rather 
illustrations of the conception of 
see page <'l~,) 
Critical Note: Doubtless no theory fully explains the problem of the 
mind's apparent unity or its relation to body (see , , ., · , ) ; but the 
personalistic view would claim to do more justice to the facts of experience 
than other theories., In the following statement., G., Watts Cunningham 
raises the : fundamental question about mind: 
11 From the survey of these ••• types of theory, two points stand 
out fairly clearly. The first is that the problem of mind 
as thus debated concerns some mechanism of unity among par• 
ticular experiences. The second point is that it concerns 
some sort of relation between this mechanism and the bodily 
organism." {.t ... .:(~r. Watts Cunningham~'· Problems of Philosophy, 
Henry Holts 1935, p. 264 
To gain a further perspective on the ground thus far covered, the theories 
of mind divide into two broad classifications as follows: 
Naturalistic theories: denial of vs. 
the "reality" of mind or self 
1. Functionalistic (e.g. Aristotle) 
2. Associationist or relational 
a. General (e.g. Hume) 
b. Behavioristic or mater-
ialistic (e.g. J.B. 
Watson) 
3. Social views (e.g. Dewey) 
Transcendental. Wholistic. or Idealistic 
theories: 
affirmation of the "reality" of mind 
and self,. 
1. Spiritual substance theory (e.g. 
Plato, Descartes) 
2., Personalistic theory, now under 
consideration 
3. Social view of absolute idealists 
(e.g. Hegel) 
~ Teleological View of Individuality or the Self: Josiah Roye~ 
The reader will recall our discussion in chapter nine, where in an effort 
to solve the problem of the relation of the Divine and human "wills" (or God's 
11:freedom11 in relation to man's) we cited Josiah Royce's conception of th3 "self," 
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mountain climber, model raiiroad enthusiastt housewife, League of Women 
Voters member, and so on: that is, we become the "person" that we 
hope to be in all of its many faceted, but naturally de-
limited variety--and that others know or perceive and ~~t1ay-,,:._: ·, come to love. 
Royce phrases this philosophy of selfhood in 
the following w~y: 
••• By an individual being, whatever one's metaphysical .doctrine, 
one means an unique being, that is, a being which is alone of its own 
type, or is such that no other of its class exists ••• 
••• if you look closely at that region of our consciousness 
where first we come nearest to facing what we take to be an experience 
of individuality, you find, I think, that it is our selective attention 
especially as embodied in what one may call our exclusive affections 
which first brings home to us what we mortals require an individual 
being to be.* 
••• an individual ••• is no abstract conception, but ••• is a con-
ception expressible only in terms of a satisfied will. An indi-
vidual is a being that adequately expresses a purpose. Or again, 
an individual so expresses a purpose that no other being can take 
the place of this individual as an expression of this purpose. And 
the sole test of this sort of uniqueness lies in the fact that in 
this individual being, just in so far is its type gets expression 
at all, the will or purpose which it expresses rests content with it, 
desires no other, will have no other. 
I conclude then, so far, that if this world contains real in-
dividuals at all, it is a teleological world, •••• ** 
We wrote in our earlier reference to Royce in chapter nine that neither 
in the Divine example nor in the human, does selfhood have a thing like "re-
ality." Royce is against any doctrine of the self viewed as mere static 
"substance" of either material or spiritual quality. We heard him say the 
nelf is not some hard core of inexplicable fact; it is "no mere datum."~~** 
* The World and the Individual, op. cit., pp. 455,457. 
** The Conception of Immortality. from Stuart Gerry Brown,~, The Religious 
~hilosophy of Josiah Royce, Syracuse University Press, 1952, pp. 102,103. 
*** The Problem of Christianity. Vol II, Macmillan, 1913, p. 61. 
on the Cosmic' (i.e. God;s) as on finite side (man's) it is essentially 
lia mean:1E£_ embodied in a conscious life .. "* Self hood is a "being" of "functio".l 11 
and "meaning" identical with its power, purposes, and achievements. Selfhood 
is a teleological, that is, a moral process. Royce said, "The life of our 
consciousness is,.._a life of watching our deeds."** 
l 
We should not close this chapter dealing with such a large su~ject matter 
in such limited space and terms--and especially the present section on "per-
sonalistic" theories of mind ..... without recognition of the vast field of investi-
gation and speculation··, from the side of technical psychology. Among psy-
cho~ogists and philosophers who have investigated the self-phenomenon, Allport 
recognized two moods under the caption (1) personalistic psychology~ and (2) 
~~ psxcholoB¥ of personality. This distinction indicates whether one allows 
respectively a somewhat more daring specualtive, or "philosophic" approach to 
the study of the 11self 11 or a more cautious, 11empirically" disciplined approach.*** 
Our own thinking about the nature or meaning of "personal mind" is a version 
of "personalistic psychology" (using Allport's distinction for the moment) de-
rived from the philosophic tradition bearing such names as Kant, Wm James, Royce, 
!tqry Whiton Calkins, Bowne, Brightman, Bertocci-0 Allport classifies the noted 
:_:>sychqlogist William Stern***~~ as standing in this tradition of "personaU.stic," 
that is, philosophical ''psycho] ogy·= 
* World and.the Individual, Vol. II, p. 269. 
** The World and Individual, Vol. I, op. cit., p. 39. 
' 
~~** Gordon W. All port . in his noteworthy, Personality. A Psychological In..:. 
J".er.J?!_etation, Henry Holt~-19S7, · chapter XX: "The Person in Psychology." 
**** Stern: General Psychology From the Personalistic Standpoint, Macmillan 
1938. 
/f-, ... ,..,, 
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The telio view of selfhood above reviewed in the classic form of Josiah Royce 
has had, of course, its expositors in other figures of our time, who have written 
from Tarying standpoints, using different idiom perhaps but developing the same 
interpretation/ of personality as dynamic, purposive energy. A noteworthy example 
it seems to us is Heidegger's "existentialist" philosophy of hum.an existence or 
the human reality, Dasein, as set forth in Being and Time. Fernando R. Molina (ed): 
The Sources of Existentialist Philosophy, Prentice-Hall, 1969, P• 132-137, esp. 
133D, 134B , 13 6C ,D , 
----------- - -------------------
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and mentions further representatives, such as Calkins, Bowne, James Ward, and 
others .-:1: Allport .sopnrot'1/.s::·~ himself to some extent from this group as an 
exposit or of the "psychology of personality."** 
Working from the side of clinical psychology,,the widely recognized Carl 
Rogers has developed a distinctive psychology of the "self" as a dynamic or-
ganizing "J:," closely resembling the spiritual philosophy of selfhood :. "to sug-
gested, in' this present chapter.*** 
We should also mention the "field," "holistic," "organismic," and 11€:astalt 11 
approaches to the study of personality as represented by investigators like 
Lewin, Koffka, Kohler, Angyal, Maslow, Lecky, and others.**** The thoroughgoing 
dynamic and holistic approach of these psychological investigators of person-
ality theory would, in general terms, express many of the · · · -; ·:, , , implications 
of our own view of mind, or the personal self, as thus far described. Lewin's 
quite conscious introduction of the concept :esychical energy_, as the most in-
clusive, phenomenp!ogical ,descriptive term for persc;mality 
;\:-'\3tc,,\, ',L., 
·:·,:· emphasis',.~**** 
* Ibid., pp. 552-557. 
** Ib., pp. 558£. 
**~'c Calvin s. Hc.11 and Gardner Lindg;ey: Theories of Personality, John 
Wiley and Sons, 1957, chapter 12, p. 478. In chapters 7-12 of this work Ha5\.1 
and L:i,+ld.ze-:y present ·. ~ . :· .-·~:: a critically sympathetic discussion of Allport' s 
and Rogers' contributions·. to 11personality" theory. For C. R. Rogers himself, 
we cite Client•centered Therapy; Its Current Practice, Im.,:elications, and Theory, 
Houghton, 1951; and "Some Observations on the Organization of Personality, 11 
American Psychologist, 1947, 2. pp. 358-68. 
*1'**Hall and Lind,zey, chapters 6 and 8. 
1~**** Ib., p. 224. K. Lewin: A Dyp.amic Theory of Personality, McGraw 1935; 
field Theory in Social Science 2 Selected Theoretical.· Papers) (ed. D. Cartwright) 
Harper, 1951. 
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In sum, these psychological theories, in so far as we are acquainted with 
them, express, more or less, from the standpoint and interests of the technical 
psychologists, what we have called with Royce the teleological view of the 
self. This teleological view of personality is eloquently expressed, it seems 
to us, by Allport himself at the, close of his :; t:;K ·~·~· text: · · 
He [map./ is more than a bundle of habits; more than a nexus 
,of abstract dimensions; more too than a'representative of his 
species. He is more than a citizen of the state,. and more than, · 
a mere incident in the gigantic movements o:fmankind. · He trans.:. 
cends them all. The individual, striyiqg e.ver for his own in-
tegrity, has existed under many forms o:f social life--forms as 
varied as the nomadic, feudal, and capitalistic. He struggles . 
on even under oppression, , always' hoping\ and planning for a more 
perfect democracy where the dignity and growth of each personaltty 
wil.l be prized above !all else .. ~'<' :, .... '· ·· 
* Gordon W. Allport, Personality, A Psychological Interpretation, (Henry 
2. Holt and Company, N~w York, 1937) p. 566. 
Chapter Twelve 
Man as Spiritual Being: 
The Reality and Transcendency of Spirit 
Common to the idea and language of man as "religious being 11 is the con-
cept of man as "spirit", or "spiritual being". Man as spiritual being is a 
comprehensive idea involving several levels of meaning. We have already dealt 
with a major aspect of man as spirit in our discussion of truth and reason 
(Part I, Chapter 2). The concept of man as a "rational being11 is a significant 
element in the idea of him as "spirit". A religious view which defines man as 
spirit claims to define him in most inclusive or coherent sense. 
In the chapter just preceding, we presented various theories of 11mind 11 or 
human "personality", concluding with an exposition of several forms of person-
alistic theory of mind as essential functioning unity and telec energy. In 
suggesting the superiority of this form of understanding of man we were advan-
cing in general terms a spiritual view of his nature. This chapter seeks to 
clarify further the idea of man as spiritual "unity", and as "self-transcending 11 
"energy11 and "reality". W'e will, before we conclude, have considered the trad-
itional terminology "soul", and suggested a place or manner in which it may 
profitably reside in our description of man. 
A further word about method before we proceed. Our argument from here 
forward will continue to be an "empirically" or "rationally coherent'' one, as 
Chapter Two 
heretofore defined,/p. 56. Considering the subject matter with which we are 
concerned, part of that method must be of necessity an introspective, self• 
reflective or "a priori" one. A topic such as freedom, for example, cannot 
be treated adequately or thoroughly apart from such method. The reader, 
-lt08-
409 
therefor-a, must at this stage, as i;1 our earlier one 
treating the arguments for God, continue to considoi: a,; appropriate a 
ration<'llly reflective method. If this is ruled out, leaving only the 
alternative of sornci na:r.ro~ily 11.::i,1pirical II or sensate method, we ~-,oul<l be 
left '('11th a devalued ·and u11satisfactory coinagG for such metaphysical 
e,:.c.hanr:;e as we must ·here make. \k,: 1nay profit.ably recall the spirit of 
Locke's No:tds, if not the liltter, that there are probably several legit• 
,t, ,J 
irnate methods :i.ri the •.mderst.rmding of truth, m1d the discovery of reality. 
Pe have the lmcmledge of our oun c:,:iste,tce by ii.1tuition; 
of the i.;;dsbmce of God by dot.1onstration; ~nd of other things 
by sensation. (ECHU, IX, 2.) 
He here, then, stress the 0 i,.1tuitive 11 sense of uh.at we believe our .. 
solves to be. I in no x-my ·oish thereby to rule out legit:1.rnate, objective, 
or 11empirical science 11 !hH1 1:-1hat it may tell us about the nature of brain, 
and the relatioLl of brain funct:i.on::i and parts t as we c:rnmine that orGrm 
from the outside, to what we feel ourselves to be as tclcc energy frorn 
ninside 11 ourselves. Indeed, o(lr latter-day discoverico th.at brain 11f1.mc.tion.s 11 
may be described an encephalic or electrical cnere;ics > h11s helped to 
brin;J, it sccri1s to me _,the tuo realms of 11mind 0 spirit 0 on th(;! one hand, aad 
11 dualisms 11 of former times (recall our discussion in chapter nine). But 
this anticipates our venture. What we stress for the moment is the need 
for some degree of a priori method in the discovery of man, and we might 
well repeat here the words on this subject of a noted psychologist, uttered 
in warmth and warning earlier in our century. James R. Angell wrote: 
We may agree that in theory all and in practice much of 
our mental life might be stated in terms of objective behavior. 
To do this would involve trespassing rather freely on the pre-
serves of biology, physiology, and neurology on the one side 
and upon those of the social sciences on the other. But such 
trespass is perfectly legitimate provided the trespasser is 
willing to face the chance that he may find himself annezed, 
appropriated, and in general swallowed up by the owner of the 
territory.which he invades. When she abandons the stronghold 
of consciousness as her peculiar institution, Psychology is 
moderately certain to find that as an autonomous government 
she has ceased to exist and has become a were dependency of 
biology or some other overlord ••• 
When it Oomes to discarding introspection I demur. 
Introspection ought to be checked by every possible objective 
device, but even for one frankly and exclusively interested 
in objective behavior as such, it seems to me at present to 
afford information not to be gained elsewhere ••• 
It is a wise instinct which science has always followed 
to glean information wherever it can be found. Until it can be 
shown, as it has not yet been shown, that introspection is 
either fundamentally incompetent, or clumsily and viciously 
misleadiilg; ,, it is the part of good judgment to use it. Refine 
it, check it, train it, but do not throw. away a good tool 
until you certainly have a better in hand. And do not forget 
that in much which offers itself as objective method, intro-
spection is really involved either directly or indirectly. 
Let us then bid the movement toward objective methods 
and objective description in psychology God-speed, but let us 
also counsel it to forego the excesses of youth.* 
I. Various Meanings of "Spiri!" 
In the conflict with non-spiritual philosophies, one of the more 
important tasks of philosophical, theological, and social thinking today 
410 
is to reinvest the word "spirit" and the idea of man as a spiritual being 
with significance.· In its casual usage, the term is often void of meaning•-
*Readings in General Psychology, Robinson and Robinson (The University 
of Chicago Press, Chicago, Illinois. 2nd edition 1929) pp. 26-28 
or utterly confused by a multiplicity of meaning! Commonly, in the west, 
the word symbolizes the religious, Biblical, and Christian doctrine of man, 
and it is frequently used in connection with the democratic and liberal 
view. In the religious tradition it has usually meant man as an "immortal 
soul.'' In social and political thought it has implied the ideas of 
"freedom" and 11equality. 11 In a philosophical naturalism like John Dewey's, 
it has stood .for scientific, "organized intelligence. 11 In philosophical 
idealism and humanistic philosophies in general, "spirit" has meant the 
height of man's thinking, rational, and omottbnal nature which perceives, 
understands, appreciates, and rea:).izes value--that activity of the "soul 11 
which has to do with "Truth," 11Beauty, 11 and "Good." In some specific 
philosophical idealisms it has. often meant the 'ttforld Mind 11 or "Spirit," 
of ·which the human mind and spirit have been regarded as part. In a ball 
game it means the "collective enthus~asm" of the team or the spectators. 
/} 
' t/' /J We cannot, of course, here :i;-un the;gamut of meanings. In one edition of 
Crudon's Concordance, some nineteen different meanings for the term in 
Eli4abethan English were listed for the King James Bible. In a story around 
the campfire, it has meant a ghost. 
The significance or definition here sought for the term will turn out 
to relate in part to its traditional religious meaning--that there is 
something distinctive or unique about man, which we may call "spirit": a 
greater whole,·more. than, and not entirely subject to, the body; the real, 
intrinsic self.or person, tr:anscendent to nature and yet dependent· en her, 
and ultimately dependent on and subject to God, ,the Divine Spirit, A re-
newed definiti:on should also include the best insights of the rational, 
philosophical tradition, to the effect that man's spirit indicates, at 
least in part, man's "reason." By retaining, or perhaps reorganizing and 
discovering new values in each of these meanings, a more effective use 
of the word may be made. 
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The materialistic systems, philosophical, psychological, and social, 
have not believed that man has a "spirit" or "is spirit" in the sense out~ 
lined above. The rise and popularity of these systems may be as respon-
sible for the decline of interest in understanding spirit as the failure 
of idealistic and religious philosophies to define it more carefully. In 
attempting to speak of spirit, we use related words like ''mind," "self," 
11 personality) II 11soul • 11 We continue to define and to relf,lte these terms as 
may be necessary, For our present purposes we use them synonymously, with 
the following brief digression to indicate several possible distinctions. 
We sometimes speak of the "whole mind, 11 i.e. the entire sensory, 
thinking, willing, feeling alive, in all its depth and heighth, with no 
distinction between conscious and subconscious sensations and emotions, etc. 
As modern psychology has shown, however, we should more accurately speak of 
two levels of "mind" at the very least, the conscious and sub-conscious. 
That there is a sub-conscious mind needs no elaborate proof here. Every 
time we forget the name of our "very best friend" whom we are trying to 
introduce to someone else implies the presence of that other dark room, 
without windows, the sub-conscious mind, like a cellar, just beneath the 
floor of the conscious mind. The name has gone "somewhere •11 It hasn 1 t fled 
from the mind entirely, else we would never be able to recall it at all. 
It has for the moment disappeared. Presently, after some mysterious 
mechanism, hidden in the walls of our being, completes its work, the lost 
name rises like a fugitive ghost through the floor. There it suddenly is--
it has popped from the sub-conscious into the conscious mind. 
We may mean then, iµ uDage 9f self, soul, or , "the whole 
roind 11 above mentioned, the entire mansion with all its apara.tus, not just 
th,q bright room of "present' c:.onstio.usness," realizing that there are 
cellars, attics, and closets where memories and habits, lost words, ins• 
pirations and idle thoughts are stored, where crowding and tightly wound 
emotions wait ready to spring, some.times with devastating anxiety, sometimes 
with liberating, exhilarating ecstasy~ 
In another usage we might, h9wever, mean the following. A possible 
distinction might be made between the "blu~ rose" which I hold on the 
mind 1 s imaginative "screen11 at the moment and the power that~ will changes 
the blue rose to a yello~ one. Accordingly, some may prefer to reserve 
the terms self, soul, or spirit for this deeper level of power or will, in 
some distinction to the pictorial "ideas'' and "images" projected by our 
mind's eye.· We could indeedsay that "mind" is the upper level of "ideas," 
while the 11 spirit" i~ the deeper or profounder. Not that we should make 
such an absolute distinction between "ideas" and "spirit" as did George 
Berkeley in the 18th century; for both ideas and spirit-will ~ kn~ 
within the circumference of consciousness and must therefore be related in a 
profounder unity. 
At any rate, I feel that these distinctions are more subtle than we now 
need, and for the purpose of our present discussion, mind, self, soul, and 
spirit will continue· to be interchangeable, more or less coordinate ex-
pressions. One further digression may be helpful before we continue with 
-l4-Je take up again at a later place the idea of "soul" for further 
discussion, p. 
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our principal argument. 
Personality--a philosophical definition. It has been traditional to 
divide the field of consciousness into two levels, first, simple animal 
percepts or sensations, and second, concepts or ideas. We open our eyes~ 
for example, to the colors about us for an illustration of percepts as 
raw sensation in its instantaneous, non-reflective presence. The first 
and main assurance about percepts Ls that they seem to stream into our 
awareness frcm outside us. By "concepts 11 or 11ideas, 11 however, we mean 
the processes that originate and occur primarily within the mental field. 
This subjective side of consciousness seems divided further into two phases 
or levels: One, the ppychical image, the blue rose or the imaginary apple 
that I now "see" if 1 wish to, in my mind's eye; and two, the power of 
generalization (possibly sometimes without "psychical images") illustrated 
by a chain of mathematical reasoning or intuition, or other complex deductive 
or inductive thinking. This refers to the profound ability of our mind's 
eye to "see" connections and relationships between things on a level 
deeper than immediate sensation. David Hume gave a good name in common 
speech to this power when he referred to it as "the relations of ideas 11 --
the connection made, for example, between a falling apple and the rising 
of the tides, by a mathematical formulation of gravitation. 
Next, there is our entire en10tional complexity, of course, which must 
be considered in a generalized description of human "personality": our 
desires, longings, loves; our fears, aversions, anxieties; our fulfillments, 
our joys 1 our ecstasies; Finally, in a philosophic resume of what "person-
ality 11 is, we refer to -consciousnes in the human sense, here 
brieflyi,and later on discuss this aspect again under the idea of "freedom." 
There seems to be a difference between animal "consciousness" and 
human "self-consciousness • 11 Consciousness may be defined in a general way 
simply as a living being's awareness of its environment. Men and animals 
have this in common. Self-consciousness, however, is consciousness of 
oneself in peculiar· self-determining relation to one's environment, which 
animals apparently do not have to the same extent as human beings. For 
example, my cat and· I , leave the room at the same time Y!!_ the window when 
fire starts in the wastepaper basket and gets out of hand. Both of us are 
cut as we squeeze through the window. On the outside the cat becomes at 
once preoccupied solely with licking its wounds, its attention absorbed by 
· the local problem of. the bleeding paw. I, however, not only run for the 
alarm, but in my chagrin at being cut, reflect: "How stupid! Why didn't I 
try the door?" The cat after the act would hardly reconsider its decision. 
A self-conscious being is the most general way to think of a personal being. 
In sum, we have been defining human "personality" in our generalized 
philosophical terms as constituted by our life of sensation, our life of 
imagination and reason, our emotions; and our self•transcendency, or our 
human freedom--each of these being different perspectives within the same 
reality as interiorly experienced in ascending comprehensiveness.** 
*'\-For those to whom the word "mind" may seem too old-fashioned and 
substantive, we suggest the terms "conscious experience" or 11 self-conscious 
experience." Even the materialist or behaviorist type of thinker realizes 
that there is "conscious experience:," that he has this kind of experience, 
or that he must account for it. 
416 
II. The Reality of Mind-Spirit: 
Are Mind and Brain Identical? 
We return to the materialist-spirilualist controversy raised in our 
chapter on theories of mind. The perennial way to state the primary 
question between materialist and idealist spiritual philosophies is 
simply to ask: are mind and brain identical? That many philosopers, 
psychologists, bio-chemists, and common citizens believe that they are 
identical, points, of course, to a truism of contemporary belief about man. 
At this stage of the descision, we suggest to the reader to peruse a 
technical study of the nervous system and brain for detail concerning the 
"physiology" of "mind. 11 There is, for e1rnmple, the recent, thoroughgoing· 
and open ended book by Dean E. Wooldridge: ~he Machinery of the Brain.* 
The title of this excellent expository treatise indeed indicates its 
ultimate materialist position, philosophically speaking. Dr. Wo· .ldridge 
believes, in the last analysis, that man and his "mind 11 is ultimately 
"machinery, 11 although vastly complex, digital-computer-like, electronic 
machinery. This book is anup-to:..date statement of the materialist 
hypothesis, replete with fascinating facts, challenging to the idealist 
view that "mind" cannot be explained in terms just of "physical machinery" 
alone. 
Wooldridge goes to great pains to interpret consciousness (though he 
admits that 11cousctou1nc:;1t,II. is :1·.pr01':ilei;.1, p.219f.) ·,' 
·'i!'ah.ge of mental: acti¼ity > like• learn:fng; netuorization, associative recall, 
as 
or concept formation, as "thought mechanisms,". that is to say ,/the elec-
trical functioning of the astronomically supernumerous, complex, and inter-
~~McGraw-HHl, 1963 
related neurons, or nerve cells (axons, ce bodies, dendrites, and 
synnpses) of the brain. When our modern knowledge of the physiology of 
brain process clarifies that specific so-called "spiritual 11 functions or 
qualities like reasoning ability, memory, emotional joys or terrors can 
be specifically located (some types of function more, and others less) in 
gray matter and cells and electrically stimulated--turned on and off by 
bl:·ain probes or electrically wired needles; when it is plain that des-
truction of brain in sufficient amount is inevitably folloued by destruction 
of specific "personality" powers, such as will, memory, etc. --the modern 
case for the "materiality" of "mind, 11 and its 11 identity 11 to or with ''brain, 11 
has been stated with wol}nigh overriding force. But we will here ask 
this scientific investigator, and lively expositor, to sum up the case 
as he sees it in his own words: 
r:1ost imp.:c0sive of all, of course, are i.:he observations 
that reveal the·physical basis of the "higher processes" of 
emotion and intelligence. The discovery of pleasure and 
punishment centers in the brain-·"."discre te., , localized, stable 
aggregations of neurons in which an electric current means a 
sense of well-being, hunger; sexual gratification, rage, terror 
or pain--made it difficult for those whose thinking emphasized 
the dichotomy of the brain and the mind. This difficulty was 
further increased by the evidence for. the controlling effect on 
personality of the integrity of the neuronal connections to 
the frontal lobes, as well as by the clear relationship es-
tablished by Penfield between stirnulating cortical currents 
and the 11mental 11 processes of speech and memory. And evidence 
for the automatic, machinelike nature of· some of the learning 
processes has further aggravated the plight of the brain/mind 
dualist. 
In short, all the material of the preceding chapters has 
consisted of evidence for the applicability of the established 
physical laws of nature to the activities of the nervous system. 
The underlying thesis throughout has been, in essence, "The 
brain is a machine. "'f, 
At one point, Dr. Wobldridget s interpretation and the philosophy 
here espoused is in hearty agreement--namely that the 
"'! , ' ' 
-l}Dean E,. Wo -ldridge, The i!Jachin§LL.9.L:the Erejn, (McGraw-Hill Book 
Company, Inc~, 1963) p. 230 
MS 
11 brain/mind 11 dualism is in or:cor, and !!lust be supplanted by a more adequate 
philosophy of mind in relation to body. In an earlier chapt,er we have 
already called attention to this need (page 347); and we will return 
later specifically to the discussion with Dr. Wooldridge at this point. 
11e ·11 · th h.1 su..mrrsrize the w1 wi in .e meanw 1 e case, 
of mind--and pr e.s"~;:. ~t ly "'tt;')Lffb to state 
for the 11 transcendo:ccy" 
precisely what we mean 
by this, semantically, psychologically, and perhaps, even ontologically. 
Accordingly, from the subjective or introspective standpoint 1,-re. experience 
the following distinctions. 
(1) Sensation (mental or conscious experience on the most imrrediate, 
primary level) .§:.§ gualitative filil]§rience i-§. incomn:ensurate with m;: "unlike 11 
,nervous imoulse, or the 11reflex 11 of the brain-nerve system. ttStirnulation 
of the visual area at the occipital pole of the br::::.in by an electric needle 
results in flashes of light in tht':l field of consciousness. rrci A little less 
technical way to state the same thing might l:::e: a blow (material impact) 
on the head makes us see "stars, 11 blue, yellow, nnd red, in the mind! 
What is this mysterious subjective experience bf seeing stars--or of sight, 
vision, or 11light 11 every time we open our eyes, vtith ,1hich we shall 
illustrate sensation? 
Physics 1s description of the objective energy on its cosmic side of a 
given by 
11 ray 11 of 11light 11 or color is/the general formula: 
i.e., 
A:c/f, 
type of light or color= 2.§lt:l£iJ:.Y of li-.;tht 
frequency 
i~ D: • Allan, The Realm of Personality, Abingdon-Coks,sbury, 1947, Po 207 
--
-
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Frequency is defined as i:.he · interval between the wave "crests" of a 
particular type of light, violet, gree·n ,' yellow·; or red: 
What physics means by objective color is stated by the formula, "~=c/f." 
But what physiology and psychology mean, you and I subjectively, is "green" 
to choose a specific color. We cannot say.that the fo~mula, 11)=c/f," or 
the wave, " t/VLfVU " is "green. 11 Were we_to apply our subjective "light" 
'• 'I' ' 
.. , 
terminology to these external stimulae, all we ,lJlis'h~ say is that they are 
. , .' .. 
"dark," indeed a good word to symbolize their ow~ inner-most, unknown 
qualities. What we 
powers somehow have 
really mean i's .tha~ your and my physio-psychological 
,,,. .A..""·''1t,.. 
the capacity of interpreti1!S_ l).=c/f as "green," in 
response to the external stimulation of retina, nerves, and brain. Similarly 
with the other basal ~ensations, sound, taste, and so on. Our inner ex-
perience· of sensation is quaiitatively.different from 11~= c/f." It is 
"incommensurate" in the sense that there is no way by which ·\Je can directly 
. . 
or in some kind of one to one terms translate "1=c/f" into "green. 11 Gen-
eral~y speaking, "l=c/f;, is that with which' nerves and brain have to do, 
But green is an expression of our inner life of ''mind" and "consciousness." 
. , . . JiJl'S'. an emergent quality 
(For the meaning of green as something objective, that it is/actually£!!. or 
· · : • (h. 2 . 
in, for example, the leaf at which we are looking, recall-1page 54.) 
Yfo Ji.re hero, :lO\"mvM", oous.idoring gr-0011 on tho r.i°ide of it~ sub~o-ctive.--, .. :-.• ~ 
,.,-;,1..,·t··· l· • n,.,,,,o.,1·i ,. ··" 
·-"" ,_J, ,l • _,..., - -~-'e • 
We pass. ne-xt 
e1cperiences of sensation to . :i more J!Ci::lootivo 
"thoughts, 11 and ''meanings." 
level of 11ideas, 11 
' 
.. >dtf. ... 
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(~) Thought £.E_ meani~ ~ f!!_ variable, whHe the Ehysical process of 
nervous reflex remains constant., The psychological experiment is common-
place of the two identical, dark profiles facing each other. From one pe!'.' 
spective of 11meaning, 11 the picture represents two silhouetted heads; from 
another it depicts a white chalice in the middle, which the profiles make. 
The meaning, the work of mind, changes at will, but the physical elements, 
the actual lines and light, which the brain receives, remain constant. 
There is a slightly more general way to state the same point. Though 
there is the area in sensation where the physical and mental seem to merge, 
the mind is chiefly preoccupied ~rr.e~:p,i;o,g ~ values, whereas the brain 
is ~oncernod ~ physiological process. The fact that identical acts 
physically speaking can have entirely different significance suggests the 
difference between spiritual ffieaning on the one hand, the function of mind 
and brain or bodily movement on the other. When Lincoln put his name to 
the Emancipation Proclamation he went through identically the same act 
physically (his brain's co-ordination of pen with paper, etc.) as in signing 
a hundred more trivial documents with entirely different meanings. The 
physical aspects of killing in self defense and in premeditated murder are 
identical--the same finger pulls the same trigger of the same pistol ac-
cording to the pattern of a constant physiological reflex acting from 
brain to nerves' end; but the meaning of the actions are different, and the 
distinction is recognized by law~ Such examples suggest that there is a 
rlifference between "mind" and 11nervous system." 
~- An ilJ.uoi:rr:,tior:. of WEliam E, Hocking. 
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(3) Another way to state the same point is to say that ~ .!.P... cof!_-
~ of its ~ content (of "meaning"); the brain is .!!2!_. The mind is 
self-reflective; it is conscious of its own functions and powers. It is 
full of colors, ideas, emotions, ambitions, reasonings, plans, fears, doubts, 
senses of valu.es, decisions all the time, and is. aware of a ubiquitous in-
tramural self that evaluates and relates this content. The brain, however, 
is not conscious of what it looks like on the inside or how it works as an 
electro-chemiGal mechanism. We never see our own graymatter, or the ,neurons 
or synapses, or the atoms of hydrogen or carbon, which chemically compose 
our brain. If mind-spirit were identical with brain, it is strange indeed, 
that, with its self-conscious power, the mind never reports directly on the 
physical content or processes of brain. As Bowne once emphasized in a 
forceful passage, the mind reports on everything else--on external objects, 
on abstract ideas, on values, etc.--but never on the inner cellular, 
chemical structure or electrical processes of the brain. His words are 
memorable and . :'we repeat'them: 
One would expect that the thoughts would represent, if 
anything, the organic processes of which they are said to be 
t::1c inner face:·, ,;heroas thc"y ne}Jer refer to these, and com,-, 
monly refer to things entirely apart from the organism. Ner-
vous combinations and movements are said to have ideas f9r 
their mental face; and the natural thought would be that those 
ideas would be ideas of their peculiar nervous correlates. 
But this is never the casei indeed, that there are such 
correlates is even now a matter of not very cogent inference. 
This complete silence of the organism as to what is going on 
in itself, and the report instead of what is taking place in 
the outer world are very remarkable facts. Certainly, when 
matter is declared to be a double-faced entity, we should 
expect to find the mental face reflecting that part of the 
physical face which attends it, or which is next to it; 
but the mental face never reflects the physical series which 
produces it, but some other and unconnected series. Thus 
a set of rays of light fall upon the body and a thought results, 
but not a thought of .the nerve-processes, or molecular motions 
which produce the thought, but a thought of some external 
luminous object. It is strange, indeed, that anything should 
result, but that the thought should be a reproduction of the 
object is surprising in a far higher degree. The wonder 
is still greater in our perception of others' thoughts. 
Here some waves of air fall upon the ear, and at once the 
nBrves produce thoughts with the added assurance that they 
are the reproduction of a thought-series which existg apart 
from our own.* 
(4) Brai£...!f in seace and subject to the laws of "matter." Can 
ideas be spoken of in spacial, prepositional terms? Where are my ideas 
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of the blue and yellow roses? Can we make any sense by saying that one is 
"beside, 11 "above," or "behind'' the other, as we would speak of physical 
objects? The best we can do is to say that they are "in the mind" in 
general, and that mind is related or connected with brain. But this is 
as far as we can go in trying to locate ideas in space. A related problem 
concerns that of time. Mind in both memory and forethought seems to 
possess some measure of transcendence over "time." (On the other hand, 
however, real, flowing.time seems to be as much an integral attribute of 
spirit as of nature, necessary to individual, personal existence; and one 
of our most fundamental and direct contacts with the flow or will of reality 
itself.),'<'* 
To summarize th.ls far> is the realm of thought on a different plane 
from that of material nature as physics and chemistry must test it? A 
11 thought ' 1 apparently has no weight, nor spacial dimensions, ro::i:t other 
features that generally charactcrizc:1 "physical matter." Indeed, the fact 
the.t there are electro-encephalic currents ("brain waves") calculal:i6 :tn th8 
r; 
' 
'1tBor:den Par:ker Bowne, Metaphysics, Harpers, 7882, p. 387 
t ... ~ '"', ... ' l' . 'I,·, ~ ~; .,.. . ... 1 
.~' 
\. 
**See our essay The Personal Significance of Time, Sp~ce, and Casualit_y_, 
' • ' • ~, . ' 1 T . ] 19 60 f .,J, '· . , ·f ' 11t • . ll . d II P "1l 
.:-.mover H0,7ton "-luartcr y, J:..ovcrocr · , o .. · c1n,<,1.yce s Q - •. J.L:C, en 1:1 ac,. 
as integral aspects of the meaning of "personality, 11 and as themselves clues 
to tlie spiritual-per.(:Onal nature Of reality. 
physical realm, which iretrically record thought activity, suggests that 
mind-spirit and its content of thought is a type of energJr, no doubt in 
a measure continuous with, but at the top of, the hierarchy of natural 
energies 
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(The fact that mind-spirit seems to be to sorr.e extent discontinuous or 
incommensu:cate with gravitational space, the m•J.terial order in most general 
sense ,may be a kind of .§. ,I?rj.Qri 11 intimation of immortality. 11 In any case, 
the common e2'.1)Grience of such discontinuity shoud remove some of the fear 
that the body and its disintegration at death must necessari.1,y fJay the 
last word in the destiny of individual life .. ) 
\Jhs:t, we have so far pointed out comes to focus as a final step in the 
case for the 11 transcendency 11 of mind. 
(5) It is the experience that ming ~ 1Q ~, .m: .t.,Q ~, §12. ~ 
of its .Q.1:Ill, over and above the body- reflex system, and ·with this suggestion 
we pass to our next section which elabora·tes it. 
III., .!:find-Energy, Body Q.§ it.§ I,n(Lt;rument, 
and ~ Reali tv .Q;( the p.Ql:f 
Jifdnd Energy. The case for m0:ntal 0n9rgy may be briefly summarized. 
On the level of the rncist common-place experience we all sense that our 
plans and intentions, our force of will behind our ideas, ~..:'.:'.;:.: --~,,_.,:'· 11nBntal 
factors, 11 are causes of physical action. . It may be a rm;stery just how 
ideas of the future, for example, can command life and bodily actions in 
the present, but it is none~-the~leGs a fact. Sirn5.larly, :Lele as c:,:' 'l:,bo c2t-
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te:,: (our 11 ideals 11 ) constantly give rise to human action and change history. 
Likewise, ideas of the worse, bad news, worry, fear, rage, mente.1 aber-
ations and 11 complexes 11 are frequently the causes of orsanic symptoms, 
adrenalin secretion, uJ.cers, hysterical lameness, etc.* The idea of food 
to a hungry man, who has been busily engaged when his wi:f'e interrupts him 
with the call to dinner, inst8.ntly excites the salivary glands. Con-
centration of thought and attention can, to a considerable extent, black 
out organic sensation and functions. Ee ing oblivious to the clock's 
ticking or the children I s noise and similar experiences are comflon to all. 
Along this line we cite a number of nempirical, 11 or 11 experimental11 
type evidences for mind energy: · Hindu Yogi, Saints, and :wry,,"!§,ke, for ex-
ample, have shown that some persons, with training, can exert a certain 
degree of control at will over some involunta.ry bodily functions, such as 
pulse beat, heartbe:J.t, pain reflex, etc. *1~ CThe influence of ideas (mind) 
over body, seems dramatically illustrated by h7pnatism. Physical mani-
festations such as ncold sweat,n "burns," 11 blisters, 11 rigid limbs, the 
inducing of anesthesia, arG caused in patients by hypnotic nsuggestion. 11 
Dramatic instances of auto-hypnd-tic.(:lly.'i:nduo.i.eTu, ana(,sthesia to 
induce& 
sound; or complete pain anaesthesia/in entire limbs by patients, trained 
to self-hypnosis through 11.reflex conditioning, 11 are reported by .Andrew 
*See, for example, Melvin Zax and George Stricker: Patterns of IJi_xnho-
J2.§,__t]:}ol~ Case Studies of Behavioral Dysfunction (McMillan, New York, 1936) 
**Currently the scientific study of meditation, and its effects in 
these ways is being conducted b:r tho physiology department of the All 
India Institute of Medical Sciences, reported by Peter Hazelhurst, dispatch 
of 1'1JQ 1'.i,™, in Eugene .E:ec.:ister-Guard, Sunday, June 1, 1969. See also 
report on works of Drs. Bernard Engel, Joe Kamiya, and Peter Land, (res-
pectively of the National Institute of Child Heo.lth and Hu..rna.n Develooment 
in Baltimore, Langley Porter .euro-pshchiatric Institute in San Fran~isco, 
and University of Wisconsin) relative to the trainih1 of the body automatic 
system by conscious co1c.trol--'rj_rr-!l, July 18, 1969, p. 67 
Salter in his well-known book, What is Hypnosis, Studies in Conditioning,, 
(Citadel Press, New York, 1963, p. 40f.). Whether hypnosis b fully 
explained or not by a "reflex condtioning 11 theory, which Salter presses, 
a report such as the following from his case histories reveals that his 
subjects were trained to bring their ~ con~_iOU..§. powers 2f thought to 
bear upon, and dramatically to control what is normally involuntary pain 
reflex: 
This subject was also conditioned to produce an 
anaesthesia at will in any part of his body, .while .re-
maining in the so-called waking state. In order to 
produce this anaesthesia, the subject had merely to 
concentrate on the part of his body in which· he wished 
the absence of feeling, and to think "The feeling is 
going away. The feeling is going away. The feeling is 
going away. 11 This was conditioned to produce a complete 
anaesthesia. In order to restore sensation, the s.ubject 
had to think 11The :l:eelirtg is coming back. The. feeling '' 
is coming back. The· feeling is coming back." That 
would suffice. ,All subjects; were similarly trained to 
anaesthetize themselves~ 
The subject would inflict perceptible inju:ries U!)On 
himself with a sterilized needle and knife point. as he 
explored his anaesthesias. After a while he was not al-
lowed to check them because it was found that this sub-
ject as well as the other two members of this group, in-
flicted deep injuries upon himself in his surprise at 
the utter absence of feeling •. All the subjects laughed 
and denied that they enjoyed any' masochistic pleasure 
in their self-punishtnent. "It isn't punishment,ir they said.* 
~,\ 
\ -,'Further examples of what appears to be a power of cor-1.trol by 11mind11 
are those numerous cases of people, who, after brai.n injury, disease, or 
surgery, are able by fo,rce of will to recall lost faculties, re-educating 
what may be left of the brain to take over functions of those parts 
that have been removed or have·deteriorated. I quote at length one such 
case as reported by D. M. Allan in The Realm of Personality: 
When ••• the brain is seriously damaged, it is the spirit 
of the man who owns the brain that is all-important. If he 
resigns himself to his fate, all is lost; but if he puts up 
a.determined fight, he can work wonders with what is left 
~~ Andrew Salter, What i,s li:z.J2nosis, the Citadsl Pres:;, (NeN York, 1963) 
p. 40. 
of his brain. He can lose approximately one half of his 
brain and still regain most of his abilities. 
This was demonstrated in the notable case of Dr. Saloz. 
At the age of sixty this capable physician was stricken 
with aphasia of the severest type and could neither 
speak, read, nor write. Only a few words such as "yes, 11 
"no," and "thanks" survived of his large vocabulary. 
The cause of this condition, as revealed by an autopsy 
later, was an extensive degeneration of the left hemi-
sphere of his brain. Most men VT·ould have given up in despair. 
But Dr. Saloz was a man of iron determination, and with 
admirable courage and persistence he set himself to the 
task of re-educating himself. He had to start on the level 
of a child, but after three years of painstaking effort he 
was once more able to use his lost faculties. He made a 
personal study of aphasia and wrote an illuminating ac-
count of his case. Looking back, he testified that ''he 
felt at first as one immured in a sepulchre, that he knew 
what he wished to express, but had lost all the instru-
ments of expression and that symbols conveyed nothing 
to him. It seemed to him that he had entered another world 
where his ideas were soft and downy, as in a dream ••• He 
had ideas, thoughts, or conceptions, but lacked the 
symbols of self-expression." At the end of his period of re-
solute self-education, his medical advisor could detect no 
defect in his mind except for an unusual stubborness of 
ideas. 
Numerous instances of this kind have convinced neuro-
logists that when one area of the brain is destroyed, other 
areas can be organized to take its place •••• We may justly 
conclude that a creative attitude is as necessary in re-
storing lost functions of the brain as it is in learning 
to use the full potentialities of that marvelous organ in 
the first place.* 
The experiments of E. L. Travis connecting the intensity of thought 
or concentration to the frequency or wave length of electrical "brain 
waves" is illuminating.** Describing this experiment, Allan writes, 
"Travis presents tables of concomitant variations which show that as one 
goes from 'mental blankness' to 'mental effort' by degrees, the proportion 
of 'small waves• to 'large waves' steadily increases. This striking 
*Abingdon-Cckesbury, 1947; pp. 224-226. A similar, stirring case 
is reported in the book Karen, by Marie Killilea (Prentice-Hall, 1952), an 
account of the education of a little girl afflicted with celebral palsy. 
,':*Brain Potentials and the Temporal Course of Consciousness," ~gl 
of Experimental Psychology, XXI (1937), p. 3028--reported in Allan: The 
Realm of Person11li1~, op. cit. p. 218 
change to smaller waves seems to accompany any process in which con-
sciousness becomes oore highly focused, that is, in which there is a 
specific attentative effort."* 
In addition to the above line of evidence, some may wish to cite the 
extensive experimentation in "exta-sensory perception" (ESP) phenomena that 
investigators like J.B. Rhine, of Duke University parapsychology institute, 
Kobe rt H. Thouless of Great Britain, and others. have been carrying out for a 
good>,· portion of this century. The general point of these investigations. if 
one accepts their findings, is to indicate that there is a distinct mental 
energy that seems to by-pass ordinary channels of sense perception. We will 
not here attempt·an exposition or evaluation (ex~ept in the brief note below**) 
~~Ibid. l), 218. Also for description of this phenomeno11.., with charts 
of encephalographis illustrating the intensity of brain waves when the subject 
is mentally alert in contrast to the relaxed waves when inattentative, drowsy 
or asleep, see Wooldridge, The Machinery of the Brain, op. cit., p.98-1018. 
**the natural scientists have long procl~imed empirical method as 
their own special way (and often exclusive way) of discovering truth about 
our world; that is to say, about the nature of beings and processess, and 
the relationships which hold between beings and process. The empirical 
spirit is the outward look, the canon or faith that holds that only ob• 
jective.nature can tell us wb.at she is like; extreme empiricism has re• 
pudiated the application of any prival:eopinion, subjective dogma, or 
prec9nceived value on the pa:r:t of the inquirer himself as he proceeds about 
his investigation of things. And this indeed is the proper method about 
many objects of scientific inquiry. . ,,, .. ~ Radical empiricism looksd 
askance at any claim of the man's inner spirit to know something about 
either itself, or reality more widely, by any a priori, introspect:i.vc, or 
self-reflective analysis. Such methods have simply been ruled out of courte. 
by some empirical dogmatists as "unscientific," occult, and even possibly 
fanatical. 
The·parapsychologist, and Mr •. Rhine among them, as.I understand their 
procedure, have quietly by,"'passed this criticism, and have been conscientiously 
endeavoring to find out if there were not some empiricalwa::[ after all to 
test whether there be a non-empirical mode of knowledge. To examine his works 
gives one the impression that .he is a sober empirical investigator, endea-
voring to bring to light, by careful and extensive experiment, fact and only 
fact .,:· ,,~ ';, · i :,}' , ·h in Extra-Sensory Perception. I greatly wonder 
myself about some of the alleged findings in this area, particularly in the 
areas of prognosticative extra-sensory perception. If the future of human 
activities can be known inorl-rn nco by these extra-sensory powers somewhat in 
an analogous manner, as an eclipse of the sun may·be predicted by astro-
nonical lc1m1ledce, what does this do' to. our feeling of human freedom, and 
the openness of the future for individuals and for history? Whatever 
psychokinesis may allege, to the effect that some human events may be an-
ticipated in advance, I am inwardly certain of human freedom, and that many 
future .. human events are indeterminate in character:. 
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of this specialized field--fascinating or doubtful, as one is inclined to 
regard the "evidence." Academic psychologists in the United States ar9 
wont to regards these experiments and investigators with varied approval. 
Rhine is under suspicion by some as not being a careful enough investi-
gator of the alleged factc·, of ESP. Others who have reported in this area, 
more highly 
1 i.k8 Gardner Murphy, are/respected by their :- ... ,-., ;:.:.;\·q~:!.:::·t colleagues. In 
some defense of Rhine, we cite two independent sources. At an annual meeting, 
the American Institute of Mathematical Statistics stated publicly· about 
Dr. Rhine's wor~s: 
" •• chat, assuming that the experiments have been properly 
performed, the statistical analysis is essentially valid. 
If the Rhine investigation is to be fairly attacked, it must 
be on other than mathematical grounds.* 
The noted psychologist, William McDougall, professor of psychology at 
Harvard (1920-27) and later head of the department at Duke University 
(1927f.) spoke of Rhine on the side of his experimental procedures and 
scientific intensity, as 11a ruthless seeker after truth, almost, I may say, 
a fanatical devotee of science, a radical believer in the adequacy of its 
methods and in their unlimited pcssibilities. 11·k* 
To recapitulate briefly, in addition to intuitive evidence of mind energy, 
we have cited as empirical type evidence for raind energy (1) the fact of 
"concomitant variations" between mental effort and the amplitude or inten~ 
sity of brain wavos; (2) the effect of mind on body in producing organic 
symptoms--such as the dramatic cases of the rebuilding of lost mental and 
physical faculties by acts of will, in hypnotism, in the control to some 
extent of ordinarily involuntary body functions through meditaive techniques, 
*Reported in Reader' Digest, February, 1948, p. 140. 
**From the Foreward of J.B. Rhine: Extrase:nsory Perception, 1934, 
pp. vi-vii. 
as with Hindu rcystics., and in general the well-knovm relation of mind on 
bociy in the whole area of health; and (3) the problematical ESP investi-
gations., 
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At this stage in the discussion the question ariB0s, by such philosophy 
as the foregoing .. are we not advocating an egregious 11 minp/body11 or 11 body/ 
· mind 11 dualism of the older and unacceptable sort? In reply, we refer the 
reader to chapter nine, page 347, where we suggested that the relation of 
11 mindrl to i1body11 is a rela-tionship of energy systems or levels and by no 
rreanct a rig:fd mind vs. ~ody dualis~,of the traditi~nal and totally bad 
kind. Ue c~ntimi_e here for further clarification of the foregoing question 
along this line, having in mind the particular criticism of a physiologist 
like Wc;oldridge in his forementioned study. In chapters eleven and twelve 
.or that book.he ,gives an extensive materialist-mechanist critique of what 
he 'terms the 11 brain/mind11 dualism, with due acknowledgerrent of the "trouble-
some property of consciousness it (p. 219). He concedes that it may ulti-
mately be discovered to be something more tl:1an a merely "passive n property 
or effect, which he, in the current writing, believes it to 1.:e. We quote 
again the following summary of his position, which includes an 
· quality 
acknowledgement that the qus:ition of a pos~ible dynami~ over and above a 
n:;ere 11 passjven a~tJ;cf01.tl:[i7 of consciousne~s must 1:;e left open., 
For those·to whom the idea of a completely passive 
sense of consciousness is unaccept11ble, there is nothinri 
in this treatment that is logically inconsistent with 
an ultimate deter:µlination that some small d""aree of .. : "; 
. . . . . . 0 
conscious contr6.l exists. Our working hypb:t,l:x :Jio., 'fer 
all practical pro.poses, is simply that knovm. ph;rsical 
principles are adequate to explain the brain processes to 
the depth of detail to which present knowledge makes 
speculation reasonable. · A sma.l 7_ perturbation in the operation 
of these PP:1·sical: ptinc;i.plas; · which could be of great -
philosophic importance, might not be observa,ble by tho 
computer or brain sciE)ntist for many years to con:e. As. 
to such a possibility, we can pres2rve an open mind.~~ 
*Ibid., Wooldridge, p,. 2200 
· li-30 
In general reply to the principal point of these two chapters of the 
we 
Wooldridge study ,/believe analysis must declare there to be --existentially--
a "distiction, 11 "difference 11 (or a "dualism") of a semantical sort, behind 
which there is a distinction of a psychological kind. Our point is that A e:-: 
.• 
c)lf: is not the color "green;" neither is an encephalic electrical frequency 
q_ualitati vely the same as 
/ the "thought" of love for my mother that I may have in my inner self. We 
difference 
are certainly speaking of a degree of, or a qualitativi(, but perhaps not of a 
radically distinct, difference!.!! kind. We do not believe that a spiritual 
philosophy intends, or must move from this degree of semantical or psycho-
logical 11dualism11 to a radical, ontological type 11dualism" of the older 
two totally, or absolutely different 
or unlj..ke things--11mind" VS• ''matter'! 
that what we are dealing with in reality are related, perhaps even super-
ordinate echelons of energy fields, is the conceptual path down which we 
Like the materialist we aim indeed 
best tread in the proper description of these phenomena. ;{;oavoid intel-
lectually destructive dualism. But neither can we move to the other extreme 
and limit our description of reality to a too simplified (and therefore 
abstract) brain/mind monism. 
From our "self" standpoint there is a sense of "freedom," or of "inde -
terminacy," or power of "will" and self-initiative; there is a sense of 
"incongruity" or incommensurateness between the "content" of our "mind11 as 
self-luminous, self-reflective "ideas," 11purposes, 11 senses of "value" and 
"ideals;" as "feelings, 11 11emotion, 11 and even 11sensory" experience, and the 
electro-chemical, and 11digital-computer" descriptions of the brain and its 
process; and tont01:1.0unt' to this, ' ... , .... there is a sense of difference, or 
sense of the 11 transcendency11 of the self. In terms, however, of Wooldridge 1 s 
brain/mind monism, such self experience is purely illusory, or. inexplicable. 
How do we explain the senne of' transcendency of the self to "mechanical" 
models and interpretations? How do we explain the very subjective but 
real sense of transcendenf)l .oG bcier; produced, according to the 11:nechanica1 11 
view, by "mechanism11 defined as non-transcending l To tl-!ink in terms of mind 
"reality 11 ' 11 wci do not have to think-fH,.the reader will bear a repetition--
in terms of the brain/mind "dualism" picture, criticized by Wooldridge. 
Rather, in a spiritual philosophy, we think in terms of brain-mind trans-
cenden~y--with due emphasis on connection, not disconnection. 
It may be as untrue to say that mirid is "brain functioning, 11 meaning 
a total identity of "mind" with "brain, 11 as to say that the bronze casting 
is the plaster matrix from which it is formed or made! At one stage the 
casting is the matrix "functioning, 11 to be sure; and the casting is, g_en-
eticall:2:, absolutely depende-nt on the matrix for its being or formed reality. 
But the end product of the process is a casting that "transc.ends ·, 11 that is, 
becomes independent of, the matrix--there still remaining, of course, the. 
one-to-one likeness of the matrix contours and the casting features. Or, 
in a similar analogy which we have already empJoyed (Hadfield, page 351), 
lt seems as·untrue to say that brain/mind are identical as to say that,the 
111igh.t 11eniitted and the "heat energy 11 of the wire through which electricity 
is passed "are tqe same." The sense of qualitative difference between 
mind-experience from the interior standpoint, and the observed electro-
chemical mechanism of brain functioning, need not be interpreted as an 
egregious 11dualism" connoted by the picture, brain/mind. We think of mind·· 
energy as a" s!:_1:,er-ordinate energy with a sense of its own integrity emergil1f~ 
from brain energy, under the rationale ofj!l~ widely experienced forms of 
the transferrence of energies. There need be no more degree of egregious 
11dualism" between mind and brain energies than there is between the stored 
chemical energ:i.es of a battery and the electrical e:iergi.es tha't. £1,0,,-1 f.~·om it 
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when the connections are made. Indeed, a sense of bad dualism enters and 
of physical 
may increase only as we persist to think in an out-moded way ,,/n:n<l natural 
energies, or pr,.·cess, in over-simplified mechanicl or 11materialistic" 
categories; or, on the other hand, when we continue to think of spirit as 
some form (Jf vaporous or ghostly abstraction, unlikcr;1" disconnected, t>.nd 
essentially alien to materiological energy. We have said that neither 
extreme may be implied by spiritual philosophy. From the standpoint of 
creation, the selft.(or spirit) is "material;" from the standpoint of the 
self, creation is "spiritual." 
G. N. M. Tyrrell said with some force: 
There is no reason why nature should terminate at the ~ii') 
point where our senses cease to register it, and no reason . 
why, beyond this point, it should net be governed by unfamiliar 
laws •••• * 
The higher laws of the spirit may be "unfamiliar" (that is, unanalyzable 
in mathematic or quantitative terms) only in the sense that we have no 
mental picture of their "structure," as we can come to know the 11stucture 11 
of external material objects. Bear· in mind, however, that the very word 
"structure" is a materialistic term, connoting opaque, material forms in 
spacial relationships ;whareav 'such terms may be inapplicable to the mind-· 
spirit energy or reality. The latter seems self-luminous, fluid, "struct • 
is, 
ureless," that/in some kind 6f grid work sense;rather., mental energy has 
been better identidied by the class ic,;.terms "immaterial, 11 "formless, 11 
'.'free·. 11 To be sure, such free spirit is unacquainted or unfamiliar with its 
own ultimate origin, and perhaps with its ultimate destiny, but it is fam-
iliar enough with the laws of its own nature to classify itself with some 
*G. N. M. Tyrrell, Presidential Address, "Proceedings of the Society 
for Psychical Research," Vol. 47, p. 301. 
certainty as a distinctive type o:f energy and reality, at the of the 
·ir.hich 
hierarchy of energies, / ·; we call, at the foundational plane, , physical, 
at an intermediate. level, organic, and at a higher echelon, psychological.* 
That these energy echelons interpenetrate, interflow, and are mutually 
dependent is a truism of experience. Philosophies which have presumed to 
submerge spirit down into "mere matter, 11 as the old materialism attempted, 
have failed to answer~ critical questions about spirit. O.n the other 
hand, philosophies "vJhich, have attempted to vaporize matter, up into the 
·immaterial rarity of so-called "pure spirit," and arrive at an i:JJusionist 
conception of the material world, are equally unrealistic idealisms. What-
ever the ultimate relationships may be, in the mind of God, between the 
physical, the organic, and.vital, and the psychological and psychic ranges 
of energies in the cosmic order, the spirit's energies are self known to 
itself in its self-initiating power, or freedom; in its logical, deductive, 
and inductive powers, which we cull truth inquiry; and of its value dis-
cerning powers that lead to insights about Good and B:;:auty. 
At this place the student may raise two further questions of considerable 
importance. The first is whether cause and effect have to be "alike"? The 
second is, what about the law of conservation -of .energy ···would not mental 
causation conflict· with the principle of conservation? As for the first 
problem, we know that cause and effect do not have to be 11alike. 11 Light 
an 
produces chemical activity; and/electric current sets up a magnetic field; 
the mechanical energy of water flowing through the sluces of a hydro-electric 
'>'cActually, are not the "laws II of mind and thpught (dr •ispirit ") quite 
familiar'? Namely, t:hey seem to be the fllaw 11 of 6ur self-determining nature 
itself, or our freedom; the law·;;·· of !£gical proceddre, dedu.ctive and induc-
t.ive, and the laws of moral and:_ aesthetic awareness, or response to good 
and to beauty. 
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dam is transformed into electrical energy. ''That an effort of the 
human will should be followed at once by a change in the intensity or 
direction of nerve currents Swee~~ across the brain is, therefore, 
not different in principle from other transformations in which the 
energy of the cause differs markedly from the energy of tl:re'" effect•; 1h'( 
As for the conservat~on of energy, Sir William Dampier, historian 
of science, analyzing the laws of thermodynamics (conservation and 
dissipation of heat energy) cautions us that science does not know 
about the total quantity of energy in the universe. The "law11 of 
connservation arises out of experiments with limited systems of events 
such as the transference of mechanical work into its exact equivalent 
in heat as defined for the needs of the specific experiment (Joule's 
experiment).** Be that as it may, mental energy1 so far as we exper-
ience it., seems to be 11free 11 and "transcendent; 11 it can manipulate, 
within bounds, lower orders of energy. 
Body as instrument of mind, an organizing whole. We have dis-
cussed above how mind seems to be an active agency. It seeks constantly 
to organize and shepherd bodily life and experience into a coherent 
whole. Take, for example, a simple experiment in sensationftom "G-estalt 
psychology, 11 by considering the following lines:*** ·y:-_' ·~t •:·r·'.'.l "'.'. he 
*D. M. Allan, The Realm of PersonalitX, op. cit., p. 220 
** History of Science, op. cit., pp. 248, 256-257. 
*1<~'( Compare Edna Heidreder, Seven Psychologies, Appleton-Century, 
1933. Students' Edition, pp. 348-349. 
l~34a 
I I 
A J) F 
What a:re the .na~u:ral 11 g;rou.ps" or 11wholes 11 that the perception of 
these.lines seems first and most readily.to form (gestalt, German 
;,for 1':f'orm11 )? The A-B, C-D, and E-F groupings seem to be the natural 
uni ts~ Alter the experiment in the following; way: 
[ J r J [ J 
.. -10 ___ _! ., __ 
l 
435 
and the "wholizing" (or holizing)* affect of the experience is height-
ened. This and similar examples suggest that the mind strives to 
perceive in terms of "wholes." The physical, bodily elements of the 
experience, the lines and light, seem forced into this mode by con-
sciousness. Or consider several more general illustrations, for instance 
memory. The physical sensations of yesterday, my passing and noting 
a certain tree on the way to work, are united with those of today, my 
seeing the tree again, by memory. Memory, a mental function, is in· 
clusive of discrete, bodily experiences and functions. Michaelangelo 
as an artistic mind makes his hand and fingers function in behalf of 
marvelous creative wholes, e.g. the Sistine ceiling in a way impossible 
to me, although physically our hands are the same. In brief, our 
thoughts and purposes in life are constantly coordinating and putting 
our bodies, with their s~parate factors of sensation and muscular 
effort, to the unified courses of action that are our programs of 
work, study, or play. 
~·~ See our former discussion of J. c. Smuto 1 philosophy of "holism," 
Chapter three, page • 
The relation of nature and mind. William E. Hocking, writing on the 
subject, "why nature exists, 11 said in his ever-picturesque manner of 
philosophizing: 
An empty mind is no mind at all. To be a mind and 
to be occupi.ed with objects, are one an~· the same· thiilg. 
Now a purely contemplative mind might be imagined which 
would be occupied solely with abstractions, such as num-
bers. But in order that the mind should have character or 
personality, there must be difference between contemplation 
and concrete action. It must be possible to think f:i..rst 
and act afterward. Now action means that a thought 
enters a world of sense, with infinite interconnections. 
Thus the world of sense is an essential part of what we 
mean by "will. 11 Nature is necessary in order that mind 
may qualify-as will. 
Thus nature is not only useful to mind: it is necessa·r'y 
in order that mind should exist, as a concrete and active 
reality. We cannot have.nature and mind, as if mind could 
be something by itself. Nature is. so essential to the very 
notion of mind, that if miµd cannot be a product of nature, 
nature must be a function' of mind. ·k 
* Ines of Philosonhy, Scribners, 1939, pp. 312-313. 
!he reality of the se~f. W~ are now ready to conclude this section 
• ' ~· ,. "':}.f'. ,; ::• • : ,, . ·~.. -~ ·1• 
with a brief statement of what a spiritual philosophy ~eans when it 
--~-. 1-,;; • ... ..~ ....... '. • ... .. ~ .......... ,. •'l.-· 
speaks of the self as a "reality, 11 to which we appfnd definitions of 
',,,,:k 
We start perforce with a definition of the "real, 11 and sugge8t that 
the ideas of ):!,nity and .122.~ are basic to our notion of what makes many 
things real (recall our discussion, page ). We may say now that the 
self is a type of reality for the following reasons, including the defi-
nition just reviewed. 
First, the self is a unity. We have already noted how the self is a 
unitary and unifying power. No doubt the ancient nominalistic definition 
of the real as the individual is a true insight. At least it seems to be 
true for a great many of the world's realities: atoms, stars, galaxies, 
stones, genes, elms, .elephants, and for us spiritual beings. The work of 
modern psychology in discovery of the vast complexity of selfhood, ex-
tending down into the subconscious, would not detract from the idea of its 
ultimate unity. Perhpas the analogy of a "federal republi;:; 11 fits the 
nature of selfhood as "unity" better tha11 that of "absolute monarchy. 11 
The basic struggle of all men to integrate personality, above the con-
flicting subordinate "selves" which we find within, is at least indication 
of a fundamental drive toward unity. Our life is commanded by the idea of 
unity. 
Second~ the~ is!. E.owcr. The profoundest realities are often 
.. -
powers or energies which we cannot see', known however through their · 
effects. Power, force, energy, have long been in physical science a kind 
. ' 
of primary definition of the real. As I raise a book counter to' the 
law of gravity both unseen powers are present through their effects, grav-
itation and~ will. And likewise with other such realities, electricity, 
magnetis~1 life, love. In the earlier part of this section we suggested 
how mind may be an energy of its own kind--a highest form of cosmic power. 
Consciousness seems to be one among the types of reality involving unity 
and power. 
To~' to evaluate, and to relate oneself effectively to the world--
cognition, valuation, decision--briefly suggest the special functions of 
;·~ ~ ' ' ') 
the. self ~ power. To use the eye analogy in a slightlydifferent way from 
'' 
Aristotle, the eye neve~ sees itself, but "knows." it is a reality by its 
't . ,-,·:, ,, .. , . 
function, its power of sight. Actually this analogy is defective because 
mind, as we have already indicated, does in a ·sense 11 see 11 itself! This 
brings us to our nezt point. 
Third, the §.tli is !. reality because g_ !!_ self-knowing. or self-
transcendent, a self-reflecting power. This fact has no other natural 
analogy; we must turn simply to consciousness itself for a description. 
Another way to speak of the self-reflective power of the self is to refer 
to its capacity to have ideas of ideas. Somewhere Hocking said, in his 
tranchant terms, that we can "think on thinking." The Scholastics, in their 
observation that intellect had perfe.s,t reflection, stated the present point 
in an arresting way. Jacques Maritain, modern interpreter of Thomfs:in and 
scholasticism, described their view by the following: 
... ) 
In their consideration of the intellect, they observed, 
for instance, that the latter is capable of E.~L~ re lee ti.£'!!, 
that is, of coming back entirely upon itself--not in the 
manner of a sheet of paper, half of which can be folded on 
· the other half, but in a complete manner, so that it can 
grasp its whole operation and penetrate it by knowledge, 
and can contain itself and its own principle, ~he existing 
self, in its own knowing activity, a perfect relection or 
self-containing of which any material agent, extended in 
space and time, is essentially incapable. Here we are 
confronted with that phenomenon of self-knowledge, of 
Qrise de conscien~ or becoming aware of oneself, which is 
a privilege of the spirit, as Hegel (after St. Augustine) 
was to emphasize, and which plays so tremendous a part in 
the history of humanity and the development of its spiritual 
energies. -Jc 
This brings us next to the largest phase of our discussion, the idea 
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of self-transcendence, the heart of the conception of man as spirit. Before 
we proceed to this, however, we digress briefly to consider two addenda: 
A definition of soul: When self-awareness is raised to consciousness 
of its unity and power, we may, for the sake of traditional language, say 
that it is aware of itself as "soul. 11 "Soul," traditionally has meant that 
sense of an abiding, unitary, or unifying power of will or intellect ~. 1.-... ~ ':. 
that expresses the deepest aspect of our mental life. This does not mean, 
of course, that the "soul 0 yet necessarily knows itself as 11 immortal, 11 or 
a type of everlasting unity and power--though the connotation of immortality 
was present in the traditional notion of "soul." Immortality may indeed 
become a possibility of the·soul-self, but it is hardly an original, or 
immediate quality of self-conscious life, as are the experiences of unity 
and power,. 
A definition of brain: A brain is (1) the organ by which (or from 
which) finite self-hood, or self-conscious life or experience comes to be: 
that is, grows into an awakened, or self-conscious awareness of itself as a 
new, emergent form of unity, energy, and power, which it calls mental or 
"~ Jacques Maritain, "Personal Immortality," Philoso_pbJ of Relir.!:£!1, 
Abernathy & Langford (The McMillan Company, New York, 1962) p. 483. 
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spiritual, feels is a ,n under the definition of as 
unity and power; (2) .is the instrument which selfhood knows and 
relates itself to.an environmental world, and exercises command,- control 
over that w9rld through ideas, plans, and purposes, with the aim of making 
that world a place wherre the spirit's higher values and ideals may better 
be realized. 
This is a fully empirical definition by being fully coherent, in-
cluding all the facts of physiology plus the fact of our inner, self-rep 
lective awareness of conscious life. 
IV. The Transcende11cy of the Spirit 
The idea of self-transcendence is part of the conception of man as a 
"spritual being/' indeed, its central point. We have just indicated how 
a definition of ma,n as "spirit" would explain first that the mind is in some 
sense a "_reality" in terms of its "unity'' and 11power." Now we must show 
that the latter ,points have fullest meaning in the idea of the spirit I s 
transcendency. 
There are two problems particularly in connection with self-tran-
scendence which need clarification. The one is what will here be called 
the "sociological definition" of personality and self -transcedence. ~he 
sociological viewpoint is espoused not only by many naturalistic philosophers, 
but, as we learned in the discussion of the sociological theories oiL.mind 
in the preceding chapter, also by some idealists. The other important 
issue involves the .question, is the self-transcendence of the human spirit 
an irrational or trans-rational phenomenon? Some neo-orthodox theologies 
have challenged us with this possibility. 
The sociological idea of perspr:,aj.:i.ty examined •. A forceful so.d.ological 
<lefiniti.on of sel£hcod nnd · self ~transcendence. uas the versi:Jn presented by 
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the idealistic philosopher, Bernard Bosanquet. In his Gifford Lectures 
. one of Booom.que.t ts central tasks is to define individuality and to show 
that, not the idea of the private, finite self, but that of the "social 
whole" defines individuality or personality. Man's "individuality, his 
self-identity, lie outside him •••• His nature ••• is in process of being 
communicated to him."* 11 ••• Personality Hself is only possible in virtue 
of an individuality which already transcends it.""~* Short of the Absolute 
itself, Bosanquet means the larger "individuality" of the particular 
human group, or society as a whole, from which we derive unconsciously 
many personality characteristics. Self-transcendence to this absolute 
idealist means to lose oneself in, and for the good of, the community or 
social whole, as one would lose or forget himself in some worthy civic 
enterprise, Putting the question back into the related term of unity, the 
prominent '·naturalistic philosopher, John Dewey, suggests substantially 
the same thing where he said that social cooperation "is ••• (the) ••• kind 
of unity that seems to me to give the clue to understanding the unity of 
the human being. "-Id("# 
Now, this is, indeed a commonplace and a valuable, but not the crit-
ical philosophic meaning of personal unity and self-transcendence. It 
must be granted that there is much truth to the sociological definition of 
selfhood in the general sense that social background often makes the roan. 
We are indeed, in one important sense, products of our culture. Neverthe-
less, the critical definition of individuality should not be in terms of 
itR sole derivation from society. For one thing, this would confuse material 
* Bernard Bosanquet, THE PRINCIPLE OF INDIVIDUALITY AND VALUE, Macidllan, 
1912, p. 259. 
** Ibid., Bosanquet, p. 270. 
·kf~~·c ,!NTELLIGENCE IN THE MODERN WORLD t JOHN DEWEY'S PHILOSOPH'1, ed. 
Joseph RRtner, Random House, 1937, p. 820. 
fact in the field of genetical science., which believes that each human 
being has a unique set of gene components, as the foundation of person-
ality on the physical side .. * For another, in the sociological definition 
of personality the tendency is to leave finite, human centers of individ-
uality in shadowed unreality, if not destroyed altogether by being ab-
sorbed into the general abstraction which is society (with all that this 
can mean for 'evil in the totalitarian states). The socio::i..ogical theory 
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in either its idealistic or naturalistic forms tends to lose sight of 
personality, either by the confusion of individuality with the metaphysical 
absolute or with the literal stato. 1H} Actually, 11 society11 is the abstraction,. 
It is not prior to the category of personality, rather personality is prior 
to it. In fact, 11 society11 exists nowhere but in the minds and wills of 
individuals and in the relationships set up between individuals. The 
Constitution of the United States for example ultimately exists only in 
the thouc~hts and hearts of the president, the rrembe:cs of Congress, the 
Supreme Court, and the individual citizens of the country. 
In some sociological thought the f~ theorv of sociGty is presented 
as a middle position between extrerne individualistic views of human life 
and personality and extreme 11 social mind 11 theories. For example, Solomon 
Asch has very thoughtfully described this possibility in a recent study. iB}* 
His main point is that there are two realities, the one, individual, the 
other social. "Society, 11 however, constitutes a field of force, compar-
able to those of physics in electricity, gravitation, or magnetism. As 
* L. C. Dunn and Th. Dobzhansky: :HEREDITY, RACE, AND SOCIETY, The 
New Arnerican Library, 1952, p. 55 .. 
-l!it Reinhold Niebuhr in NATURE AND DESTHlY OF MAl'J, Vol,. I., has ana-
lyzed these trends carefully. 
1}** Solomon E. Asch: 
Ch. IX. 
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, 1952, Prentice-Ho.11, Inc., 
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individual atoms have their field structure when associated in groups, 
like a chemical compound, with their nature, behavior, and qualities in 
large part understood only in terms of the group as a whole, so individual 
human action and personality is in considerable measure formed by the 
socio-historical "field" in which it finds itself. 
In reply, it may be pointed out that this description is primarily an 
analQgy, helpful, to be sure, in understanding that society is a type of 
"real ity 11 with a "force II that conditions and modifies individual life. The 
criticism, however, is the possible implication that the "force 11 of the 
social field is indentically comparable to the material forces of chemical, 
gravitational, or magnetic fields. In the latter cases we are dealing with 
the realm of absolute natural determinat.ions--a pin ~ rise to meet the 
magnet by virtue of the latter's "field. 11 The properties of hydrogen and 
oxygen in the "f.ield" combination H2o are exactly predictable, given con-
stant outside factors. In contrast, however, on the human level of organ-
ization the particular human group or individual does not in any absolute 
way have to respond to a given social "force" or "field." Indeed, an 
individual often responds to the social environment in ways contrary to 
his deepest, ideal desires--i.e. against his will--if he is to survive. 
nut to suggest that such environmental field sets up an absolute pressure 
like those of chemical affinity or magnetism is to stretch an otherwise 
valuable analogy. 
It seems to the present writer that the social field still has its 
locus and its only "reality" in individual wills. The price of eggs is a · 
series of~ decisions all the way back, granted the near infinitely 
complex casual relationships of a price structure, of which no one .indi-
vidual is completely cognizant, and the fact that I~ pay that price, if 
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I expect to have an omelet for breakfast. The "force II and "reality" of 
the social field as it affects or even coerces me is defined by the cumU!"'·' 
person 
lative action of other men, living and dead, with the action of one/often 
carried over in the form of 11 influence 11 either conscious or unconscious in 
the thinking and action of another. The "impersonality" and seemL.1g 
trans-individual "objectivity" of this social web or structure is an ap-
pearance, the main content of which is the failure of human cognition to 
comprehend the infinite degree of relationships involved. Society seems 
like an impersonal, metaphysical reality not only because the influences 
of individuals on each other are often unconscious, but because they are 
often in the form of group against individual; and finally becaus.e · it 
usually takes more than individual action to adjust and change.the social 
field. 
Further, the sociological view in eome of its extreme forms does 
not carefully distinguish between being "related":to something, and 
being "identical II with it. I am related to the sun by virtue of its 
light and heat, which conduces to my comfort and well-being and very life, 
but I am not identical with the sun. Generally speaking, the sociological 
theory of personality, like certain older theories of evolution, essentially 
makes the mistake o! emphasizing too exclusively the force of "environment" 
in th,e origin of life. 
The personalistic theory subsumed. Rather than the sociological 
emphasis on social wholeness as the criteria of individuality, the true, 
personalistic criterion is separateriess and uniqueness, or difference of 
one human being from another. In the true criterion of ti:'·,:,, individuality, 
the emphasis should be on the discrete purpose and will of each person 
over and above those characters of his life derived or borrowed from 
society. Josiah Royce, an idealist who certainly understood and stated 
the values of the sociological view in inimitable way in every volume he 
wrote, nevertheless senses and defines individuality in the true person-
alistic way: "By an individual ••• we mean an essentiallyuni'qu.e being, or 
a being such that there exists, and can exist, but one of the typ~s con-
stituted by this individual being."* 
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Giving due credit, then, to the legitimate insights of the socio-
logical view, Edgar S. Brightman carefully analyzed the difference between 
it and a personalisti.c conception. The result of his discussion in 
several places**is that the self or personality is a dynamic whole, a 
true "realm"--developed in and expressed by interaction with the environ-
ment. Personality gains in being and self-consciousness (it does not lose 
these qualities, as extreme sociological theories imply) by its interacti-on 
with the environment. Further, Brightman suggests that the power by 
which the self is able to interact with and relate to the environment is 
reason. The self I s t:ranscend~nt quality is defined, not by its loss of 
self-awareness and absorption in either the metaphysical absolute on the 
one hand or the state on the other, but by the intensified self-conscioull;-
ness required in observing the total world from the higher perspective 
of reason. Personality could not relate to, interact with, and in a word 
know the environment unless it were in a sense above the network of re-
lations viewing them all at once. In this sense the self is indeed a 
transcendent whole, but its wholeness is its self-conscious, personal 
unity, which makes knowledge, judgment, and change possible. Its trans-
* THE CONCEPTION OF IMMORTALITY, Houghton, Mifflin, 1900, p. 8. 
-1(* PERSONALITY AND RELIGION, Abingdon, 1934, pp. 15-.35L Also see 
Brightman in PERSONALISM IN THEOLOGY, ed. Brightman, Boston Univ. Press, 
1943,. pp. 47-40~~ 
cendence is along a dimension perpendicular to environment, not coin-
cident with it. 
Self-transce·ndency and reason. Possibly no one in our day has so 
forcefully defined man's spiritual transcendence over nature as has 
Reinhold Niebuhr. His point of view, however, differs from the above 
analysis mainly on the question of "reason" and its role. Along the 
vertical dimension of spirit above the plane of nature Niebuhr reminds 
us of the levels of human self-transcendency, which seem to reach upward 
in infinite regression. -Jc His main points are, f,irst there is the plane 
of nature on the widest inorganic and organic front short of higher con-
scious life. Second, there is the plane of consciousness, of sentienut 
awareness of environment, which man shares with the higher animals. Third, 
there is the level of self-consciousness, the higher perspective of man's 
distinctive rational awareness of his world. From this altitude he looks 
down upon the world critically; can develop a science; can construct meam!i 
and instruments by which he overcomes the hazards of the natural environ-
ment more successfully than animals, and lives above .it in an artificial, 
social one of his own creation. Fourth, there is the infinite reach of, 
the self-conscious levels, which Niebuhr seems to believe is trans-rational. 
According to him, it is out of this depth or down from this height that, 
on the one hand, come man's impulsive, irrational, and sinful acts that 
darken life, and on the other his higher emotional insights of beauty 
and goodness that lift and enoble life. This level is (or these. levels 
are) trans-rational in the sense that so much of human thought and act-
ivity cannot be 11rationally 11 explained, that is, as being derived from a 
completely coherent set of general concepts. Moreover,' it is frcm this 
level that ultimately the insights of religious faith come. 
* NATURE AND DESTINY OF MAN, Vol. I., especially Ch. I. 
The principal criticism of this classic discussion in Nature and 
Destiny of Man concerns the prevailing assumption that man in his self-
transcendent acts steps out of 11reason 11 or above reason. Indeed, the 
deeper note is sounded by Niebuhr himself, at least in the following 
place, where in just criticism of much shallow rationalism he says: 
; ,V .. • l .. ,. ~ 
••• the ratic,siid:i:.sts do not always understand that 
man's rational capacity involves a fur'ther ,ability to 
stand outside himself, a capacity for self-transcendence, 
the ability to make himself his own object, a quality of 
spirit which is usually not fully comprehended or con-
noted in "ratio 11 or ''nous'' or "reason" or any of the con-
cepts which philsophe~sually use to describe the uniqueness 
of man.~'( 
Thinking of man's "rational capacity" in th.is larger sense, it seems 
to the present writer, that man's self-transcendence is rational through-
out. In its essence "rationality" is the ability to judge a previous 
judgment. Thus, self-transcendence in the sense of self-reflection has 
an infinite scope. Each self-transcendent thought or act is "reason" 
functioning in a higher perspective of judgmet1t" .:ind self criticisD. · It 
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is this tha:tlrrnakes'both1 scientific and moral knowledge, and historic 
advance and transformation in these areas, possible. Self-transcendence 
is at once reason's own acknowledgement of its present limitations, but 
further, of its courage to judge and correct its own finite judgment in 
the interest of ultimately discovering the fuller truth. "Dialectical 
thinking" (most simply understood as thought's own self corrective power) 
goes on within: this larger ambit of reason itself. This is not to say 
that human reason in some fallen and misguided pride is to usurp the place 
of God. Rather, it is to be aware humbly and faithfully of .the larger 
truth (and truth is an expression of God!), and to say that we possess 
and effective though finite ability, adequate for life, of receiving truth.** 
* Ibid., Niebuhr, p •. L+. 
~~-;: We :cecotr,'.11.~n::: th-;i following distinctions: trm~1tional = act in~ 
when the reasons are not clear; and !!:r:1,t:.1£:D9~:'l.; go:l.ng e.g,::iinst known :reason~ 
or failing to find out the ·reason. 
This quality of rationality, able to transcend the world, in inde-
finite ascendency, defines man's essential freedom and spirituality. It 
is man's' distinctive feature, his uniqueness--that with which God can 
work, making possible man's salvation and growth. 
Infinite ascendency of the spirit 
4. 
Infinite reach of the self-conscious tevels 
3. Plane of self-consciousness and man's distinctive 
rational awareness of his world: makes man's 
scientific and moral growth or history possible •• 
the ability to judge a judgment. · 
2. Pl~ne of consci~usness (higher sentient awareness) 
1. Plane of nature 
We are now prepared to discuss the problem of freedom and r~lated 
topics under the idea of man as a "moral being." Before proceeding to our 
next chapter, however, we present in two appendixes some classic 
statements of the major, opposing viewsof "mind," "man,11 11 the self," or 
"personality." Namely the materialist and the ~piritual conceptions; and 
a third appendix outlining the solutions of the mind-body problem in 
classic philosophy. 
APPENDIX A 
Materialist Ideas of M~ 
The Disunity and Materiality of Mind 
David Hume (1711-1776) in A Treatise of Human Nature sets forth 
in classic terms the essociationist or non-unitary theory of 
mind and affirms the futility_ of the search for a central spi::: ... 
itual self or p'3rson.. (From Jlu,!!le, ~lection~, ed. Hendel, 
Scribner's, Modern Students Library, p. 81-91). 
"Of the Immateriality of the Soul" 
and "Personal Identity" 
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'1:I desire those philosophers, who pretend that we have an idea. of the sub-
ctance of our minds, to point out the impression that produces it, and tell 
distinctly after what manner that impression operates, and from what object it 
is deriv'd ••••• My conclusion ••• is, that since all our perceptions are different 
from each other, and from every thing else in the universe, they are are also 
distinct and separable, and may be consider 1d as separately existent, and may 
exist separately, and have no need of any thing else to support their existence. 
11 There are some philosophers, who imagine we are every moment inti.lnately 
conscious of what we call our Self •••• Unluckily all these positive assertions 
~re contrary to that very experience, which is pleaded for them, nor have we 
~ny idea of §tli ••••• It must be some one impression, that gives rise to every 
real idea. But self or person is not any one impression but that to which our 
several impressions and ideas are suppos'd to have a reference. If any im-
pression gives rise to the idea of self, that impression must continue invar·· 
iably the same, thro 1 the whole course of our lives; since se1£ is suppos 1d 
to eJcist after that manner. But there is no impression constant and inv~r-
iable. Pain and pleasure, grief and joy, passions and sensations succeed each 
ether, and never all exist at the same timeo It cannot, therefore, be from 
any of these impressions, or from any other, that the idea of self is deriv'd; 
nud consequently there is no such idea •••• 
nFor my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always 
stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat, or cold, light or shade, 
love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch myself at any time without 
~ perception, and never can observe any thing but the perception. When my 
perceptions are remov 1 d for any time, as by sound sleep; so long am I /in.::,J-
scnsible of ~ysel.f., and may truly be said not to exist. And were all my per-
ceptions remov'd by death, and cou'd I neither think, nor feel, nor see, nor love, 
nor hate after the dissolution of my body, I shou'd be entirely annihilated, nor 
<lo I conceive what is farther requisite to make me a perfect non-entity. If 
o.ny one upon serious and unprejudiced reflexion, thinks he has a different no-
tion of himself, I must confess I can reason no longer with him ••• He may, pe:r.-
haps,perceive something simple and continu'd, which he calls hfmself; tho' I am 
certain there is no such principle in me. 
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ti But setting aside some meta.physicians of this kind, I may venture to af-
firm of the rest of mankind, that they are nothing but a bundle or collecti.or.i. 
of different perceptions,which succeed each other with an inconceivable rapi-
dity •••• nc:r is there any single power of the soul, which remains unalterably 
the same, perhaps for one moment. The mind is a kind of theatre, where several 
perceptions successively ~ake their appearance; pass, re-pass, glide away, and 
mingle in an infinite variety of postures and situations. There 'i.ri properly no 
.§.i!.lmJicity__ in it at one time, nor identi!=J! • ••• whatever natural prope'nsion we 
may have to imagine that simplicity and identity •••••• the successive perceptions 
only ••• constitute the mind; nor have we the most distant notion of tJ:,e place, 
where these scenes are represented, or of the mnteri,als, of which it is corn= 
p~sed. 
11 
•• ~relation facilitates the transition of the mind from one object C of 
thoughV to another, and renders its passage as smooth as if it contemplated 
the continu'd object. The resemblance is the cause of the confusion and mistake, 
and makes us substitute the notion of identity, instead of that of related ob• 
jects •••••• our propension to confound identity with relation is so great, that 
we e.re apt to imagine· something unknown and mysterious, connecting the parts, 
beside their relation •••• 
n We now proceed to explain the nature of personal identity •••••• the under-
sta.nding never observes any real connexion among objects, and that evc-m the 
union of cause and effect, when strictly exiimined, resolves itsel£.into a cus-
tomary association of ideas. For from thence it evidently follows, th.at iden-
tity is nothing really belonging to these different perceptions, and uniting 
them together; but is merely a quality, which we attribute to them, because 
o:f the union of their ideas in the imagination, when we i·oflect upon them •••• 
1Tis, therefore, on some of these three relations of resemblance, contiguity, 
and causation, that identity depends ••••. 
l1 h • d f h d • . f if 
..... t e true :i.. ea o t e ·.mman min , is to consider :1.t as a system o d -
ferent perceptions or different existences, which are link 1d together by the 
relation of cause and effect, and mutually produc~, destroy, influence, and 
modify each other. Our impressions give rise to their correspondent ideas; 
and these ideas in their turn produce other impressions. One thought chases 
another, and draws after it a third, by which it is expell 1 d in its turn. In 
this respect, I cannot compare the soul· more properly to any thing th.an to a 
republic or commonwealth •••• 
II As memory alone acquaints us with the continuance and extent of this suc-
cession of perceptions, 'tis to be consider 1d upon that account chiefly, as the 
source of personal identity.,· Had we not memory,·we never shou'd have any notion 
of ,;:ausation, nor consequently of that chain of ca.uses and effects, which con-
stitute our self or person.; •• In this view, therefore, memory does. not so much 
;e.roduce as discover personal identity, by shewing·us the relation of ·cause 
,'md effect among our different perceptions.... · 
11 
The whole of this doctrine leads us to a conclusion, which is of great im-
portance in the present affair, viz.,, that all the nice and subtle questions 
· concerning personal identity can never be decided~" 
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John Broadus Watson ( ) in Behaviorism, 1930 (W. W. Norton & Co.) 
explains that "behavioristic psychology" is opposed to all outmoded 
"soul," "self," idealist, personalist, or spiritual views of the mind, 
saying that the proper object of psychological study is not ''mind" or 
tne'subjective states pf'an alleged "consciousness" or consc;i:ous en-, 
tity at all, but rather ''behavior," as the only expression of our 
psychic nature which can be empirically observed and quantified. His 
is a classic expression of an extreme 11functionalistic" theory of 
man's psychic nature. (The following passages are selected from pp. 
1-19, 238-268, and 303-304.) 
11 Two opposed points of view are still dominant in American psychological 
thinking--introspective or subjective psychology, and behaviorism or objective 
psychology. Until the advent of behaviorism in 1912, introspective psychology 
completely dominated American university psychological life. 
"The conspicuous leaders of introspective psychology •••• Titchener ••• and 
James •••••••• claimed that consciousness is the subject matter of psychology. 
u Behaviorism, on the contrary, holds that the subject matter of human psy-
chology is the behavior of the human being. Behaviorism claims that conscious-
ness is neither a definite nor a usable concept. The behaviorist, who has been 
trained always as an experimentalist, holds, further, that belief in the ex-
istence of consciousness goes back to the ancient days of superstition and 
magic., 
" •• religious concepts ••• heritages of a timid savage past--have made thee-
raergence and growth of scientific psychology extremely difficult. 
11 One example of such a religious concept is that every individual has a 
~ which is separate and distinct from the bodx. This soul is really part 
of a supreme being. This ancient view led to the philosophical platform called 
11dualism11 •••• 
n Wundt, the real father of experimental psychology •••• substituted the term 
consciousness for the term soul. Consciousness is not quite so unobservable as 
soul. We observe it by peeking in suddenly and catching it unawares as it were 
{introspection) ••••• 
11In his first efforts to get uniformity in subject matter and in methods 
the behaviorist began his own formulation of the problem of psychology by sweeping 
aside all medieval conceptions. He dropped from his scientific vocabulary all 
subjective terms such as sensation, perception, image, desire, purpose, and 
even thinking and emotion as they were subjectively defined. 
The Behaviorist's Platform 
u 
The behaviorist asks: Why don't we make what we can observe the real field 
of psychology? Let us limit ourselves to things that can be observed, and form-
ulate laws concerning only those things. Now what can we observe? We can ob-
;3erve b~,h.avior--~hat the organism does or says. And let us point out at once: 
th::;,,t .§,aying is doing--that is, h,ehaving_. Speaking overtly or to ourselves (think-
ing) is just as objective a type of behavior as basebe.11. 
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"The rule, or measuring rod, which the behaviorist puts in front of him 
always is: Can I describe this bit of behavior I see in terms of "stimulus Rnd 
response?" By stimulus we mean any object in the general environment or any 
change in the tissues themselves due to the physiological condition of the an-
imal, such as the change we get when we keep an animal from sex activity, when 
we keep it from feeding, when we keep it from building a nest. By response we 
mean anything the animal does--such as turning toward or away from a light, 
jumping at a sound, and more highly organized activities such as building a 
skyscraper, drawing plans, having babies, writing books, and the like ••••• 
11 /To observe peopl<i;Ji is the fundamental starting point of behaviorism. You 
will s~on find that instead of self-observation being the easiest and mos.t nat-
ure.l way of studying psychology, it is an impossible one; you can observe in 
y011rselves only the most elementary forms of response. You will find, on the 
other hand, that when you begin.to study what your neighbor is doing, you will 
rapidly become proficient in giving a reason for his behavior and in setting 
situations (presenting stimuli) that will make him behave in a predictable manner. 
11 The interest of the behaviorist in man's doing is more than the interest of 
the spectator--he wants to control man 1 s reactions as physical scientists want 
to control and manipulate other natural phenomena. It is the business of be-
havioristic psychology to be able to predict and to control human activity. To 
do this it must gather scientific data by experimental methods. Only then can 
the trained behaviorist predict, given the stimulus, what reaction will take 
place; or, given the reaction state what the situation or stimulus is that has 
caused the reaction •••• 
What is Thinking? 
11 Thinking, on account of the concealed nature of the musculature with which 
it is done, has always been inaccessible to unaided observation and to direct 
experimentation. And there is always a strong inclination to attach a mystery 
to something one can't see. As new scientific facts are discovered we have 
fewer and fewer phenomena which cannot be observed, herice fewer and fewer pegs 
upon which to hang folk-lore. The behaviorist advances a natural science theory 
about thinking which makes it just as simple, and just as much a part of bio-
logical processes, as tennis playing. 
11 The behaviorist advances the view that what the psychologists have hitherto 
called thought is in short nothing but talking to ourselves. The evidence for 
this view is admittedly largely theoretical, but it is the one theory so far ad-
vanced wtiich ex-plains thought in terms of natural science ••• We have all had the 
proofs before us time and again that the larynx can be removed without completely 
destroying a person's ability to think. Removal of the larynx does destroy 
articulate speech but it does not destroy whispered speech •••• My theory does 
hold that the muscular habits learned in overt speech are responsible for im-
plicit or internal speech (thought) •••• Our main line of evidence comes from 
watching the child's behavior. The child talks incessantly when alone. At three 
he even plans the day aloud ••••• Possibly it always will be difficult to obtain 
an overwhelming mass of positive evidence for this view ••••••• we can say that 
"thinking" is largely subvocal talking_--provided we hasten to explain that it 
can occur without words. ti 
452 
APPENDIX B 
The Spiritual~Idealist View of Man: 
The Unity and Energy of Mind 
Immanuel Kant .. (1724-1804) in the Critigue .of Pure Reason speaks of 
the highest focus of human reason as the "transcendental m,ity of ap-
perception." Although affirming the e,dstence of ultimate psychic 
unity in these terms, he believed (at least in this stag8 in his 
thinking) that further qualities of "soul," such as transcendent free -
dom or immortality, cannot be known on the basis of the "transcenden-
tal unity" alone. His statement, however, remains a classic summary 
of the idea of the unity of psychic life, in opposition to non-unitary 
theories. (The following passages are taken from Kant. Selections, 
ed. Greene 11 Scribner 1 s, Modern Students Library, pp. 76-78, 170-171.) 
11 
.... the consciousness of oneself •••• cannot be thought as such by means of 
empirical data only. It must be a condition which precedes all experience, and 
in fact renders it possible, for thus only could such a transcendental supposi-
tion acquire validity. 
11 No knowledge can take place in us, no conjunction or unity or one kind of 
knowledge with another, without that unity of consciousness which precedes all 
data of intuition, and without reference to which no representation of objects 
is possible. This pure, original, and unchangeable consciousness I shall call 
transcendental apperception ••••• I also call the unity of it the transcendental 
unity of self-consciousness, in order to indicate that it contains the possi-
bility of knowledge a priori. 
**'~***** 
11 Of that subject, however, we have not and cannot have the slightest know-
ledge •••• Besides this logical meaning of the I, we have no knowledge of the sub-
ject in itself, which forms the substratum and foundation of it and of all our 
thoughts. " 
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Borden Parker Bowne (1847-1910) expands the es-
sential thesis of Kant, just quoted. As fatner OL one influential 
form of A.nierican Personalism, Bowne acknowledged his indebtedness to 
- Kant, Berkeley, and others.:. In th~ following s~ lection (Theory of 
Thought and Knowledge, Harpers, 1897, pp. 20-30) he argues a'.ga ii1st · 
:·:~·: Li Hume concerning the awareness of the unity of the seh:. 
(The final passage is from Personalism, Houghton-Mifflin, 1908, p.266). 
Though primarily a philosopher, Bowne expresses the essential point 
of personalistic psychology and the personalistic concept of mind, 
previously described, chapter eleven. 
"The General Conditions of Thought 11 
11 We consider first the unity of the mental subject as the condition of thought. 
"Let us take the judgment a is b, where a and bare any two particular states 
of consciousness. How is this judgment possible? 
11 The answer is, It is possible only as there is a conscious subject M, 
which is neither a nor b, but embraces both in the unity of its own consciousness. 
Then, by distinguishing, comparing, and uniting them in the unity of one con-
scious act, it reaches the judgment a is b. But so long as we have only the 
particular states a and b, they remain external to each other, and the judgment 
is non-existent and impossible. 
1
~ •• judgment ••• may be psychologically one, but logically it involoves the 
distinction of a and bas well as their union. Without this distinction the 
judgment is impossible. And for this logical distinction and union alike we 
need something which is neither a nor b, but which comprehends and acts upon 
both. This something we call the self. By it we mean not anything sensuously 
or imaginativel:ypresentable, but only that unitary and abiding principle revealed 
in thought, and without which thought is impossible. 
nThe judgment as an act is unique and lonely. Physical images only serve 
to obscure it, or, rather, contradict it. The field of consciousness is space-
less and partitionless. Our objects are separated, but not in space or time. 
They are united, but.not spacially or temporally. The relation is logical, not 
physical, and does not ·admit of being pictured. The attempt to construe it to 
the imagination misses its true nature, and leads to that mechanical external-
ism which seeks to build up mind from without. How the judging act is posslble 
is the unparalleled' mystery of consciousness. But then it is a fact; and the 
unity of the thinking self is not an hypothesis for its explanation, but its 
analytically necessary condition. Without this a and b fall: asunder, and the 
judgment is impossible ••••• 
11 We conclude, then, that the unity and identity of the thinking self is an 
absolutely necessary condition of the simplest and most elementary judgment. 
11 This account of the matter is not accepted by all. A very general claim 
of the sensational physiological school is that a simple passive consciousness 
is possible which is made up of particular units of feeling or impressions; and 
these impressions, when united by association, are supposed to give us the 
judgment as a matter of course, On. this view there is no unitary self which 
judges; but there are particular impressions grouped by association, and this 
grouping is the judgment. 
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11 
•• o if we allow those uuch "simple passive~ states, we are not advanced. 
For, by hypothesis, no one knows itself, to say nothing of knowing its neigh-
bors; and thus the conditions of the judgment are not given. For this we need, 
not simply states of consciousness, but a consciousness of states: and this 
is a very different thing. 
"Nor will association help us. Indeed, association itself means nothing 
except for a consciousness which is not composed of particular states, but which 
in its unity comprises particular states as belonging to itself. In other 
words, the association of sensations is nothing in the intellectual "Orld except 
for an· abiding self. To see this we need only ask where, or for what, the sen-
sations are associated. To say that they are associated for one another is to 
endow them with mutual consciousness.· To say that they are associated in the 
nerves is to plunge into unintelligible cerebral mythology. If there were an in-
dependent consciousness which embraced them, we might say that sensations are 
associated in consciousness; but this will not apply to a v·iew which recognizes 
only states of consciousness, and not consciou-sness of states. Thus the doc-
trine has no assignable relevant meaning whatever, except with reference to an 
abiding self ••••• our self-distinguishing, self•identifying thought must be con-
ceived as something above particular thoughts, as having, comparing, and judging 
·them, and as abiding through them ••••• 
"Under the pressure of ••• verbal intimidations, some of the weaker brethren 
among the psychologists have such fear of the 11scientist" before their eyes that 
they are ready to ignore facts in order to be scientific. It is supposed to be 
metaphysical, and hence unscientific, to speak of a real self; and hence they 
hesitate to do so for· fear of losing caste with the "scientists" •••• 
11 Only a theoretical.. prude, therefore, or one so anxious for the purity of 
science as to forget that science itself must be subordinated to fact, will take 
offence at the notion of the self if the facts call for it. But in affirming 
the self, we affirm nothing picturable or sensuously presentable, but only what 
we mean and experience when we say "L" And this self, so far from being a ques-
tionable fact, is one of the surest items of experience. The sun in the heavens, 
as objective reality, is far more questionable. - ~-· "'·: 
·,. ·,::: 0 0•,:, :. -- If science is to deal with facts without 
distortion, no fact can well be more scientific than the one thus described by 
Thomas Reid: "I am not thought, I am not action, I am not feeling; I am some-
thing that thinks and acts and feels. The self or I is permanent, and has the 
same relation to all the succeeding thought, acts, and feelings which I call 
mine." However we may change the name, we are forced to retain the thing, or 
the thought life falls asunder and vanishes. 
II Sundry. metaphysical questions may indeed be raised concerning the natu.re 
of this self and in what its permanence consists; but they do not touch the fact 
of permanence. The fact is revealed in thought itse~f; and no one has ever suc-
ceeded in more than a.verbal denial of it. Moreover, the metaphysical questions 
apply equally to all reality, andare not special difficulties of psychology. 
On the plane of ordinary thinking, where for action we demand an agent, and for 
changing states an abiding subject, there is nothing which can show a better 
title to be called real and abiding than the thinking self. And if we raise 
the deeper metaphysical questions we find the apparent realities of sense per-
ception vanishing into phenomena, while selfhood seems to be the only thing 
that can show any claim to abiding existence. But these deeper problems we hand 
over to metaphysics. Here it suffices to point out that, whatever mystery the 
reality and permanence of the self may involve, they cannot be denied without 
wrecking thought altogether. As to the fact, the uninitinted will find some 
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help in deciding from remembering that the claim is simply that I am not thoughts 
but I think, and that I who know think am the same who thought yesterday ••••• 
11 The trick of language whereby the self is denied is assumed in order to 
express its own denial is well illustrated in the following passage from Hume, 
in which he proclaims the reduction of the self to a flux of impressions: 
11 
'For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call 
myself, I always stumble on some particular perception or other, 
of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. 
I never can catch myself at any time without a perception, and 
never can observe anything but the perception •••• If any one, upon 
serious and unprejudiced reflection, thinks he has a different 
idea of himself, I must confess I can reason no longer with him. 
All I can allow him is that he may be in the right as well as I, 
and that we are essentially different in this particular. He 
may, perhaps, perceive something simple and continued, which he 
calls himself; though I am certain there is no such principle in 
me.' 
We shall get a realizing sense of the advantage of expressing a theory in 
language which hides its true nature if we will be at pains to substitute for 
the personal pronoun in this passage the vanishing impressions required by the 
theory. As none of these abides beyond the instant of its occurence, and all 
are perpetually dissolving into something else, it follows that the first I is 
not the same as the second I, and that of the later I's no one has any identity 
with any other. The Hume of the beginning of the passage dissolves into any 
number of other Humes before it ends. But the humorous nonsense of the doctrine 
is concealed from the reader by the language employeq, which throughout implies 
the denial of the theory •••• 
**-l~** 
"Man himself in his essential personality is as unpicturable and formless 
as God •••• The essential meaning of personality is selfhood, self-consciousness, 
self-control, and the power to know." (Personalism, p. 266.) 
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In 1922 Canon B. H. Streeter and others compiled an influential book en-
titled 11 Immortality, An Essay in DiscoverY 11 , Macmil1£tn. The following se-
lection is taken from a discussion in this book entitled ''The Mind and the 
Brain," by James Arthur Hadfield, M. A., M. B. (Surgeon, Royal Navy). 
His analogy of the wire filament and its light as having relation like that 
of the nervous system to consciousness is a striking comparison. It sug-
gests how conscious mind may indeed be related to the nervous system, and 
even dependent upon it for its origin, while also becoming poss:i.bly a dif-
ferent form of energy qualitatively, and perhaps independent in its own 
right from the bodily, sensory, or stimulus-response system. (pp. 64-66.) 
"Consciousness is the sensation of psychic states. When we speak of being 
"conscious" of any sensation we mean that by some means we become "aware" of it. 
Let us realise that there are millions of sensations which never rise to con-
ciousness; impressions that do not impress our mind sufficiently to make us 
11 aware" of them. Such, for instance, are the "sensations" of normal digestion, 
breathing, or the secretions of glands. These functions are always sending im-
pressions up to the higher centers, but, under normal conditions, they do not 
produce consciousness of their movements. They become ccnscious only when these 
organs are disturbed and their functions upset, in which case we may be very 
painfully "aware" of them. But let us pause for a moment. What do we mean when 
we say that we are "aware~'? What is it to be 11aware'1? Who is it that is con• 
scious7 We have, in using these terms, taken a great stride: we have, in fact, 
passed from physiological to psychical terms. In using such words as "aware" 
we are using terms for which we can find no physiological substitute. We have, 
in fact, entered the realm of 11 mind, 11 a sphere into which physiology cannot enter 
and in which it cannot live. Like a fish which cannot breathe in the open air, 
physiology pants and expires in its efforts to follow the mind into the psychic 
region; the atmosphere is too rarefield; thought is too etherial to be grasped 
by it. In short, physiology has to abandon this field to ••• psychology. 
11 In the earlier stages physiology may, with some reason, claim to explain 
the phenomena presented. It can trace the stimulus as it passes round the re-
flex arc, up the sensory nerve, across the synapse or junction, and down the 
motor nerve. This acts with the same mechanical certainty as the touching of an 
electric button at one end of a wire produces the ringing of a bell at the other 
end. But when we come to consciousness, physiology fails to satisfy us, because 
we are dealing with something that is different in kind from nerve energy. We 
may make use of our last illustration (remembering~ it is only an analogy, 
and at best only explains the mechanism of consciousness) to make clear this 
difference. An ordinary current of electricity produces heat in a wire--such 
is the normal mechanism of nerve energy as illustrated in the reflex action. 
But let this current pass through a filament of exceptional refinement, and be 
raised to a greater intensity, and the heat will be transformed into light. 
Consciousness is thus a phenomena of intensification: it is produced when our 
sensations are raised to a sufficiently high pitch of tension. It is due to 
mental friction: to the effort to cut a new channel through the brain. Heat 
and light may both be produced by the transmission of a current of electricity· 
along an electric wire: they may, from the physical point of view, differ only 
in the length of their waves and in velocity. But the essential feature of our 
analogy, imperfect as it is, is that in its resultant expression light is a 
~ifferent form of energy from heat, and therefore stimulates an entirely differ-
ent system of nerve-endings in our bodies. Consciousness is thus a different 
454c 
form of energy from nerve energy, though it may have arisen out of it; it is, 
in fact, psychic energy, t:vhicL is impossible to describe in terms of the physical,, 
11 This dramatic leap from the physiological to the psychical is the most im·· 
portant factor in the evolution of mind. It is the decisive factor which once 
and for all turns the balance and establishes the supremacy of the mind over the 
body •••• 
11 Henceforward the mind begins to live a life independent of the body. The 
tulip springs from a bulb, and in its early stages derives all its s·istenance 
from the store of food in the bulb. But when its leaves are well established, 
nnd it has exhausted its store of nourishment, it begins to breathe in strength 
and force from the sunlight and air around, without which it would fade and 
wither and fail to produce the perfect flower. So mind can come to perfection 
only by turning to the light, and freely exercising its intellectual and aes-
thetic functions. The mind arises from the body and its sensations, but only 
in the sense that the dragon-fly springs from the grub which lives in the mud 
of a stagnant pool; its origin is humble but its life in the sunlight is a whirl 
of coloured brilliance and wanton liberty. This new form of energy which we 
call consciousness has a similar freedom and autonomy; it originated in physical 
sensations of the body, but has taken wing, breathes the airs of the ethical 
blue, and is nourished by spiritual food. Thus the mind has now as little in 
common with the sensations of the body from which it sprang, as this fiery, 
dazzling, creature has with the slime-covered grub:1 
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APPENDIX C 
Classic Views of the Mind-Body Problem 
(I) Interaction theorl (Descartes). This theory has as its metaphysical 
background the conception that reality is a rigid, dualistic affair--.in fact, 
that there are two, absolutely distinguishable kinds of reality. One is matter, 
the realm of "extension," as Descartes called it; the other is mind, the realm 
of selfhood and its "thought," which is spiritual, non-extended "s~bstance." 
The belief is that mind and· body somehow _interact. For example, acts of will 
that cause the body to move, or physical pains that cause apprehensive thoughts 
would illustrate such interaction. Descartes speculated that the "point" of 
connection between mind and body was the pineal gland deep within the brain! 
The problem with this theory is how to conceive the casual relation between an 
idea or spiritual force and a physical motion, if matter and mind are two such 
completely disparate things? In any case, there certainly is "interaction," 
regardless of how we may evaluate the details of Descartes' dualism. 
(2) '!._he parallel theory (Leibniz). Leibniz suggested that there is no in-
teraction between mind and body, but that when one wills, the other accordingly 
acts, due to a "pre-established harmony" between the two orders of existence. 
God arranged these parallel orders from the foundation of the world. The trouble 
with this theory is not the ultimate reliance on God so much as the assumption 
of the parallelism itself, which seems repugnant to a sense of simplicity and 
coherence. Actually the parallelistic theory is a more rigid, separating kind 
of dualism than the interaction theory of Descartes. The parallel view seems to 
deny our undoubted experience of interaction between mind and body rather than 
explain it. The trouble with both views is their too great reliance on~a spirit-
ual substance understanding of the mind. 
(3) Double aspect theor.x, (Spinoza). The difficulty of this view is to all 
extent and purposes like that of Leibniz. Spinoza believed that our human "thought" 
and what we observe to be the world of matter and "extension" are but two as-
pects, called "attributes" of a more fundamental and largely unknown "reality," 
called "Substance" or "God." God 1 s only known attributes are thought and ex-
tension. Spinoza's view is sometimes called psycho-physical monism. The trouble 
with this view is that Spinoza postulates an unknown "y" (God-Substance) to ex-
plain an already unknown "x" (how mind and body relate?). Again the argument 
with Spinoza is not so much that he falls back ultimately on God for explanation, 
as with the repugnance to coherence and simplicity ofth@ double-aspect notion 
itself. The basic criticism of Spinoza is that he never really solves the pro-
blem of Descartes• dualism, as he tried to do. He posits an ultimate fundamental 
11ni!,y of nature.in God. But why, then, for man, whom Spinoza conceives as a fi-
nite "m de" of God, is there the appearance of duality between Thought and Exten-
sion? Spinoza's is an ambiguous monism. The next two attempts to solve the 
problem are quite frankly monistic, each in its opposite way. 
(4) Extreme materialism or the denial of mind (Watson, et al). This view 
is that mind is in no sense "real," and for it the mind-body problem disappears. 
The real must be defined in terms of "matter" and its mechanical forces, and 
these alone. Mind is an "epiphenomenon"--it is like the "glow" or "light" of 
an electric filament. It is there while electricity is running through the wire 
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e.nd the filament is functioning; but 11 turn the light out u and it is nowhere, as 
if it had never been, though filament and its material parts (i.e. the brain) 
remain. The basic contradiction in materialism is brought out by asking, "How 
does non-conscious matter produce consciousness which claims that it is not 
wholly material!," The spectre of consciousness reappears to haunt the mater-
ialistic mind, and to raise the mind-body problem again. Extreme materialism 
glosses over the distinctions that conscious introspection suggests, which we 
have reviewed~his chapter. The view just described "materializes" the universe 
too much. 
(5) Extreme idealism or the denial of matter. This point of view tries to 
exorcise the mind-body problem with the magic of saying that matter is in no 
sense "real." Extreme forms of idealism claim that matter is but "appearance" 
or "illusion." The main problem of an extreme idealistic belief is, of course, 
how to explain the material aspect or "appearances" of the world? Extreme ideal-
ism glosses over distinctions that sense experience suggests. It 11spiritualizes 11 
the universe too much. 
Difficulty of the classic views. Each of the foregoing theories in their 
classic forms erred in either one or both of two points, namely, in conceiving 
of matter as inert mass and of mind as spiritual substance totally different in 
kind--in short, the problem of dualis~. 
Value of the older views and summary of the energistic conception. As has 
already been suggested in general terms, a solution lies in the direction of con-
ceiving of the world as a hierarchy of energies with mind, the super-ordinate 
energy. The development of physics during the past one-hundred years, and also 
trends in psychology and the theory of mind, are helping to bridge the gap be• 
tween mind and matter. As we have said, the general points of the older views, 
that there is an aspect of our world that must be called "material," and another 
which must be termed "spiritual," should be retained, without thinking of these 
differences is such hard and fast fashion as to make them mutually exclusive. 
No doubt the spirit of Spinoza's synthesis although not the letter, should be 
our ideal, with attempt to work out the problem in a more satisfactory manner 
than he did. In addition to "personalistic idealisms," philosophies of "organ-
isms" "organicism," "wholism," "spiritual-field" theories, 11panentheis1ns," and 
others of the naturalistic type are attempting to do this, each with its varying 
measure of success. Their main emphasis is that we cannot reduce the world to 
the older concepts of matter and "mechanism, 11 or raise it to an ill-defined and 
out-of-sight "spiritualism" without doing violence to certain aspects of the real 
on either side. Most modern philosophies agree that to conceive the real in 
terms of energy or energies helps in the solution of the mind-body problem, 
since then it becomes one of a transference of energies, and we know that that 
takes place. 
'.;rj:).e general value of idealism. The abid:ing general truth of a spiritual or 
idealistic philosophy is its claim that reality cannot be defined in terms of an 
all-engulfing materialism or mechanism and exclude or nullify the patent force 
and reality of the spiritual aspect, known particularly in self-conscious exper-
ience. If both sides have to yield to some extent, undoubtedly self-conscious 
experience forces the materialistic side to yield first. Better to insist on 
spirit at the expense of matter, than the other way! Actually, we have asked, 
need the legitimate claims of either side be forfeited? 
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Personalistic idealism, that stemming particularly from Berkeley's phil-
osophy, has ins.isted that ''matter" must be understood as the immediate or £-
~ energizing activity of. the Divine Mind. Without falling prey to Berkeley I s 
eighteenth century provincialisms, or committing ourselves uncritically to his 
views, we might commend to the reader's attention the over-all spirit of his 
solution to the matter-mind problem. Berkeley's position possesses a greater 
universal appeal if we state his point negatively. It is that matter cannot be 
understood in such a way as to remove it entirely into a metaphysical citidal of 
its own dark, disparate, outside the realm of spirit and alone--which spirit 
can neither understand nor reach. So much of Berkeley most spiritual philosophy 
would accept. Berkeley's desire was to retain the aspect of matter as something 
11real 11 to finite spirits, but keep it under the rule and dominion of Cosmic 
Spi:dt. Essentia.lly Berkeley I s solution to the problem is similar to Spinoza's 
(and to Classic Ved nta) with the important difference that in the case of 
Berkeley, personal Cosmic Spirit takes the place of the metaphysically dark 
God-Substance of Spinoza. 
The following quotation of E. S. Brightman is a forceful, contemporary 
statement of the mind-body problem by this ·kind of personalism. We present it·· 
as a type of Christian solution to this perplexing problem. 
Mind~ •• interacts with and is dependent on body, which, for tl:e 
per-sonalist, means that hi.,mnn perscnnlity interacts with and is de .. 
pendent o~ Divine Personality; for body is in nature and nature is 
God in action. A brain is the Divine Personality in action at the 
point of the continual creation of a human personality. Mind is 
not in nature, but nature in the Divine Mind is God's way of creating 
human mind.* 
* Nature and Values, Abingdon-Cokesburg, 1945, pp. 124-125. 
CHAPTER THIRTEEN 
Man as : ·. Moral Being: 
His Freedom and Resnonsibilitv 
The elements of man as a "moral being11 are 
1 • his freedom, 
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2. his search for "values" and a "meaning11 or purpose to his life, 
3.~ his awareness of and participation in the moral order of the 
universe--or his sense of 11 moral law, 11 
4. his sense of conscience as arising in these things, 
5. his ideas of righteousness (and e.~3"4'';:l<t::li);t!Si~?Z~· moral_, wrong, evil, 
or sin) as expressive or reflective of this moral order. 
These five things are related aspects of his moral nature, and obviously 
in much of our prc:ceding discussion we have been talking about them. We 
invite the reader particularly to review 01:i:f analysis of the moral argument 
for God, in chapter six, page l9~where point three has already been quite 
fully discussed; and ou.r analysis thus far of major aspects of point 2 in 
chapter nine, page 37lt Accordingly, in this chapter discuss,,, more 
fully than we have previously done, the problem of freedom, the ITeaning of 
life ts ™ning or purpose, conscirn, and the ideas of righteousness. 
I. !he Idea of Freed.om 
A two-year-old youngster in a playpen demonstrates human nature in 
its yearning to be free! iJe have already considered several topics in the 
idea of freedom, as discu3sed from a religious point of view, such as the idea of 
Recall our repudiation of the notion of a divine determinism or 
divine 11 foreknowledge 11• , .. './ 11 predestination. 11 We now move over into another 
area of consideration; it concerns the idea of "natural determinism. ti We 
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ask, "What is the character and limits of nature's determination of man'? 11 
To look at this question will focus our attention, ,upon. the logical limits 
between which the meaning 
{. 
o~ 1freedom must t''\.,, .. ,(· of 
meaning, ~/the 
h ' j ,:'. :, t ," 
reality of freedom. 
(1) The Idea of Natural Determination 
Natural determinism. How far do the "laws of nature" determine 
human life or condition human freedom'? Again we will state briefly a few 
general principles. 
(a) Natural determination cannot be universal or absolute. The 
actual fact of our psychological freedom would disprove the hypothesis 
that there is no freedom. Indeed this involves the problem of carefully 
defining what we mean by freedom (see section 2). 
(b) The degree to which there is determinism. Briefly, we may say 
that there are several levels of intensity or degrees of "freedom," or, 
what is the same thing, of amount or kinds of "control" of our lives by 
the natural situation in which we find ourselves. Generally speaking, 
human freedom rises in its ascendency from lower planes of determination 
in the following scale;· reading up: 
Self-transcendence-------------------area of true or highest freedom 
Psychological law--.-:-.-:-::.:-------------areas in which "vital" processes 
and the "sub-conscious" limit 
Biological law freedom 
'·Cher~ical and physical .. law------------areas in which basal nature 
limits freedom 
The fact of regularitl in the operation of law in these areas makes for a 
dependable and predictable world, a situation which is itself the greatest 
boon to our ultimate freedom. Because of these areas of law, regularity, 
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and predictability the world is one over which we can have control. Its 
laws control us so that we may in our way gain greater control over it! 
The self-transcendent spirit of man constantly utilizes the lower levels 
of natural law in order to increase his freedom. Without a world of "law" 
in its lower reaches, we would never be able to learn how to "make hab-
itual the most favorable adjustment. 11 
Where freedom lies: a rational mean between extremes. The following 
diagram may to state the problem of freedom and determinism: 
Absolute "mechanical" 
determination: 
(the billiard ball 
analogy) 
Where Human Free-
dom lies: 
G(,dn self-deter-
mined, responsible, 
or rational freedom--
free thought and 
activity motivated 
by highest ideals 
and values 
Absolute inde -
termination: 
Completely 
"unmotivated," 
"aimless, 11 
"inexplicable, ii 
"irrational, 11 
"unaccountable," 
"capricious," 
11unf ounde d" 
activity. 
Professor Harold Titus gives an excellent summary of the problem. "Human 
freedom is neither freedom from causes nor freedom from laws. It is the 
ability to act from self-choseri ends. It is the power to direct mechanisms 
in line with our purposes. Without reliabe caus.e-and-effect relationships, 
our human purposes would meet frustration at every turn."~': 
There .are m~µy types .. of dete:dainati9n in; an.4 over, life •. :.:We?ha:ve· 
already su3gested some of these., such as phyGical and chemical, biolo.-
Ki~al,. psychological, and social. In the midst of these kinds of deter-
mination, in what follows 
lies. 
we define more carefully wherein our freedom 
* Living Issues in Philosophy, op. cit., p. 182. 
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2. Meanings of Freedom 
From a practical standpoint as we observe life, freedom means in-
itially two things, related to each other as a higher and a lower ex-
perience. 
Freedom of movement. Freedom means first and most simply~ power 
!:£~in alternative ways. Man's freedom on the bodily level is like 
that of other higher life, a "natural liberty" characteristic of animals 
and distinguished from the rooted condition of plants. But this first 
meaning of freedom, on the plane of action and getting things moved in 
the outward world, leads to the next inner, and for the moment we shall 
say, higher meaning. It is, by way of degree at least, more distinctive 
of human than .any other form of life. 
Freedom of thought. This is the power to deliberate, to pay attention 
mentally, to think--the mental choice or decision behind the action. This 
is what we mean by freedom at its private intellectual center. It has 
been summarized by some philosophers as the freedom to choose truth from 
error. This type of freedom of the spirit all men possess, in spite of 
chains and dungeons. .The fight of liberal political history has been for 
the right fundamentally to express this freedom. In the area of science 
it is known as the freedom of scientific inquiry. On the philosophic 
plane freedom of thought means the freedom to judge judgments and implies 
our self-transcendency (recall our previous chapter). In sum, our two 
levels are: 
1. Freedom of thought: mental attention, or deliberation, choice 
and decision. 
2. Freedom of action: power to carry out our thoughts or delib-
erations. 
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Freedom of will. Which of these "levels" of freedom is primary? On 
first consideration No. 1 seems to take initial and most significant 
place; yet, on second thought No. 2 may seem more fundamental. It ap-
pears more basic in the sense that we are always free to act capriciously, 
or without thought.££ against~~ thought and judgment! Level two 
may ignore or rebel against level one. Here the Hebraic understanding of 
''will" as the principle deepest in freedom seems to offer the best ex-
planation. The factor common to both levels is the will: the will to 
think, and the will to act. Ultimately "truth" should be the standard for 
thought, and in turn for action, and when level two does not heed level 
one, if one is functioning rightly, it does not heed truth. 
Intellec,t and ;flfeedom,. In attempting to place the dispute between 
reason ... and freedom :iii 1.a'i:ges.t coherent light; the problem..,rna~,,be 'phrased 
in another w,ay, as .the alleged difference 'between .the. nrationalistic 11 
and the "romantic" meanings of freedom. The romantic instinct about 
freedom preserves the realization that deeds do not always have to 
conform to thoughts. Indeed the romantic definition of freedom seems 
counter to certain forms, or interpretations of the "rationalistic" defi:-.. 
nition, as that, for instance, found in Spinoza, where he wrote, "a free 
man ••• (is) a man who lives according to the dictates of reason alone. 11 '>'~ 
This apothem may not be greatly different from Jesus 1 "know the truth 
and the truth shall make you free, 11 or Socrates 1 11knowledge is virtue. 11 
Such sayings are sometimes interpreted to mean that there is a certain 
mechanical compulsion in reason that ob\udes itself upon the whole mind, 
~'( Spinoza, Selections, ed. John Wild, Scribners, 1930, p. 346. 
nullifies will, and absolutely determines action or choice i.n one and 
only one direction, namely, a "rational" one. A deterministic meaning 
460 
may be closer to that of Spinoza a~ Socrates (recall Aristotle's criticism 
of Socrates at this point,*) than to Jesus' words. Such sayings, however, 
may mean that a man is morally free in highest sense if he freely chooses 
the rational way, as a conscious, interior, personal decision, acknowledging 
other possible choices which he might alternatively have made; they need 
not mean that he is compelled so to act. 
Indeed, rationalistic definitions of freedom err, if they limit the 
meaning of freedom to the power of analytical thought alone, or identify 
it too closely with logical mechanism alone, as Spinoza may have done. 
Rational freedom has a wider ambit than that implied in such concepts. 
Freedom is the power and the right to go against analytical reason, if we 
choose to do so. But in so doing, freedom reveals its own deepest 
rational meaning. There are further depths to reason, to human "ration-
ality" in fullest sense, than the one merely of analytical or logical 
power; or of abstract ratiocination or power of classification of exper-
iences into universal categories or types. Reason is also in its rnost 
comprehensive meaning, a synthesyzing, synoptic, whole-seeing, or co-
underst~nding 
herent · of relationships and values. From the viewpoint, 
then, of this highest coherent reason, the power to go against reason 
on the lower analytical plane would seem wholly _reasonable or rational 
for trulr ~ beings. Such freely rational beings we sense ourselves 
to be. That it would be "immoral" for us to go against analytical reason, 
when it arrived at a logical conclusion, we also sense; but that we are 
free or not to swing our choice and action, without compulsion, into line 
with analytical reason reveals to us our highest rational freedom and 
-1~ Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. II, Chs. 2-3, Introduction to Arist.sitl;..:~,, 
ed. Richc'lrd Mcl<0on, p. l~44f. 
moral dignity, To be sure, the rational training of motive and con-
science may make decision~' as it becomes good habit, toward the 
"dictates of reason alone. 11 
461 
On the other hand, extreme romantic conceptions err, if they believe 
that freedom is to be identified with essentially anti-rational, undis-
ciplined vitality. On the human level there is little vitality that is 
totally without some degree of motive, thought, or concern. The idea of 
freedom must steer its course between the Scylla of some extreme Spin-
ozistic determinism, to the effect that "If I know, I must" (which ex-
perience belie·s), and the Charybdis of extreme indetermination, and ir-
responsibility, to the effect that "If I live, I may," in the sense that 
all things are possible and all permitted to man (which experience again 
belies). Real freedom, human freedom, lies between the hypothetical, ab-
solute determinations of a "perfect intellect, 11 as Spinoza seemed to 
think of it, and the absolute indetermination of pure impulse and vitality 
as extreme romanticists might conceive it. 
In actuality, "perfect intellect" would not mean a mechanically 
frozen system of logical implication and this alone. Our point in this, 
where we huve touched upon it, 
and in previous chapter.yhas been to say that "freedom" and "intellect" 
are two aspects of the transcendent personality of man; we have seen that 
they are not conflicting phases, but rather that one implies the other. 
An aspect of the "perfection" of perfect intellect would be its freedom 
to think; "perfect intellect" would after all be a free intellect. Kant's 
view of freedom in the now classic moral terms, "If I ought, I can," 
suggests the moral median between the extremes discussed above. Ulti-
mately the so-called conflict between reason and freedom Kant resolved 
in the "idea of freedom, 11 which w.EL.mentioned in an earlier context. 11Now 
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I say every being that cannot act except under the idea of freedom is 
just for that reason in a practical point of view really free."* Can 
we not return with profit to this classic solution? The idea of freedom 
is the exalted ideal that moral rationality ~~ts before life--the ideal 
of a life morally self-determined by its own will, to live according to 
the dictates of moral law~ per'c'eived by reason functioning in its 
highest capacity. The idea of freedom is the intellectual side of free-
dom; freedom itself, the ability to judge a judgment, is the free side 
of intellect. Borden Parker Bowne, who as much as anyone in contemporary 
times, strove to preserve the rational tradition in Christian philosophy, 
and who looked to Kant as one of his intellectual forebears, wrote the 
following penetrating words on our very point at issue: 
The laws of thought represent absolute fixities of mental 
procedure. They are the constants of the mental equation, re-
presenting no legislation of the will but the changeless nature 
or reason. They admit, then, of no abrogation or rebellion; 
and yet, while thi.ts secure from all. tampering and overthrow, 
they do not of themselves secure obedience. For this there is 
needed an act of ratification by the free spirit. The mind 
must accept these laws and govern itself in accordance with 
them. Only thus do we become truly rational, and that by our 
own free act. Thus we discover freedom and uniformity united 
in reality, or rather we discover reality as having these op-
posite aspects ••• Thus we see that the assertion that freedom 
means lawlessness is mistaken. An element of uniformity must 
always be allied with freedom ••• this element becomes con-
trolling only through freedom.** 
·If the romantic view of freedom,that there is incorrigible impulse, 
sheer, dark vitality, and this alone, at the center of man's being, is true, 
then there is little hope ultimately for the discipline of such "freeflom. 11 
The rational view of freedom, however, seems at once more illuminating 
and more salutary. The rational understanding of freedom is its pro-
b · 11 f 11 f feed foundest definition, and it suggests t e most cogent proo or r om. 
~'< Kant. Selections, ed. T. M. Greene, Scribners, 1929, p. 335. 
** Personalism, Houghton Mifflin, 1908, pp. 205-6 
Having clarified, then, to some extent what we mean by freedom, we turn 
next to the argument for it. 
3. Arguments for Freedom 
There are five principal steps in the "proof" of freedom. Ee<:h 
successive step pushes the argument into a wider sphere of comprehension 
and inclusiveness. 
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(1) The biological proof. Being creatures not rooted to the ground 
as a tree, but outfitted with feet and hands, nature has by our funda-
mental constitution made us 11free "--laid upon us the necessity to turn 
to right or left, step forward or backward, stand still or take flight 
in the need to forage for food or seek shelter and protection. Nature 
ministers to trees-as it were, coming to them in their wants; she has, 
however, cut animals and man loose, left them alone to decide and act on 
their own if they are to survive. Man shares this kind of physical free-
dom, of course, with many other living creatures. The degree of freedom 
that a creature has is determined by the type of organism that it is. If 
man had wings, he would be "as free as the birds! 11 
(2) The psychological or emotional proof is indicated dramatically 
in a kind of negative way by our common-place moments of hesitation and 
indecision. I am finishing my sophomore year. The problem of selecting 
a major course of study faces me. My whole future may turn one way or 
another as a consequence of this choice. It is a pretty important matter! 
What program shall I select; which way shall I go? In the mood of un-
certainty, in the anxiety, alarm, and even dread that we may feel.at such 
moments of high decision, we are most conscious of our freedom; the sense 
of our own responsibilitz ~ ~ creatures weighs heavily upon us. Such 
exper.ience :ts t:he bas:Ls·of mrmkind's-common belief.in freedom. 
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(3) The rational proof. The central experience of our life is that 
our .!:!!£.ught is ~. Nothing that I here write (except perhaps the truth) 
will coerce your thought. You are free to accept as true or false what is 
here said--free to receive or to. reject it. (We have already said that 
this is not only your freedom, but your right too.) Put the matter neg-
atively. Let us accept the deterministic hypothesis for the moment to see 
how it may test against experience. If, then, determinism is true-:--if all 
our being and movements are absolutely predetermined by the cosmic mech-
ahnism, in which we are cogs, according to this view, then our thoughts 
would be determined in advance. I now think of our old friend the blue 
rose; but I do not call this to mind myself. Who or what does then? Some 
inexorable external power chalks this across the blackboar.d of my mind. It 
is not !!!l, idea then, but Its or~! I do some ,deed in consequence of 
some thought; it is not I, but the universe that commits the crime. I am 
therefore absolved! A mistake is made in adding a column of figures. But 
I have not made the error--the error was committed by the universal machine 
of which I am a part and which determines me throughout all my being, even 
the errors which my judgment makes! I fall in love with my sweetheart. 
She needn't take it seriously, because it is not really I who has freely 
fallen in love with her, but the world machine, of which I am but the 
blind and dumb slave·;· • 
~ thought is Erecisely ~ !§. !1£.t determined in advance--at least 
in any such mechanical way as determinism logically implies. 
Borden Parker Bowne in the previously cited passage and the present 
one analyzed the rational meaning and necessity of freedom in most cogent 
form. We continue with his words: 
Freedom itself has the deepest speculative significance 
for reason and science, as well as for morals and religion •••• 
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Our fir.st· care ••• must .be to decide what ,>Je mean by fre!=dom ••• 
By freeom in our human life, we mean the power of self-
direction, the power to form plans, purposes, and ideals, 
and to work for their realization. We do not mean an ab-
stract freedom existing by itself without relation to in-
telligence or desire, but simply this power of self-direction 
in living men and women. 
With this understanding of what freedom is, we recur to 
its speculative significance. This appears first in its 
bearing on the problem of error. That problem lies in this 
fact. First, it is plain that unless our faculties are .. 
essentially truthful, there is an end to all trust-worthy 
thinking; but, secondly, it is equally plain that a large 
part of thought and belief is erroneous; hence the question 
arises as a matter of life and death for rational thought, 
how to reconcile the existence of error with faith in the 
essential truthfulness of our faculties. Freedom is the 
only solution which does not wreck reason itself. If our 
faculties are essentially truthful and trustworthy, but may 
be carelessly used or willfuily misused, then we can understand 
how error should arise without compromising the truthfulness 
of our faculties. But on any other basis error becomes cosmic 
and necessary, and reason is overwhelmed in skepticism •••• 
Hence anyone wishing to find his way into the problem of 
freedom will do well to consider first of all the relation 
of freedom to intelligence itself, and the collapse of 
rationality involved in tbe system of necessity .. * 
As we have earlier seen, reason means in part the power to judge 
judgraents. This recalls our discussion of consciousness and self-trans-
cendency. 
(4) The nroof from .£.QPSCiousness can be simply stated, If we were 
not free we would not be, or need to be, _gonscious., If our actions were 
all determined in advance by the cosmic machinery, we would not have to 
be conscious, any more than a falling stone needs to be conscious in order 
to have its motion explained., If we were not free, consciousness would be 
an inexplicable superfluity. Consciousness is an organism's awareness of 
its environment. If our motions were determined in advance, we would not 
have to be thus awake or aware. But the getting of food and the avoid-
i} Ibid., Bmme, pp. 199-202. 
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ence of dangers could all be carried out for us by the universe. But we 
~ conscious; therefore, we ~ free. Consciousness implies freedom 
and is freedom. 
Add to this the highest level of consciousness in self-consciousness 
and self-transcendency, and we see what freedom for man is in all i.ts 
ms.jesty and possibility. Indeed we have the final depth of insight about 
how and' why_we are free. 
(5) The proof from moral self-consciousness. Above all, self-con-
sciousness has to do with moral choice, 11right 11 and 11wrong. 11 At the center 
of our beings we are most aware of the problem of. doing right, of ma_ldng 
wise and good choices, if life is to be well lived--if need be, of judging 
our former thoughts and actions. Here, then, we touch Kant 1 s great in-
sight about freedom. 11 If I ought, I can, 11 he said, which seerred to him 
to imply the reality of freedom in its highest moral sense. To state the 
matter negatively helps to clarify the point: if I were a determined 
being, I could not possibly have a sense of obligation. But I do have 
a sense of obligationi therefore I cannot be a determined being. 
lhe_social determination of freeQ.QID•: The relation of our real human 
freedom to the natural and social environment, vrr1ich does indeed condition 
and determine life, may be brought out in most positive fashion by mentioning 
the sociological factors that help us to grovm in freedom out of the en-
vironmental determinations of existence. They are the multiform institutions 
of education, science, economics and politics, of art, morality, o.nd re-
ligion--briefly, hwnan culture, when at its best. Education frees by en-
larging knowledge; science by expanding human control over nature_; free 
467 
economic institutions by increasing the production and distribution of 
goods; democracy by giving men self-government; the forms of religious 
and moral culture by designating general norms for belief and conduct 
that will tend to guarantee the best development of institutional life as 
a whole. 
Freedom as the power of atte~. Freedom is not just a matter of 
simple choice between two alternatives, selecting a red apple in prefer-
ence to a green one--it is this, but much more. Actually, freedom is the 
12ower of attention (freedom of thought) to the problems of life in all 
their obscurity and complexity. Man with the airplane or the moon rocket 
has come to be literally 11free as the birds!" But the story of man's 
mastery of the air and of space, or any other technological or social 
advance, is a good illustration of man's long struggle to be free and of 
the interrelation and social solidarity of man's free life. These achieve·-
ments are made not just by one person, but by numerous individuals patiently 
bending their attention to life's problems, wherever the vision of greater 
freedom is bright and insistent enough. On the historical-social plane 
it took more than one man and more than one generation to create the 
American democracy. On the personal plane, one 1 s fulfillment of his vo-
cational ambition is not a matter of this moment's decision alone, but 
rather a matter of many decisions and great iabor. Freedom is the morally 
rational education of our motives and habits. It is self-determination. 
Freedom as responsibility. Freedom is ultimately found in responsibility. 
As we catch the idea of the social responsibility of our freedom, we begin 
to see some of the final meaning and purpose of freedom itself, namely the 
freedom to serve our fellows in the cooperative adventure of life--the 
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' highest freedom implied in the wisdom of him who said, " ••• he who loses 
his life for my sake will find it."* 
Having toucJ-ted/on the purpose of freedom, we sho~d turn l:rr±ef1y to 
~r pointq 
II. Intimations of Life' .§....lieaning_ 
The desire for life to have meaning is the second stage of our D.o1f-crwareness 
as moral beings. The. old popular .song, "Why was I born, Why am I living? 
What do I get? What am I giving?" reflects a rather basic philosophic 
query. College is one of the great periods of transformation and devel~ 
opment in a young person's life. So much is packed into those four 
years! Among the more serious problems the average college·student"faces 
is the one about his future vocation •. Except for _the rare student who 
(either from an early, real maturity, or sometimes a brash immaturity!) 
has long s.ince made up his mind in high school exactly what he plans to do, 
are wont to the "basic 
college men and women/ask themselves / · question, "What am I to do 
with my life? What are my really largest interests and purposes? Is 
there any way that I can really make my life ~- What is the meaning 
of·illX.,~? 1' 
Recall points memtioned in several previous chapters as background for 
the present discussion of freedom, responsibility, and the sense of li~e's 
meaning. The first of those earlier insights appeared in chapter nine, 
where we were discussing the idea of God and µis relation to the world of 
human freedom, and the conception of "providence," page 36 ~ The second 
tel-
was our resume of Royce's /1eological view of the meaning of self-hood or 
d 
,.;. i' ! 
* See our subsequent chapter on "love and.Asel£ in the teachings of 
Jesus, 11 for analysis of this saying in the full Judaeo-Christian context. 
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· personality in chapter eleven, page With . those di:.·oussioN: 
in mind, we can now proceed to a summary statement of the idea of life's 
meaning or purpose from the standpoint of a spiritual philosophy. Harold 
Titus in a superlative analysis of this problem suggests that we human 
beings become assured of$or discover meaning for our lives personally, on 
the basis of the following insights or types of experience:* 
First, the capacity for meanina. He reminds us that we all wish life 
to have rr:eaning, that is, importance and purpose; we all search for meaning. 
The wish and the search indicate at least that there is a capacity for 
meaning, and this suggests that there should be a content or fulfillment 
of this capacity, someplace, sometime, somehow, if we can but find it. 
Psychologically, man is a being that wants meaning and will either find 
it or make it. How important, then, to discover, if we can, the right and 
the wholesome meaning, lest dark and destructive meanings fill the void• 
We begin to see that the problem is a twofold one. Firstly, it concerns 
the universal purpose of human life and the meaning of history as a whole, 
and secondly, the purpose of my life in particular. 
The first level of these questions we commenced to discuss in the 
previous places above recalled. The main purpose of our present context 
is to throw some light on the sense of purpose of the particular life, It 
will be well here to keep in mind another earlier paragraph of the study 
where, in mentioning life purposes, we referred to Gordon GiEceyts two 
points and added a third. Our purpose in life is (1) to realize whatever 
five capacities are latent within us; (2) to love and serve those with 
whom life has placed us; and (3) to help prepare the human future for 
good and not for evil. Titus' following emphasis contains these insights, 
* Living Issues in Philosophi, op. cit., p. 136f. 
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Second, creative ability. Leading out of this desire for meaning we 
find corresponding to,and fitting in with it genuine creative ~rges and 
abilities in most men, which Titus reminds us are "part of or ••• related 
to the creative forces of the universe ... ,., These creative urges may be 
generalized in terms of the marital, the vocational and serviceable, the 
artistic, and the recreational. 
From exercising these creative abilities, we derive our more immediate 
satisfactions or senses of meaning to life. 
The following three principles help us to find meaning in the longer 
historical sense~-that we as individuals are is some way important to the 
larger on-going of history and the world process. Accordingly, we come 
to our next point. 
Third, dependency of the future on us. One of the deepest insights 
springing out of the creative urge is, the realization that, as we gain 
\. 
independence and increasing contro11 6v~rf\ life, the future depends to a 
considerable extent on us and how we handle the present, whereby we 
11gain a new sense 
or does 
ation does/not do 
of importance and responsibility."** What our gener-
circu:rnstances of life in the 
will partially influence and determine the/nextsenerationo 
Fourth, new meaning constantly coming to light. "More meaning is 
created or discovered as we move forward."*** How dramatically this is 
illustrated in the creations of modern science. In this technological 
field we modern men are veritable wizards, who can command the lightning 
and the thunder, fly through the air, and to the moon, and explore the 
* Ibid., p. ·137 
** Ibid., p. 137 
*** Ibid., p. 137 
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fathoms of the sea., 
realize 
But in our twentieth century disillusionment we have 
come to f, that 11 scien,tific progr:ess 11 )Jy n,o rr.eans preempts the meaning , 
;. I: y {:"' 
of life 1s rr.eaning. In fact, as we toy with the atom bomb, 1:the possibility 
of 11 scientific progress 11 leaves us rather frightened and doubtful. We 
perceive that real meaning is withheld until there is fulfillment of 11 the 
humanities, 11 in the social, artistic, and personal-moral areas of life. 
Here in the realm of the spirit, then, will 1"B found the real intrinsic 
yalue_§, to which our mechanical instruments are but ministers. 
Fifthly, historical nurnosiveness. The idea of a meaning to life 
roots in the idea of a purposive history and purposive universe founded 
in the will of God. As we believe ue discover what this general purpose 
is, and fit specifically our ovm lives into it in our several creative 
tasks, they take on direction and meaning. 
We suggest that, in fulfillment, of. the larger purposes of God, the 
tasks of men are, scientifically and philosophically, "to extend the areas 
of our awareness; 11* socially and religiously to plumb the depths of fel-
lowships with man and God; personally to intensify our own feeling of well-
being and happiness. In most gener'al terms, the foundation of existence 
is God; the pur.pose of existence is the coming of finite personality; the 
ultimate means of existence is love and cooperation; and the fulfillment 
of existence is fellowship. 
III The Ideas of Conscience and Ri~hteousness 
We invite the reader at this stage to review the discussion of the 
"moral nature of man 11 in chapter t.hvee, dealing with the moral argument 
for God, especially pages 192-207. We there set forth the concept of 
-i, Ibid. 9 Titus, p. 138 
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conscience as an accompanyment of man's freedom and rationality; we cited 
ten principles which we believe reflect a common "content" of human 
conscience concerning matters of supreme importance for men the world over; 
we reviewed Immanuel I<ant•s concept of the rationality of conscience as 
fruitfully describing the idealist's philosopher's concept of the naturalness 
and the universality of man's moral nature; and leading into the moral 
argument for God.,we discussed what we called 11the cosmic reference of 
conscience." From that place in our discussion we here continue with the 
idea of conscience. 
1. Change and Growth in Conscience 
The standard of conscience should be truth, "Con-science" means 
"with knowledge, 11 or "with truth. 11 What the content of our conscience is 
should be .determined by the true facts and relationships of the universe. 
A basic truth is the dissimilarity of persons, making some of the content 
of the conscience of different persons different in a great many matters 
not of universal or supreme importance. Brand Blanshard summarizes what 
conscience is, 11 ••• conscience .•• is simply our mind as a whole making its 
response to an act that comes before it."* And our mind as a whole con-
stitutes our personality. Thus eating meat was repugnant to Mahatma 
Gandhi and with him a matter of deep conscience, whereas it may not be for 
you or me. This, of course, acknowledges that different backgrounds of 
culture and training will make for differing content of conscience between 
individuals. Such facts of relativity in conscience suggest several further 
main principles. 
'le In Preface to ,Philosophy: Textbook, ed. by William Ernest Hocking 
Macmillan, N. Y., 19li-7, p. 135. 
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Conscience is complex. Blanshard speaks very truly again where he 
writes, nconscience (is) not a single voice but a chorus of voices. 11·k 
He reminds us that conscience as we ordinarily find it is partly the voice 
of habit, partly the voice of intelligen~, and partly the voices of 
feeling and desire; and we might add the voices of others' approval or 
disapproval. The problem here is to allow moral intelligence rightly to 
train habit, feelings and desires. The most coherent analysis of life 
that we can make will tend to be the main guide of conscience. This com-
plexity suggests the next point. 
Conscience is variable. It can change; it can grow. As suggested 
above, the standard for our changes in conscience should always be truth. 
Then change will be real growth and enlargement of moral perspective. 
Larger insight into the truth may make a change of conscience imperative. 
The tragedy of much commonplace human life is that conscience stops 
growing at too early ~. date. Blanshard expresses it in another maxim, 
"Other things equal, the richer the mind, the better the conscience."** 
The training and right education of conscience is always humanity's central. 
task. The following principles may help us in the cultivation or education 
of conscience: 
(a) We often need to develop conscience in areas where it was pre-
viously lacking, or brighten up old conscience tarnished over by hapit. 
(b) Growth may take the form of "dropping" outmoded conscience. 
(c) Change, growth, enlargement of conscience should take place in 
areas where an enlarging sense of the truth suggests change. 
(d) Bear in mind that we human beings will continue to face dilemmas 
of conscience throughout life. By the nature of our finite situations, we 
~'-: Ibid. 
** Ibid. 
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can never become fully acquainted with~..!.. the facts that, ideally, perhaps, 
should be considered in ~ny given situation, calling for moral decision and 
action~ We will always Me, under the tension of imperfect Judgment, to 
the extent that we may lack full, coherent understanding. Accordingly, 
we have to train ourselves, and our emotions, to live with ourselves with-
in the circumstances of life. We have to learn to accept ourselves. What 
may we do appropriately as we have various moral dilemmas and ambiguities? 
The reply .. is, we appropriately (that is, quite morally), either suspend 
judgment and action, oftentimes until further facts are in--perhaps even 
postponing action indefinitely, where a decision simply does not have to 
be made necessarily by us at the moment, and perhaps never; or we act on 
the best judgment that we can muster now, resting in the faith that this is 
all life's duty could expect of us .. 
At t.his place we can but mention the problem of oversensitive, and 
pathological, or perverted consciences. That there are such consciences 
the slightest examination of life reveals. Undoubtedly, Adolph Hitler 
was a man of ringing "conscience;" we would doubt whether of "wholesome 
conscience." Adequate education, modern psychiatry, a liberal religion 
no doubt are the instruments available to remove these dark areas in the 
life of conscience, so that they do not become besetting guilts. We may 
here refer with profit to Reinhold Niebuhr's great prayer: "Lord, grant 
us the serenity to accept what we cannot change, the courage to change 
what we can, and the wisdom to know the difference." 
Blanshard again says, "Conscience is an imperfect light; granted. 
But that only proves that we should make it clearer, not that we should 
put it out."~'( 
* Preface to Philosophy, op. cit., p. 138 
2. The Idea of Righteousness: 
Some Practical Tests of Right and Wrong 
Morality, according to C. S. Lewis, comprehends three orders of 
harmony: harmony between individuals; harmony within the individual; 
and harmony between man and the power that made him. Practical life 
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should seek to establish these orders of harmony. We have been suggesting 
the general principles that would tend to make for these harmonies. Let 
us now attempt to define as concretly as possible the idea of 11happiness 11 
or "wellbeing" and of "right" and "wrong. 11 
Fell-being, or happiness, , the good for persons, has several 
principal elements: (a) physical health; (b) psychological health; 
(c) "success" at one 1 s vocation, or what one feels is his special work in 
the world (principally the Greek understanding of happiness); (d) the 
sense of loving "service" to one's fellow men in some larger cause than 
mere ministry to one's own "success" (the Hebrew understanding of happiness); 
(e) the ach~ement of lasting fellowship or friendship with other in-'-
dividuals, of which a happy marriage may be center and is the epitomy; 
(f) a sense of poise in success or failure in realizing those ideals, 
before the total universe and the power that sustains and gives it ulti-
mate meaning and purpose, i.e., "God. 11 These elements of happiness are 
of course all interrelated. Individual cases are examples of relative 
fulfillment or failure to realize these ideals in varying degrees. Rarely 
is a human life privileged to enjoy the perfect realization of them. We 
have to learn to be satisfied with partial happiness, and rely finally on 
the last criterion for our ultimate poise. Brand Blanshard discusses·the 
difference between happiness and pleasure in the following cogent terms: 
By pleasure we mean the feeling'that comes from 
satisfying our more immediate appetites, desires, and 
impulses; we speak of the pleasure of a good meal, a good 
novel, or a good game of tennis. By happiness we mean the 
feeling, less intense perhaps but less vulnerable and more 
enduring, that comes with the satisfying or our more central 
and long-range impulses, such as the desire for friends, for 
success, for the full and free play of our faculties.-/( 
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A definition of right conduct. In summary of the personalistic view 
of ethics here set forth, we quote the succinct definition of T:ltus: 
'·• ••• and act is right if it leads to the development of persons or to a 
more harmonious personal and social life •••• Conduct is right if it pro-
ceeds from a good motive, through' the use of the best available means, 
to consequences that are beneficial. '!-I,* A. C. Wickenden summarizes in 
practical way the criteria or tests of right conduct in his book Youth 
Looks at Religion.*** He reminds us that in contemplating an act we 
should think of (a) the effect of the act on one's own person. Would 
it be degrading or uplifting. We have seen how the element of one's 
personal motive is basic. (b) The effect on others. Would the act bring 
blessing or blight? These two, of course, are the principal criteria. 
Three further guides of a corollary nature are (c) the long-range effect. 
What difference will the act make to us in the future? (d) Publicity. 
Would the act be generally approved? This appeal to consensus gentium is 
of course a limited criterion, and although sometimes ambiguous, it may 
be a helpful criterion in general terms. Some acts have to be done against 
public opinion; the opinion of the majority about some matters may be 
wrong. (d) Universality. Could we conceive the act being done by all 
and sundry without ill effect? Tliis was Kant's basic criterion. It's 
admitted limitation is that it is sometimes very difficult to apply this 
-I( Ibid., p. 164 
** Living Issues in PhilosoQ~~, op. cit., p. 381 
*** Harper, 1948, pp. 127-32 
criterion in concrete cases and crises. We have seen that this last 
criterion is really based on the principle of personality. 
3. The Idea of Sin 
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We again at .this place invite the reader to review carefully what was 
said in our footnote, page 268-270, on the concepts of sin, ,·pride · and 
repentance as found in the Bible. Beginning .there, we continue with the 
following recapitulation and add several further general observations 
on this topic. 
A definition of wrong conduct and sin: Conscious aggression on other 
personal life, to live at the expense of other life against its will, 
would be the definition of wrong, or sin, on its social side. This de-
fines "injustice." Disrespect for the principle of personality, my own. 
as well as others, would define sin more inclusively. The causes of sin 
as injustice are threefold: ignorance, inertia or indifference, and malice 
or conscious perversity. The degree of responsibility increases in this 
order. 
Can sin be sub-volitional? Must sin always be a conscious act or may 
it include unconscious acts which have harmful consequences to our neigh-
bors? It seems to the present writer that we should limit the essential 
definition of sin to conscious malice and acts of aggression against our 
neighbor, letting such terms as "mistake" or "error" or possibly even 
"social sin" cover the multitude of unpremeditated and unconscious, harm-
ful acts. 
A theological meaning of sin. Oftentimes in the religious tradition, 
sin has been defined as a defiant or rebellious relation to God. What :ts 
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the connection between this religious and the moral meaning of sin above 
Eet :forth? Most simply· stated, aggression on other personal life can be 
c,,nsidered as a form of rebellion against. God because God has wEled other 
life to exist as well as one's self~ an4 aggression upon it is defiance 
of the divine will. Virtually, in acts of aggression, one is putting him-
self in the place of God, that is to say, denying that there is the higher 
authority to which both one's self and one's neighbor are responsible. It 
is this mutual relationship before God that equalizes the status between 
oneself and one's neighbor. Thus aggression on neighbor becomes a personal 
defiance of God. The theological and ethical meanings of sin are inextric-
ably interwoven, as the Bible in numerous ways suggests. To disrespect 
our neighbor's personality is to disrespect the very highest principle of 
being, which reflects what God Himself is. Love of God is love of the 
creative source of all personality, and sin against God would be 1 for 
one thing, sin against personality. 
· Is there "original sin? 11 Bear in mind that the doctrine of original 
sin was rejected by the great prophets--e.g. contrast Jeremiah 31:29b 
in a footnote 
and Ezekial 18 with Psalm 51:5, and recall our discussion/on pages 268 to 
270. (See also our appendix on Jesus' concept of man, below.) 
However, perhaps the term original sin has some usefulness if it refers 
to a tendency in life to live at the expense of other life, or if it stands 
for the element of pride in men, which tends to keep them selfishly 
seeking their own security at the expense of others. Such "tendency, 11 
however, should by no means be regarded as inevitable, constitutionally 
determined by, or "original" in our nature in some way, or incorrigible 
or intractable. Traditional doctrines of a "biologically inherited, 11 or 
a predestinationist .,;,"'te}.1:0. of 11 sin11 (see our earlier discussion of pre-
destination, page 365) must simply be rejected. Clarifying the rr:eaning 
of "sin11 and discussing the necessity of maintaining an essentially 
11 ethicali1 or voluntaristic conception, Albert c. Knudson said in his 
searching way: 
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Original sin may refer to the unfavorrible psychological 
conditions under which the child begins his moral life: in-
herited evil tendencies, animal passions, bad habits later 
formed, and the organized evils of human society. These 
factors ••• limit our freedom and incline our wills toward evil. 
They are not themselves morally evil apart from the actions 
of our wills. They are temptations rather than sinful states ..... 1~ 
Sin as oride. It is often said that 11 pride 11 is the essence of sin, 
and this point is indeed fol1nd in Biblical understanding. But by pride 
as sin is rr.eant the inordinate pride that would set a man above his 
neighbor and thereby defy God's will and work in his neighp,or. Reinhold 
Niebuhr, in his thorough-going way, reminds us of the ranges of pride that 
define sin in essentie.l terms. One is the 12ride of oower, over nature and • 
over other men, that leads to the various kinds of economic and political 
exploitation. This kind of pride involves us in the sins of greed and 
injustice. .Another is ;gride .Qf knowled_gg_, intellectual pride or the 
affirmation that 11 the truth11 as one sees it is the ultimate truth. Such 
idological pretension involves us in the sins of grogrn,, ..l,ntoler@ge. 
and ~.ll19-i~- Finally Niebuhr points out that there can be moral or -
spiritual J2.ride. This would be to hold that 11 our partial standards and 
relative attainments are the unconditioned good, and claim divine sanction. 11*1' 
Briefly, this is the sin of trying to make our finite selves ultimate, 
and defines the essential meanin:s of sin against God. Generalizing in 
broadest terms, Niebuhr says sin 11has its source ••• in man's willful re-
fusal to ackno1t1ledge the finite and determinate character of his existence .. .t-iHrn 
* Principles of Christian Ethics, Abingdon-Cokesbury (1943, p. 101-102) 
** ,Pature and Destiny of Manffe Scribners, 1948, Vol. I, p. 200. 
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Accepting Niebuhr's main point, we must distinguish, however, between 
normal or legitimate 11pride, 11 the necessary self-confidence without which 
we would not be psychologically poised, which God has given us as created 
centers of finite life--and the inordinate prides, above described, which 
may indeed be called sin. In his first volume of I.ruLNature and De§tim 
of Man, Niebuhr fails, we believe, to distinguish carefully between tbese 
two meanings of pride. 
,Eill.!,ive sinlessness. or relati,ve 12erfection. Much necessary work has 
been done in present-day theological thought, especially by nNeo-Orthodox11 
theologians like Reinhold Niebuhr, in calling modern man's attention to C. 
the fact and the nature of sin. But a religious philosophy may reject the 
traditional doctrine of man's "total depravity. 11 We call attention to the 
patent doctrine of .r:g]..,.Qtive sinlessness (or .r£l.l1?,°tiy_e pe~tion) possible 
to man which runs throughout the Bible. Realistically, no man is "per-
fectly good, 11 or has through the whole course of his life, been entirely 
without some measure or degree 'of 11 sin" in the general ways defined apove. 
There is, however, the perfectionist ideal in the New and .Old TestamElnts, 
and it must be recognized as a prominent point of the Judaeo-Christian 
ethical philosophy. The problem is clarified by asking, 11 Is altruistic 
action or agape-love (action beyond self-interest) ever possible to human 
life?" Jesus certainly thought it Wl:\S, else there was- no point in his 
parable, for example, of the Good Samaritan. The problem becomes one of 
maximizing, in so far as human finitude and fraility permit, the approach 
to life in terms of agape-love. The conscious, persistant attempt so to 
live may be defined as a kind of 11relative sinlessness. II{} This possi-
bility would be the final grace of religious life.in the belief of Judaism 
* Examples of the doctrine of relative sinlessness or relative per-
:f.'ection'.in Bible: 
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and Christianity. Albert c. Knudson again- summarizes the matter in most 
forceful way: 
The quest after sinlessness is, therefore, not an 
attempt to get rid of the metaphysical uroots of sin, 11 
nor does it require complete compliance with all the 
detailed requirements of an external standard of ab-
solute purity. It is rather such a wholehearted de-
votion to the fundamental Christian principles of love 
and holiness as will save one from deliberate violations 
of them. Violations may now and then occur, but where 
they are few and not of a serious nature, the moral 
quality of the life is determined by its obedience 
rather than by its.lapses, and in such a case we may 
speak of. a relative sinlessness. Such a sinlessness 
is a constituent element in the Christian moral ideal. 1~ 
APPENDIX A: 
..:msus• PHILOSOPHY OF HAN 
In view of the widespread confusion that Christianity is a system 
of belief which teaches the concept of man as inherently, or 11 originally, 11 
evil, or "sinful,'1 it is appropriate to conclude this chapter with a 
discussion clarifying this issue. We acknowledge, of course, at the outset 
that much historic 11Christianity 11 or 11 Chris:tian theology" has so taught--
and the idea of man 1 s inherent "sinfulness" is emphasized in conservative, 
fundamentalist, and neo-orthodox circles now-a-days as a si~ ~g_ llQll of 
the Christian faith and outlook. It is another matter entirely, however, 
whether Jesus himself as the historic 11 founder 11 of Christianity so viewed 
Old Testament:. Psalms 19:13; 24:2-5; Jeremiah 22:16 
New Testament: Luke 10:18; Matt. 5:44,48; Romans 6:2,6,11,lL",22; 8:1-17; 
12:1; Phillipians 3:14-15; John 14:21,23;. I John 3:9-10,14; 4:7,16,18. 
Commenting about the apparent contradiction in I John 1:8,10, A. C. Knudson 
says: 11 In these verses those are condemned who say 1We have no sin, t or 
'We have not sinned. 1 . But the reference here would seem to be not to 
Christians in general but to persons who denied that they had themselves 
ever sinned. Otherwixe there would be a plain contradiction in the text., 11 
(Principles of Christian Ethic], p. 150.). 
-Ii· Princioles of Christian Ethics, op. cit., p. 153 
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man. We believe that it is very problematic whether a doctrine of 11 original 
sin11 or the inherent evil of man can be, without question, derived from 
the reported words of Jesus. It is quite true that St. Paul so believed; 
and accordingly, tr-e emphasis on this theme in the theology of the church 
has, no doubt, derived from Paul, rather than expressly from Jesus,, In 
any case, the following is presented as a summary statement of Jesus' 
conception of man 
Jesus' conception was realistic. Highlighting this generalization, 
we suggest three specific characterizations of His understanding of man: 
1. Fundamental to Jesus' outlook was his belief in the sacredness 
of human personality, its supremacy in value and being, derived from his 
Jewish heritage. In Fosdick's trenchant phraseology the distinctive 
Hebrew-Christian outlook emphasized "personality as boundless in value 
and possibility" and expressed the faith "that God and his universe are 
pledged to the satisfaction of personality I s inherent promise.""'' True to 
his Jewish inheritance, Jesus possessed an optimistic view that man and 
life are good. His affirmation of the sacredness of human personality is 
asserted in such passages as the following: 
Matthew 5:43---Love enemies 
6:26,30---You· are of more value than the birds and grass 
of the field. 
7:12---The Golden Rule 
10:29-31---You are of more value than many sparrows; the 
hairs of your head are numbered. 
20:1-16---Parable of the laborers and the hours. 
16 :25---The Great Paradox with 
20 :26-27 · · • 
Luke 10:25-37---The great commandment, and parable of the good 
Samaritan: love God and neighbor as thyself.** 
* £uide to Understanding the Bible, :· l93"8l- 1,., p. 97., Harper. 
*'~ Deuteronomy 6:5, Leviticus 19:18. 
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Mark 2:27---Man takes precedence over sacred institutions, e.g. the 
Sabbath. 
2. Jesus often thought of men as being like "wandering sheepn who 
need guidance. ,'I' This evaluation is suggested by the familiar parable 
of the lost sheep (Luke 15:Sf), and, in John's gospel, by the figure of 
Jesus himself as the Good Shepherd. Jesus enjoins repentance at the be-
ginning of his ministry (Mark 1:15), and it is reported that he forgives 
the sins of people who came to him needing help. This does not mean, 
however, that Jesus believed that all men were abject, gross, or depraved 
sinners. Like Jeremiah (31 :29) and Ezek.iel (ch. 18) he did not seem to 
believe in inherited "original sin.'' His sayings', as "Suffer the little 
children to come. unto me, for of such is the Kingdom of Heaven" (Mark 10: 14, 
Kg.J.); or, "It is not the will of my Father, who is in heaven, that one 
of these little ones should perish" (Matt. 18:14), suggests his positive 
or optimistic outlook on human nature in its original state. In the in-
cident of the healing of the blind man in John 9:3, he is reported as 
saying, in direct answer to the question whether the man had sinned, "It 
was not that this man sinned, or his pa.rents. 11 Furthermore, there are 
those passages where, in quite natural way, he assumes that many men are 
"righteousn: 
Mark 2:17---Came not to call the righteous but sinners. 
Luke 15:7---The 99 righteous who need no repentance. 
Matthew 25:31,37---The quiet, unassuming righteous who were not 
aware of their virtue. 
5:18---The Beatitudes 
5:45---God's sun shines on the just and the unjust. 
In enjoining repentance Jesus points to the sound psychological 
principle 01f being willing to change our mind, to remake values that 
guide us, indeed to acknowledge past mistakes and sins, if they have 
* As phrased by Wesley G. Nicholson 
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occurred, and to resolve toward renovation and improvement. Such attitudes 
of mind make moral growth possible. 
That the need, and the experience, of renovation and growth is norm-
ative for most human life may be the implication of Jesus' saying in the 
Q document (Matt. 7 :11) where, in the larger context of affirming God's 
forgiving and bestowing love, in contrast to imperfect humanity, he is re-
ported as saying: "If you then, who are evil, know how to give good gifts 
to your children, how much more will your Father who is in heaven give 
good things to those who ask him?'' (The New E.1glish Bible and Smith-
suggesting., simply., "bad as you can be sometimes") 
Goodspeed translate: "bad as you aren '/. Indeed in the famous saying in 
Mark 10 :18 Jesus apparently included himself among "imperfect" men. In 
John 8:1-11 (woman taken in adultery) we have a passage not found in some 
of the earliest manuscripts--'.·:;:, RS'V translators have indicated it as a 
footnote addition. I.e., it may be late and apocryphal. In any case, 
where Jesus is reported as saying ''Let him who is without sin among you be 
the first to throw a stone at her,'' he is not describing the metaphysical 
nature of man, but obviously a particular type of sin, or human weakness--
into which human beings (and no doubt particularly men) are prone to fall. 
He is not only reminding men of their frequent ~. but also their lurking 
hypocrisy. Note that the passage as a whole emphasizes his sympathy with 
the sexual problem, 
and expresses his faith that human nature--
womn 
in this case exemplified in the/;.:---:.": --could find and continue in a better 
way! 
3. One summarizing affirmation is certain: Jesus, like his prophetic 
forefathers, believed in human moral freedom, and appealed!:.£_ men's inherent 
possibility ~ be righteous. Th'is all-encompassing outlook embraces his 
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s and teachings.* He believed that human 1 ife could become pre -
dominantly, or characteristically free from sin, Matthew 5:38-48, 13-16. 
In addition to saying that God!s nature as love, and his own example, were 
present to inspire men in the quest for the good life, he suggested that, 
men's reasons--as native impulse--could guide them, Matthew 7:24-27; 9:13; 
12:7; Luke 12:57. Jesus put his faith in all kinds and conditions of men. 
He excluded none from his society or assistance, not even official out-
casts such as publicans or harlots. The often-quoted interpretation in 
John's Gospel, 11Ye shall know the truth, and the truth shall make you 
free" has summarized for Christian faith Jesus' understanding of in 
the positive terms here ·set forth. 
* E.g. The Great Commandment, The Good Samaritan, Luke 10:25-27, etc. 
APPENDIX B l:-35a 
Reinhold Niebuhr's analysis of human freedom in terms of "self 
transcendency," Gifford Lectures, The Nature and Destiny of Man, 
Vol. I., pp. 13-14, 54-56, 70-7t.~, Scribner 1 s, 1941. 
· ••• Characteristic of the Christian view of man is that he is understood pri-
marily from the standpoint of God, rather than the uniqueness of his rational fac-
ulties or his relation to nature. He is made in the "image of God." It has baen 
the mistake of many Christian rationalists to assume that this term is no more 
than a religious-pictorial expression of what philosophy intends when it defines 
man as a rational animal. We have previously alluded to the fact that the human 
spirit has the special capacity of standing continually outside itself in terms 
of indefinite regression. Consciousness is a•capacity·for surveying the world 
and determining action from a governing center. Self-consciousness represents a 
further degree of transcendence in which the self makes itself its own object in 
such a way that the ego is finally always subject and not object. The rational 
capacity of surveying the world, of forming general concepts and analyzing the 
order of the world is thus but one aspect of what Christianity knows as 11 spirit. 11 
The self knows the world, in so far as it knows the world, because it stands outside 
both itself and the world, which means that it cannot understand itself except as 
it is understood from ooycnd itself and the world •••• 
Individuality is a fruit of both nature and spirit. It is the product of 
nature because the basis of selfhood lies in the particularity of the body. The 
self is most obviously separated from other selves by the simple fact that it is 
grounded in a physical organism which maintains its discrete existence and has its 
particular and dated history. Yet nature rises only gradually to the reality of 
individuality. In the inorganic world substances or forces are integrated and 
disintegrated so as to produce capriciously "unique" events (the upheaval of a 
particular mountain, for instance, and its gradual corrosion) but no unique or 
irreproducible unities. The inorganic world is thus subject to recurrences which 
can be charted with mathematical exactitude; hence the intimate relation between 
physics and mathematics. 
In the organic world nature rises to the particularity of organisms, char-
acterized by an interdependent and indestructible unity. The plant lives as a 
unity and its death means the destruction of that particualr unity, its component 
elements sinking back into the inorganic world. On a still higher level animal 
life achieves a higher measure of discrete particularity, through an organism with 
a specific centre of unified interdependence, a central nervous system. Through 
this nervous system the animal achieves a higher degree of separation from its en-
vironment; yet its actions are governed by instincts which bind the individual 
animal to the general characteristics of the species. Variations in colour, size, 
and, possibly, temper are capricious rather than significant and are subject to 
predictable recurrences. In animal life it is the speci~s rather than the indi-
vidual which is really unique. The particular animal merely expresses through 
endless repetition the special life-strategy of the species. 
Genuine individuality, embodying both discreteness and uniqueness, is a 
characteristic of human life. It must consequently be regarded as the product of 
spirit as well as of nature. Nature supples particularity but the freedom of the 
spirit is the cause of real individuality. Man, unlike animal existence, not 
only has a centre but he has a centre beyond himself. Man is the only animal 
which can make itself its own object. This capacity for self-transcendence which 
distinguishes spirit in man from soul (which he shares with animal existence), 
is the basis of discrete individuality, for this self-consciousness involves con-
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sciousness of_ the world as 11 the other • 11 The animal knows its particular needs 
and the particular objects in its environment which satisfy those needs. Its 
consciousness therefore does not transcend the natural process in which it is 
involved. Animal consciousness is merely the expression of a central organic 
unity of an organism in relation to its immediate environment. Human conscious-
ness involves the sharp distinction between the self and the totality of the 
w~rld. Self-knowledge is thus the basis of discrete individuality. 
Human capacity for self-transcendence is also the basis of human freedom 
and thereby of the uniqueness of the individual. Human consciousness not only 
transcends natural process but it transcends itself. It thereby gains the pos-
sibility for those endless variations and elaborations of human capacities which 
characterize human existence. Every impulse of nature in man can be modified, 
extended, repressed and combined with other impulses in countless variations. 
In consequence no human individual is like another, no matter how similar their 
heredity and environment. To a certain degree man is free to reject one environ-
ment for another. If he dislikes the spiritual environment of the twentieth 
century he may consciously choose to live by the patterns of the thirteenth 
century. If he finds his physical environment incongenial he has the capacity 
to modify it. The pride of modern man has sometimes tempted him to forget that 
there are limits of creatureliness which he cannot transcend and that there are 
lnexorable forces of nature which he cannot defy. It is nevertheless important 
to remember that human spirituality is sharply distinguished from animal ex-
istence by the measure of human freedom and the consequent degree of discrete 
and unique individuality in man. 
Human individuality, being a product of spirit as well as of nature, is 
subject to development •••• 
The naturalistic portion of modern culture seeks to reduce the whole dimen-
sion of spirit in man to an undifferentiated "stream of consciousness" if indeed 
it does not seek to reduce consciousness itself to purely mechanical proportici:rn •. 
Beginning with Thomas Hobbes a fairly consistent denial of the significance 
of selfhood, certainly of transcendent individuality, runs through the empirical 
and naturalistic tradition •••• 
John Locke is sufficiently influenced by Cartesian thought to define the 
self as a "thinking thing" and to insist on personal identity as a reality •••• 
The idea of self-awareness does not, however, enter into Locke 1 s conception of 
personal identity from which he explicitly subtracts the element of self-trans-
cendence involved in memory: "Could we suppose any spirit stripped wholly of 
all its memory or consciousness of past actions" this "would make no variation 
in personal identity. 11 (ECHU, II, 25). It is perfectly true that this would 
make no difference in the identity of what may be called the "empirical ego," 
the self as involved in the unity of the body. But it is precisely the pure or 
transcendent ego, which stands above consciousness as the consciousness of con-
sciousness and which expresses itself in terms of memory and foresight, which is 
the real centre of human personality. 
David Hume, in this as in other respects, purges Locke's thought of Cartesian 
elements in the interest of a purer empiricism and denies the possibility of any 
awareness of the ego •••• The ego is always the centre of relations so that it 
is perfectly correct to observe, "I do not catch myself without a perception ••• u 
••• even if Hume were correct in his interpretation of the empirical6 ~9 a stream 
of impressions it would still be pertinent to inquire into the nature of the 11111 
485c 
which he implies when he says: "When I enter most initimately into what I call 
myself." It is reality of that 11! 11 as subject which challenges the validity of 
all purely empirical interpretations of the ego. 
However great may be the achievements of modern psychology, it is not 
unfair to say that the psychological systems which remain within the confines 
of the naturalistic tradition never get beyond the varying interpretations of 
Hobbes, Locke, and Hume. Behaviouristic psychology is an elaboration of Hobbes' 
position. The position of Locke is taken by all "dynamic" psychologists who 
emphasize the initiative of the ego and the unity of its processes. Of those 
who follow Hume •••• /William/ James' assurance that the hypothesis of a substan-
tial principle of unity is superfluous, is an interesting example of an ever 
recurring effort of psychology as a natural science (and of all natural science 
for that matter) to affirm its character as a pure science by its metaphysical 
scepticism. But, unfortunately, this scepticism leads to implied metaphysical 
credos. An object which has both surface and depth cannot be correctly inter-
preted in terms of one dimension when it has in fact two. That is why science 
which is only science cannot be scientifically accurate. This is particularly 
true of Geisteswissenschaft in contrast to physical science. It is more par-
ticularly true of psychology which deals with a dimension of depth in the 
human spirit, transcending the scientific method. Every rigorous effort to re-
main within the confines of pure science reduces psychology to physiology, and 
physiology to bio-mechanics. This ultimate unity and transcendence of the 
human ego are indeed beyond pure science. Yet it is a necessary undertaking to 
inquire into the realities of that region "beyond." 
Psychological theory of the past decades exhibits, of course, a wide variety 
of schools which range from mechanistic to organismic interpretations, and 
from atomistic and behavioristic interpretations of consciousness to interpre-
tations which emphasize configurative wholeness (Gestalt psychology) •••• The 
real profundities of self-consciousness, the complex problems of personality, 
in the breadth of its relations to the world of nature and history on the one 
hand and in the depth of its dimension as self-conscious ego on the other, are 
the concern of only those schools of psychology which frankly leave the confines 
of natural science and regard psychology as a cultural science, which means that 
their psychological investigations are guided and prompted by philosophical and 
therefore semi-religious presuppositions~ 
CHAPTER FOURTEEN 
The Meaning of Love: 
Ethics in Its Religious Dimensions 
Within the Judaeo-Christian Tradition 
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In this chapter we suggest some of the central concerns and ~erspectives 
of ethics from within the Judaeo-Christian tradition. There are, the idea 
of God as loving heavenly Father, whose righteous and loving will is the 
ultimate standard of ethics and whose Holy Spirit is the dynamic source of, 
or inspiration to lead the ethical life; the understanding of this divine 
love as "agape·," the New Testament term that has come to summarize the 
"Christian ethic" in much contemporary religious discourse on the nature 
of ethics; and the place or role of the self in the society or fellowship 
of selves, which is the kingdom of God. 
I. The Fatherhood of God 
Jesus carried over from his Jewish background and reemphasized the 
belief in God as a Father, concerned for, loving, and forgiving men "their 
trespasses," if men in a like spirit of loving concern forgave one another's 
trespasses--to cite the familiartranru~tionof the Lord's Prayer. T\1e 
phraseology, God as "Father," appears in the Old Testament and in other 
Jewish literature of the late Old Testament age. 24 In the book of the pro-
phet Hosea in the Old Testament God is tenderly depicted as a father in his 
relation to Israel, '!my son. 11 The expression translated "mercy" or "stead-
fast love" is chesed, a Hebrew counterpart for the New Testament ~~-25 
24 Psalm 68:5, 103:13; Ecclesiasticus 23:21; Book of Jubilees 1:24-5. 
25 4 Hosea 11:1, 6.:,6; 10:12; 12:6. See also HQ.~<! 11:4 and 1 :4 for the 
idea of outgoing, serving, and forgiving love. 
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In the New Testament, the phrase describing God as "Father" appears 
a number of times, for example, in the Sermon on the Mount (Matt. 5 
and, in that context, with love, or a.gape as descriptive of the fatherly 
nature of God. 26 
Inspiration for the moral life is here described as flowing from this 
quality or nature of the divine reality (Matt. 5:44~48). Central to the 
religious experience·of Jesus was an intense (and for Christians regarded 
as unique) reliance upon, and fellowship with, God as the Heavenly Father 
of Love .. 
II. Agap~Love 
Christian love is the love for another, or for others. It is respect 
for per.sons activated, into out-going, self-giving service, which may call 
for varying degrees of self-denial or self-sacrifice in our human rela-
tionships. However, rather than some inflexible "law" or demand, it is the 
spirit of willingness to serve, to yield, "to wash one anothers feet, 11 in 
joy and in freedom. 27 The English expression "altruism" sometimes means 
a kind of dry, disinterested duty; as we use it below, however., we will 
mean by it Christian love, or the dynamic love of persons. 
In varying syntactical forms within the New Testament, the Greek word 
"agape 11 often means this active love of persons, and is translated "love."28 
26 
.
11 
••• 1 say to you, Love (agapete) your enemies and pray for those 
who persecute you, so that you may be sons of your Father who is in heaven .... 11 
Matt. 5:44. 
27 Ag~ is not "other" than justice, but includes or relates to jus-
tice, as that spirit which sometimes calls for arbitration or harmonization 
of sincere conflicts in interest. 
28 In the New Testament, forms of Agape are used in varying senses, 
for example, not only to show the classic "love for enemies" (Matt. 5:44) 
o-r: God I s love toward men (Rom. 5: 8) • but also to st.gte ut.:1.lit"'.r.i.s.n lo•re 
(Matt. 5 :40), and even love as eujoym,:nt of l:l.fe :i:nt' tho self~ i.e. s in an 
11eros 11 sense, :r Peter 3:1O~-a quote from I's, 31:,:12-16). In H,i::to 2Z:37, 
the great Cornruc1.ndmant, the one term ~£1'~~::iti. covers love :for God, for 
oneself, and for neighbors. 
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In m ch contemporary Christian discourse it summarizes the Christian ethic. 
Both the term and the idea are found in such well known places as the fo 0 
llowing: 
Matthew 5:44-48: 
22 :37-40: 
Luke 10:25-37: 
Luke 15:1-3: 
Love enemies, etc. 
Great Commandment. 
Good Samaritan. 
The lost sheep. 
John's Gospel, Ch. 15: Greater love hath no man. 
'I Car. Ch. 13: Se. Paul's hymn to love. 
Gal. 2:20 & Eph. 5:2: Christ's love in undergoing suffering and death. 
First John 4:7-12 
We may summarize the Christian agape in simplest terms as Givin~ Love: 
it seeks realization or fulfillment of other's interests and needs. It is 
altruism in highest meaning. 
Christian writers today have found it convenient to contrast the New 
Testament Agape with another common meaning of the word "love," also having 
a Greek original, "Eros," found in Plato's beautiful dialogue Symposium. 
In that writing we have a moving depiction of the self, seeking self-real-
ization or self-fulfillment in the highest terms of one's quest for spiritual 
values: truth, beauty, and the good. Taking this theme as our own, we 
may let Eros stand for £Faving Love, which seeks self-realization or ful-
fillment of one's own interests in some form. Eros may encompass the range 
of cravings from the desire to satisfy bodily or physical appetites to the 
satisfaction of higher spiritual needs. To speak of love for candy, to 
satisfy one I s ~weet tooth; or love of music, to satisfy aesthetic craving; 
or love for friendship; or love of knowledge is.-to speak of "eras" on var-
ious planes. In addition to love for the opposite sex, or erotic craving, 
as we say in English, eros in Plato's d'ialogue stands for the full range of 
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values for the self. As giving love may be expressed by the classic term 
Altruism, so craving love may be summarized• by tpe expression Egoism. 
Are altruism and egoism opposing and contradictory impulses or pr:tn-
ciples? That the "tension" of ethical life arises in the problem of the 
relationship between altruism. and egoism is plain. That e;iving love, 
agape, should sometimes take precedence over craving love, or eras, may 
also be suggested by the Judaeo-Christian ethic. But does this mean that 
one 1 s self or personal being, in one's own interests and needs, is in some 
unalterable or irreconcilable way opposed to other selves or persons in 
their interests or needs? Does agape conflict with eras? Are love for 
others and love of self mutually exclusive? What does the New Testament 
teach about such central concerns of the ethical life? How does it resolve 
the tension between altruism and egoism? What is the place or role of the 
self, in one's relation to other selves, in being? This is the ethical 
problem. 
There is considerable controversy among theologians as to precisely 
what Christian love, or agape means, relative to the role or the place of 
the self in the ethical relationship. Some discussion among contemporary 
writers, suggests that the Gospel rules out the self and its cla:i.ms--or &.::-
least much argument tends toward a negative view of the rights, needs, or 
place of the self .. For example, it is said that there is no place for self 
love in the Gospel~9; or that in some way Jesus did not really mean in 
the great commandment, "love thy neighbor as thyself. 1130 Or it has been 
29 cp. George F. Thomas: Christian Ethics and Moral Philosophy, 
Scribners, 1955, pp. 55-57; but also pp. 78-79! And see Anders Nygren, 
~&!},Pe and Eros, I, 1953, Westminster Press. 
30 cp. Rudolph Bultmann: Jesus and the Word, Scribners, 1958, pp. lll~-9. 
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argued that Christian ethical motivation is not based on the infinite worth 
of personality31 --but rather that agape means to love another even though 
he be "worthless." 
Behind the more particular Biblical problem of the place of the self 
in the love relationship within Jesus' reported thought, lies a wider 
philosophic type 0£ theological opinion today which disvalues finite self-
hood, or individuality, in its separateness of being from the "Ground of 
Being," as somehow evil, unworthy, or "sin." In this larger discussion today 
there is the outlook, proclaiming itself to he the "Christian view," which 
negates and condemns the self by pointing to the inevitable "Ontological" 
fate of its finitude or "separation." Accompanying this perspective is an 
emphasis on "anxiety" as the characteristic motif of our being, that is, 
(we would say) on psychological .ill-health and emotional perturbation. 31a 
Other Christian opinion insists that the self is described in the 
Gospel as having and playing a legitimate role in being; that the charact-
eristic feeling of the self is its sense of joy in life; that the largest 
aspect of Christian teaching is the worthfulness of all persons; that all 
persons mutually share a right to existence, one's self as well as the other; 
and that the Christian Gospel of love solves the tension between the al-
truistic and the egoistic impulses.32 
31 cp.Paul Ramsey: Basic Christian Ethics, Scribners, 1950, pp. 94-5, 101. 
George Thomas, in the work above cited, note 29, after granting the legiti-
mate place of "self-respect" and "self-acceptance" in the message of Jesus 
makes the following assertion, which, to this analyst, leaves us in am-
biguity: " ••• it is possible for a person to be concerned for the Kingdom 
of God without loving himself ••• the aspiration for its (the Kingdom) life 
demands the reflection of all self-love, aiming at the satisfaction of its 
own desires; the principle of life 'in the Spirit' is love of God and love 
of neighbor leading to Transcendence of the self. Every person must choose 
which of these two opposing principles he will follow" (pp. 57-58, italics 
his). Later, however, in his chapter on "The Life of Love," Thomas suggests 
a correction to the above impression in opposing Nygren 1s view that "agape" 
rules out "eros" or "natural love in all its forms." (p. 78.) (Cont'd) 
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According to such view the to the ethical problem may be 
suggested by Jesus 1 "paradoxical 11 utterance itself, where he expressed th0. 
principle: ''whoever would save his life will lose it; and whoever loses 
his life will save it., 11 (Mk. 8:35; Matt. 16:25). The problem is to in-
terpret what the losing of the self means. Does it mean self-abnegation 
and the obliteration of the self, its reduction to zero, or its complete 
erasure? Does Jesus mean that desire> or the impulse to live, intrinsic 
to personality or selfhood, is evil and should be destroyed? Actually 
the great paradox has its parallel or alternative phrasing where, if we 
may join the two sayings, losing the self is defined as the dedication of 
self in service, (Mk. 10:42 .. 45; Matt. 20:26-27): " ... whoever will be great 
(31 cont 1d) Ramsey also raises a question where he writes: "Christian 
love, attributing worth to the neighbor's rieeds .infinitely superior to--the 
claims of self, does not rest upon a doctrine of the infinite, inherent 
value of human personality in general ••• " (p 94, op. cit.). This.statement 
should be compared to his analysis of Christian ethical motivation on the 
succeeding ·page, where he says, 11 • ._love for neighbor for lli ~ sake in-
sists upon a single-minded orientation of a man's primary intention to-
ward this individual neighbor with all his concrete needs ••• It begins by 
loving 'the neighbor, 1 not mankind or manhood." (italics his.,) 
Concerning self-love, Ramsey says on page 101: 11No more disastrous 
mistake can be made than to admit self-love into the ground-floor of Christian 
ethics as a basic part of Chrisitan obligation, however much concern for 
self~improvement, for example, may later come to be a secondary, though 
entirely essential, aspect of Christian vocatiot:l. 11 
As a whole the above books are meritorious commentaries on the 
Christian ethic, but at these crucial points on the personality criterion, 
and the problem of love and the self, they seem unclear. 
31a E.G., Although Paul Tillich in characteristically powerful terms 
evaluates selfhood positively or as worthy (The Courage~, Yale Univ-
ersity Press, 1952, pp., 86-87, and again pp. 180-181, and 188,) and ac-
knowledges "joy" as a primal sense of life (p. 14); his basic emphasis 
seems weighted on the side of the disparagement of the ontological status 
of the finite self, and on the theme of life as a tissue of chronic an-
xieties concerning "fate and death, 11 "emptiness and meaninglessness," 
"guilt," "condemnation," "estrangement," and 11sin11 (The Courage to Be, 
pp .. 54, 75, 126--127, 132., 169; ~....filLaji!,ng of the Foundations, Scribner~, 
1948, pp., 154-155; Systematic Theology. Vol. II, University of Chicago 
Press, 1957, pp. 38, 44, etc.). 
32 For this view see Josiah Royce: The Religious Philosophy of Josirui 
!loype, (ed. s. G. Brown) Syracuse University Press, 1952, pp. 146-147. 
Albert C., Knudson: Basic Issues in Christian Thou,g_h!_, Abingdon, 1950, p., 191., 
And A. C. Knudson, Th~incfRles of Chdstie.n Ethics_, Abingdon, 191-i-3~ p. 178~ 
These memore.ble statements follow in Appendi:;{ B &t end of om: ch::11,1ter. 
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among you, let him be your minister; and whoever will be chief among you, 
let him be your servant (KJ Matt. 20:26-27). Jesus teaching here seems 
to be that a full-orbed motive for life would be one of dedicated self-
giving in service looking to the needs of others, concern for them and 
their welfare, over and above and beyond mere concern for onetself. That 
Jesus did not mean, by such sayings as the great paradox, to rule out 
legitimate self-interests, seems affirmed in the Great Commandment, or in 
the Golden Rule, where the self is expressly included as having rightful 
place in the ethical relationship. If one insists on terminology or the 
letter, in the phraseology of the Great Commendment, agape expressly in-
cludes the idea of legitimate self-esteem, self-regard, or "love of self" 
along with love of neighbor.33 
The Christian Gospel is a gospel of self-realization for all selves 
inclusively. Indeed, it is not an ethic of self-realization in an ex-
clusive or "selfish" sense. Jesus• ethical teachings in their full con-
text suggests that agape is physchologically satisfying, whereas eros 
alone or by itself, as a sole motive for life, would be self-defeating. 
Live life in terms of a hy.pothetioal eros alone, that is, in terms of self-
seeking, deaf to, or heedless of other lives around us, and we will miss 
the secret of life, or that very self-realization which we legitimately 
crave. Live life, however, in the spirit of agape, and we not only serve 
and help others to fulfill their lives, but we find highest joy, and 
fulfill our own lives in the highest way, by so living--this, in our view, 
is the meaning of Jesus' paradoxical utterance. The total outlook of 
Jesus teaching and the New Testament (as does the Old Testament in.its 
highest rer1ches of thought) --as mankind searches for the solution tb the 
ethical problem--is found in the fellowship that agape establispes, or tenas 
to secure. 
33 See not~ 28 
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Psychological reality seems to be this: that the love and respect 
that others have for one 1s self is the highest form of self~realization • 
.Agape achieves this; eras alone or by itself, does not.. When one reaches 
out toward another, in the spirit of agape, that is, to love him and serve 
his interests and needs, over and beyond one's own--when the other realizes 
that his life and welfare is your concern too--confidence and friendship are 
established. Then, as a product of this relationship, when one stands in love 
and fellowship with others, one experiences full or highest well-being or 
joy or happiness. We know this in our deeper human friendships. Agape does 
not rule out legitimate ranges of eros; it simply says that life lived solely 
in terms of eras, will not complete its destiny in fellowship; whereas in 
agape we find life 1s highest satisfactions. 
Life is a proper mixture of eros and agape, with agape a more inclusive 
statement of motive, indicating the design of others' desire to live along 
with the self, and, in the highest sense, to live together in fellowship. 
True, agape should over-reach in its aim just the closer circle of one's 
more intimate friends--to include all and sundry and even those who may be 
antagonistic, or one I s enemies, as Jesus says (Matt .. 5 :46)., It is active 
good will toward all men as sacred in their persons. In his saying in J:!!8.t---
thew 5 :46--"if you love those who love you, what reward have you? 11 --Jesus 
seems to n:ean that love should be more, or reach beyond, or rise higher than, 
bare utilitarian or mutual or market love--the love and service of others 
Qllib:y if they love and serve in return. 
III., The Se+f_in the Teachings of Jesus 
Such passages as the following emphasize or suggest the right to personal 
life, fulfillment or self-realization as included in the meaning of agape 
and the kingdom of heaven. This theme is an extension of the primary New 
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Testament teaching of the sacredness of personality. 
Natt. 5:3f 
6:32-33 
Mk. 
7:7-12 
25:21 
12:30--31 
8:35 
10~42-:-45. 
Luke 6,08 .-
Acts 20:35 
John 16 :24 
10:10 
Matt.·5:23 
Luke 18: 2-16 
Matt. 7:6 
(Rom. 12 :6, 18 
:Mark 9:2f 
l!.,:33f 
--The Beatitudes: "1Ble ssed are those who, netc. 
--On anxiety and trust, and recognition that God af-~ 
firms our need for material security. 
--Ask and it will be given you, and Golden Rule. 
--The faithful servant in parable of the talents to 
enter into the joy of the master. 
--The Great Commandment: Love neighbor as s3lf. 
--He that loses life in service will find it. 
--Give and it shall be given you. 
--It is more blessed to give than to receive, 
--That your joy may be full. 
--That men may have life abundantly. 
--Passages including the idea of justice, acknow-
ledging men's fundamental right to selfhood, fair 
play, and the principle of arbitration and adjust-
ment between persons. 
--The defense of one's person, values, and accomplish-
ments against heedless, unjust, or malicious attack 
or abuse. 
--Acknowledgment of personality differences or 11gifts 11 
and personality conflicts and problems, setting 
limits to comradeship.) 
--Where Jesus selects the disciples so that they 
would be near him, and passages which expressed 
his need for fellowship with special friends. 
We may point out that the explicit doctrine of 11rewai:-ds 11 in the Gospel 
emphasizes the self (:Matt. 5:3, 8, 10; 6:4, 6; 10:42; Luke 6:35; 11;28; 
lv',ark 9:47). 
Many contexts contain the idea of life's consequences, fruits, and re-
wards. In a number of instances life's rewards in Jesus' teachings are 
practical and utilitarian in addition, no doubt, to son:e which are escha-
tological and transcendentai.33a A practical and this-wordly concern for the 
33a Matt. 515, 7, 25; 6:11; 20:k8; Luke 6:38. 
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self, in its will-to-live and personal need, seems plain in the great prayer, 
"Give us this day our daily bread11 (Matt., 6 :11); or in the saying, "Call 
the laborers and pay them their wagcs 11 (IYf.att. 2ota); or 0Give and it will 
be given you; good measure, pressed down, shaken together, running over, 
will be put into your lap. For the measure you give will be the rr3asure 
you get back (Luke 6:38)--said in a context about life with other men, con-
cerning generosity as the normative response to '.";enerosity. And even in the 
sayings about a heavenly or transcendental reward, it is concern for the self 
and i:.ts indivudual destiny that is implied. 
An implication of the parable of the talents is Jesus 1 approbation of 
self-expression in the practical uorld, in addition to the probable central 
meaning which enjoins faithful stewardship for the kingdom. 
A point of central importance, connected with the problem of the self, 
in Jesus• ethical teaching, is the meaning of his saying that the perfection 
of God is highest ethical standard, or inspiration for the moral life. As 
it stands in Matthew, Jesus' words concluding tha section on agape love 
(5 :4.3-48) "You, the ref ore, must be perfect as your heavenly Father is per,.,., 
fect\1 (v .48) do not necessarily sug<;;est some rigid, static absolute, or 
completed pattern which the finite self must fit '.Jefore it may qualify for 
salvation.. Rather may not the 11 perfection11 of God refer here to the personal 
loving source of our being, and to imitate this would mean that our full-
orbeq motive and purpose should be outgoing and serving like God's, as Cosmic 
Source or Creator of all persons? At least part of the meaning of Jesus• 
Sermon in Matthew is to lay stress on intentions or motives, as defining 
virtue, goodness, or righteousness, rather than to erec.t an absolutistic, 
or abstract standard of perfections, without room for growth or margin for 
error. tlynarnic respect for J;ersonality--one 1 s m,m a:: well as other, pointed 
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up in the idea of love of enemies and over-reaching forgiveness--is the full, 
or Divine-like motive. It is interesting that Luke I s version of the Sermo:1 
(Q source here) suggests the possibility of this type of commentary. In 
comparing the two sources we find that Luke refers to the Divine mercv as 
the divine standard of righteousness: 11 Be n:erciful, even as your Father is 
merciful" (Luke 6 :36).. Also in the Lukan report we have the significant 
addition of reward for the self in the love relationship, and the elevation 
of the selves to status of 11 sons 11 of the 11..ost High as the fulfillment or 
destiny of that relationship (6:32-36). 
Christianity has two ultimate objectives, an objective of motive, and 
an objective of results. Its objective of motive is ~gape; its objective of 
results is the Kingdom, or Fellowship. Each of these may be transposed and 
become means and results for the other. In stressing agape we must not for-
geG that one ultimate objective of the Christian ethic is fellowship, and 
fellowship implies oneself and one's fulfillment as well as the other self 
and his fulfillment. Agape is the means to fellowship. We should expect 
to experience a sense of well-being, or personal fulfillment (or 11 self-
realization11) in doing any right or duty, including Agape. (Matt. 5 :lf; 
Acts 20:35; Luke 6:38; Matt. 25 :21; 7:7-12). The Agape-Fellowship pol-
arity of the Christian ethic n:eans the self-realization of all selves in a 
bond of serving love to each other. The Christian ethic, of course, is 
not self-realizational in the sense of realizing the self in exclusion of, 
or. at the expense of, others. 
The Christian metaphysics and Christian ethics includes oneself as well 
as other selves. The ultimacy of personality in being and value is the car-
dinal motif--all persons, everywhere included, one's own as well as another 
are sacred. The problem of Christian ethics is to solve the 11 tension11 be-
tween the legitimate claims of one I s own 11ego 11 and those of another. Fe1-
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solves this ·tension and ag£1pe creates fellowship" 
lowship/ The motive of agape is to love the other person, in his material 
and spiritual need, first, in the sense that it transcends thogght of mat-
erial reward for oneself, or even of the reward of 1.nnning friendship. One 
· may not win friendship in some particular isolated case; but he must still 
love in agape. However, the facts usually are that friendship and fellow-
ship are established; accordingly agape tends to solve the deepest need of 
the self as a by-product of its activity. Usually agape establishes the 
earthly fellowship with men, as the normal outcome of the moral laws of the 
universe. Agape always establishes the fellowship with God. 
Self-love is an express aspect of Christian ethics, if it means one's 
self-respect, and one 1 s self-:acceptance as a sacred person along with other 
persons, created as such by God. Agape does not mean delf-denial or self-
abnegation, or self-annihilation in some morbid or extreme sense. (This 
would rather be the ethics- of extrerr.e philosophic Hinduism o·i- Buddhism.) 
Jesus t highest ethical te.achings include the self: The Golden Rule, lfJa.tthew 
7:12; The Great Paradox, Mark 8:35; 10:43-44; The Great Commandment, Yark 
12:30-31; It is a mistake to say that Christian ethics is not self-reali-
zational in the highest sense advanced in our preceding discussion, or that 
Christian ethics rules out self-love, in the terms expressed above: i.e. as 
legitimate self-esteem, central to stable personality. It would indeed rule 
out self-realization or self-love in some inordinate sense that would exclude 
others from fellowship with the self, or that would seek to dominate others 
and to live at their· expense, in the true meaning of 11 self'ishness 11 or sin-
fulness., 
Furthermore, for there to be love, there has to be one who loves, i.e. 
one's self or one's own person. For others to ce served there must be a self 
or oneself who serves. Therefore, love itself implies one's self or one 1s 
person and establishes it in value and in being. The concept of service im-
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implies 
two selves, one's own and the other. 
The Christian ideal of self-forgetfulness or self-sacrifice does not mean 
to destroy the self, but to let the self become completely outgoing and 
loving as God's own self is. Consciousness lies at the heart of the idea 
of the self. The difference between Christian self-consiou:sness and pagan 
or utilitarian self-consciousness o~ selfhood is that the latter is domi-
nated by consciousness of one's own needs; whereas Christian selfhood is 
dominated by consciousness of the needs of others over and above and beyond 
mere concern with the needs of the self, but!!£.!:_ exclusive of God's ultimate 
~ of ~ establishment £i ill selves in fellowship. Christian consciousness 
does not deny the legitimate claim and right of oneself to existence, or 
question the value of self-existence, as the Eastern religions in some res·-
pects seem to do. 
Agape includes the self. The Christian ethic is like an ellipse: it 
has two foci. One focus is self-realizational in the highest form of fel-
lowship--the focus which is the self. However, the other focus, the focus 
centering on other life, is absolutely essential, if the focus of the self 
is to be realized or to have legitimate meaning and status· •. Likewise the 
other person is commanded to focus on us in ag?pe, to establish us. There 
could be no f~cus of agape, or the love and service, and establishment of 
the other, for the sake of the other, if there were not the focus of the self 
who serves and establishes, and is likewise a focus to receive the agape of 
the other. The outer curve of the ellipse itself is the society or fellow-
ship established by these two principles, both selves going out to each other 
in agape, as the moral gravitation by which these foci are maintained in 
' 
being. I!!£. Christian ethic .i§.. inter-self-realizational;:f 
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In his discussion of the relations of "eschatology" to "ethics II in a 
contE:xt acknowledging the trans-ethical, mystical dimension in the life and 
teachings of Jesus, Amos Wilder concludes with a memorable sentence: 
But in a higher sense ethics still .. characterizes the fel-
lowship of the kingdom in that it is a kingdom of person-
ality, a communion of selves, whose peculiar beatitude is 
made possible by the combination of liberty and loyalty. 33b 
IV. Joy and Existence 
The Judaeo-Christian scheme of values is not one primarily emphasizing 
"separation," "sin, 11 and "anxiety • 11 Rather it stresses fellowship, right-
eousness, and joy. "Sin" is not some inevitable status of finite being, 
resulting from a metaphysical "separation" from the Ground of Being in God; 
though it may indeed be, in the Biblical perspective, that "separation" is 
a provisional consequence of possible sin! In any case, the larger Biblical 
message is on the sacredness of the self, and it expresses undying hope in 
the possibility of human growth toward good. Closing, then, on the larger 
metaphysical scheme woven into the background of this immediate section we 
wish to say that in the sense of our finitude and freedom arises a primal 
sense of joy in life and existence, derived from Ultimate Love. We do not 
first have a sense of "anxiety" arising out of our possible coming into 
nothingness or non-being. Philosophies of anxiety state a truth, and play 
their part, but they do not state the whole truth of life, nor its funda-
mental truth. The genius of the religion of Jesus as stressing life's Joy 
seems enshrined in the Beatituads, or in his words, above mentioned, about 
the kingdom of Heaven as being like the trusting, joyful attitude of little 
children. 
My awareness of myself as true object to God--implicit in our sense of 
finitude--carries a sense of the gracious love and generosity of God as the 
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Creative Power, or "Power of Being" that brought me forth or makes me 
possible. Let us start from the sense of joy, then, rather than anxiety, 
as the first sentiment of our self-experience. So starting we may challenge 
the philosophies of "estrangement" from being, as characteristic of man. 
sense of "estrangement", but rather fundamentally a sense of e:J1:istence and its 
We do not fundamentally have a/goodness as the work of Creative Love. And 
out of our sense of joy springs the trust that life will open unto us, and 
unto us with otqers jointly, into fuller, and ever more abundant, meaning. 
APPENDIX A 
Personality as Criterion of the 
Judaeo-Christian Ethic 
501 
Are there two points at issue here, namely: a. What is the ultimate 
reason, sanction or motive of the Christian ethic of~ love? ~nd b. 
What is the precise role or place of the self in being, and in the Christian 
etl:iic of love? This analyst believes that these issues are identical in 
substance. In any case, in speaking to the first question, we should re-
call that Jesus appealed to several sanctions or reasons for his ethic and 
program •• Amos Wilder indicates five such motives uttered by Jesus for the 
Christian life and conduct, namely: a reverent appeal to the authority or 
prestige of Scripture (but not in sense pf an absolµte binding law); an ap-
peal to reason and common sense; an appeal to the nature of God as love; an 
appeal to the authority and example of Jesus' himself; and an appeal to con-
, sequences, i.e. to reward and judgment. ' Prof. Wilder believes that this 
last type of appeal, in its transcendental or eschatological aspects, was 
a formal sanction, the nature of which Jesus could anti~ipate only by sym-
bolic expressions suggested by the apocalyptic thought forms of his day, while 
the appeals to reason and God's nature as love were more fundamental in the 
thinking of Jesus.* 
We would &dd (and perhaps this is only an elaboration of the sanctions 
of reason and of God's nature as love; or perhaps it is a summary of all of 
them together) that the sacred worth of personality is certainly an under-
lying motive, sanction, reason, or theme for Christian love. This point seems 
implicit in many of the great sayings and parables: The Golden Rule, The 
Good Samaritan, The Prodigal Son returned, The Lost Sheep found, the Labo1::ers 
* Eschat~logy and Ethics in the Teachings of Jesus, Harper, 1950, p. l12f~ 
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hired last announced as worthful as the first to be hired; his sayings that 
in the eyes of_God men are supremely worthful, more valuable than the grass 
of the field, or than many sparrows; in the injunction to love enemies, to 
forgive our neighbors, as God loves and forgives us. His sayings, "Suffer 
the little children to come unto me ••• for of such is the kingdom of heaven" 
(Mark 10:14, KJ); or, "it is not the will of my Father who is in heaven that 
one of these little ones should peris.h" (Matt. k8:14), suggest not only the 
ingenuousness and simplicity of childhood as a character ideal of the kingdom, 
but also Jesus 1 -positive or optimistic outlook on human nature in its ori-
ginal state, and on the divine attiuude toward personality's worthfulness or 
value, as it comes from the Creator. 
It may indeed be granted, if this is what is sometimes meant, that hhe 
Judaeo-Christian personality criterion of being, value, and ethical life, does 
not mean that man is conceived solely as a Platonic universal, or trans-earthly 
"essence" of individuality; but rather the personality criterion refers to 
the concrete reality of people, or persons as individual "creatipns" of God. 
Our view is that the correct statement of the Judaeo•Christian metaphysics 
does indeed 
and ethics would be that i1/rest. on a doctrine of "the infinte, inherent 
value"-!( of all human Eersons, oneself, as well as the oth~--however much 
also we all share in such "universal" qualities as individuality, freedom, 
reason, a life of desire, and of some responsiveness to value. 
Interpreted in one way, Jesus' Great Commandment, on its side of love to 
God, implies personality as a "universal" or "cosmic" criterion. May we not 
say that the command to love God means to love, honor, or reverence the Creative 
source of all personal life, or personality? We love and reverence God, in 
utmost gratitude, for our own and our neighbor's being. We love God who has 
* Contrc:sbRamsey, £12.• cit., p. 94. 
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brought us forth the Creative mystery of His Being out his love 
. , 
us. Moreover, as we may love another human person for what he is, over and 
above and beyond what he may do, so, by analogy, part of the meaning of our 
love for God may be our love for what He is as the Supreme Person, beyond 
His aspect as the creative source of all being. The love of a younger brother 
for an older brother, or of a son for a father, is our best human analogy of 
this dimension of the human love for God. Such loves at ·their highest have 
risen above utilitarian value, and are in a sense what we may mean by the 
agape love of men toward God. 
Also, from the standpoint of a further side of contemporary debate al:>out 
the nature of Jesus I teaching, we assume that much of it is practic·al, and 
this-worldly, and not entirely "eschatological" or 11apocalyptic, 11 or bearing 
solely on the expectation of the imminent end of the world and historic time, 
in anticipation of the early return of the ''Sonjd of man. 11 We believe that "· 
the tone of many of Jesus' utterances, their note of ageless wisdom that ap-
peals directly to mind and heart, to experience, reason, and aspiration, 
suggests that he was speaking of God and Man in terms relevant !2_ 1ili M. §UCh 
on any plane in both its personal and social needs. in many such clue~ the 
faith of the expositor finds in Jesus' sayings an understanding of life, in 
its religious dimensions, that transcends the particualr apocalyptic outlook 
of the first century. This analyst is in agreement with the form of inter::-··· 
pretation which believes that, as we study the Gospel records closely, we hear 
Jesus speaking with a genuine concern for historical reality and the problems 
of this world, wit.h a gradual lifting of vision toward eschatological and 
transcendental themes.* 
* Amos N. Wilder, .2.E.• ill• 
APPENDIX B 
Josiah Royce and Albert c. Knudson on 
Christian Love 
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~The love which Jesus preached has often been misunderstood. Critics, 
as well as mistaken friends of the Master's teachings, have supposed Christian 
love to be more or less completley identical with self-abnegation--with the 
amiably negative virtue of one who, as the misleading modern phrase expresses 
the matter, "has no thought of self. 11 Another modern expression, also mis-
leading, is used by some who identify Christian love with so-called 'pure 
altruism. 11 The ideal Christian, as such people interpret his virute, 'lives 
wholly for others." That is what is meant by the spirit which resists not 
evil, which turns the other cheek to the smiter; .which forgives, and pities, 
and which abandons all worldly goods. 
uNow, against such misunderstandings, many of the wiser expounders of 
Christian doctrine, both in former times and in our own, have taken pains 
to show that love, as the Jesus of the sayings and of the parables conceived 
it, does!}.£!. consist in mere self-abnegation, and is not identical with pure 
altruism, and is both heroic and positive. The feature of the Master's 
doctrine of love which renders this more positive and heroic interpretation 
of the sayings inevitable, is the familiar reason which is laid at the basis 
of his whole teaching. One is to love one's neighbor because God himself, 
as Father, divinely loves and prizes each individual man. Hence the indi-
vidual man has an essentially infinite value, although he has this value 
only in_ and through his relation to God, and because of God's love for him. 
Therefore mere self-abnegation cannot be the central virtue. For the Jesus 
of the sayings not only rejoices in the divine love whereofevery man is the 
object, but also invites every man to rejoice in the consciousness of this 
very love, and to delight also in all men, since they are God. 1 s beloved. 
The man whom this love of God is to tr,msfm~m into a perfect lover cam.1ot 
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henceforth merely forget or abandon the self ••• Every man, this se 
has just such a unique value, and must be viewed so. Hence the sayings are 
full of calls to self-expression, and so to heroism. Love is divine; and 
therefore i. includes an assertion of its own divinity; and therefore it 
can never be mere self-abnegation. Christian altruism never takes the 
form of saying, 11I myself ought to be or become nothing; while on:S.y the 
others are to be . · and saved. II. For the God who loves· me demands not 
that I should be nothing, but that I should be his own.ti 
(From T~e Problem of Christiani~y, selections in 
Stuart Gerry Brown, ed., The Religious Philosophy of Josial Royce, 
Syracuse Universit·y Press, New York, 1952, pp. 146-147.) 
11The true Christian ideal is self-realization through self-sacrifice. 
It includes both self~love and the love of otherso And the love of others 
is not un~otivated. It is conditioned by the moral worth of its object. 
If it were not, it would not itself be moral. It is.the sacredness of pe~-
sonaliy that makes love morally obligatory. This applies to love both of 
oneself and of others. Indeed, so far as th~ attainment of the moral goal 
of life is concerned, everyone has a greater responsibility for himself than 
for anyone else. Self-love is therefore a moral obligation. But it cannot 
in our social world be detached from the love of others, nor can the true 
love of others be completely detached from the love of self. In other words 
there is a common moral ,ideal that is implicit both in true self-love and 
in the true love of others and that binds the two together. This moral 
ideal is furthermore grounded in both our love of God and his love of us:' 
~rom Albert C. Knudson, Basic Issues in Christian Thousht, New York, Ab-
ingdon Press, 1950, pp. 191-192.) 
uLove, however, which is thus detached from the idea of worth and from 
the idea of duties to self has ceased to be love in the moral sense of the 
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term. If there is no worth in ourselves or in others, which imposes ob-
ligations upon us, it is clear that love in the·latter .as well,as the former 
case has no moral or rational basis. It was insight into this fact that 
led Augustine to base both the love of self and the love of others on the 
presence of God in the human heart. Self-love, as he conceived it, means 
loving God in ourselves, and the love of others means loving God in them~ 
In other words, it is the divine sanctity of the human soul that imposes 
the obligation of love upon us, and this obligation applies to ourselves as 
well as to others. 
(from Albert c. Knudson, The Principles of Christian Ethics, New York: Ab-
ingdon Press, 1948, p. 178. ) 
CHAPTER FIFTEEN 
~ .Q! ~ ~ Religious Bein~: 
E,rayer, ¼ipmortality, and ,Bistoric Destiny 
In this chapter we presume to write briefly on some of the mo::-e 
"personal aspects 11 of religion,. Traditionally these personal aspects 
have meant such things as Ufaith11 and 11 prayer, 11 personal "religious 
experience, 11 the problem of life I s n:eaningfulne ss and sense of God 1 s 
providence in life, and the problem of belief in immortality., Some of 
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these topics we have already covered and will not elaborate further here, 
such as the concept of faith dealt with in chapter one, page 23-27; the 
discussion of 11religious experience 11 and the idea of salvation in chapter 
seven on the religious argument for God, pages 263-274; the idea of 
11 providence 11 in chapter nine, pages 366-373; and the problem of the personal 
rr..eaningfulness of life, germane to religious experience, considered in 
chapter thirteen, page ., In the present chapter we will discuss those 
topicl:l in the preceding list not yet specifically considered--namely, 
prayer and.belief in a herea:fter or immortality; and we will conclude with 
the idea of the religious meaningfulness of history. This last topic 
touches upon personal religion insofar as a sense of the personal mean-
ingfulness of life and God 1s providence in life would naturally lead into 
the larger question of whether human history as a whole has meaning. Ac-
cordingly, we shall conclude this chapter with a brief discussion of the Judaeo-
Christian conception of history and human destiny. 
I. Prayet 
If answer to prayer is a reality and affects results in life, it 
would be religion in the most experimental and empirical mood. 
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1. The difference prayer makes in life: the need for prayer. Prayer 
is a natural expression of belief in the universe as a moral and pu,:.posive 
ple.ce ~ conceived to be interested above all else in our own finite personal 
lb.res o Prayer is the supreme response on man I s part to this kind of a 
universe. The differnece prayer would make seems crucial. If the universe 
is such a place, then it would be through prayer that we gain support from 
the ultimate purposiveness to live our life in the fullest, most meaningful 
and happiest way. If the universe is such a place, alive with the purposes 
of God, to neglect prayer would be the greatest oversight on a man's part. 
It would be failure to utilize life's supreme resource in God. Perhaps to 
experiment with prayer confirms the experience that the universe is such a 
place. William Adams Brown said: 
Prayer is the most serious business in life. It is 
the way in which we define for ourselves the final issues 
and relate ourselves to the ultimate reality.* 
2. Conditions for belief in prayer and types of prayer. The basic 
condition, obviously, would be the belief that God is in some sense a reality •. 
Accordingly, various types of belief about God would have corresponding 
beliefs about "prayer." The two great watersheds of thinking about God 
are the iropersonalist and the personalist. 
If God is thought of mainly as the impersonal whole of being, somewhat 
after the manner of the classic pantheisms, prayer then would take the 
form of "meditation," and perhaps "aspiration." It would be meditation in 
reverence and awe about the wonder and mystery of existence, with no thought 
of the dependence of existence on Ultimate P.ersonal Being. It would be 
aspiration for the good, the true, arid beautiful, the'..highest ideals and 
abstractions of which we can think without conceiving these as also repre-
* The Life of Prayer in a World of Sc~, Scribners, 1931, p. 132. 
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senting or reflecting the "thoughts" of a personal source of existence 
in God. John Dewey, for example, in his system of naturalistic, religious 
humanism allowed "religious" emotion and aspiration in this sense. A 
great deal of Oriental p±ety has stressed the ultimate union of man with the 
transpersonal "God" ., e.g. 
di..:icipline. 
Brnhnan , in and through meditative 
Prayer for the theistic personalist in broadest terms would mean 
"communion" of the finite person with the Infinite Person, and the real 
response of the Infinite Person to primary needs and aspirations of the 
person 
finitr- Traditionally speaking, prayer has thought to be legitimately ex-
pressed by several kinds of moods, such as: 
1) Petition (for things?) 
2) Petition for personal spiritual values or gifts--e.g. for illumi-
nation and clarification of moral and/or intellectual perpleJdty- .. 
in which the prayer for faith itself may have some legitimate place; 
for moral qualities for one's life, such as the power to forgive and 
to love. 
3) Prayer for forgiveness for oneself for conscious moral failure or 
misdemeanor, expressed in the attitude of contrition. 
4) Prayer of adoration, thanksgiving and praise in the midst of the 
sense of life's well-being; at times of great joy or fulfillment; 
or at the passing of illness or great danger. Involved here is a 
complex sentiment reflecting belief in God as prot,ctive Creator, 
sustainer, and preserver of life~ 
5) Intercessory prayer for the health and welfare of others. 
For the modern man of religion~ living in a 11scientific 11 day and age, can 
prayer have meaning or reality in all of these ways? Or if not in all per• 
haps, in which particularly? 
3. ~nn1,y~i_.~ of belief in_£_rayer a_§ a~lity:_-it1? intellectua~-
§..!;!P..,.'29Sitions: David Elton Trueblood encompasses the issue, we believe, in 
thA following memorable statement: 
So long as one really believes in God, no ethically 
sensitive p~tition need be ruled out •••• God does not need 
to change the laws of nature in order to answer prayer, if 
the laws themselves> as there is reason to believe, are de-
pendent upon a divine purpose, and are relatively constant 
only because God's will is constant •••• 
••• Unless the world is a closed mechanical system, there 
seems no reason to doubt the effic.;i.cy · of prayer, but we 
know that it is not such a system, for there are men in it. 
A world in which thought can move matter is a world in which 
it is wholly reasonable for prayer to affect destiny,* 
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Analyzing this statement, we : · ,,. · · · find the characteristic pre-
suppositions or emphases that our belief about prayer must have as modern 
men: 
~-Belief in God 
~-An ethically sensitive petition 
£._·Recognition that we live in a world of "natural law" 
.2,-Yet at the same time realizing that it need not be viewed as a 
"closed mechanical system" 
e-Our own experience that thought (acting within the realm of law) 
can move matter 
The critical problem for many modern minds as to whether prayer can 
be a reality or a significant force in life centers in the question whether 
the concept of "prayer" does not conflict with the idea of a world of 
"natural law. 11 The old "rationalist" criticism that a wise Providence 
would not "'interfere" in .his world of "natural law" to cause an ~ hoc 
miracle, we believe should hold as a general guide of our thinking in 
this area. Accordingly, the resolution of the conflict moves in the di-
rection of redefining prayer, to be sure, away from some of its tradition-
alist meaning, to center primarily in point~ above, or ethical sensitivit~; 
while at the same time we become aware of the meaning of "natural law 11 in 
* The Logic of Belief, Harper, 1942, pp. 278-279. 
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fullest, synoptic,. or coherent s~, suggested by s £., £, and 
~- To discuss this latter need first. 
We live in a universe of what we have heretofore called superord:i.nate 
energies, or a hierarchy of "laws, 11 representing ~ ascending orders 
of complexity and freedom: materiological energies and laws, biological 
or organic laws, with the psychological or psychogenic laws of "thought 11 
and ufree spirit" the topmost echelon of these inter-related energies, and 
their modes of operation or process which we term their "laws." Further, 
the facts of evolution and growth, the ar-rivnlof real novelties, and, ul-
. . 
timately, experienced freedom, suggest that our universe is not a closed 
"mechanical" system (recall our discussion of mechanism vs. purpose, pp. 
150-157).. Indeed, the very meaning of a world of "law" as something moving 
its tel-
or operating with a predictable constancy contains .i~·. / eological ir·.pH.cot.'ion 
in the realization that such is necessary as a stable environment, if living 
beings are to learn to make habitual the most favorable adjustment (D. C. 
Macintosh). The world of "law 11 as viewed from the perspective of belief 
in God is again well evaluated by Trueblood: 
••• the order of the world·· is accounted for by reference 
to the con$tancy of divine purpose ••• Prayer means conscious 
participation in the purposive order in particular situations •••. * 
And again by W. A. Brown: 
••• law ••• whether inner or outer, is not a barrier to 
progress, but the condition which maRes it possible.** 
How, then, may we define prayer as a hypothesis regarding spiritual 
energy, in such form as to be consonant with the understandipg of the 
universe as a system of superordinate law-abiding energies, among which 
prayer itself takes its normal place? 
~-: Ibid., p. 277 
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4. What is highest prayer? We here wish to avoid such a dogmatic 
or narrow interpretation of prayer as would possibly rule out its mean-
ingfulness in other dimensions or interpretations where no doubt many 
people, past and present, have believed its significance or reality to 
lie, in addition to our understanding of prayer as relating primarily to 
the area of moral sensitivity. Is pr.ayer for material things possible? 
Is prayer for the healing of broken bones ever effective or a reality? We 
do not wish to deny its possibility in such areas of hope, where people 
testify that they have experienced its power, but we tend to feel that its 
highest or finest meaning transcends (indeed must transcend) its use for 
such material goals; and we tend to believe that in the growing religious 
life it is normative for the meaning of prayer, at its roost mature, to. 
come to have, more or less exclusively, the moral or ethical power and 
significance, here described. We leave open the possibility~ when 
prayer has done its sure wor:; of good within the pla:r,D of thoµght, spirit, 
that 
and mind, it then may have important effects, derivative, and possibly 
even direct, in the realm of the "material," such as aiding bodily healing. 
(We do not deny, of course, that there has been, perhaps often times, an 
observed relationship between "prayer," "mental conditioning," or "faith, 11 
and healing in some forms of illness.)* 
In any case, we believe that prayer at its highest should be for 
spiritual values, for oneself and for others. For fortitude and courage 
in the face of obstacles; for quickening in the will to do one's duty in 
the day-to-day necessity of making moral decisions; forstrength against 
temptation; for clarity of judgment in intellectual perception amid the 
perlexities of life-; for forgiveness, if need be. t1;1us Er2}:.§1'_is_ ~tarJ: 
communion ~ God concern:i.ng His e,{pectations ~ your life. Indeed, 
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transcending oneself, it should aim at securing values for others;such 
that our prayers should be that we ourselves become instruments of love 
and service. 
The late Douglas Clyde Macintosh believed that he formualted quite 
said 
exactly the "law" of the answer to prayer, and that prayer so und'::rstood 
could always be counted upon to "work, 11 as the experiential "proof" of the 
reality1 of God, or in his own alternative words, of a "Divine Factor," 
operating within and behind th~ experience.* The formula can be rendered 
in two ways: 
a) Formulated as normative psychology (from the subjective side) 
E, RRA(VE)-----------------ap 
ego•right religious adjustment toward volitional effect gives 
answer to prayer 
b) Formulated as a dependable theistic reaction (from the objective 
or cosmic standpointl 
DF RRA(VE)------------------ap 
Divine Factor•right religious adjustment toward volitional effect 
gives answer to prayer 
In Macintosh's exposition of the normative law of answer to prayer, 
the two formulas are not mutually exclusive, but complementary. For 
If 
indeed it could be asked, are E and DF the same? E and DF (Ego and the 
Divine Factor) are logically or exhaustively !~1.£&, then "prayer" 
could indeed be called wish-fulfillment, or perhaps self-hypnosis, at 
least a self-verifying ta\ttology. 
Macintosh;, however, believed that the content or experience itself 
of right religious adjustment (in the moral or volitional terms meant) 
and the sense of answer to prayer discloses a truly "objective" factor, 
God; "objective," or "transcending," because of a characteristic sense of 
* Theology as an Empirical Science, Macmillan, 1927, p. ll,,Qf. 
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one's 
inc.mning "strengthn not entirely/' self,. He was thus accustomed to 
pi:-asent the following diagram.which represented, he believed, the authen.::l.c 
"Christian" experience of God, and answer to prayer: 
·.oD~ 
:;...-- ... ,~, _:...-------
God: the Divine ·, -~ · ~ 
Fae.tor· or Reality A.·. 
0 
• • The finite. 
. · (~1';-f- self"\ 
- _,.:- _ _,'" J • ~ '. 
\ /'~ ,r~j'j 
,/1 ~ 1,, 
l 
i,, 
.. Area w.here the Divine Personal and the 
human personal conjoin in the sense of 
strengthened moral personality.* Arrow D would indicate a directional 
movement, or guara:nteed response of the·Divine Factor toward and "into" 
the finite as the finte made effort. (i.e,. Right.rel.igious adjustment) in 
the direction £. toward J). in order to "receive 11 the Divine Presence. 
Macintosh rationalized the reality of prayer (and religious experience 
,. ' ' .,- . . 
in its normative moral dimensions,;.-recall our discussion pp. 266-70) ex-
tremely·~~ggestive'ly.in the ab~ve ~~Y for the religious consciousness. 
(We call the reader's attenti.o~ to appendix A of this chapter where ~e 
have exc€pted the main portion oi Macintosh on "religiou~ experience" ·and 
"prayer, 11 iri 'his own eloquent words, from his ~las sic work, Theology as 
now 
an Empirical Science.) We/summarize what we have just elaborated into a 
general ·s~atement or definiqqn of pr.ayer., When .J;>rayer is the deepest 
expression ,Qf our reverence for person~lity and seeks a voli.tional effect· 
in the furtherance .of good for personality, finite life feels inf ;lowing 
power and t.he sustaining presence and help of the Personal Source of life 
* Perhaps, in some cases, radiciilly restrtictured. pe,rsonality: "conversiQn" 
The memorable words :.tl'-'::;ain d" 
and being. /William Adams Brown 
here 
are . fitting: 
Through prayer we experience that which we cannot 
explain, and solve the mystery of the relation of finite 
to the infinite. We do not know how peace, power, and 
courage come to us. We know only that they come.* 
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5. The medium_of prayer. As in physical science, processes and 
laws need a continuum in or through which their operations effect their 
results, causalities their consequences, so in the "spiritual realm" prayer 
needs its conu:nun:l.cating medium or continuum. That spiritual sensitivity 
continuum is love--through it prayer works. This was beautifully expressed 
by the noted Scottish pracher, John Watson. He phrased it in particularly 
Christian terms--as the Christianpreacher--but that would not detract 
from the universal appeal of his insight; since the "Christ" whom he 
particularly reverences in his statement is the expression in his tra-
dition of the~ which is , universal in all great religions. Love 
as a sensitivity medium is a spiritual reality. Operating through it, as 
we essentially pray to be ourselves the answers to others' prayers, we 
can come to see how prayer at its most exalted can have real effect, or 
be an effective power. After relating his experiences of answer to prayer, 
John Watson offered three inferences: 
"(1) People may live in an atmosphere of sympathy 
which will be a communicating medium. When someone· 
appears to read another I s thoughts, as we have all seen 
done at public exhibitions, it was evidently by phys-
ical signs, and it served n~ood purpose. It was a 
mechanical gift, and was u.:,d for an amusement. This 
is knowledge of another kinq, whose conditions are 
spiritual and whose ends are ethical. Between you 
and the person there must be some common feeling; 
it rises to a height in the hour of trouble; and its 
call is for help. The correspondence here is between 
heart and heart, and the medium through which the 
message passes is love. 
* The Life of Prayer in a World of Science, op. cit., p. 124 
n(2) This love is but another name for Christ, who 
is the head of the body; and here one falls back on St. 
Paul's profound and illuminating illustration. It is 
Christ who unites the whole race, and especially all 
Christian folk, by His incarnation. Into Him are 
gathered all the fears, sorrows, pains, troubles of 
each member, so that He feels with all, and from Hirn 
flows the same feeling to other members of the body. 
He is the common spring of sensitiveness and sympathy, 
who connects each man with his neighbour and makes of 
thousands a living organic spiritual unity. 
11 (3) In proportion as one abides in Christ he will 
be in touch with his brethren. If it seem to one 
marvelous and almost incredible that any person should 
be affected Ly another's sorrow whom he does not at 
the moment see, is it so marvelous, although quite 
credible, that we are so often indifferent to sorrow 
which we do see? Is it not the case that one of a 
delicate soul will detect secret trouble in the failure 
of a smile, in a sub-tone of voice, in a fleeting 
shadow on the face? "How did he know? 11 we duller people 
say. "By his fellowship with Christ" is the only answer. 
"Why did we not know?" On account of our hardness and 
selfishness. If one lives self-centered--ever concerned 
about his own affairs, there is no callousness to which 
he may not yet descend; if one lives the selfless life, 
there is no mysterious secret of sympathy which may not 
be his. Therefore, if anyone desire to live in nervious 
touch with his fellows, so that their sorrows be his 
own and he be their quick helper, if he desire to share 
with Christ the world burden, let him open his heart 
to the Spirit of the Lord. In proportion as we live 
for ourselves are we separated from our families, our 
friends, our neighbours; in proportion as we enter into 
the life of the cross we are one with them all, being 
one with Christ, who is one with God~* 
II Immortalit}:'. 
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In this section we consider the rational foundations of faith in im-
mortality. Basic questions in this area of philosophy of religion are: 
Of what value is belief in "immortality?" What do we mean by 11:tmmortality 11 --
what would · · be--i.e. what are varied views of immortality? 
~~ A summary of John Watson's ("Ian Maclaren") interpretation of 
prayer, - <1 • in The Christian Doctrine of· Pl::ayer ed. by 
J. Hastings, T & T Clark, Edinburg, 1917. 
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that it is 
Among possible meanings of immortality, there is the faith/ "personal 11 ,. 
:-• " Is "personal immortality" a possibility? This is the 
question we will be centrally considering here. 
1. Y££.!ed meanings of immortality, In the great religious traditions 
several alternative meanings of roan as having some kind of death·crans-
cending destiny are present. At the risk of sono over-simplification 
we suggest that there he.ve been four basic views, given below. To these 
a. 
we add/first philosophic or logical possibility that will make. our list 
complete as to beliefs about ·a transcending destiny 
for man • , ~ 1«', The first of these positions is the denial 
that there is a transcending destiny of any kind•-or that this idel}.has 
any meaning or significance for us men. Accordingly, we have the following 
five philosophical possibilities: 
l) The belief in no "immortality": the materialist. position. 
2) Absorptionism: the belief that man•s finite ''spirit 11 is tobe 
of 
reabsorbed into the absolute or ul tiroate impersonal whole/Being, with no 
remainqer of anything that we could call personality or personal consciousness 
left--e,remplified in many Hindu and Buddhist scripture c. 
3) ;Qeification,. div:i.nization, or a;potheosis of man then:e 0 ijere the 
belief is somewhat like two above.--but with the idea that we finite spirits 
cecome literally the infinte Spirit or Person Himself;. we become literally 
j.§ent.ified with the Supren:e Consciousness, .?:f:l .ConscJotlsnes~, or Person--
thus man as the outcome of his religious striving becomes 11God; 11 we at'e 
exalted reality 
really God Himself all along., but be.come fully aware of this/only upon: 
nt whioh transition 
release from this· life, , / our consciousness can expo. nd into · 
· This point of .v.iew is 
its full realization as Supreme or.Cosmic Consciousness. /.exemplified 
al;so 
again in Hindu scriptures; in MusliP. Sufi writings; and/in the western 
t::.~adition .. 
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(4) Personal immortality. The belief that in the presence of God,.or 
in God Himself in some way, we are preserved or remain as "personal con-
1 sown ultimate Selfhood 
sciousnesses" or spiritual persons, distinct from God/and from each other. 
This possibility as a type of immortality, would logically necessitate, 
it.seems to us, the continuation of our own sense of finitude in such a 
Hereafter or "Heaven." In the west at least this has been the most common-
place meaning of immortality. 
(5) Reincarnation as a mode of immortality. 
Thus 3, 4, and 5 are varied meanings of "personal immortality." We 
will not here attempt to argue a case either for or against "reincarnation." 
Many peoples throughout historic time have believed in reincarnation. I 
think we may keep our minds open to the possibility that reincarnation could 
be true as a metaphysical fact--surely not with all of the pessimistic 
over-tones of the classic Sansara-Karmu doctrine; but with the main idea 
that the Spiritual Purposiveness or Administration of the universe may be 
providing worlds of transcending beauty, in gala.otic times and spaces, 
where "reincarnated" souls find themselves in bodily, human bid e.:d·ntences, 
and /in such terms of felicity and joy as to be literally and relatively nheavens 11 
in contrast to our earthly existence here and now. This could be the ul-
timate destiny of men and women who by the power of God were thus "rewarded, 11 
Faith can legitimately take such a form it seems to us. Indeed, in the 
Hebrew Christian West, where the Sansara doctrine of the east was not 
specifically present (save in some of the ancient Greek outlook: Plato 
~~, there was the similar theme of the "resurrection of the body. n 
Deificationism (3 above) seems to us a doubtful possibility--because 
of its inherent and ultimate. impersonal ism (?). Our evaluative premise 
here is that (finte?) personal identity and difference is a supreme 
eman- or 
cosmic value" B::npirir::.ally speaking the production, / ·ad.on ,/cr2atio:2 cf: 
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such identities seems to be what the cosmic process is busiest doing, or 
is all about. If that is the case, what becomes of 11personal identityn 
and difference, and variety, if all such are ultimately transrro1tted into 
a single "Personal Consciousness," "God" V'fould not our own self-values 
thereby be lost or blurred? It takes two to love. In such monistic God-
Person (if this is what some of the Sufi mystics mean when they identify 
self with Allah), where then would be love? There must needs be an inherent 
cosmic 11 dualism11 between self and others so that love can arise. In pro-
foundest religion God is Agape. If He makes finite persons in the first 
place, as an outcome of His love (recall our discussion, p. 
would He not desire, and plan, to keep them as such~from the very nature 
of Himself as Personal love? Accordingly, we believe that the idea of 
"personal :immortality" best satisfies the sense of values of a personalistic 
metaphysics--and therefore our rationale for immortality has point 4 above 
in mind as its guiding conception, including possibly (if desired) some 
degree of reincarnationist or resurrectionist theory9 as aid to it. If 
reincarnationism and/or resurrectionism are left out, then some kind of 
theory of bodiless !lspirits" would be implied by our fourth alternative. 
At any rate, we now endeavor to state the case for irnmortal.ity·more or 
less in the terms outlined in the fourth alternative c, 
2. The difference belief in immor~ality makes. , . The funda -
mental question is , can we have an ethical universe without irnmor-
tality? Is immortality needed in a moral universe--is immortality necessary 
We believe th&t is 
to ethics? ? immortality/ a necessary corollary to the hypothesis that 
our world is a moral place and process. for two 
reasons. 
In the first place, we will .be certain to treat a man right if we 
regard him as an immortal being, as the most prec:io us and everlasti.n; tJ-1.ing 
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in the universe. Belief in immortality does not arise from the desire for 
unending bliss for oneself. This would found the belief in a too self-
centered and non-ethical motive. It is naive to allege that Christians 
and other religious people believe in immortality because they are looking 
for pie in the sky by an by. Rather belief in immortality is necessary 
for highest ethical sensitivity. Immortality is implied in the ethical 
premise that personal being, or personality, is of ultimate significance. 
Psychologically speaking, are we most deeply motivated to treat a man with 
highest respect, or go out to him in love and service, in the fullest im• 
plications of love, unless we regard his personal being as of ultimate 
and eternal significance, of quintessential and permanent value? Belief 
in immortality is an a priori affirmation of the ethical consciousness. 
Tennant and Hocking state the point well. Tennant said: 
Immortality becomes a matter of more or less reasonable 
belief, as distinct from deducibility from assured meta• 
physical principles or from more or less arbitrary post~ 
ulations concerning the harmonising of moral experience. 
It is ••• a demand for coherence in what is, as a matter of 
fact, a moral universe.* 
In his inimitable manner, Hocking wrote what we can summarize as the 
argument for immortality from love: 
And thus to love is to treat the loved being as 
worthy of permanence. The impulse of caring is to hold 
that being forever above the accidents of time and 
dcath--as if one could! The miracle of love is that it 
so spontaneously forgets its own limitations: it assumes 
its right to act in loco Dei--and with the right 
assumes also its ~pacity!The pathetic folly of human 
affection? Or is it the reverse, a point at which 
human finitude rises to the point of participating in 
,* F. R. Tennant, Philosophical Theology_, Vol. II THE WORLD, THE SOUL, 
AND GOD (Cambridge, at the University Press, 1937) p. 271. 
deity? I propose -that here, in willing to 
.confer immortality on another mortal, the self is 
in that moment reaching a deeper self-consciousness, 
an intimation of its own destiny.* 
521 
In the second place, and very much related to what has just been 
said, the belief in immortality puts meaning and a consequent energy 
into our struggle to perfect personal and social life. 
3. What then are the rational grounds for belief in immortalitYl 
First, there are the ethical grounds, just reviewed. 
Second, belief in the goodness and sufficiency of God is the found-
ation. That there is conscious planning in the universe for immortality 
seems a necessary postulate, else how we could survive the actual cata-
clysm of bodily death would be utterly incomprehensible., The same 
creative power that brought us into being in the fir8t place would be 
required to get us over hhe crisis. Is a philosophy of immortality 
without God convincing7 1i,, ·:i"[cTaggart attempted such in a position that 
resembles the Sankhya Hindus.**) What we mean by immortality is the 
permanent significance of personal being--this implies the power, ground, 
or condition that brings forth, and sustains, personal being, and this 
in one sense is what we mean by God. The conception of immortality is 
impossible apart from the conception of God. 
'!( William Ernest Hocking, The Meaning of Immortality in Human 
E}cperience, (Harper & Brothers Publishers, New York, 1957) p. 247. 
~'.·~'<: The Sankhya Hindus, in ancient times in the Orient (6th centur.y 
E. C.) and the early 20th century British philosopher and personal idealist, 
MacTaggart, defined personal spirits as by nature self-subsistent or 
11 ete.rnal" souls, a metaphysical view •·•hich includes the idea of immortalii-y 
without God. (See our criticism of lK.cTaggart I s non-theism, "The Per-
sonality of God, A Dialogue in Anglo-American Idealism," 1966, chapters 
six and seven.) 
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Third, a philosophy of progress and purpose implies immortality. 
Belief in immortality grows naturally out of the conception that the 
universe exists for some end--the end of bringing into existence personal 
beings with dynamic or exp a. nding capacities of growth for good, for 
intellectual, aesthetic, and moral enrichment. Man is nature's escape from 
necessary mechanism--he is a free spirit, for good or evil. "Our faith 
in the survival of man's soul· fits the universe in the sense that it 
continues its picture of development and saves it from irrationality and 
meaninglessness." (John HaXies Holmes: Ingersoll Lectures, Harvard, 1947, 
11The Affirmation of Immortality.") 
The belief is a logical and psychological accompaniment to a life of 
earnest effort and striving. Hocking again said,'~o cease at the peak of 
attainment is to lose the full meaning of that attainment. From the mere 
logic of meaning, then, there is no moment at which conscious existence 
could appropriately cease," (quoted from the above mentioned lectures.) 
Kant's argument comes in here: that our earthly span is never sufficient 
to get done what we were born to do, lmmortality is a corollary to the 
doctrine of the purposiveness of existence. 
The basic definition and meaning of immortality, then, would be the 
extension of purpose beyond this life, whatever the mode may behhich 
this is secured, or the "form"' that immortality may take. 
Fourth, we may focus on the general mystery of matter and physical 
existence in any case, as itself a clue. Hard materialism is no longer 
a tenable view of reality. The very atoms are full of energy and insub-
stantiality--and may in themselves be the same thing that we experience 
from our subjective viewpoint as the energy of life and will. "I stand 
upon the br:i.nk of the unknown, utter and unpJ.umbed .•• If we accept, as we 
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must, the indestructibility of matter, no less must we accept the inde-
structibility of ·the spirit with which matter is inforrred,'1 said the 
Ha:i'ie s 
eloquent Johr/Holmes, (Holmes, op. cit.). 
Arthur Train in his novel, ,Ihe Autom,.Q_gz:aPhv of Ephti.,~;rri- Tutt: has 
Tutt say (I paraphrase) 11 How we may live forever, would be no stra~1ger a 
possibility than that we have lived at all! 11 
In sum: mind, self-conscious life, personal consciousness, are 
better clues to reality than bare sense and soil. The experience of pur-
pose, the dis.covary of truth, the up-building of ideals and values are 
our fundamental clues to the nature and meaning of existence. Personal 
identity and.unbroken consciousness persist through physical changes of 
the body.. Is this a clue 01:· the transcendence of . personal consciousness 
over material changes? A kind,of scientific proof for immortality would 
lie in the direction of proving the case for the reality and independence 
()f mind-energy .. * Would death l:;;e the liberation of mind-energy, that form of 
energy with which we are already acquainted at the top of the hierarchy of 
energies? What is the energv o£-"1i..ud which is eternal? Plato said in the 
1:hgeq.,.q that it was truth itself, and that the soul knows that it is eterne,l 
because it may participate in the eternal order of truth itself,. 
4,. Further possibilities and l?roblems ~ the "vision .Qf God. 11 Much of 
the mystic l~terature of the west (as in the east) moves along the absorp-
t:i.onist--identificationist......:deificationist themes discussed above; and the 
rr:eaning of the ultimate life with God, or nvision of God, 11 as anticipated in 
the mystic• s pre sent rr.omentary 11vision;11 which vouchsafes his ultimate anr,1 
perduring experience in a Hereafter, were expressed· in such 
lines as the following by St. Thomas: 
* Recall chapter 12 
Here the soul in a wonderful .and unspeakable manner 
both seizes and is seized upon, devours and is herself 
devoured, embraces and is violently embraced: and by the 
knot of love she unites herself with God, and is with Him 
as the Alone with the Alone.* 
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Jacquos Maritain concludes his powerful little book, Approaches to 
Q..£4** (in large part an exposition of St. Thomas) with a defense of the 
identification:i.st outlook. in a memorable commentary, which we quote at 
some length in Appendix B. In contrast to this classic interpretation of 
the Vision of God theme, we here pose an alternate view, a confessio ~' 
as to what the Vision of Q£!! could mean from within a personalist philosophy 
of existence. 
First, however, an appreciation of the deificationist philosophy of the 
destiny of man: If it be true that we are indeed to be transmuted into 
Deity Himself, in !2!£, then our destiny is to become the inner workings 
and creativity itself of being, becoming, and the universe. Doubtless this 
is not to be disparaged as a less than grand and awe-inspiring idea. We 
reverently sugge$t, however, that this philosophy points to an aloof and 
above 
lonely destiny, 11alone with the alone" (recall St. Thomas' sentiment ;I ). 
We believe that the following is a warmer, more personalized conception 
of man's metaphysical destiny. 
Our freedom, and our finitude will continue permanently--even in :a 
Hereafter--even our "ability to sin," perhaps (compare the Lucifer myth). 
God's creative love, in our view, implies this •. We will, however, have 
"the more perfect," more intimate, direct, and satisfying knowledge or 
* Quoted by Evelyn Underhill, Practical Mysticism, E. P. Dutton, 1960) 
p. 141. See Summa Theologica t, 12, 1 for St •. Thomas further on the "Vision 
of God" theme. 
~~* Chapter five, "The Desire to See God" 
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"vision of God'' as sustaining Source of Being and Supreme Goodness and 
Love. 11Vision" implies a certain standing 11outside"--reverent and res-
pectful of the object in vision, at some distance to its own inner sacredness 
and sanctity. Our "epistemic freedom" (to borrow a phrase of John Hick) 
which God has originally given each of us must of necessity continue if 
personality is to continue, though doubtless at a lessened 11distance 11 from 
God than may now be necessary. 
That it will be a "vision" and "acquaintance" analogous to our present 
vision and acquaintance of earthly friends is our view. As we know them 
through their sustaining love toward us, without desiring !£ ~ them, without 
desi1?ing to take away their reality, or they ou_rs, and our mutual joy and 
satisfaction in fellowship is therein vouchsafed, so it will be in our 
relation with God. Our destiny will be fellowship, community. kingdom, not 
"identity"--and so we believe is the . Biblical themeof destiny. Destiny 
is likened in the words of Jesus to a "banquet," a "bridal festivity,". a 
"kingdom."* Accordingly, there will doubtless never be a time when we will 
cease from exercising faith: faith that the Source of Being or the First 
Cause is truly "Person," rather than impersonal Being (just as we are re-
latively sure now, but not absolutely sure, that our friends are persons 
rather than ultimately some impersonal structures); faith ~hat God is good 
rather than evil, or indifferent; and finally faith that we are ourselves 
free rather than bound! Personhood in its real finitude and freedom im-
plies faith as·a continuing and primal necessity of its being. The minute 
faith ceases, personality ceases. Several corollaries and comments follow 
from this analysis. 
(1) The ultimate externality of knowledge for God's created beings. 
We will never have a knowledge of perfect "internal relat:l.cnsn--contrary 
*In St. Paul we perhaps have a nasr.ent identification or deification 
philosophy of destiny. 
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to the expectation of absolute idealisms, as well, apparently, as to the 
hope of Thomism. A universe of persons implies this boundary of knowledgu -=· 
we must always remain with a certain "epistemic distance" from God. 
(2) As personality implies the continuance of faith in the above terms, 
so love, integral to the meaning of personality, implies the continuance 
of faith. Perfect identity with another would shrink love to zero. Love 
implies a certain separateness of being. Love imples, not a desire!£ 
be the other person, but to :tnteract with him in his presence in mutual 
appreciation and joy, in fellowship. Love respects the mystery of the 
other selfhood. Love means affirming and respecting the other person in 
his sacredness and reality, with always a margin of "ignorance" (or. re-
alization of lack. of' identity in being, if that is what ignorance means), 
present or acknowledged in the relationship. But by this willing and cre-
ative "ignorance" we affirm his reality in being! So.it is not a des-
troying ingorance, but a constituting and creating respect that is the 
ultimate effort of our being, vis-a-vis ,another. Cre.ative acknowledgment 
is the ultimate fulfillment of knowledge. This seems identical precisely 
our 
to what we mean by moral nature or virtue, or "reason." This/personality 
and its immanent logic of respect we feel to be. the "divine image" or 
"spark II struck into us. That much of God we do know! And perhaps this 
suffices! In the Kantian and Roycean formula, God shares "His being" in 
the '.'Idea of Freedom;" but this is as much as He can do--would He preserve 
Dur being in love. What God shares with us is the immortality of His 
freedom, rather than an identification of being in some metaphysical to-
as 
tality. God is that Love which ever goes forth to- love us/finite and free • 
. , 
(3) God 1 s "eternity" (in which we will share) can only mean that He 
has a primordial or time--full, unchanging· moral purpose. His purpose for 
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;:;ood extends from time immemorial to time immemorial! His "eternityH is 
filled with the time energy of His purpose. Is Heaven 11endless time" or 
"timeless eternity;" is it continued 11purposive life" or "rest"? Per-
haps there are values in believing it to be timeless eternity and rest; 
raised 
but as for us, we keep our hope/. to the possibility that it is a life 
of good purpose in unending time --and no doubt, in "other spaces. "1' 
Addendum on the 
~aning of Love Toward God 
In what sense do we love God "more" than ourselves? We love the 
creative source of personality more than self in the sense that we know 
we do not create ourselves--we love and reverence the creative power which 
transcends us. In loving God "more II we do not deny the very self that He 
has brought forth in us. In loving God as the creative Source of per-
sonality, we love and reverence ourselves, as selves, supremely: in loving 
ourselves, as we love others,we love and reverence His highest work in 
creation. We love and reverence Him "more" as we love and reverence more 
any superior source of power and ability to ourselves, without subtracting 
from or negating ourselves. It is because of God that I love myself; £!Y_ 
destiny in moral or responsible freedom is what He wishes! 
III The Religious Meaning of History 
When we use such a title as the above, we are aware that the "meaning, 
of history" would vary in the thought of the great religions, or the phil-
osophical system. For example, its meaning for the 
~·: See William Ernest Hocking on 11other spaces, 11 Meanipg of. IromortalitY._ 
j._11~Fu~ ..~r1-J~1merience, pp. 28-29. 
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Hindu-Buddhist system of thought, as for the classic Greeks, or Platonic, 
was that history,in the larger cosmic ongoing~ is "cyclical, 11 
whereas for the Hebrew-Christian outlook history is conceived as a "linear" 
process, or progress. We will not attempt here to analyze the meanings 
of history in all the major intellectual traditions of mankind, but will 
focus on the Judaeo-Christian tradition of the west, in terms of what we 
believe to be its central or underlying peroonalistic philosophy-~the 
major featnres of ·which ~ have been outlin'~ in this study. 
In the Bible itself there are two teachings about 11history 11 and its 
outcome. One can be called the transcendentalist (or apocalyptic) mole 
of thought. In the New Testament, for example, in many passages and re-
ported words of Jesus, there is the apocalyptic conception::'.' of the "Kingdom 
of Heaven" as an entirely transcendent reality, which will come as a 
supernatural act of God at the end of the present world and its history. 
In New Testament times it was widely believed that this kingdom of God was 
about to appear imminently, or very soon (e.g., Mark 4:24-27; 13:3; etc.). 
Many scholars (generally following Schweitzer) feel that this apocalyptic 
vision was one of the central notes of Jesus 1 teaching. Other scholars, 
however, (e.g., Branscomb), believe that the apocalptic interpretation wa.s 
which was 
an , early church heightening or overcast of Jesus' original thought,/' 
in fact more "realistic." 
realistic interpretation 
Thi's noro / ' finds also among. Jesus' reported words the idea of the 
"kingdom of heaven" as a type of subjective, psychological, or individual 
inner state of mind and heart;~ ethical decision, a kingdom of love; 
which comes quietly, without external signs and the cosmic fanfare announced 
by the current apocalyptic literature of his time, but more or less grad·· 
ually, as men come to experience and realize it in personal relationships 
(o.g., Mark 4:26-30; 8:11; Luke 17:20; etc.). We add to this realistic 
note, found in somG. of the .,.,,', . .:-< teachings of Jesus,. the v:J.0w 
of the earlier ethical prophets in Israel, between the 8th and 6th 
centuriessto the effect that historic time would issue in a golden age of 
p:~(WB, prosperity, and universal human folicity under the spiritual 
leadership of Israel. (The apocalyptic or transcendentalist view of his-
tory followed in point of time the more realistic interpretation of the 
earlier ethical prophets just reveiwed.) 
It will doubtless never be conclusively decided which of these views 
the historic Jesus himself may have embraced or emphasized more--we 
simply have to accept the fact, ,. that his friends reported 
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both conceptions as coming from his lips. In any case, perhaps the spirit 
of both views can, to ·some extent at least, be blended into a general 
interpretation, such as the following, which would also include the thinking 
of Jesus' contemporaries am~ng the great rabbijs. 
In simplest terms the Judaeo-Christian interpretation of history is 
the belief that the ultimate,purpose sof history is the triumph or fulfillment 
of the kingdom of God. Whatever final, transcendent consummation of the 
kindgom, beyond our present human understanding, may have been assumed :i.n 
the actual thinking of Jesus and his contemporaries, their teachings are 
also replete with the message that we are, in the meanwhile, to seek, as 
fully as possible, the triumph of love and justice in practical terms, rc-
,<i.l:Lzing that this aim may have but a partial or approxim te fulfillment on 
earth. Accordingly, in the spirit of such a synthesis, we.-ask _QP.. 
what philosophic grounds may· we rest a· reasonable hope that love and justic~-
will triumph? 
The Main Tenets of a Religio~~ 
dudaeo-Christian View of History 
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le There is moral order, or moral law in hiotory. Hi:'3tory "tends 
to support relationships of justice and love,"* and to reject those of 
selfishness, brutality, and aggression. This was essentially the teachings 
about history of the great 8th-6th century B. C. ethical prophets of Israel 
(recall our previous discussion of these themes, chapter six). To consider 
the possibility on its dramatic, negative side, do the wrecks of the tyran-
nical empires, along the way of history, bear out the truth of this over-
view of historical law implicit in the thought of the great prophets: the• 
0 pire Assyritrn, the late Roman, Tamerlane's, Hitlers? 
2. The primary causes of historical events are the free, moral decisions 
of men.** The personal factor, the human person, making decisions 
in reaction to situations, is the dominant type of historical causality or 
energy. There are, indeed, a plurality of causes of historical process, 
but history in the long run is made by conscious personal response to the 
persc.nal and the impersonal material pressures of life. Harold Titus woll 
summarize this point: 
History is made, in considerable part, by persons who 
make up their minds and who act with coilrage and intelligence. 
Climatic, political, and economic conditions may provi.de a 
stimulation for human beings, but these conditions do not 
wholly determine the response made to them.*** 
3. The meaning of "progress" in a personalistic, open view of ex-
istence and history: We ,~ould first cite the nn_iV~!€3 of. the late 19th 
'l( William Spurrier, Guide to Christian Fnit'hi.··:, (Scribner•:, 1952) p. 170 
-1,* Cf • lb " p • 16 8 
-l<-l('lc !4ving Issues :tn PhilosoJ?hY., 191+6, Amerk~u Book Comp,my, pp. 391-2 
(1st edHicn) 
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century dogma that the central'meaning or purpose of history be 
~,&E~i:'l:~,'d--t'r~ an . inevitable., gradual material "progress. 11 Rather the 
larger historic fact has been the growth or expansion of more and more 
opportunity for good or evil, of which atomic science is the great symbol 
and expression of 20t_h century man, considering its potentialities for 
good or il 1. The true meaning or nature of such "progress" as has actually 
occurred must be understood in the following way. There has indeed been 
"growth," ·"increase," "progress" in man I s understanding of, and mastery over, 
nature (technological progress), giving him greater "freedom" of a certain 
kind; but at the same time this has necessitated greater responsibility. 
or has brought to the forefront of his consciousness the imperative need 
for increase in personal and social moral control of his historical sit-
uation. The meaning of progress at its deepest level in a philosophy of 
moral pers_onalism can 
degree ~ men face up 
be understood or measured by the 
moral responsibilities, as individuals and as 
human groups. Material progress is incidental or corollary to such morl'l.l 
progress, defined by man's increasing awareness'/cif responsibility, as ~e 
may be abhrt-o achieved, According to this insight then, we may suggest the 
following, inclusive definition of "progress" in a Judaeo-Christian per-
sonal ism. Such a definition we believe states what has in part already 
tak<m place, and what the ideal fulfillment of hQman life and history may 
be: if we are guided by these ideals. 
Progress ~ the increase ~ and preservation of, truly humane and 
creative value. Perhaps most simply stated, progress would be increase 
in the welfare of persons. What "humane and creative value" or "the wel-
fare of persons 11 means, WS" have suggested in many places in pre-
vious chapters. To those insights we add the following: Progress is 
gr.o~,1th in or toward: 
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a) Theoretical knowledge, and the educational and technical facilities 
providing for it. 
b) Technological .use ., .of' . nature to resources., without _pollu:Hon or 
ecological disruption. 
c) Growth in moral character personally. 
opportunity, 
d) In economic welfar~/and security for all men. 
e) In political welfare and security for all men, such as guaranteed 
by democratic constitutions and bills of right, the spread of 
humane and democratic forms of government and administration, 
the ultimate abolit::i.on of armaments and war, of race prejudice. 
f) Expansion and enrichment of all legitimate modes or instruments 
of human fellowship on highest social, cultural, and religious 
planes: 
- The family 
- The institutions of Art, Music, Literature, and education, 
etc. 
- In guilds, clubs, and recreational associations, etc. 
- In the church, synagogue, mosque, as focal points of social, 
moral, and religious fellowship. 
A ~ie1:11aF,;'."'·Glr special-1 need of our present historical epoch 
is the understanding of progress to be the bringing of collective 
moral practice--especially in race, industrial, and international 
relations--into greater conformity with the highest ethical insights 
of personal moral behavior. The vast collectivities of modern society 
must become tractable to love • 
. 4e Opportunity is fluid in history, giving issue to an indom-
itable h.~ fo.!_ history, characteristic of the Judaeo-Christian spi.rit. 
Due to the enormously complex character of historical causation, tlie 
Christian outlook is that history is never exactly predictable in some 
absolute, mechanical way (where Marxists are in error). The unex-
pected crops up; there is a spontaneous element in history. Therefore, 
religious man never despairs,. "We.do not close up any possibility for 
some answer or partial answer" to pressing problems (Spurrier, p. 181). ~·~ 
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We look at history as always leaving some doors open through which the 
spirit of God may enter. The Christian view is ~sti£H it is neither 
excessively optimistic or extremely pessimistic. lf.!an has more than a 
fighting chance on this planet; though we should fac.e the possibility 
that the experiment with responsible freedom might fail here (thov'.5h it 
need not fail elsewhere on other worlds). 11 The Christian view, therefore, 
is heither a simple passimism nor a simple optimism, but it is a view 
which we beheve is able to face grim realitites, yet also retain possibil-
ities for new creative action. 11* 
5. God acts in history. The fundarrental Judaeo-Christian theological 
proposition is that the Divine Mind may be, and has been, a directive in-
fluence in history.. How is such a proposition conceived or brought within 
a rational perspective? We telieve the answer to be a simple, natural, 
personal and social one, not an occult one., Accordingly, when it is said 
God acts, 
a) 
b) 
\ 
Creatively in nature itself, in the course of whose processes 
free, personal life has come to be. 
Redemptively in history in.the best personal decisions and social 
influences, i.e., through the instrwnsntalities already mentioned, 
; _ ..•. those of personal decision making, political, economic., 
social, and cultural media., Where God or the Divine Mind could 
and would act in or upon history is through the ideas and actions 
godly men, acting not only as individuals, but times 
in creative concert. (Here our discussion reflects philo-
sophy of 11 providence 11 outlined in chapter nine O ) 
6. ~an must act in history. Religious men must develop policy and 
a mode of action in history. Here is implied the invoivoment of religious 
people, in church and synagogue, in social debate and in action on social 
issues, as guided by the ideal of love. 
--------
it- Ibid .. , p. 182. 
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We summarize this brief review of the meaning of history in a Judaeo-
understanding 
Christian type of religious/.-·,,.. Can there be a policy of religious man 
in the attempt to control or guide history? We believe the answer to be 
yes, and that it is based on the preceding premises, which 
dense I into: 
.,t.:> 
here con-
a) "That history is the result of human nots behind which there is 
is a motivating standard of value. 11 -l} 
b) That men are endovred with moral freedom. 
c) That God can act in history through men as they come to be moti-
vated by a Christian standard of v~lue,,, or its equivalent in other 
forms of faith. 
That standard of v~lue is the belief that reverence for, or love of 
persons, is supreme ethical truth; and that any personal acts or social 
policies that express such reverence--i.e. which enchance or promote the 
welfare of persons ahd them- joy ahd fellawship--is in line with cosmic 
and historical purpose, in a word, does the will of God. 
St. Augustine's analysis of history as the conflict of the two Cities, 
the City of God and the City of this World, of Good and Evil, of. Love and 
Selfishness, is symbolically true, or descriptive of, the central type 
and institutions 
of conflict going on in men 1 s · hearts and minds/ and therefore in ht.U11,9-P 
history. 
-------·---
* A phrase of Basil Matthews. 
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... we are taking the position ••• that in experimental religion at its 
best there is objectively valid religious perception ..... 
n In experimental 1".eligion, as in all experiential life, there are factors 
which are constant and others which are variable. Now the possibility of 
formulating empirical laws depends upon the discovery of constant relations 
in the midst of experienced variations. Among the constants invoJvS"d in 
the present instance are nature with its laws, and certain aspects of the 
social environment and of ~uman nature in general. The most important con-
stant for theology, however, is the being and character of God. This is 
thsl .Q..Q.!].~_t of empirical theological laws,. The God whose existence, in 
the light of permanently successful religious experience, we are justified 
in assuming, has been defined above as the necessary objectiv:e Factor in.re-
ligious experience, or the Object of active religious dependence, or the 
Source of salvation, i.e .. ,· of religious deliverance from evil.. Other pre:,.:, 
liminary definitions, sufficient to mark off the religious Object from other 
objects are the following: the objective Source of that inner or spiritual 
:;-irepa:;_~edness for whatever the future may bring which is achieved through 
the right sort of religious adjustn:ent; or again, the Power, not identical 
·,rith our empirical selves, nor with the merely physical 6r merely human 
,:nvironrnent, which makes for righteousness in and through us according as 
. we relate ourselves to it in a certain discoverable .way. This is the Reality 
which we have called the Holy Spirit •••• God is a constant Source of un-
f'ailing spiritual power., 
~~ Douglas C. Macinto.s:h, Tl~_glggy as_§l.n.B:m;p:Lrical,.J~cien.~, (M-'J.cl:1i_llnn~ 
New York, 1927) pp. 140-153. 
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11 Among the variables which tend to enter as factors into religious 
experience are certain phases of the social environment and of the indi-
vidual training and outfit of ideas. Often these are constants relatively 
to some collections of religious data, and variables relatively to others. 
But the two most important variables, at least within the individual re-
ligious subject, are the quality and degree of responsiveness of nature 
or constitution, and the particular religious adjustrJent adopted. According 
to the variation from individual to individual, and from one time to another 
within the same individual, the results of the religious ad~ustment come 
quickly or slowly, and steadily or unsteadily. For example, the conditions 
of right religious adjustment being fulfilled and persisted in, there are 
some persons into whose lives there will be a gradually increasing in-
coming of the divine, and others in whose cases the incoming may be delayed 
for some time, and then, when the constitutional resistance has been over-
come, it may manifest itself suddenly. However, the influence of the social 
religious environment may counteract the tendency to slowness and unstead-
iness. But in general there would seem to be at least four possible types, 
due to constitutional and environmental differences, viz. (1) that of quick 
but unsteady returns, (2) that of slow but steady returns, (3) that of 
qui.ck and steady returns, and (4) that of slow and unsteady returns •••• 
t\ 
'It may be worth while to point out the mistaken nature of the notion 
often entertained that the adjustment is primarily or even exclusively 
intellectual, i.e., that there is a law of religious experience the sole 
and sufficient human condition of which is correct religious opinion or 
belief •••• The 'rightrgligious adjustmenti must be sought primarily in the 
volitional rather than in the intellectual realm •••• 
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~1 •• First, then, there must be concentration of attention, with the aid 
of appropriate guiding ideas, upon the Object of religious dependence, 
identified with the Source of religious deliverance, with special reference 
to a thoroughly moral end which represents 'the soul's sincere desire." 
There must also be a whole-hearted or absolute self-surrender to the di-
vine Being, a consecration and abandon of one's self to be worked upon 
and through by the divine Power; and at the same time an absolute depend-
~ upon God with reference to the thoroughly moral and sincerely desired 
end which is to be realized with the assistance of the divine Power. It 
is also important that there be a willed responsiveness, or read:l.ness for 
active expression, as the divine Being may seem to guide and impel •••• 
1
~ •• primary theological laws ••• may be called laws of the answer to 
prayer, understanding by true petitionary prayer what we have described 
uncer the caption of 'the right religious adjustment.' This right religious 
adjustrnent~is, of course, psychologically impossible save on the supposition 
that .God .is rE=al and will re-spooo favorably to those who diligently culti-
vate the relation; but it is never spiritually fruitless ••• ~ 
ti· P i h 1 d f . 1 li i d •••• rayer st e sou an essence o experimenta re g on; an 
rather than ceasing to pray for the reason assigned, we should pray and 
critically observe the results, ~ntil we learn what true prevailing prayer 
is, and what may and what may not be.looked for as a possible direct and 
immediate answer to prayer. In the end it will be borne in upon us by 
e~r.periem::e that what we lave called the right religious .adjustment is true 
prayer, and this will become a habitual attitude with us. And so, instead 
of praying until we )'cease to pray," we shall have prayed until, as Paul 
puts it, we 1pray without ceasing." •••• 
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lij· Among the elemental religious experiences of a volitional sort which 
may be predicted on the basis of knowledge of the theological law or lam, 
of such experiences are the following: the receiving of moral power for 
repentance (as the turning away of the will form moral evil); the receiving 
of the same for moral aspiration; for self-control and courage (in so far 
as these are moral, as distinct from physiological); for victory over temp-
tation (in so far as the problem is a moral rather than an intellectual 
one, such as it would be, if it were simply that of knowing the most ef-
fective means wf putting an end to the tempt in~·-· suggestion); and further, 
for faithful service to one's fellows and for the steadfast er.durance of 
affliction and overcoming of obstacles. And the laws of such elemental 
religious experiences may be stated in abbreviated form as follows: On 
condition of the right religious adjustment with reference to desired truly 
moral states of the will (such as repentance, moral aspiration, and the 
moral elements in self-control, courage, victory over temptation, faithful 
service and patient endurance), God the Holy Spirit produces the specific. 
moral results desired •••• 
nThe theological law of religious assurance has to do with experimental 
assurance of God and of reconciliation, rather than with the reasoned as-
surance by means of which this may be partially anticipated or supported. 
It may be stated as follows: On condition of the right religious adjustment 
so persisted in as to lead to the characteristic Christian experiences of 
:'regeneration,. and 11 fulness of the Spirit, 1' and consequently in some 
measure to the Christian feelings of peace, joy and love, God enables us, 
through an ·intuition which naturally arises out of our religious experience, 
to 'feel sure' that he is real and that we are reconciled to him.11 
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0 •• It is natural and normal that, knowing a reality--and the most 
important of all--from without and by means of signs, we should desire to 
know it in itself and to grasp it without any intermediary. Such a desire 
follows from the very nature of that quest of being which essentially char-
acterizes the intellect. There is in the human intellect a natural desire 
to see in His essence that very God whom it knows through the things which 
He has created •••• 
it To know God in His essence is evidently something which transcends the 
powers of every created or creatable nature, for it is to possess God in-
tuitively, in a vision in which there is no mediation of any idea, but in 
which the divine essence itself replaces every ilea born in our mind, so 
that it immediately forms and determines our intellect. This is to know God 
divinely, as He Himself knows Himself and as He knows us, in His own un-
created light •••• 
" ••• Such desires reach for the infinite, because the intellect thirsts 
for being and being in infinite. They are natural, but one may also call 
them transnatural. It is thus that we desire to see God; it is thus that 
we desire to be free without being able to sin; it is thus that we desire 
beatitude .1 .. 
~} ~.ti.12roaches .t,o G,Qg, Collier Books, the Crowell-Collier Publishing 
Company, 1962, pp. 97-100. 
1on the transnatural desire for be titude, or of absolutely and de-
finitely saturating happiness, as distinct from the strictly naturRl desire 
for happiness or felicity in general, see our ]"fill£ ~.9.QD-..Q fil1! ~ li.91:L'2!1.§ 
Pr~mi§.!_es_g.~J::'J1iloso~-li2~ (Paris, Tequi, 1950) PPo 97-98., 
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11 
••• Through the night of faith it is given us to attain in His inner 
life----on the testimony of His Word--the very God who will be intuitively 
grasped when faith gives way to vision. 11 
